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Executive Summary 
 
In the aftermath of the 2007–2009 financial crisis, several regulatory measures have been 
proposed and implemented in the banking sector. However, these regulations are the subject of 
ongoing debate because there is no consensus in academia regarding why banks are regulated. 
In addition, these regulations do not definitively exclude the possibility that a systemically 
important bank in Switzerland (or elsewhere) will receive emergency liquidity assistance by 
the central bank as the lender of last resort in the future. Thus, further consideration is needed 
regarding the lender of last resort because the financial crisis of 2007–2009 has underscored 
the important role of this type of lender in restoring financial stability. Therefore, the aims of 
this thesis are to elucidate a comprehensive economic theory of bank regulation, on the one 
hand, and a well-designed lender of last resort scheme for Switzerland for the twenty-first 
century, on the other.  
The economic theory of bank regulation draws upon the economic theory of regulation 
and the financial intermediation theory of banking. We extend the micro-based approach with 
a macro-based approach and develop an alternative regulatory view based on the endogenous 
nature of money and credit. Moreover, we elaborate a novel systematisation scheme to improve 
classification in bank regulation as an integrated part of our theory. In light of these schemes, 
we analyse and suggest reforms to current bank regulations because they fail to address several 
problems (such as the risk manipulation associated with risk-weighted capital regulation). 
Furthermore, we develop an alternative regulatory proposal based on the main causes of the 
2007–2009 crisis.  
To redesign a potential lender of last resort scheme for Switzerland for the twenty-first 
century, we analyse the nature of the lender of last resort and conduct a literature review of the 
different schools of thought. We thereby introduce two new schools of thought. Further, we 
analyse the history of the lender of last resort in Switzerland and empirically investigate its role 
in the 2007–2009 Union Bank of Switzerland (UBS) crisis. In this connection, we elaborate a 
novel solvency framework as an early-warning system for central banks and regulators. Based 
on all these considerations, we redesign Switzerland’s lender of last resort regime for the 
twenty-first century.  
This dissertation establishes for the first time a complete and comprehensive economic 
theory of bank regulation in the twenty-first century and a lender of last resort regime for 
Switzerland that is more effective, timely, sustainable and credible than the status quo.  
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Introduction 
 
Motivation and problem statement 
 
‘It ain't what you don't know that gets you into trouble. It's what you know for sure that just 
ain't so’.  
Mark Twain (1835 -1910), American author 
 
Although there is no evidence in the literature that Mark Twain is actually responsible for the 
instructive quotation above, this conventional wisdom emphasises the danger of “knowing” 
something that simply may not be true. In this sense, as this thesis began to take shape in 2013, 
we believed that the current banking regulations would eliminate the risks associated with 
systemically important banks (SIBs)1 and the problems posed by SIBs in connection with 
emergency liquidity assistance (ELA) by the lender of last resort (LOLR), such as moral hazard 
and adverse selection. However, the deeper we delved, the more we began to question the 
efficiency and effectiveness of current bank regulatory measures (such as capital requirements, 
liquidity requirements and recovery and resolution standards) because of the following issues: 
(1) There is no consensus in academia regarding why banks are regulated. (2) The regulatory 
measures are not objective-oriented with regard to the problems related to the main causes of 
the recent financial crisis. (3) The total economic costs and benefits of the measures are disputed 
because, as stated by Hellwig (2010b: 2), ‘[t]he Basel Committee does not, however, present 
any systematic analysis of why the proposed measures should have the salutary effects that are 
expected of them’. (4) The internal ratings-based approach used by SIBs to calculate risk-
weighted capital (a) is a source itself of risk manipulation—in this sense, Hellwig (2016: 24) 
concludes that ‘[c]alibrating regulatory requirements to risk-weighted assets is problematic 
because risk weights are highly unreliable; the statistical basis for determining risk weights is 
insufficient and the procedure lends itself to manipulation, including manipulation by subunits 
of the regulated unites. Important risks are not even consistently covered [(such as systemic risk 
and so forth)]’—and (b) reduces capital requirements because ‘it allows banks to reduce the 
equity requirements by concentrating on investments [(Greek government bonds and so forth)] 
that the regulation treats as safe’ (Admati and Hellwig 2013: 183). (5) The fact that certain 
                                                          
1 ‘Systemically important banks are banks, financial groups and bank-dominated financial conglomerates whose 
failure would do considerable harm to the Swiss economy and the Swiss financial system’ (Art. 7 para. 1 of the 
BA 2015 [1934]; trans., see section 7.2.1). 
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government bonds, such as Greek government bonds, are weighted at zero risk calls into 
question the very nature of both capital and liquidity requirements. (6) ‘A liquidity requirement 
is an oxymoron. If you have to continue to hold an asset to meet requirements, it is not liquid’ 
(Goodhart 2010: 175). (7) Considering sub-prime mortgage securities (with credit ratings of 
AA and higher) as liquid assets (such as level 2B assets) questions liquidity regulations to a 
certain degree because if sub-prime mortgage securities are downgraded to junk bonds (as in 
the most recent financial crisis), it is difficult to imagine that these assets are liquid. (8) 
According to recovery and resolution standards, recovery plans are helpful. However, 
additional funding is required to wind down an SIB that is not guaranteed by the recent 
standards because ‘[d]iscussions about the funding of recovery and resolution procedures 
usually pay too little attention to the distinction between the need to fund operations as long as 
they are ongoing and the need to allocate or to absorb ultimate losses’ (Hellwig 2014a: 19). 
Notably, the list of these problematic matters is not exhaustive, and additional issues that are 
not included herein may appear. Consequently, following Mark Twain, it is what we know for 
sure about bank regulation that gets us into trouble. Therefore, the above-mentioned bank 
regulation deficiencies require a comprehensive economic theory of bank regulation with 
continuing calls for further reforms. 
To fill this gap in the literature, this thesis first aims to elaborate a comprehensive theory 
of bank regulation that is grounded in economics, a so-called ‘economic theory of bank 
regulation’. This under-researched academic field was highlighted by the law and economics 
approach to banking regulation at the Second International Workshop of the Center for the 
Study of the New Institutional Economics at the University of Saarland, which convened on 
June 14, 1989, at Schloss Halberg, Saarbrücken. At this workshop, Prof. Dr. Ernst 
Baltensperger introduced what is likely the first contribution to the field regarding an economic 
theory of bank regulation. In this sense, we accept the majority of the positions articulated by 
Dr. Baltensperger and extend the idea to a contemporary context, thus offering the first 
comprehensive economic theory of bank regulation of the twenty-first century that is based 
upon an economic theory of regulation and a financial intermediation theory of banking. 
However, the 2007–2009 financial crisis has called into question exclusive reliance on the 
micro-based approach to the financial intermediation theory of banking. Therefore, we extend 
the micro-based approach with a macro-based approach and develop an alternative regulatory 
view derived from the endogenous nature of money and credit. Moreover, we elaborate a bank 
regulation systematisation scheme that produces a better classification of bank regulations and 
propose a revision of the main regulatory measures – or a replacement of them with alternative 
Introduction   3 
 
 
 
proposals – based on the main causes of the most recent financial crisis. However, neither of 
these proposals can definitively exclude the possibility that SIBs in Switzerland (or elsewhere) 
will receive ELA from the LOLR in the future. As Grossmann and Rockoff (2015: 58) noted 
concerning the LOLR concept, ‘more rethinking of the LOLR doctrine is needed’ because the 
financial crisis of 2007–2009 has shown the important role of the LOLR in restoring financial 
stability. 
To examine the LOLR role, the Bank for International Settlements (BIS) held a 
workshop entitled, ‘Re-thinking the Lender of Last Resort’. At the 2014 workshop, Paul 
Tucker, the former deputy governor for financial stability at the Bank of England, offered 
several useful principles for redesigning the LOLR regime to fit the principles of modern central 
banking. Nonetheless, certain problems remained from a Swiss perspective: (1) the workshop 
did not provide any analysis of the LOLR in Switzerland; (2) the literature lacks a systematic 
analysis of the LOLR in Switzerland; and (3) the role of the LOLR in the 2007–2009 financial 
crisis remains ambiguous and unresolved. Therefore, to fill this research gap, the second 
objective of this dissertation will be to elaborate a substantive LOLR regime for Switzerland 
that should be more effective, timely, sustainable and credible than the current regime. For this 
purpose, we conduct a literature review of the various schools of thought and introduced two 
new perspectives. Moreover, we historically analyse the role of the LOLR in Switzerland and 
investigate this role in the UBS crisis of 2007–2009. Thereby, we elaborate a solvency 
framework as an early-warning system for central banks and regulators. In a nutshell, the 
redesigned LOLR regime (1) mitigates ELA problems, (2) enhances the financial stability of 
the banking sector, (3) increases market discipline, and (4) enables other central banks to rethink 
their role in the prevention, management and resolution of financial crises. 
 
Research questions and outline of the thesis 
 
To achieve the above-mentioned objectives, open research questions are introduced that will be 
answered in this thesis. In this sense, the following main questions can be derived and are 
addressed in this dissertation: 
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To answer the first and second question sets, we divide this thesis into two parts: (1) the 
development of an economic theory of bank regulation and (2) a redesign of Switzerland’s 
LOLR for the twenty-first century. The thesis is organised as follows. 
 The first part is divided into three chapters, which together formulate a comprehensive 
economic theory of bank regulation. The first chapter defines the main banking and bank 
regulation terms that are used throughout the manuscript. In this context, we define the term 
‘bank’ both under the mainstream view that draws upon the dominant financial intermediation 
theory and under the alternative view grounded in the endogenous nature of money and credit. 
Chapter 2 presents the relevant theories of economic regulation and applies them in the banking 
context. In addition, we describe the objectives of regulation that justify regulatory measures in 
the banking industry. In this sense, we extend the micro-based approach with a macro-based 
approach that helps us classify the regulatory objectives conclusively. In addition, we present 
an alternative bank regulatory justification based on the alternative view articulated in chapter 
1. Chapter 3 elaborates an alternative systematisation scheme to classify bank regulations more 
effectively. In the next step, we describe the most common regulatory measures and briefly 
analyse recently enacted regulatory measures, such as capital requirements, liquidity 
requirements and recovery and resolution standards. In this context, we propose options for 
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reform and ultimately design an alternative regulatory proposal based on the lessons learned 
during the most recent financial crisis. Although these measures mitigate the risk posed by SIBs 
to a certain degree, they do not completely exclude the possibility that an SIB will be allowed 
to fail in the future. With regard to LOLR, ‘more rethinking of the LOLR doctrine is needed’ 
given the important role of the LOLR in restoring financial stability in times of financial distress 
(Grossmann and Rockoff 2015: 58). Therefore, in addition to both our reform proposals and 
our alternative regulatory proposal, the second part of this dissertation aims to design a 
substantive LOLR regime for Switzerland to meet the challenges of the twenty-first century. In 
this context, chapter 4 elucidates the very nature of the LOLR. In other words, chapter 4 defines 
the term ‘LOLR’, explains the rationale for having an LOLR and provides a systematisation of 
the LOLR that is grounded in the systematisation scheme articulated in chapter 3. Chapter 5 
elaborates a scheme to analyse the various schools of thought in the literature, including two 
new schools of thought that have extended the literature in this regard. Chapter 6 sheds light on 
the history of the LOLR in Switzerland. Chapter 7 empirically analyses the role of the Swiss 
LOLR in the UBS crisis of 2007–2009, drawing upon multiple sources, including all UBS 
quarterly and annual reports from 2007 through 2009, shareholder reports on UBS write-downs 
and so forth. Based on these sources, we assess whether UBS was systemically important, 
solvent and holding sufficient collateral at the time of ELA. Chapter 8 redesigns Switzerland’s 
LOLR for the twenty-first century by drawing upon the considerations and principles elaborated 
in chapters 4, 5, 6 and 7. Moreover, chapter 8 provides a qualitative assessment of the LOLR. 
All findings and implications of this thesis are summarised in the conclusion. In addition, we 
present an outlook that offers fertile ground for further academic research in this area. The 
figure below illustrates the outline of this thesis.  
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Part I – The economic theory of bank regulation 
 
1. The nature of banking and bank regulation 
 
Achieving a clear understanding and definition of the concept of bank regulation is difficult 
because (1) the phrase contains two different terms, namely, ‘bank’ and ‘regulation’, and (2) 
both terms are considered differently; for example, the term ‘bank’ is defined differently in the 
legal and economic contexts, whereas regulation is concerned with the new political economy 
(public choice theory), cartel theory, and various contributions from regulations, market 
structure, behaviour and the results of studies in various industries. Thus, (3) the term 
‘regulation’ is frequently found in legal and economic contexts but with various meanings, and 
(4) it involves a number of different regulations that vary to a considerable degree (self-
regulation and government regulation). This chapter focuses on the definition of the terms 
‘bank’ and ‘bank regulation’ from an economic perspective. In a first step, we define the term 
‘bank’.  In this sense, it is necessary for regulation to focus systemically on selected industries 
(in our case, the banking sector) and their corresponding activities (see Selznick 1985). In a 
second step, we define the term ‘regulation/bank regulation’. 
 
1.1. What is a bank? 
 
1.1.1. The mainstream view 
 
Banks can be defined in numerous ways. In the literature, the term ‘bank’ can be defined using 
the legal or economic definition. To reduce the scope of this problem, only commercial banks 
in Switzerland are considered here. In Switzerland, the term ‘bank’ is defined by the Swiss 
Financial Market Supervisory Authority (FINMA). According to Art. 2 para. 1, 2 and 3 of the 
Bank Ordinance (BO) (2016 [2014]; trans) the term ‘bank’ is defined as follows: 
 
Art. 2  Banks 
 
1Banks are institutions that, in the main, are active in the finance sector, and in particular: 
a. accept deposits from third parties or publicly offer such services; or 
b. refinance, to a great extent, with other banks that are not influentially involved with them in order to 
finance an indefinite number of people or businesses in some way and with whom they do not form a 
financial unit. 
The nature of banking and bank regulation   8 
 
 
 
2 They are classified into five categories by the Swiss Financial Market Supervisory Authority according to the 
following criteria: 
a. balance sheet total; 
b. assets under management; 
c. privileged deposits; 
d. minimum capital. 
3 A bank is classified into the category in which it fulfils a minimum of three of these criteria. 
 
However, the legal definition can be criticised from different angles: (1) the legal definition can 
change over time and across borders (see Crane et al. 1995); (2) certain bank functions are 
provided by non-bank financial institutions (NBFIs) that change over the years; and (3) the 
‘[i]nstitutional form follows function – that is, innovation and competition among institutions 
ultimately result in greater efficiency in the performance of financial system functions’ (Crane 
et al. 1995: 4). Therefore, the legal definition is less stable than the economic definition, and no 
further elaborations on the legal perspective are provided here. Conversely, the economic 
definition focuses on the functional perspective of what banks actually do. 
In economic textbooks and in the present conventional view, the terms ‘bank’ and 
‘financial intermediary’2 are often used interchangeably. Furthermore, the term ‘bank’ and 
bank-related activities draw upon the evolution of history. In history, the first recorded banking 
activity involved safeguarding deposits, as described in legal texts in the Code of Hammurabi 
(1000 B.C.) (see Orsingher 1967). The second recorded historical activity of banks was to 
exchange currencies, as described in the etymology of the Greek and Italian words for bank 
(“trapeza” and “banco”, respectively). The third activity involved deposit management, which 
emerged as a result of the Italian innovation of bills of exchange in the thirteenth century and 
allowed merchants who travelled in Europe to avoid the security problem inherent in carrying 
gold or foreign coins. In this sense, bills of exchange allowed 
 
‘the recipients to draw on another merchant for the amount owed. Typically, the recipient would resell the claim 
to someone else, who would present it to a merchant or bank elsewhere, and so on, until at last it was presented to 
the issuer with whom the first merchant had initially made a deposit’ (Admati and Hellwig 2013: 250). 
                                                          
2 ‘Financial intermediaries are entities that intermediate between providers and users of financial capital’ 
(Greenbaum and Thakor 2007 [1995]: 43). Thereby, financial intermediaries can be categorised into different 
types. Greenbaum and Thakor (2007 [1995]) classify financial intermediaries in terms of whether they finance 
their activities with deposits. Thus, commercial banks with the characteristic of funding propositions with deposits 
are considered financial intermediaries. 
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Thus, the innovation of bills of exchange connected with foreign trade helped to develop early 
banks, such as the Amsterdam Bank in 1609 (see Kindleberger 2006). This contradicts accepted 
wisdom, that is, 
 
‘[t]he usual textbook view is that banking developed from goldsmiths who issued receipts for gold left with them 
which later circulated from hand to hand, and that observation of this circulation ultimately induced goldsmiths to 
issue receipts without previous deposit. The story is well told but inaccurate. Goldsmiths evolved into bankers 
only in the middle of the seventeenth century in England. Banking developed much earlier and was connected 
especially with foreign trade. Even in the eighteenth century more banks in England developed from merchants 
than from goldsmiths’ (Kindleberger 2006: 35). 
 
In light of these considerations, it appears that early banks were mainly defined by three 
functions – (1) offering payment services, (2) taking deposits and (3) transforming liquidity – 
because the bank ‘issu[ed] liquid claims to one and the same agent that [were] backed by 
illiquid’ receipts to merchants (Greenbaum and Thakor 2007 [1995]: 95). These early bankers 
(who ranged from moneychangers to deposit takers) quickly realised that it was not necessary 
to have a unit deposit for each outstanding receipt. Therefore, they used deposits to make loans 
(receipts) (see Greenbaum and Thakor 2007 [1995], Kindleberger 2006, Admati and Hellwig 
2014). ‘Since then, the triad of offering payment services, taking deposits, and lending has been 
rediscovered several times and has come to be regarded as the essence of banking’ (Admati and 
Hellwig 2013: 250). Thereby, loans are typically created by depositors (such as household 
savings), and banks lend those deposits to borrowers (such as firms). Thus, banks act as 
financial intermediaries between different agents (depositors and lenders) at different time 
periods, gathering resources and reallocating them. This concept expresses the so-called 
‘financial intermediation theory of banking’ that has dominated the literature and the design of 
regulatory policy since the late 1960s (see Werner 2014). Because of its dominance in the 
literature, we refer to the financial intermediation theory of banking as the ‘mainstream view’ 
in this thesis.3 To understand the main bank function of the financial intermediation theory of 
banking, it is useful to understand banks’ balance sheets. Figure 1.1 shows a simplified balance 
sheet of a representative bank B.  
The asset side of the balance sheet is equal to the liability side. The asset side consists 
of reserves (for instance, cash, non-interest-bearing deposits, treasury bills and minimum 
reserve requirements), currency and loans (for example, interbank loans, credit to households, 
                                                          
3 The different schools of economic thought will be analysed in Appendix 3. 
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and credit to firms (see Dewatripont and Tirole 1994). In this case, the asset side consists of 
many illiquid loans and few reserves and currency. 
 
Figure 1.1 Bank B balance sheet 
 
Source: Authors’ own elaboration. 
 
By contrast, the liability side of the balance sheet consists of deposits and equity. Thus, deposits 
are the bank's principal liability, including interbank deposits and funds collected from 
households and firms (there are demand and savings deposits and short- and long-term deposits) 
(see Diamond and Dybvig 1986). Equity is the other important entry on the liability side. The 
liability side is entirely composed of the ratio of low-equity and numerous short-term liquid 
debts. Moreover, the liability side is more liquid than the asset side. This characteristic is 
important in our further analysis of bank regulation. Based on the bank's balance sheet, the main 
functions include (1) asset services; (2) liability services; and (3) transformation services (see 
Diamond and Dybvig 1983, 1986). Figure 1.2 illustrates these main bank services with respect 
to the balance sheet. 
Asset services are provided to borrowers and generally consist of the funding, 
evaluation, granting, managing and monitoring of loans. Thus, banks fund loans from the 
deposits that savers (bank customers) place with them. In addition to funding loans, the 
following information-related services can be included in asset services: securitisation,4 
                                                          
4 The word securitisation refers to the act of an untraded group of (debt) claims in a market (such as a bank loan) 
being bundled and converted into traded securities by issuing claims against it and selling these claims to capital 
market investors (see Greenbaum and Thakor 2007 [1995], Hellwig 2009; see section 3.3 for further details). 
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portfolio management,5 and investment banking activities (such as mergers and acquisitions 
and so forth) (see Baltensperger 1990).    
 
Figure 1.2  Main bank functions of the balance sheet 
 
Sources: Adapted from Dewatripont and Tirole (1994) and Mishkin (2013). 
 
As opposed to asset services, liability services consist of accepting deposits, controlling 
maturity transformations between liabilities and assets, hedging against changes in interest, 
clearing transactions and holding currency inventories. On the liability side, Bryant (1980) and 
Diamond and Dybvig (1983) suggest that deposits constitute a vehicle through which banks 
convert illiquid assets into liquid deposits and vice versa, which is also called liquidity 
transformation (see also Diamond and Dybvig 1986). Bryant (1980) first addressed the question 
of refinancing liquid assets6 and suggested a possible approach to understanding the existence 
of banks, which was developed and formalised by Diamond and Dybvig’s (1983) model. 
Diamond and Dybvig (1983) show that a demand deposit contract leads to full information 
optimal risk sharing as a ‘good’ Nash equilibrium.7 If agents panic and attempt to withdraw 
their deposits, there is a ‘bad’ Nash equilibrium. In the ‘bad’ Nash equilibrium, people run to 
withdraw their deposits (bank run) under the ‘sequential service constraint, which specifies that 
a bank's payoff to any agent can depend only on the agent's place in line and not on future 
information about agents behind him in line’, also known as the so-called ‘first come, first 
                                                          
5 We follow Baltensperger’s (1990: 3) view on portfolio management: ‘At low cost, investors can acquire a 
diversified portfolio of securities issued by deficit spending units [(for example, investment funds)]’. 
6 We follow the definition of Mishkin (2013: 165) that ‘a liquid asset is one that can be quickly and cheaply 
converted into cash if the need arises’ (for further considerations regarding liquidity, see section 3.2.2 for further 
details). 
7 A Nash equilibrium is ‘a steady state attained when none of the contracting parties has an incentive to change its 
actions unilaterally’ (Greenbaum and Thakor 2007 [1995]: 170). 
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served’ principle (Diamond and Dybvig 1983: 408). A ‘bad’ Nash equilibrium can be 
prevented, according to Diamond and Dybvig (1983), by suspending convertibility. Calomiris 
and Kahn (1991) have correctly noted that, in reality, a suspension of convertibility8 has been 
mandated for the banking system as a whole to avoid a system-wide run. Section 2.2.2 will 
elaborate on bank runs. 
Transformation services are divided into (1) maturity transformation, (2) risk 
transformation and (3) pooling and subdividing shares. First, ‘one of the key functions of the 
banking system is maturity transformation’ (see Turner 2009: 21), understood as the transfer of 
resources across time and space. In this context, short-term liquid deposits are transferred to 
long-term illiquid loans and vice versa as the maturity of the assets and liabilities of a bank 
differ (see Burghof and Rudolph 1996, Turner 2009). Second, risk transformation ‘is to 
transform the risks faced by the parties, that is, to supply risk-sharing contracts’ (Baltensperger 
1990: 4). In other words, risk transformation is understood as risk taking, risk diversification 
and risk sharing. Risk transformation distinguishes between credit risk, market risk and liquidity 
risk. The term ‘credit risk’ includes both credit risk and solvency risk. In this regard, ‘“credit 
risk” relates to the occurrence of defaults or to changes in the likelihood of such defaults related 
in the future’ (Goodhart et al. 1998: 7). ‘Consequently, a major risk that banks face is credit 
risk or the failure of a counterparty to perform according to a contractual arrangement’ (BCBS 
1997: 21). In other words, credit risk is the risk that a bank cannot fulfil the demands of the 
providers of debt capital or that it can only partially fulfil those demands  (see BCBS 1997, 
Goodhart et al. 1998). In contrast to credit risk, market risks are risks of a structural type that 
develop from the uncertainty of future market prices with regard to interest rates, share prices, 
exchange rates and raw material costs (see Büschgen 1998, Kunze 2007). In other words, 
‘[m]arket risk refers to the variability of portfolio values due to changes in market prices of the 
portfolio components’ (Goodhart et al. 1998: 73). Liquidity risk is developed predominantly as 
a result of maturity transformation (see Burghof and Rudolph 1996, Büschgen 1998, Kunze 
2007). If a significant number of depositors withdraw their bank deposits in a short period of 
time, the bank is not able to pay back all deposits. In other words, liquidity risk is related to the 
likelihood of loss arising when ‘(i) cash and/or cash equivalents are inadequate to meet the 
needs of depositors and borrowers; (ii) the sale of illiquid assets yields less than their fair value; 
or (iii) illiquid assets cannot be sold at the desired time due to a shortage of buyers’ (Moosa 
2015: 88). The third transformation service, the pooling and subdividing share function, occurs 
when numerous small credits are collected and passed on as a large credit to institutional clients 
                                                          
8 Suspension of deposit withdrawals is referred to as suspension of convertibility (see Diamond and Dybvig 1983). 
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(for example, pension funds) and vice versa. In this case, the supply of credit is compensated 
with the demand for credit (see Diamond 1984, Crane et al. 1995). 
In addition to the balance sheet functions, a fourth bank service includes payment 
services. In this sense, the banks take ‘the management of the payment system, that is, to 
facilitate and keep track of transfers of wealth among individuals. This is the bookkeeping 
activity of banks realized by debiting and crediting accounts’ (Baltensperger 1990: 3). 
In light of these major functions, the term ‘bank’ can be defined as follows. According 
to Fischer (1983: 4), ‛[b]anks do two things in this economy. First, they act as financial 
intermediaries. […] Second, they provide transactions services, making payments as demanded 
by the households’. Fischer (1983) describes the dual function of banks: on the one hand, 
deposits create loans; on the other hand, there is the function of payment services. In relation to 
Baltensperger and Dermine (1987: 72),  
 
‘[a] bank or a financial intermediary is a firm whose assets include primary financial claims issued by borrowers 
such as individuals, governments, firms (or other financial intermediaries) and whose liabilities are sold as 
secondary claims to capital surplus units in various forms such as demand deposits, savings deposits, term deposits, 
subordinated debt (loan capital) or equity shares’. 
 
For Goodhart (1989: 6), ‘[a] bank will provide payments services, investment advice, maturity 
transformation, portfolio management or credit risk assessment, in addition to market making 
in money’. Thus, Goodhart (1989) distinguishes between bank services and market making in 
money. Goodhart (1989: 5) describes banks as market making in money because they ‘[make] 
bids on known terms for funds from depositors and offer loans on known terms to those needing 
to borrow money’. Moreover, a bank is a financial intermediary corresponding to the market 
making in money activity. In this regard, Dewatripont and Tirole (1994: 14) offer the following 
definition: ‛[a] bank is a financial intermediary that participates in the payment system and 
finances entities in financial deficit, generally the public sector, firms and some households, 
using the funds of entities in financial surplus, typically households’. According to Greenbaum 
and Thakor (2007 [1995]: 55), ‘banks are widely considered the center of the financial 
intermediation universe because of their role in administering the community’s payments, and 
also because commercial banks are used to transmit monetary policy impulses originating with 
the central bank’.  
According to these considerations, the term ‘bank’ can be defined as follows: 
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Source: Authors’ own elaboration. 
 
Although the mainstream view has dominated the current banking and regulatory literature, 
following the outbreak of the 2007–2009 financial crisis, the theory of financial intermediation 
in banking and the micro-based perspective in regulation have been openly questioned, which 
has reopened debates involving banking and regulation. Therefore, we describe an alternative 
view of banking. 
 
1.1.2. The alternative view 
  
Within the mainstream view, ‘banks act simply as intermediaries, lending out the deposits that 
savers place with them’ (McLeay et al. 2014: 15). However, according to the Bank of England 
(BoE), the major common misconception in banking is that banks lend out the deposits that 
savers place with them because (1) ‘when households choose to save more money in bank 
accounts, those deposits come simply at the expense of deposits that would have otherwise gone 
to companies in payment for goods and services. Saving does not by itself increase the deposits 
or ‘funds available’’ (McLeay et al. 2014: 15) and (2) there is a misconception that 97 per cent 
of the circulation of money (bank deposits)9 are loans that depositors save at banks (McLeay et 
al. 2014). Thus, two questions arise: how can the formation of bank deposits be explained, and 
thus, what are the main bank functions?  
 The formation of bank deposits results from a payment (Rossi 2007). ‘In other words, 
the essential role of the banking system [and thus of banks] lies in the process, that is to say, an 
action, whose result is the creation, transfer or destruction of a bank deposit within the domestic 
economy as whole’ as a result of the agent’s credit demand (Rossi 2007: 34, Rochon and Rossi 
2013). Consequently, the term ‘bank’ is closely linked to the endogenous nature of money and 
credit, where endogenous10 means that the emission of money is determined by credit and 
money demand. Although numerous current mainstream economists (for example, Friedman, 
Schwartz, Wicksell; central bankers such as the former governor of the BoE, Mervyn King; and 
                                                          
9 The remaining three per cent of the circulation of money is in the form of currency. 
10 In contrast, exogenous means ‘that the central bank determines the quantity of loans and deposits in the economy 
by controlling the quantity of central bank money’ (McLeay et al. 2014: 15). 
A bank is understood as a financial intermediary that acts between different agents and 
provides four main functions: asset services, liability services, transformation services and 
payment services. 
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regulators such as the former head of the UK Financial Services Authority, Lord Adair Turner) 
have advocated for some form of endogenous money, ‘only post-Keynesian [(PK)11] authors 
have made, so far, endogenous money the cornerstone of their monetary theory’ (Rochon and 
Rossi 2013: 211). However, in the PK literature, the term ‘bank’ is ‘often misunderstood – not 
to say entirely neglected – even by contemporary (PK) writers’ (Rossi 1998: 2).12 In other 
words, PK theory lacks a definition of a bank. To fill this gap in the literature, Rossi (1998, 
2007) provides a useful concept in the monetary macroeconomics of banking by combining the 
elements of circuit analysis and PK theory. In what follows, we adopt this concept and provide 
an alternative bank definition in the modern economy.  
One common statement in PK theory is that banks are decisive in the business of lending 
because, according to the principle of double-entry accounting, whenever a bank makes a loan, 
it simultaneously creates a new, equal-sized deposit entry on the liability side (see Rossi 1998, 
2007). Cencini (1997: 375) notes:  
 
‘[t]he reality of our modern monetary systems is thus based on the simultaneous application of the two principles, 
'loans make deposits' and 'deposits make loans', where the first refers to the fact that deposits are created through 
the loans granted by banks to firms, while the second states that the deposits earned by workers are immediately 
lent to firms to financially cover their costs of production’ [(for example, for wages)]. 
 
To better understanding this principle, Figure 1.3 describes the lending mechanism resulting 
from the payment of wages in the labour market. Suppose a set of firms, F (payer), requests 
loans starting from a situation in which no pre-existing bank deposits are available13 (before 
loans are made) to finance its expenditures in the labour market ‘in order to pay out wages to 
the current period workers, W’ (payee) to begin the production of goods (Rossi 2007: 35).14 
                                                          
11 The origin of PK economics may be traced to Gunnar Myrdal (1939) and to the British Radcliffe Committee 
report on the ‘Working of the Monetary System’ (1959) (see Rossi 1998, Rousseas 1998). Myrdal (1965 [1939]) 
was the first to clearly state that the demand and supply of money are independent. Twenty years later, the British 
Radcliffe Committee published a report on the ‘Working of the Monetary System’ to identify recent changes in 
the British monetary system. This report raised doubts about the assumption of mainstream theory in monetary 
policy and banking. The report concluded that money supply as the objective of monetary control is irrelevant and 
that an effective monetary policy could be enhanced by the control of general liquidity, called the Radcliffe 
liquidity thesis. Eleven years later, PK pioneers, such as Nicolas Kaldor (1970), Paul Davidson (1972), Sidney 
Weintraub (1978) and Hyman P. Minsky (1982), began to elaborate on the theory of endogenous money: ‘money 
matters’. PK monetary theory was further elaborated and refined by authors such as Moore (1983), Rossi (1998, 
2007), Lavoie (1999, 2000), Rochon and Rossi (2007, 2013). 
12 Moore (1983: 541) defined ‘a bank as a two-input, two-output firm. The two inputs are retail and wholesale 
deposits; the two outputs, loans and wholesale lending’. 
13 ‘[T]o avoid assuming the existence of the very object that we want to explain, that is, a bank deposit, which 
would amount to a petitio principii’ (Rossi 2007: 35). 
14 ‘Any transaction involves three parties, namely a payer, a payee and a record keeper, that is, a ‘banker’’ (Rochon 
and Rossi 2013: 221). 
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Bank B offers loans, on which the bank sets an interest rate according to the creditworthiness 
(solvency) associated with loans, also called ‘screening devices’ (see Rossi 2007, Rochon 
2016).15 Consequently, new loans to firms F are created on the asset side (as illustrated in the 
third row of Figure 1.3), and matching new deposits with wage earners W, they are 
simultaneously created on the liability side of the bank balance sheet. The result of this payment 
is shown in Figure 1.3. 
 
Figure 1.3 Before and after loans are made 
 
Sources: Authors’ own elaboration based on Rossi (1998, 2007) and McLeay et al. (2014). 
 
The result of the payment of wages implies that (1) ‘money is created when firms agree to get 
into debt with regard to the banks and when wages are paid to workers’ (Rochon 2016: 85); (2) 
‘banks provide only the number of money units asked for by non-bank agents [(such as firms, 
householders and so forth)] [..] – on the assumption, needless to note, that the firms’ 
creditworthiness satisfies the benchmark set by the bankers’ (Rossi 2007: 35); (3) ‘the emission 
of money as means of payment is a credit-driven and demand-determined process, quite in line 
                                                          
15 In this sense, the decision of bank B to lend is based on uncertainty, as the future by definition is unknown (see 
Rochon 2016). In this context, bank B faces two situations of uncertainty with respect to the set of firms F’s ability 
to reimburse their loans in the future, namely, ‘micro-uncertainty’ and the minimum criteria ‘macro-uncertainty’ 
(see Rochon 2016). The former corresponds to the evaluation of the set of firms F, namely, creditworthiness. The 
latter corresponds to macroeconomic expectations (for example, the forecast of a growing economy or a recession) 
(Rochon 2016). ‘If the bank believes a recession is forthcoming, characterized with a decrease in income, then this 
will make it more difficult for a firm to sell its products and reimburse the bank’ (Rochon 2016: 86). However, 
irrespective of whether the bank sets minimum criteria, if a firm meets them, it will be granted a loan (Le Bourva 
1992, Rochon 2016). Consequently, bank B never faces limits on the lending process with respect to macro-
uncertainty. Bank B is only limited with respect to the creditworthiness of the borrower and faces limits itself in 
the lending process (for example, market forces constrain lending because banks must be able to lend profitably 
in a competitive market, and bank regulation can constrain lending) (see Tobin 1963, McLeay et al. 2014). 
Therefore, bank B determines the interest rate for a loan based on creditworthiness and bank regulatory 
requirements. 
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with the endogenous money literature’ (Rossi 2007: 35)—in other words, money as a means of 
payment is issued via a credit operation16 as a consequence of credit demand17—(4) ‘deposit 
holders, workers, W, have a credit to firms, F, via the bank in which these deposits are recorded. 
Hence, it is W, and not the bank, that grants a credit to F eventually, even if deposit holders 
may not be aware of this credit operation’ (Rossi 2007: 37); and (5) the production gives 
purchasing power to money that is a numerical form, whereas ‘banks alone cannot give value 
to the money units’ (Rossi 2007: 35), 
Although Figure 1.3 is helpful in describing the result of a payment in the labour market 
that is a stock (in the form of bank deposits), analysis of the balance sheet is insufficient to 
illuminate the nature of money and the workings of payments because ‘the emission of money, 
which is a flow [...], is an instantaneous event; that is, it has no duration in time, even though 
its result has indeed a stock dimension in the form of a bank deposit being either created 
[through production], transferred or destroyed [via consumption] in the economy as a whole’ 
(Rossi 2007: 34). Hence, Rossi (2007: 34) proposes to conduct a circular flow analysis that 
helps us ‘to distinguish conceptually between a flow, that is to say, money, and the actual result 
of this flow, [as shown in Figure 1.4], namely, a bank deposit’ […] ‘in which the circuit of 
money lasts no more than an instant, in order to reproduce the fact that a payment is an 
instantaneous event and so is money’ (Rossi 2007: 36).  
 
Figure 1.4 The emission of money as a flow in the labour market 
 
Sources: Adapted from Rossi (1998, 2007). 
 
                                                          
16 ‘Although the creation of money is essentially tied to bank credit, money and credit are separate things’ (Rossi 
2007: 21). In this sense, Cencini (2001:3) indicated that ‘money is a flow whose instantaneous circulation has a 
stock of income (or capital) as its object. Banks create the flow but not its object, which is closely related to 
production. This is to say that money and credit are not one and the same thing’. 
17 Certain observers suggest that bank deposits result from ‘fountain pen money’, which means ‘money created by 
the stroke of the bank president’s pen when he approves a loan and credits the proceeds to the borrower’s checking 
account’ (Tobin 1963: 1). Fountain pen money has been clearly discussed by Tobin (1963), who considers that 
‘banks do not create money’ (Tobin 1963: 2). 
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Consequently, ‘[m]oney and payments are one and the same thing’ (Schmitt 1996: 88) 
‘in the sense that the emission of money occurs within payments, while money balances (bank 
deposits) exist between payments’ (Rossi 2007: 36). Therefore, the emission of the means of 
payment can be described with an instantaneous circular flow from and to its issuing bank B 
between firms F and wage earners W (see Rossi 2007). The emission of money as flow in the 
labour market has two implications: (1) The creation and simultaneous destruction of the 
relevant number of money units occur (see Rossi 2007). In this context, Cencini (2001) 
indicated that double-entry book-keeping leads to a perfect instantaneous balance between the 
creation and destruction of money units. In this connection, the following question arises: how 
can the destruction of money units be explained? If ‘a deposit holder spends his/her purchasing 
power on the goods market, the corresponding bank deposit is actually destroyed for the deposit 
holder as well as for the economy as a whole’ (Rossi 2007: 39). In other words, consumption 
has an effect that when wage earner W spends his/her income, bank deposits are destroyed. In 
this sense, ‘money will flow back to firms. At this point, one can see the circuit forming: money 
first flows out with the payment of wages, and it then flows back with the act of consumption, 
which becomes a source of revenue for firms’ (Rochon 2016: 87). This phenomenon is 
identified as a reflux mechanism that is the act of money returning to the set of firms F (see 
Lavoie 1999, 2000, Rochon 2016). According to Lavoie (2000: 3), ‛[t]he reflux principle says 
that when agents dispose of money balances that they do not wish to hold, these excess money 
balances can be extinguished by the reimbursement of previously accumulated debt’. 
Consequently, the flux mechanism is the creation of loans (see Rossi 2007). (2) Money is not a 
stock (bank deposit), as it was considered for more than 200 years, but rather a flow that occurs 
within payments issued via a credit operation (see Rossi 2007). In other words, ‘money is a 
flow whose result is a stock under the form of a bank deposit’ (Rossi 1998: 10). This leads us 
to the conclusion that ‘money carries out payments, while bank deposits finance them’ (Rossi 
2007: 37), where the form of bank deposits is the income as a result of the effort (labour) of 
wage earners W (see Rossi 2007). 
Consequently, if we adopt the above-mentioned considerations to define the term ‘bank’ 
under an economic point of view, a bank provides two main bank functions: asset services, 
particularly lending loans, and payment services. With these considerations in mind, we can 
formulate the following alternative definition of the term ‘bank’: 
 
 
Source: Authors’ own elaboration. 
The crucial role of a bank is to provide two main functions: asset services, especially lending 
loans, and payment services as a result of the endogenous nature of money and credit. 
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1.1.3. Summary 
 
We conclude this section by noting that the term ‘bank’ can be defined in several ways, 
depending on whether the definition is made in a legal or an economic context. We noted in 
this section that the legal definition can be criticised from several angles; thus, the legal 
definition can change over time and cross borders, as it is based on the functional definition of 
a bank. In fact, prioritising the economics literature, rather than the legal literature, appears to 
be useful in this regard. In the economics literature, the term ‘bank’ is defined from a functional 
perspective that can be traced back to the historical evolution of banking. This evolution leads 
us to a definition that draws on the standard references and textbook concepts, that is, that bank 
deposits create loans and that a bank is understood as a financial intermediary operating 
between two agents that provides four main functions: asset services, liability services, 
transformation services and payment services.  
 However, the outbreak of the 2007–2009 financial crisis prompted the mainstream view 
of banking to be questioned, thus reopening a heated debate. Therefore, we articulate an 
alternative view based on the assumption that banks make loans and simultaneously create 
matching deposits on the liability side. Furthermore, with respect to the circuit analysis, the 
crucial role of a bank is to provide two main functions: asset services and payment services. 
However, one challenging question concerns which school of thought is more appropriate. Both 
schools have advantages and disadvantages that have been discussed in the literature (see Tobin 
1963). Overall, however, our position is that the essential function of a commercial bank lies in 
the provision of two main functions: asset services and payment services. These functions arise 
as a consequence of endogenous money and credit for the following reasons: (1) ‘[W]hen 
households choose to save more money in bank accounts, those deposits come simply at the 
expense of deposits that would have otherwise gone to companies in payment for goods and 
services, and saving does not increase deposits or ‘funds available’’ by itself (McLeay et al. 
2014: 15). (2) There is a misconception that 97 per cent of the circulation of money (bank 
deposits) are loans that depositors save at banks (McLeay et al. 2014). (3) Rochon and Rossi 
(2013) have clearly shown that money has always been endogenous in the history of banking.  
In other words, ‘[m]oney goes along with the needs of production, as any payments of 
production costs need a means to settle debt obligations finally. Hence, in this sense, money 
has always been responding to the needs of markets for a means of final payment, and has 
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therefore always been endogenous’ (Rochon and Rossi 2013: 216).18 Consequently, over time, 
lending has always created deposits as a result of endogenous money and credit. (4) In modern 
financial systems, there are several NBFIs19 (for example, investment institutions, i.e., 
investment banks such as Allen & Company), asset managers (such as BlackRock), contractual 
saving institutions (for example, life insurance companies such as Zürich Insurance), pension 
funds and government retirement funds, ‘so that banks are not unique in this activity, in which 
they never were actually special’ (Rossi 2007: 33). Moreover, (5) ‘the emission of money as 
means of payment is a credit-driven and demand-determined process, quite in line with the 
endogenous money literature’ (Rossi 2007: 35). (6) The principal of double-entry accounting 
for new loans is equal to new deposits. (7) Money is not a stock (bank deposit), as it has been 
considered for more than 200 years, but is considered a flow, occurring within payments issued 
via a credit operation (see Rossi 2007). Furthermore, in our view, banks provide a different 
range of other financial services that are considered supportive functions, namely, liability 
services, maturity transformation and risk transformation. In what follows, we explain why we 
consider these functions to be supportive functions.  
Liability services, a useful function to clear transactions and hold currency inventories, 
can be considered as an effect on the demand for money and credit. Therefore, liability services 
are viewed as a supportive function rather than a main bank function. 
Maturity transformation services are a supportive function because banks shift assets 
and liabilities off their balance sheets to subsidiaries and special purpose vehicles (SPVs).20 
Likewise, we can argue the same for risk transformation. However, a challenging question 
concerns whether we can calculate the risk of adequate funding to mitigate the likelihood of 
future defaults. Certain economists would say no because the future is uncertain and cannot be 
subject to calculation. Moreover, they would note that risk management and risk models of 
banks during the financial crisis of 2007–2009 failed because the banks would have otherwise 
adequately considered the solvency risks in their credit lending function. In this sense, assessing 
whether a bank is ‘undercapitalised’ or has too much ‘value at risk’ is highly technical and 
remains incompletely codified (see Tirole 2002, Hellwig 2010b). Furthermore,  
                                                          
18 For further details, Rochon and Rossi (2013) provide a valuable analysis on the evolutionary and revolutionary 
view of money in banking. 
19 Non-bank financial intermediaries (investment banks and so forth) are considered in our view to be financial 
intermediaries with respect to Tobin’s (1963) definition, namely, ‘to satisfy simultaneously the portfolio 
preferences of two types of individuals or firms. On one side are borrowers, who wish to expand their holdings of 
real assets inventories, residential real estate, productive plant and equipment, etc. - beyond the limits of their own 
net worth. On the other side are lenders, who wish to hold part or all of their net worth in assets of stable money 
value with negligible risk of default’. 
20 The role of SPVs in the most recent financial crisis is analysed in section 3.4 and section 7.1. 
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‘it would be foolish, in forming our expectations, to attach great weight to matters which are very uncertain. It is 
reasonable, therefore, to be guided to a considerable degree by the facts about which we feel somewhat confident. 
[…] The state of long-term expectation, upon which our decisions are based, does not solely depend, therefore, on 
the most probable forecast we can make. It also depends on the confidence with which we make this forecast on 
how highly we rate the likelihood of our best forecast turning out quite wrong’ (Keynes 1964 [1936]: 148).  
 
Therefore, risk calculation itself can be a useful measure in the lending process to avoid risky 
lending decisions. 
Another mainstream function is the pooling and subdividing share function. In our view, 
the pooling and subdividing share function is irrelevant, as banks lend small and large credits 
independent of collecting small credits to pass along to large borrowers.  
 
Nevertheless, if the reader bases his/her decision on one concept, there can be implications for 
bank regulation with respect to the justification for the safety and soundness of banking services 
and the safety and soundness of the banking system. However, before we describe implications 
in this regard, we require a clear definition of the term ‘bank regulation’, and we must 
understand the main causes that justify government intervention in the banking industry. Thus, 
the next major challenge is to define regulation, particularly bank regulation, because the term 
(1) has several meanings, (2) can be divided into different concepts, and (3) has meanings that 
vary in different policy areas. The next section clarifies the difficulties discussed above and 
defines the term ‘bank regulation’ in both a broad and a narrow sense. 
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1.2. Regulation and bank regulation 
 
1.2.1. The legal and economic concept of regulation 
 
Understanding and defining the concept of banking regulation is no easy task, and there is no 
single accepted definition in the economic and legal literature (see Burghof and Rudolph 1996, 
Baldwin and Cave 1999, Ogus 2004). 
 
The term ‘regulation’ is derived from Anglo-Saxon literature and has mainly legal – and 
not economic – origins (see Fest 2008). In theory, a distinction is often made between 
legislation and regulation. In this context, Hertog (2010: 4) states that ‘[a] distinction is often 
made between legislation and regulation. Usually in legislation regulatory powers are allocated 
to lower level institutions or officials. The result of the use of that power by these officials or 
institutions is then called regulation’. This definition describes regulation as a result of 
allocating power from one regulatory agency to another. In our view, regulation results not from 
the use of regulatory powers allocated to lower-level institutions but from a dynamic political 
decision-making process influenced by several regulatory agencies. Hence, on the one hand, 
legislation is the decision-making process of passing the public good,21 understood as laws, 
rules and standards by a parliament (such as the enforcement of such legislation). On the other 
hand, regulation is the result (setting the rules and procedures for implementing regulation) of 
a legislative process controlled by officials, including the parliament, local regulatory agencies 
or international regulatory agencies (for instance, the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision 
(BCBS) and so forth). In this sense, regulation is a public good understood as a set or framework 
of contracts crafted as laws, rules, standards (for example, capital and liquidity standards) and 
supervisory actions (such as registration or licensing for banks, periodic inspections to ensure 
internal compliance frameworks, and identification of employee misconduct) (see Goodhart et 
al. 1998, Llewellyn 1999, Moosa 2015). However, in practice, the legal concept of regulation 
does not (1) justify government intervention; (2) investigate which form of regulation is 
optimal; and (3) involve any impact analysis (such as banking sector assessments). Therefore, 
no further headway on the legal concept of regulation is made herein.  
In the economic literature on regulation, several researchers abstain from an exact 
definition of regulation (see Train 1997, Ekelund 1998). To delineate the subject, the few extant 
economic conceptions of regulation can be found in Loevinger (1966), Posner (1974), Selznick 
                                                          
21 Bank regulation is a public good (non-rivalry in consumption and non-excludability). 
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(1985), Soltwedel et al. (1986), Baldwin and Cave (1999), Ogus (2004) and Hertog (2010). As 
per Loevinger (1966: 105), ‘[r]egulation […] usually implies control of an economic area 
through orders directed to named or specified enterprises by an administrative agency with 
limited delegated authority’. According to Posner (1974), all government intervention, such as 
taxes, subsidies, and legislative and administrative controls, in the market are economic 
regulations. In this context, Soltwedel et al. (1986) generally assumes that control of the 
economic decision-making of market participants is exercised either by government laws, rules, 
standards or supervisory actions or independently through self-regulation. Furthermore, 
Selznick suggests (1985: 363) that ‘regulation refers to a sustained and focused control 
exercised by a public agency over activities that are valued by a community’.22 Likewise, 
Baldwin and Cave (1999: 2) understand regulation as ‘a sustained and focused control exercised 
by a public agency over activities’. In other words, regulation is (1) ‘a specific set of commands 
which is a set of rules applied by a body’ (Baldwin and Cave 1999; 2); (2) a deliberate state 
influence (for example, taxes or subsidies); or (3) all forms of social control or influence 
(affecting behaviour, such as the red and green light concept related to road traffic) (see Baldwin 
and Cave 1992). In this regard, Ogus (2004) notes that ‘regulation’ is used to indicate any form 
of behaviour control of a person or a firm. In addition, Hertog (2010: 3) indicates that regulation 
involves ‘the employment of legal instruments for the implementation of social-economic 
policy objectives. A characteristic of legal instruments is that individuals or organizations can 
be compelled by government to comply with prescribed behavior under penalty of sanctions’. 
However, Hertog’s (2010) definition can be criticised as follows: (1) Hertog (2010) describes 
an ideological anti-regulation stance (see Moosa 2015), and (2) Hertog (2010) does not say 
anything about why ‘compelled’, ‘penalty’ and ‘sanctions’ are necessary (see Moosa 2015). 
Therefore, no further headway on Hertog’s definition is provided herein. 
These legal and economic considerations can be used to formulate a broad concept of 
bank regulation: 
 
 
 
Source: Authors’ own elaboration. 
 
                                                          
22 The term ‘activity’ is important for Selznick (1985: 363) because ‘it is the effort to uphold public standards or 
purposes without undue damage to activities’. In this regard, the crux of regulation is to uphold public standards 
without undue damage to activities. 
Bank regulation is understood to mean any government intervention that limits banks’ 
economic decision-making and activities. 
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1.2.2. Government regulation vs. self-regulation 
 
The understanding of bank regulation in the broader sense corresponds to the concept of 
government regulation as distinguished from private (or self-) regulation. Although this 
distinction may often be made in the literature, in reality, it is difficult because the term ‘self-
regulation’ varies in meaning and unusual hybrids of government regulation and self-regulation 
are constantly developing (see Moosa 2015).  
According to Baldwin and Cave (1999: 125), ‘[s]elf-regulation can be seen as taking 
place when a group of firms or individuals exert control over its own membership and their 
behaviour’. Therefore, the control ‘may be entirely voluntary and quite informal or subject to 
degrees of governmental supervision and legislative structuring’ (Markova 2009: 124). In 
addition, Taisch (2010) defines self-regulation more broadly as a fundamental outflow of 
private freedom or as a governmental delegation of activities, whereas FINMA attempts 
through systematisation to make the term ‘self-regulation’ amenable to further analysis. 
Consequently, FINMA systematised self-regulation into three different forms, namely, 
voluntary self-regulation,23 self-regulation recognised as a minimum standard24 and 
compulsory self-regulation25 by private organisations (such as the Swiss Bankers Association 
(SBA) and so on) or in cooperation with the government (see FINMA 2007, 2015a).  An 
example of self-regulation in Switzerland is the agreement regarding Swiss banks’ code of 
conduct with respect to due diligence activities, which involves the identification of the 
beneficial owner of an account (know your customer). Only in a later step is the core content 
taken into the Swiss Criminal Code (SCC) (see Art. 305 SCC 2017 [1937]).   
In reality, there is a smooth transition between self-regulation and government 
regulation. Thus, over time, the banking sector has become subject to a changing degree of 
regulation, which can be divided into three scenarios. Figure 1.5 shows the trade-off between 
scenario A (‘government regulation’), scenario B (‘self-regulation’) and scenario C 
(‘combination of government and self-regulation’). Scenario A assumes a fully nationalised 
banking industry with government regulation to protect the banking industry from crisis. Thus, 
protective motives play an important role in Scenario A. Scenario B assumes a low level of 
regulation or – in the extreme – no government intervention. Here, the banking industry 
                                                          
23 Free or voluntary self-regulation is created with no government participation. 
24 Minimum standards are imposed at the request of a bank and apply to all other banks through their recognition 
by the regulatory authority. 
25 Compulsory self-regulation is based on legislature tasks on a specific issue (for example, deposit insurance) (see 
FINMA 2015a). 
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regulates itself and ensures adequate control and safety under the ‘free banking hypothesis’,26 
also called ‘laissez faire’.27 Free banking means that there is no central bank intervention 
(monetary policy) and bank regulation (regulatory policy) necessary because inefficient banks 
go bankrupt and go out of business (also in the case of overcapacity in the banking sector), 
thereby encouraging market discipline and efficiency. Therefore, free-banking advocates, such 
as Weber (1992) and Ritzmann (1996), believe that a banking sector without a regulatory 
authority or a central bank leads to a superior economic outcome.28 Crises are a necessary state 
of nature because they turn a country from an excessive speculative system into a stable 
equilibrium (see Goodhart and Illing 2009). 
 
Figure 1.5 The level of bank regulation between government regulation and self-
regulation 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Adapted from Burghof and Rudolph (1996). 
 
The ‘free banking hypothesis’ is not empirically testable because all current governments 
exercise some degree of central bank money and bank regulation (see Bernet 2003).29 
Therefore, no further elaboration is provided here. Scenario C shows a combination of 
government regulation and self-regulation. As a result, Burghof and Rudolph (1996) note that 
efficient regulation by bank supervision is based on the combination of monitoring and the 
                                                          
26 In the literature, the best-known example is the Scottish free banking era between 1695 and 1864 and the Swiss 
free banking era between 1826 and 1881 (see Dowd 1992, see section 6.1). 
27 According to Kahn (1998: 17), the laissez-faire (free banking) system is based on the belief that ‘an unregulated 
market economy will produce optimum economic results’. 
28 That ‘is the optimal means for allocating and for distributing products and incomes’ (Timberlake 2009 [1984]: 
127, see section 5.1 for further details). 
29 In the case of SIBs, the free banking approach should be discussed as critical because if the banking sector as in 
2007–2009 is not able to wind down a systemically important bank, then the costs of bankruptcy are higher than 
the benefits (for example UBS and Royal Bank of Scotland) (see part II). 
Monitoring costs and potential 
market failure costs 
Scope of bank regulation 
Government regulation Self-regulation 
Scenario A Scenario B 
Scenario C 
Cost minimum as an efficient combination 
of government- and self-regulation 
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potential cost of market failure. Government regulation can lead to higher monitoring costs 
compared with self-regulation. In this context, the potential cost of market failure can be 
reduced compared with a system without government regulation. Thus, an effective30 and 
efficient31 regulated banking system is a combination of government regulation and self-
regulation with the least possible level of inputs or supervisory costs from several involved 
institutions. The following dissertation focuses on government regulation. 
 
1.2.3. The boundary problem 
 
In the literature, bank regulation can be classified according to various policy areas. The 
difficulties of this classification are as follows: (1) the meaning of relevant policy areas differs; 
(2) the classification cannot be conclusive because of the existence of various policies—in this 
sense, ‘policy areas are related to others by common goals, common measures, and a common 
source of risks’ (IMF 2011: 51)—and (3) it is difficult to evaluate the effectiveness of policy 
areas because of the lack of systematisation. Therefore, the main challenging role for any 
regulatory agency with multiple objectives relates exclusively to the selection and combination 
of several policy measures to achieve a broad set of objectives (see Tinbergen 1956). In this 
context, regulators and policy makers use the Tinbergen Economic Policy: Principles and 
Design (1956) to argue that a policy can only achieve a specified number of objectives with 
precision if it is endowed with the same or a greater number of regulatory measures. One 
common misunderstanding is that the principle does not state that one regulatory measure 
should at least be equal to the number of objectives. Hence, several policy areas with several 
regulatory agencies can be incorporated; the main challenge is ‘how they are combined in the 
                                                          
30 Baldwin and Cave (1999) suggest that effectiveness addresses the issue of whether desired outputs are achieved. 
In other words, ‘[r]egulation can always be made more effective in terms of its defined objectives’ (Llewellyn 
1999: 52). Therefore, the regulatory objective should be clearly formulated in advance of choosing among 
alternative policies (see Tinbergen 1956). 
31 In the literature, it is typical to evaluate regulation with the Pareto criterion. Pareto efficiency or simply economic 
efficiency exists when it is not possible to improve on the current equilibrium without making at least one 
economic agent worse off. In other words, bank regulation is regarded as efficient if the specified regulatory 
objective is achieved with as little effort as possible in terms of direct and indirect costs. Direct costs include those 
costs incurred for supervision and its functions. The opportunity costs of banks that arise from regulatory 
requirements are deemed indirect costs. In reality, it is difficult to assess bank regulation with the Pareto criterion, 
as the banks or the public interest will be harmed ‘when the mandate fails to set down consistent or coherent 
objectives or where a regulator’s functions intermesh with other agencies and departments’ (Baldwin and Cave 
1999: 81). An alternative standard is the compensation principle, which is equivalent to choosing bank regulation 
that yields the highest total economic surplus (such as the safety and soundness of the banking system). The basic 
idea is that if the ‘winners’ from bank regulation, for example, the banks, compensate the ‘losers’, in our case the 
central bank and the government (tax payer), so that everyone is better off, then it is a ‘good’ change and satisfies 
the Pareto criterion (see Viscusi et al. 1998). 
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overall policy mix’ (Llewellyn 1999: 48).32 Moreover, the main risk is an overlap with other 
policy areas and agencies, called a ‘boundary problem’, which reduces the effectiveness and 
efficiency of bank regulation and ‘reinforc[es] existing biases towards inaction’ (IMF 2011: 
34). In the following, we describe four issues with respect to the boundary problem.  
First, different policy areas might relate to or have undesirable side effects on one 
another (trade-off). For example, low policy rates of interest are consistent with low inflation 
rates. Low inflation rates contribute to excessive credit growth, generate asset bubbles and sow 
the seeds of financial instability for regulatory policy (see IMF 2013).  
Second, there is a risk of overlap with respect to the objective between different 
agencies. For example, in Switzerland, there is a risk of overlap with respect to the objective of 
financial stability between the Swiss National Bank (SNB) and the FINMA. 
Third, there is a coordination problem with multiple regulatory agencies.33 For instance, 
Murphy (2015) noted the overlap of policy areas and regulatory agencies for JPMorgan in the 
US derivatives and trading businesses. In these businesses, JPMorgan must deal with five 
regulatory agencies and three different policy areas. The regulatory agencies are allocated to 
the three following policy areas: (1) monetary policy (the Federal Reserve System (Fed));34 (2) 
competition policy (the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC));35 and (3) regulatory 
policy (the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC),36 the Securities and Exchange 
Commission (SEC),37 and the US Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC)38). Since 
the crisis of 2007, the banking business has been more complex because of multiple regulatory 
agencies (regulatory infrastructure). Therefore, we propose the adoption of an integrated 
                                                          
32 For instance, bank regulatory instruments (capital, liquidity, organization and risk diversification) are mixed 
with monetary policy instruments. 
33 Jamie Dimon (2015: Internet), the CEO of JPMorgan Chase & Co., notes that ‘in the old days, you dealt with 
one regulator when you had an issue, maybe two. Now, it’s five or six. It makes it very difficult and very 
complicated’. 
34 The Fed is the US central bank and is responsible for monetary policy in the United States. 
35 ‘The OCC is an independent bureau of the U.S. Department of the Treasury. Its mission is to ensure that national 
banks and federal savings associations ‘operate in a safe and sound manner, provide fair access to financial 
services, treat customers fairly, and comply with applicable laws and regulations’ (OCC 2015: Internet). 
36 The first deposit insurance was introduced in the United States in 1934 in response to the financial crises of the 
1930s (see Fischel et al. 1987, Dewatripont and Tirole 1994, Blanchard and Johnson 2013, Mishkin 2013). The 
FDIC was established to prevent bank runs and to protect small depositors. The FDIC uses two methods to handle 
failed banks: the payoff method and the purchase-and-assumption method. The payoff method pays deposits up to 
USD 250,000. The purchase-and-assumption method reorganises banks by finding a willing merger partner to 
assume all liabilities (see Mishkin 2013). The initial coverage of the FDIC was USD 2,500. This number has 
increased to USD 250,000 (‘In response to the crisis, all accounts are currently fully insured, regardless of the 
amount, but this is scheduled to end in December 2012’) (Blanchard and Johnson, 2013: 95). 
37 The major objective of the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) is ‘to protect investors; maintain fair, 
orderly, and efficient markets; and facilitate capital formation’ (SEC 2015: Internet). 
38 ‘The mission of the CFTC is ‘to foster open, transparent, competitive, and financially sound markets; to avoid 
systemic risk; and to protect market users and their funds, consumers, and the public from fraud, manipulation, 
and abusive practices related to derivatives and other products’ (CFTC 2015: Internet). 
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supervisory system for countries such as the United States. A similar discussion about the 
problem with multiple regulatory agencies has been held in Switzerland. In this sense, Gugler 
(2005) has clearly highlighted the weakness39 of the old decentralised supervisory system, 
which was systematised into the following authorities: the Swiss Federal Banking Commission 
(SFBC),40 the Federal Office of Private Insurance (FOPI),41 the Money Laundering Control 
Authority (MLCA),42 and the Swiss Federal Gaming Board43 (SFGB). Although the legal bases 
and activities of supervision are different, as ‘are the sanctions in cases where the different laws 
were not complied with’ (Gugler 2005: 141), the Zufferey Commission and the follow-up 
Zimmerli Commission44 proposed the establishment of an integrated supervisory authority 
(centralised regulatory system) that offers numerous advantages. For example, ‘it subjects all 
institutions to the same set of rules (same business, same risks, and same rules), reduces the 
distortion of competition, increases efficiency (reduction of administrative costs and wasteful 
duplication), and simplifies the exchange of information. Furthermore, it should make the 
reform of the penalty easier’ (Gugler 2005: 141). According to these considerations and the 
work of the Commission, in 2009, the three predecessor institutions (SFBC, FOPI and MLCA) 
together created the Swiss Financial Market Supervisory Authority (FINMA).  
Fourth, the financial crisis of 2007 has shown that prudential regulation, market 
discipline such as the constructive ambivalence strategy of the central bank (see section 6.3 for 
further details), and inflation targeting alone cannot achieve financial stability. As a result, we 
propose an alternative systematisation model based on five policy areas with respect to effective 
aspects. In this context, the number of regulatory agencies must, from an effective perspective, 
be reduced to a minimum. Consequently, the focus in this dissertation is on all bank regulatory 
measures that are (1) overlapping between regulatory policy and other policy areas (for 
example, between regulatory policy and monetary policy) and (2) not sufficiently covered by 
                                                          
39 For example, the SFBC is sometimes questioned regarding the control of auditing activities (see Gugler 2005). 
‘On the one hand, private firms conducting audits are hired by the institutions subject to supervision. They may 
therefore be subject to pressure. On the other hand, they compete with other audit firms and are therefore pushed 
to achieve minimal costs, which may imply minimal control’ (Gugler 2005: 130). 
40 The SFBC was an administrative authority of the Confederation, ‘which is independent of the individual 
directives of the Federal Council and is not a part of central government administration’ (SFBC 2015: Internet). 
41 ‘The FOPI monitors the business operations of private insurance companies: life insurance, accident insurance, 
insurance against damage and re-insurance. It grants approval for business operations, checks and approves the 
insurance products for life and health insurance, checks annual reports, inspects the companies and deals with 
complaints, if any’ (FOPI 2015: Internet). 
42 The MCLA was a division of the Federal Finance Administration (FFA) (Federal Department of Finance) (see 
MCLA 2015). 
43 The SFGB is a supervisory authority that monitors the legal provisions on games of chance and casinos (see 
SFGB 2015). 
44 The Zimmerli Commission is an expert commission headed by Prof. Zimmerli from the University of Berne for 
the follow-up to the Zufferey expert group that recommended the adoption of an integrated supervisory system 
(see Gugler 2005). 
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policy areas other than monetary policy, fiscal and structural policies, competition policy and 
other policies. Figure 1.6 describes the relationship between regulatory policy and other policy 
areas (such as monetary policy, fiscal and structural policies, competition policy and other 
policies). 
 
Figure 1.6 Relationships between regulatory policy and other policies 
 
Sources: Authors’ own elaboration based on BIS (2011), IMF (2013). 
 
1.2.4. Bank regulation in the narrower sense 
 
Bank regulation in the narrower sense is understood to occur when the government (and/or its 
agents) sets the standards (for example, supervisory authority and central bank).45 In this case, 
the meaning of the term ‘regulation’ is equivalent to that found in Anglo-Saxon literature, which 
distinguishes between regulation and supervision (see Blumer 1996, Fest 2008). Supervisory 
authorities focus on forward-looking supervision, also known as prudential supervision 
regarding banks. For example, banks must always have adequate capital buffers and liquidity. 
Therefore, supervisory authorities monitor these requirements regularly in different supervisory 
categories (for instance, size and complexity) to ensure that priorities based on prudential 
supervision are correct (see FINMA 2015a). Consequently, in practice, a clear separation 
                                                          
45 An example of bank regulation in the narrower sense is the amendment to the Swiss Banking Act (BA) with 
respect to banks that are too large to fail. 
The nature of banking and bank regulation   30 
 
 
 
between bank regulation and supervision is difficult. As a result, bank ‘regulation and [bank] 
supervision will be viewed in a more general sense and, in many cases, will be used 
interchangeably’ (Spong 1994: 5). Summarising the additional concept of bank regulation 
yields the following operational definition (see Figure 1.7): 
 
 
 
 
Sources: Authors’ own elaboration. 
 
Based on the working definition, one significant challenge is to justify government intervention 
in the banking sector. In this regard, we ask ourselves the following question: what are the 
rationales for bank regulation? To answer this question, the next section presents the economic 
rationale and objectives of bank regulation. Figure 1.7 plots the different contexts for deriving 
the concept of bank regulation.  
Bank regulation is understood to mean all government interventions that limit banks’ 
economic decision-making and activities by government laws, rules, or standards without 
monetary policy, fiscal and structural policy, competition policy and other policies.  
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2. The economic rationale and objectives of bank regulation 
 
In the following chapter, we describe the economic rationale and objectives of bank regulation. 
The former is derived from the inquiry into why bank regulation is necessary and is based on 
economic criteria, whereas the latter focuses on the outcome that it is trying to ensure (see 
Llewelyn 1999). In this chapter, based in this context, we elucidate the ‘theories of economic 
regulation’, the ‘objectives of bank regulation’ and one new regulatory view, namely, the 
‘alternative bank regulatory view’.  
 
2.1. Theories of economic regulation 
 
At the beginning of the 1970s, the first explanations for government intervention in the markets 
were discussed in the United States. These explanations are shown in Figure 2.1 and were 
summarised for the first time by Posner (1974) in an article entitled ‘Theories of Economic 
Regulation’. Inspired by Posner (1974) and Peltzman (1976), we classify regulation 
conceptually as either positive or normative (see Figure 2.1).  
 
Figure 2.1 Theories of economic regulation 
 
Sources: Authors’ own elaboration based on Posner (1974), Peltzman (1976), Weizsäcker (1982), and Hertog 
(2010). 
 
The normative approach is the oldest approach to analysing issues involving regulatory 
positions. The approach is called normative because the implicit assumption is that efficient 
regulation is desirable (see Budäus 1988, Hertog 2010). The goal of the normative approach is 
to justify government intervention by pointing to market failures in the banking sector. Thus, 
the only potential role in which the government should take action involves market failure (see 
Musgrave 1966, Blankart 2006). The normative approach examines economic conditions (for 
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example, asymmetric information or externalities)46 to identify market failure47 and aims to 
provide whichever ‘type of [bank] regulation is the most efficient or optimal’ (Hertog 2010: 
49). The normative approach contains the public interest theory – market failure theory. The 
normative approach will be the focus of this thesis because the normative approach contains 
both first- and second-best solutions (see Rombach 1993, Stillhart 2002, Fest 2008). Moreover, 
there is at least one cause for bank regulation that is in the public interest and allows us to justify 
bank regulation with respect to different reasons (see also Goodhart et al. 1998). 
 
The positive approach to regulation has its origins in the Chicago school. 
Representatives of this school include Stigler (1971), Posner (1974), Peltzman (1976), and, in 
the German-speaking world, Frey (1981). The positive approach, as Keynes notes, deals with 
‘what is’ and ‘is in principle independent of any particular ethical position or normative 
judgments’ (Friedman 1996: 3). In this sense, the positive approach investigates economic 
explanations for – and provides impact analyses of – regulation. To that end, the positive 
approach explicitly considers the political decision-making process and thus involves the design 
of banking regulation content and its structure (see Hertog 2010). With the positive approach, 
according to Stigler (1971) and Peltzman (1976), regulation is understood as a public good and 
treated in accordance with the law of supply and demand (see Stigler 1971, Peltzman 1976). 
The positive approach involves private interest theory (see Figure 2.1), which in turn consists 
of the capture theory, the economic theory of regulation, the bureaucracy theory and the public 
financing approach. 
 
The next sections are dedicated to a better understanding of economic theories. 
 
2.1.1. Private interest theory 
 
Private interest theory is a combination of public interest theory and neoclassical theory that ‘is 
supplied in response to the demands of interest groups struggling among themselves to 
maximize the incomes of their members’ (Posner 1974: 335-336). Rather than assuming the 
public interest, private interest theory assumes the interests of organised interest groups (such 
                                                          
46 According to Kahn (1998), there are three distinguished groups of normative regulation theories: price and 
market entry regulation in monopolistic industries, price and market access regulation in industries with 
competitive structures and behaviour regulation to avoid external effects. 
47 In this context, the normative approach is not independent of the positive approach. In other words, any 
regulatory ‘conclusion necessarily rests on a prediction about the consequences of doing one thing rather than 
another, a prediction that must be based - implicitly or explicitly - on positive economics’ (Friedman 1996: 5). 
The economic rationale and objectives of bank regulation   34 
 
 
 
as banks or depositors). Thus, regulatory decisions are not disinterested but reflect particular 
interests, and bank regulation can be understood as the result of the successive impact of 
pressure from interest groups, consistent with the Becker (1983) model.48 These organised 
interest groups in turn are directly or indirectly involved in designing and implementing 
regulation in the decision-making process and trying to exploit supervisory authorities (for 
example, FINMA). In this regard, Kane (1985, 1986) was one of the first scholars to apply 
private interest theory to the banking sector, highlighting the interdependence between 
supervisors and the banking industry and addressing the question of whether banks should be 
regulated at all. In this view, interest groups as depositors or investors request banking 
regulation to reduce their own risk. The bottom line, according to Kane (1985, 1986), is to 
prevail on the market for bank regulation regarding demand, which may affect how standards 
are organised. Stakeholders can be banks, depositors (or depositor groups), regulators or even 
legislators (see Hertog 2010). Moreover, the private interest theory also features a theory of 
supply through the government or the regulatory agency and demand in the market (for 
example, depositors and banks), using banking regulation as an interchangeable good (see 
Stigler 1971, Posner 1974).49 Recently, the focus has not been on the exchange but rather on a 
redistribution of producer and consumer surplus. For these purposes, the regulator maximises 
its benefits in the form of income until its marginal costs (such as monitoring costs) reach 
marginal revenue (see Niskanen 1975). Various interest groups compete for demand for 
regulation. Despite the convincing arguments of private interest theorists that banks influence 
the political decision-making process and related regulation, there are four main criticisms of 
the theory. First, Posner (1974: 347) notes that private interest theory ‘has not been refined to 
the point where it enables us to predict specific industries in which regulation will be found. 
That is because the theory does not tell us what (under various conditions) is the number of 
members of a coalition that maximizes the likelihood of regulation’. Second, the empirical 
examples are criticised as being invalid. In this regard, Posner (1974: 352-353) suggests that 
‘only three studies have tried to test the economic theory of regulation, as distinct from the 
general interest group theory’. Third, ‘it is not clear why an industry [(banking industry)] 
succeeds in subjecting an agency to its interests but cannot prevent its coming into existence’ 
                                                          
48 Becker (1983) focuses on the role of interest groups and assumes that they compete with one another to gain 
more influence. 
49 According to Llewellyn (1999), there are several reasons why consumers demand banking regulations: to secure 
economies of scale in bank monitoring, to address past experiences of bad bank behaviour and to lower transaction 
costs for consumers. 
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(Hertog 2010: 22). Fourth, bank regulation often serves the interest of consumers rather than 
that of the banking sector (see Moosa 2015). 
 
Capture theory 
 
In the literature, there are conflicting substantive boundaries of capture theory with respect to 
private interest theory. Here, Schmidt and Kirschner (1987) assume that capture theory can be 
interpreted as a form of private interest theory. In this regard, Hertog (2010) views capture 
theory as a part of private interest theory. According to Hertog (2010: 22), however, ‘the capture 
theory is more of a hypothesis that lacks theoretical foundations. It does not explain why an 
industry is able to ‘take over’ a regulatory agency and why, for example, consumer groups fail 
to prevent this takeover’. Conversely, Posner (1974) notes that the theory has a certain 
independence. Becker (1983) maintains that capture theory does not refer to Stigler (1971) but 
rather is based on the approaches of public choice theory. In this dissertation, the view of 
Schmidt and Kirschner (1987) and Hertog (2010) is considered, that is, that capture theory is a 
part of private interest theory. Consequently, regulation means ‘a process by which interest 
groups [(regulatory agencies)] seek to promote their (private) interests’ (Posner 1974: 341). In 
other words, regulatory agencies become controlled by the banking industry. Therefore, the 
intent of the original regulation is captured and thwarted by banks, and regulation is modified 
over time until it serves the interests of the banking sector. According to Olson (1965), Stigler 
(1971), Niskanen (1975) and Peltzman (1976), small interest groups can be organised with 
lower costs than large interest groups. Thus, it is easier to organise small groups with limited 
interests than large groups with different objectives because of the free-rider problem (see 
Olson 1965, Laffont and Martimort 2002). Consequently, the interests of the producers (banks) 
typically prevail, which suggests a pro-producer theory. The reasons for the dominance of the 
producer are the declining interests of depositors, heterogeneous group attributes,50 and free-
rider problems, among others. One of the first scholars to examine the group attributes of 
producers was Mancur Olson (1965). To that end, Olson (1965) suggests that not all potential 
interests in a society can organise themselves equally well. Consequently, small homogeneous 
groups, such as the Swiss Bankers Association (SBA) or the American Bankers Association, 
                                                          
50 Economic agents (such as consumers (depositors)) are different and have different skills and different needs – 
in economists’ jargon, they are heterogeneous. 
The economic rationale and objectives of bank regulation   36 
 
 
 
find it easier to organise with lower cost themselves than large heterogeneous groups51 such as 
depositors. The following three examples describe the capture theory in banking.  
Following the 2007 financial crisis, an expert commission was formed in Switzerland to decide 
which measures should be implemented to reduce the risks of SIBs. On 30 September 2010, a 
group of experts consisting of representatives from FINMA, the SNB, the FFA, and, among 
others, two large Swiss banks (Union Bank of Switzerland and Credit Suisse), appointed by the 
Federal Council, submitted its proposals (see Commission of Experts 2010). The proposal on 
‘Amending the Banking Act’ (too big to fail) ‘was submitted for consultation by the Federal 
Council on 22 December 2010 […] [and] reservations and proposals for adjustments were 
raised. Based on the feedback, it was decided that amendments would be made to the 
consultation draft in various areas and that the proposed switch from the debtor principle to the 
paying agent principle for withholding tax would be dealt with in a separate dispatch for 
technical reasons’ (SIF 2013: Internet). In this regard, the ‘Amending the Banking Act’ was 
captured and thwarted by the banking lobby with respect to the paying agent principle. In 
practice, there are numerous other examples that show the watered-down effect. In the United 
States, Acharya et al. (2010) examines the modification of the Volcker rule in the Dodd-Frank 
Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (DFA). In this context, ‘in passing the Dodd-
Frank Act in 2010, Congress weakened the so-called Volcker Rule, which prohibits commercial 
banks from trading securities on their own account’ (Admati and Hellwig 2013: 3). 
The second example is related to the Swiss Financial Services Act (FinSA), which is 
equivalent52 to the European Markets in Financial Measures Directive II (MiFID II). 
 
‘The FinSA governs the prerequisites for providing financial services and offering financial instruments and 
facilitates the enforcement of customers’ claims against financial service providers. […]. [T]he rule on the reversal 
of the burden of proof, the procedural costs fund and the arbitration court were clearly rejected together with the 
instruments of collective legal protection limited to financial services’ (FDF 2015a: Internet). 
 
                                                          
51 In this respect, Goodhart et al. (1998: 7) suggests that the ‘consumers [(depositors)] of financial services are not 
a homogeneous group’. 
52 Countries have the option of adapting their banking system to the equivalent regulations of other governments. 
When another regulated country has the same regulation, it is referred to in the regulation as the equivalence 
principle. Conversely, countries can pursue an independent ‘heterogeneous’ approach. Both approaches have 
advantages and disadvantages. In the case of the equivalence approach, countries are less independent and must 
assume higher monitoring costs in purchasing. By contrast, the yield potential of the equivalence approach is larger 
than that of the heterogeneous approach (see Gerber and Kronenberg 2014). Furthermore, countries that adopt the 
heterogeneous approach are less dependent on other regulated countries. According to Gerber and Kronenberg 
(2014), the disadvantages of the heterogeneous approach include increased expenses attached to implementation 
and control, which are accompanied by operational and legal risks. 
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In other words, the Federal Council has taken initial decisions that the procedural costs fund 
and the arbitration court will be removed because the preliminary draft in which customers had 
the possibility to enforce their claims against financial service providers faced the strong 
headwind of the Swiss banking lobby (see SBA 2015, FDF 2015b).  
Moreover, sometimes an entire government may be captured by a regulatory agency. 
For instance, in autumn 2010, the European Central Bank (ECB) ensured that the Irish taxpayer 
would be liable for German banks’ claims against Irish banks. The ECB persuaded the Irish 
government by threatening to stop the ELA for Irish banks, which might have caused the Irish 
banking sector to break down (see Hellwig 2015a). In other words, the ECB captured the Irish 
government by promoting their private interest or the interest of German banks. The behaviour 
of the central bank can be seen as a form of government failure.  
Nevertheless, according to Posner (1974), capture theory is unsatisfactory for five 
reasons. First, in practice, capture theory is indistinguishable from public interest theory in its 
assumption that regulation is implemented to benefit the public interest. Second, Posner 
suggests (1974: 342) that the theory has no explanation for ‘when a single agency regulates 
separate industries having conflicting interests’. Third, capture theory ignores the fact that 
regulation serves the interests of consumers rather than the interests of the banking sector. 
Fourth, banks refuse regulation because of the negative effect on profitability. Fifth, the theory 
does not exactly describe why a bank can capture a regulatory agency and why heterogeneous 
interest groups fail. However, recent capture activities from bank lobbies, according to the Basel 
Accord in 1996, 2007, 2010-2011 and in Switzerland, advocate for the capture theory. 
Therefore, further academic research is desirable with regard to the capture theory in the 
banking sector. 
 
The theory of economic regulation 
 
In 1971, George J. Stigler refined and expanded the ideas first developed in capture theory into 
a reformulated theory of economic regulation. This theory of economic regulation is derived 
from public choice theory, which is defined as ‘the economic study of non-market decision 
making, or simply the application of economics to political science’ (Mueller 2003: 1). In this 
context, the theory first takes the view that regulation is a public good whose allocation is 
governed by the laws of demand and supply (see Posner 1974). On the demand side are industry 
groups that have access to better information than consumers and politicians have access to; 
thus, this scenario begs for regulation. In other words, a central thesis of Stigler (1971: 3) is that 
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‘regulation is acquired by the industry and is designed and operated primarily for its benefit’. 
On the supply side, regulation as a public good is supplied by policymakers. In this context, the 
second view is essentially that the political process defines the rational explanation for 
regulation (see Stigler 1971). Consequently, in contrast to public interest theory, government 
intervention does not seek to correct market inefficiencies but (following capture theory) rather 
accommodates the notion that regulation exists to promote the interests of politically effective 
groups (see Stigler 1971). The following example briefly describes the theory of economic 
regulation in the banking industry. Consider the case of capital regulation. Banks, particularly 
SIBs, must meet risk-weighted capital requirements (see section 3.2.1). Based on the theory of 
economic regulation, it might be argued that risk-weighted capital requirements are acquired 
by the banking industry for its benefit because, under the risk-weight approach, SIBs can 
manipulate the capital required to be held for funding propositions. According to Stigler (1971), 
on the demand side of the banking industry, the SIBs ask for more regulation (an internal 
ratings-based approach) that does not seek to correct market failures but rather to promote the 
interests of the politically effective group, namely, the SIBs. Although the above-mentioned 
example might be a possible explanation for the theory of economic regulation in the banking 
sector, further academic research is necessary to make such a determination.  
 
The theory of bureaucracy 
 
Another approach of private interest theory is Niskanen's theory of bureaucracy (1975). The 
theory of bureaucracy can explain the spread of regulation and over-regulation in the banking 
industry. However, bureaucracy theory does not explain the formation of regulated areas. 
 
The central component in the analysis of bureaucracy theory is the government 
bureaucrat; in our case, this role is played by the supervisory authority of banks. In this respect,  
 
‘regulatory agencies can be viewed as supplying regulatory, monitoring and supervisory services to various stake-
holders: financial firms, consumers, government etc. However, complications arise because, unlike most other 
goods and services, they are not supplied through a market process, but are largely imposed by the regulator even 
through there may be a process of consultation’ (Llewellyn 1999: 6). 
  
Thus, regulatory authorities have an informational advantage over governments with respect to 
regulation. Based on this informational advantage, Niskanen (1975) suggests that the regulator 
will maximise utility by providing monetary or non-monetary incentives. In light of these 
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characteristics, the main conclusion of the Niskanen model is that the public sector consists of 
an oversupply of regulation that is produced at little or no cost. Thus, the output of bank 
regulations is so large (over-regulation) that it is allocatively inefficient, notwithstanding the 
fact that it was produced at minimum cost. The equilibrium is called the Niskanen equilibrium 
(see Niskanen 1975). 
The weaknesses of the Niskanen model are that its results substantially depend on 
assumptions: (1) budget maximisation; (2) asymmetric information; and (3) natural monopoly. 
The first assumption is based on the argument that regulators do not reject higher budgets. In 
this context, regulatory authorities have an incentive to hire more regulators and promote 
mature regulators. However, in practice, it is unclear whether regulatory authorities use larger 
budgets to hire more regulators. In relation to the second assumption, there is an asymmetric 
information problem between politicians and the regulator agency. In this sense, politicians 
cannot (or are unable) to evaluate and control regulatory services. According to the third 
assumption, it will be argued that the supervisory authority is a natural monopoly (see 
Dewatripont and Tirole 1994). However, this assumption should be differentiated because 
regulatory agencies (for example, FINMA and the Competition and Markets Authority) are in 
competition with one another (see Becker 1983, Blankart 2006). 
 
Public financing approach 
 
Another economic reason for bank regulation is public financing. Public financing means that 
a country’s banking industry is devoted to funding the public sector, that is, the government. In 
this context, Bruni (1990) analysed the Italian banking industry as it was approaching 1992. In 
so doing, he found that ‘the consumer market for financial services is still underdeveloped’ 
(Bruni 1990: 255). In other words, ‘a small part of the output of Italy’s financial industry, a 
distinguishing characteristic of the country’s banking sector, is that a large part of its activity is 
devoted to financing the public sector’ (Bruni 1990: 239-240). In this context, Bruni (1990) 
explains that the highest percentage of the demand for bank assets in Italy involves bank claims 
on the government because of governmental regulation and financial protectionism. In other 
words, public finance results from bank regulation because regulation in the form of capital 
controls and financial protectionism encourages banks to fund the public sector. Consequently, 
the higher the degree of public funding is, the less the government is interested in deregulating 
the banking sector. Thus, regulation and deregulation can also be justified by means of a public 
financing analysis. In this regard, further academic research on the public financing argument 
The economic rationale and objectives of bank regulation   40 
 
 
 
in a contemporary context would be desirable because the European banking sector has 
undergone structural changes since 1992. 
 
2.1.2. Public interest theory – market failure theory 
 
Public interest theory underlies numerous contributions to the literature and was developed 
initially by Pigou (1932 [1920]). Pigou (1932 [1920]: 229) interprets regulation as  
 
‘state interference, designed to modify in any way the working of free competition, is bound to injure the national 
dividend; for this competition left to itself will continually push resources from points of lower productivity (in 
terms of economic satisfaction as measured in money) to points of higher productivity, thus tending always away 
from less favourable, and towards more favourable, arrangements of the community´s resources’.  
 
In the literature on public interest theory, there are four main assumptions: (1) perfect 
information;53 (2) benevolent regulators who aim to pursue the public interest; (3) separate 
markets that are extremely unstable and inefficient; and (4) relatively costless regulation. 
According to these assumptions, the ‘state’ interferes in markets when they are unable to 
regulate themselves. Thus, ‘state interference’ is triggered when the neoclassical assumption of 
the Walrasian54 general equilibrium theory breaks down and resources are not allocated to their 
highest valued uses, defined as ‘market failure’ (see Posner 1974). Hence, regulation – 
including bank regulation – is supplied in response to the demand of the national dividend for 
‘the community’, known as ‘public interest’, to push resources from lower productivity to 
higher productivity. In other words, ‘[r]egulation's purpose is to achieve certain publicly desired 
results in circumstances where, for instance, the market would fail to yield these’ (see Baldwin 
and Cave 1999: 19). The main causes of market failure are market structure (such as natural 
monopoly), asymmetric information and externalities. However, market structure,  particularly 
natural monopoly, does not play a decisive role in the justification of bank regulation because 
the banking industry consists of a large number of banks subject to significant competition. In 
this regard, ‘the existence of a large number of banks provides an additional reason for believing 
that it is extremely difficult for the banking system to form a system-wide monopoly. In short, 
analysis of the aggregate effects of monopoly does not provide an argument for controls [in the 
banking sector]’ (Meltzer 1967: 483-488). Likewise, Goodhart (2010) indicated that market 
                                                          
53 Conversely, Laffont and Tirole (1994) assume asymmetric information. 
54 Leon Walras (1834-1910) was a French economist and an early explorer of general equilibrium theory. 
Walrasian equilibrium is understood as competitive equilibrium (see Varian 2004). 
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structure, with a few minor exceptions (for example, access to clearing houses (see section 
5.1)), is not relevant in the banking system. Therefore, no further elaboration on market 
structure is provided here. Conversely, asymmetric information and externalities justify 
regulation in the banking industry. In what follows, we describe the role of bank regulation in 
relation to asymmetric information and externalities. 
 
Asymmetric information 
 
Information plays a crucial role in the economy. Contrary to the assumption often represented 
in models of ‘perfect information’,55 real-world practice assumes ‘asymmetric information’ (see 
Budäus 1988, Tirole 1988). In ‘Market for Lemons’, George Akerlof (1970) became one of the 
first scholars to address the problem of asymmetric information, modelled as quality uncertainty 
in the sale of goods. For this purpose, buyers and sellers do not have the same information 
regarding the cost and quality of goods and services. In other words, the difficulty of bank 
regulation arises because each party (for example, banks, lenders and borrowers) has different 
knowledge and information regarding their own motives, actions, positions and services and 
those of other agents. 
In the literature, there are three common phenomena of asymmetric information, 
namely, ‘adverse selection’, ‘moral hazard’ and ‘ruinous competition’. The first two 
phenomena are frequently explained by referencing the insurance – and not the banking – 
industry (see Tirole 1988, Greenbaum and Thakor 2007 [1995], Burghof and Rudolph 1996, 
Goodhart et al. 1998, Laffont and Martimort 2002). For the purpose of describing the 
asymmetric information problem, we can use the principal-agent relationship.56 In the principal-
agent model, it is assumed that the principal uses an incentive-compatible contract to ensure 
that the representative agent acts in the principal’s interests (see Maskin and Tirole 1990). 
Figure 2.2 depicts the bank as a member of a dual principal-agent relationship assuming utility 
maximisation in the credit market by the principal (lender), agent I (bank) and agent II 
(borrower). We called this the dual principal-agent relationship in the banking industry. Here, 
we assume that banks are simply financial intermediaries, that is, they are in a position to grant 
credit only if they have collected pre-existent deposits.57 
                                                          
55 Kiener (1990) posits that there is perfect information when the principal and the agent at one point have the 
same level of knowledge regarding a decision problem. Otherwise, information is asymmetric. 
56 The literature has developed the principal-agent relationship and applied it to a variety of economic problems 
such as insurance contracts, labour contracts and the regulation of monopolies (see Maskin and Tirole 1990). 
57 In an endogenous money framework, deposits are created in the act of lending. To describe the asymmetric 
information problem, we use circuit analysis. 
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Figure 2.2 The bank as part of a dual principal-agent relationship with the example of the 
credit market 
 
Source: Authors’ own elaboration. 
 
In the dual principal-agent relationship, a two-step asymmetric information problem is created 
by adding the bank between (1) the lender and the bank and (2) between the bank and the 
borrower. In this respect, Stiglitz and Weiss (1981) first provided evidence of adverse selection 
and moral hazard in the credit market by means of an increase in interest rates. Stiglitz and 
Weiss (1981) utilise two assumptions. First, they assume a credit market with ‘good’ and ‘bad’ 
borrowers. Second, they assume credit rationing.58 In other words, demand is greater than the 
supply of loans, which means conversely that ‘good borrowers’ either do not receive loans or 
do not receive the desired amount of loans. Let us suppose a higher interest rate in the credit 
market, which will have two effects, according to Stiglitz and Weiss (1981). 
First, the rationing of credit acts to exclude ‘good borrowers’ from the credit market. In 
other words, ‘bad borrowers’ crowd out ‘good borrowers’ because the bank cannot observe the 
borrower's credit rating. This effect is called adverse selection, ‘the problem created by 
asymmetric information before the transaction occurs’ between the bank (Agent I) and the 
borrower (Agent II) (Mishkin 2013: 81, see also Figure 2.2). In other words, adverse selection 
in banking ‘occurs when the potential borrowers who are the most likely to produce undesirable 
(adverse) outcomes – the bad credit risks – are the ones who most actively seek out a loan and 
are thus most likely to be selected’ (Mishkin 2013: 81). In general, adverse selection arises 
before signing the contract, when products or services of low quality will displace products and 
services of high quality due to the cost of information (see Tirole 1988). Thus, adverse selection 
                                                          
58 In an endogenous money framework, banks have an incentive to accommodate all demands for funding 
independent of the risk preference of the borrower. The bank creates funding by accommodating the funding 
demands of the borrowers. Thus, as we already noted in section 1.1.2, ‘there is virtually no constraint on the ability 
of banks to issue credit’ regarding the macro-uncertainty (Rousseas 1998: 83, Rochon 2016). The question arises 
regarding who a bank deals with regarding micro-uncertainty. As Rochon (2016: 86) clearly noted, if the borrower 
already meets the basic minimum level of creditworthiness, the additional creditworthiness (micro-uncertainty) is 
determined by using the interest rate. In this case, if the borrower meets the minimum level but the bank expects 
some uncertainty regarding the repayment of a loan, the bank may impose a higher rate of interest for the borrower 
in question compared with other borrowers (see Rochon 2016). Consequently, higher interest rates have the effect 
of discouraging potential borrowers from borrowing (credit rationing), which is not desirable in a growing 
economy. 
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indicates that one side of the market cannot evaluate the quality of goods and services on the 
other side of the market, which is also referred to as hidden information (see Arrow 1985b, 
Varian 2004). 
Second, ‘adverse selection is not the only informational problem one can imagine’ 
(Laffont and Martimort 2002: 145). Stiglitz and Weiss (1981: 408) posit that ‘increasing interest 
rates or collateral requirements could increase the riskiness of the bank's loan portfolio, either 
by discouraging safer investors or by inducing borrowers to invest in riskier business projects’ 
(see Figure 2.2). According to Laffont and Martimort (2002), this effect represents the moral 
hazard. In this case, the moral hazard ‘is the problem created by asymmetric information after 
the transaction occurs’ between the bank (Agent I) and the borrower (Agent II) (Mishkin 2013: 
82). In other words, moral hazard in banking ‘is the risk (hazard) that the borrower might engage 
in activities that are undesirable (immoral) from the lender’s point of view’ (Mishkin 2013: 82). 
In general, the moral hazard arises after the contract has been signed when an incentive for risk-
taking behaviour is created as a result of risk coverage (for example, deposit insurance (see 
Appendix 6) and LOLR (see part II)). Thus, because of risk insurance, the insured parties do 
not suffer if they behave carelessly, which is referred to as hidden action (see Arrow 1985b, 
Tirole 1988, Laffont and Martimort 2002). 
In short, Stiglitz and Weiss (1981) use the example of the credit market to show that, on 
the one hand, quality uncertainty leads to adverse selection59 because banks cannot observe 
borrowers’ creditworthiness and, on the other hand, moral hazard60 arises due to behaviour 
uncertainty because banks have difficulty observing how loans are used.61 
A third characteristic discussed in the market failure literature is ruinous competition62 
between banks. As a result of price pressure, it is believed that ‘good’ banks with good services 
are displaced by ‘bad’ banks with bad services. As the result of a lack of information and 
knowledge (‘buyer ignorance’),63 depositors can only judge the quality of banking services with 
substantial difficulty or not at all. Therefore, Goodhart et al. (1998: 7-8) indicate that ‘the 
individual consumer has limited ability and opportunity to acquire the necessary skills to enter 
                                                          
59 Mishkin (2013: 209) explains adverse selection by noting that ‘potential bad credit risks are the ones who 
most actively seek out a loan’. 
60 One practical example of the moral hazard problem is the insolvency of Barings Bank. In February 1995, a bond 
trader incurred a large loss. In this context, the trader had two options: (1) he might reveal his loss to his manager 
and risk being fired or (2) he might decide to ‘gamble on resurrection’ by taking on more positions in the stock 
market to recover the initial loss. ‘If the trader continues losing money and the internal controls fail, he can bring 
the whole bank down’ (Goodhart et al. 1998: 47). 
61 Economic transactions frequently involve people with asymmetric information because ‘the borrower usually 
knows more about its own investment opportunities than the lender’ (Greenbaum and Thakor, 2007 [1995]: 24). 
62 According to Budäus (1988) and Hertog (2010), ruinous competition is a result of long-term overcapacity. 
63 Buyer ignorance is the inability of buyers to judge the quality of the purchase (see Kahn 1998). 
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into complex financial contracts’ (see also Llewellyn 1999). Expanding on this point, Spong 
(1994: 6) notes that an ‘investigation of these factors is likely to be too complex and costly for 
the vast majority of depositors’. In other words, small ‘depositors are said to be unaware of – 
and unlikely to pay the cost of acquiring information about – the risk position accepted by the 
bank or the character of the banker’ (Meltzer 1967: 496). In light of these characteristics, the 
complexity of assessment and the control of financial services are prohibitively expensive for 
small depositors.64 None of these authors indicate that the depositor has insufficient 
knowledge.65 In this context, when creating their credit supply, ‘good’ banks generally work 
based on realistic assumptions, whereas ‘bad’ banks are aware that their offer to the borrower 
has more attractive conditions than the offers of ‘good’ banks. Because the lender can make the 
quality of the loans difficult to judge, the borrower enters into the deal with the attractive 
conditions of the ‘bad’ bank, which results in ‘good banks’ slowly exiting the market and, at a 
later stage, ‘bad’ banks being unable to provide additional credit. According to Baltensperger 
(2005), this situation leads to a sub-optimal allocation of resources in the form of loans and 
risks. Thus, the risk of a banking crisis increases, and the demand thus arises that ‘bad’ banks 
be excluded from the banking industry with stringent market entry restrictions. With these 
considerations in mind, the question arises: what does asymmetric information have to do with 
banking?  
 
One key function of banks is that through delegated monitoring, a bank can eliminate the 
asymmetric information problem of adverse selection and moral hazard between the lender 
(Principal) and the bank (Agent I) and between the bank (Agent I) and the borrower (Agent II) 
that can occur, as shown in Figure 2.2. In this context, the question arises regarding how banks 
can reduce asymmetric information. 
In 1984, Douglas W. Diamond developed a theory of financial intermediation and 
delegated monitoring. His theory was based on minimising the cost of monitoring information 
through the delegation of monitoring (‘delegated monitoring’) by a bank (see Diamond 1984). 
Figure 2.3 presents the Diamond model as an optimal contract that is sufficiently attractive 
between the borrower, the bank and the lender as part of a dual principal-agent relationship. 
 
                                                          
64 In addition, the contribution of bank depositors is small relative to the costs of control of the bank and is not 
worth the deposit (see Burghof and Rudolph 1996). 
65 According to Llewellyn (1999: 31), the ‘lack of information and ability of consumers to utilise information’ 
about financial products and the bank is one important reason for consumer protection (see section 2.2.1). 
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Figure 2.3 The Diamond model as a dual principal-agent relationship 
 
Source: Authors’ own elaboration. 
 
Diamond (1984) presented two main assumptions in his model: delegated monitoring and 
diversification. As a result of delegated monitoring, the bank incurs monitoring costs. In this 
case, Diamond (1984) assumed that time-consuming monitoring by banks (self-regulation) 
could be offered in contrast to bank regulation as cost effective ‘because the alternative is either 
duplication of effort if each lender monitors directly, or a free-rider problem, in which case no 
lender monitors’ (Diamond 1984: 393). The assumption of the bank’s cost-effective monitoring 
is based on three characteristics. First, banks can use economies of scale66 (see Diamond 1984). 
Second, lenders do not have to assess knowledge and information to evaluate and monitor banks 
(see Baltensperger and Dermine 1987, Goodhart et al. 1998, Llewellyn 1999).67 Third, banks 
have better information about the activities of borrowers and lenders – as well as their own 
liquidity and solvency68 – because they can monitor how diligently the borrowers conduct their 
activities by spending some money and avoid ‘extreme’ negligence (there are banks that can 
reduce borrowers’ outside benefit) (see Diamond 1984). For this reason, the cost of delegated 
monitoring to lenders can be reduced with increasing numbers from the bank, which leads to 
lower costs compared with direct financing by the lender. However, Figure 2.3 shows an 
additional information problem that results from the monitoring delegated by the bank. In 
addition to the bank, the lender must address the problem of project outcome uncertainty. In 
other words, lenders and borrowers do not observe the project outcome. If nothing has been 
agreed upon in the loan agreements, the bank may allow opportunistic behaviour and lower 
                                                          
66 Economies of scale means ‘[t]he reduction in transaction costs per dollar of transaction as the size (scale) of 
transactions increases’ (Mishkin 2013: 680). 
67 ‘The bank knows more about the quality of its loan book, the security of its assets and the matching of asset and 
liability duration than the prospective depositor. Monitoring banking solvency requires skills which many 
depositors do not possess’ (Finsinger 1990: 59). This reasoning also explains why private audit firms (for example, 
PricewaterhouseCoopers) or regulators must protect the interests of depositors (see Dewatripont and Tirole 1994, 
Burghof and Rudolph 1996). 
68 The solvency state of nature is analysed in section 7.2.2. 
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project revenues for the lender. To mitigate this behaviour, lenders provide their credit contracts 
with an interest payment and penalties (that is, a non-pecuniary penalty) regardless of the 
borrower’s project outcome (see Diamond 1984). Thus, the bank has an incentive to ensure that 
the project outcome of the lender, less monitoring costs, is equal to or greater than the 
corresponding interest payment and penalty costs of the borrower. In other words, banks have 
(1) the incentive to ensure that no sanctions are levied and (2) the incentive to monitor the 
movement of capital to ensure that the flow of capital is adequate to pay the lender’s interest. 
In this context, banks attempt to use diversified capital inflows (deposits) to guarantee capital 
outflow (credit). Thus, Diamond (1984) suggests that with a higher number of loans, a single 
credit default has less of an effect on the total projected outcome. Thus, individual credit losses 
are identified, assessed and monitored in the risk transformation.69 It is the goal of an efficient 
banking system to circulate the cost-optimal allocation of credit risk to the lender. For this 
purpose, credit default risks are diversified in the sum of projected outcome (see Diamond 
1984).70 Diamond (1984) showed that losses tend to be zero with an increasing number of 
credits through diversification.71 Consequently, Diamond (1984) demonstrated that the benefits 
to the bank are found under certain assumptions in the process of risk transformation; to 
minimise the problem of asymmetric information, the ‘agency’ costs72 are less than the costs of 
direct financing by the lender to the borrower.  
Nonetheless, the Diamond model has limitations; for example, it does not eliminate the 
asymmetric information problem. This is counterfactual in the light of financial and banking 
crises because a banking crisis is not a rare event (see Dewatripont and Tirole 1994).73 
Therefore, bank regulation could mitigate the problem of asymmetric information. 
                                                          
69 ‘The recent literature on transformation services shows that there is a close relation among improving risk 
sharing, fixed claim deposits and bank runs’ (Diamond and Dybvig 1986: 63). 
70 In addition to diversification, there are two basic forms of risk transfer: hedging and insurance (see Bernet 2003). 
71 ‘The result that the delegation costs go to zero implies that asymptotically no other delegated monitoring 
structure will have lower costs’ (Diamond 1984: 395). The bank may reduce the probability of failure by means 
of risk diversification, and the default risks of loans tend towards zero (see Diamond 1984). 
72 Although banks and depositors are interested in reducing information asymmetry with monitoring, monitoring 
is associated with costs. The sum of the monitoring costs is called agency cost, which consists of the cost of 
depositors’ ‘bonding costs’, the bank's ‘monitoring costs’ and the uncertain ‘residual-loss’ costs (see Jensen and 
Meckling 1976). 
73 Many researchers contradict one another regarding the frequency of financial and banking crises. Richter (1990: 
28) asserts that ‘it should be kept in mind, though, that a general banking crisis is an extremely rare event, what 
came close to it only happened once between 1931 and 1933’. Conversely, Caprio and Klingebiel (1997), Goodhart 
et al. (1998), Tirole (2002), Rochet (2008a) and Reihnhart and Rogoff (2009) disagree. According to Rochet 
(2008a), in the past thirty years, there were numerous banking and financial crises around the world, such as those 
in Latin America (early 1980), Russia (1998), Argentina (2001) and the United States (2007) (see Tirole 2002, 
Reinhart and Rogoff 2009). Further, Reinhart and Rogoff (2009) empirically analyse financial crises over eight 
centuries, focusing on 66 countries between 1800 and 2008. In this context, they use two approaches: defining the 
crisis using strict quantitative indications (such as inflation crisis, currency crashes, currency debasement and the 
bursting of asset price bubbles) and defining the crisis by events (for example, bank runs, external debt crisis and 
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Figure 2.4 Bank regulation as a consequence of potential market failure in the Diamond 
model 
 
Source: Authors’ own elaboration. 
 
In this sense, bank regulation provides minimal quality standards that reduce agency costs and 
also serves as a substitute for the monitoring of the lender and borrower, as shown in Figure 2.4 
(see also Stillhart 2002). Consequently, there is a need for bank regulation to mitigate the 
asymmetric information problems that arise between the lender and the bank and between the 
bank and the borrower. 
 
Externalities 
 
Another justification for bank regulation includes externalities. The concept of externalities 
(external effects) dates to A. Marshall (1997 [1920]) and A.C. Pigou (1932 [1920]). In defining 
the concept, Marshall assumed internal effects. According to Marshall (1997 [1920]), all cost 
and benefit factors that influence decision makers directly in their decision-making functions 
can be understood by the term ‘internal effects’. In this case, for Marshall (1997 [1920]), 
externalities are the residual form of internal effects. The concept of externalities was 
introduced into public finance by Pigou (1932 [1920]), who posited that externalities arise 
whenever there are either positive or negative side effects in the consumption or production of 
an economic agent. In this regard, Frey (1981) suggests that consumption or production is 
disturbed by the economic agent, leading to a Pareto inefficient situation. As a consequence, 
the costs or revenues of external effects are not accounted for in the decision-making process 
                                                          
domestic debt crisis). According to Reinhart and Rogoff (2009), financial crises and banking crises are not rare 
events. Consequently, we advocated in this dissertation that financial crises and banking crises are not rare events. 
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and are thus not internalised (see Budäus 1988).74 The concept of externalities from Marshall 
(1997 [1920]) and Pigou (1932 [1920]) can also be used in the bank regulation literature. 
With externalities in consumption, all economic interdependencies are considered in 
which the benefits to a consumer (depositors and so on) are directly affected by the conduct of 
another economic agent. In simple terms, ‘[a]ny market action taken by one player in a market 
is always likely to affect the economic position of all the other players in that market’ (Goodhart 
2010: 168). Thus, risk-taking behaviour75 in the form of a ‘fire sale’76 as another source of 
financial instability can lead to negative externalities (information contagion, linkages and 
counterparty exposures) on other banks in the industry. In this regard, the recent financial crisis 
indicates a fire sale throughout the banking industry (see Kashyap et al. 2011). Therefore, bank 
regulation that addresses fire-sale mechanisms can mitigate negative externalities. 
Such fire-sale behaviours can spill over to other banks and functions (for example, 
payment systems) and play an important role with respect to adverse effects on the balance 
sheet (such as an impairment of the solvency positions of the bank balance sheet), which can 
lead to bank failure in extreme cases and the failure of other banks as the result of contagion 
effects77 because the monetary and credit systems are inextricably interconnected. As the result 
of a bank failure, credit information is lost in the market. Therefore, borrowers must take out 
new loans under unattractive conditions, and as a consequence, ‘[m]ore expensive credit terms 
[are offered that] imply lower investment and [possibly] unemployment’ (Baltensperger 1990: 
5). Thus, a bank failure leads to potentially substantial social costs in the real economy. Because 
a bank failure, particularly for an SIB, can lead to enormous externalities on the entire economy, 
bank regulation and/or safety-net arrangements (such as deposit insurance or the LOLR) are 
justified to mitigate damage in the entire economy.  
With regard to an externality in production, all economic interdependencies are 
considered in which the production level of a bank is directly affected by the action of another 
economic agent (see Marshall 1997 [1920], Pigou 1932 [1920], Frey 1981, Varian 2001, 2004, 
Blankart 2006). An externality on the banking industry can be attributed to the information-
processing system (for example, lending). One such externality in production can be explained 
                                                          
74 According to Budäus (1988), externalities must be observable and predictable to be internalized over time such 
that they can be made marketable. 
75 In this regard, Borio and Filosa (1994) argue that banking has become riskier in some countries because of 
deregulation and with commercial real government business. 
76 According to Shleifer and Vishny (2010: 30), ‘a fire sale is essentially a forced sale of an asset at a dislocated 
price. A sale is forced in the sense that the seller cannot wait to raise cash, usually because he owes that cash to 
someone else. The price is dislocated because the highest potential bidders are typically involved in a similar 
activity as the seller, and are therefore themselves in a similar financial position. Rather than bidding for the asset, 
they might be selling similar assets themselves’. 
77An overview of contagion effects will be provided in section 2.2.3. 
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using the following example. Suppose two banks, B1 and B2, compete in a mortgage market. 
B1 sets its fixed and variable mortgage interest rates based on a costly mortgage branch analysis 
and publishes the fixed or variable mortgage interest rates to attract new customers. 
Simultaneously, bank B2 uses the publicly accessible mortgage rates of bank B1 and sets the 
mortgage interest rate at the same level as B1 without any costly mortgage branch analysis (free-
rider problem) (see Fest 2008). This example illustrates an externality on the banking sector 
that positively affects the action of a competitor (see Fest 2008).  
 
In the literature, the public interest theory has been criticised from theoretical, political and 
empirical perspectives. First, in practice, the perfect information assumption is rarely found 
because regulators do not have enough information regarding the cost, demand, quality and 
benefits to the public interest. Second, the theory is unsatisfactory because there is no link ‘or 
mechanism by which a perception of the public interest is translated into legislative action’ 
(Posner 1974: 340). In addition, using the political decision-making process, it ‘is extremely 
difficult to validate this assumption. The study of motivation is an elusive and perhaps an 
impossible task. Laws, particularly in the form of legislation, are rarely the work of a single 
mind, and there are often conflicting expressions of what was intended’ (Ogus 2004: 3). Third, 
the market mechanism is often able to compensate for any inefficient separate markets (see 
Moosa 2015).78 In theory, it can be shown that the allocation of resources by the mechanism of 
a free market is optimal (see Arrow 1985a). In practice, these conditions may not always apply, 
and market failures may result. The fourth assumption is that regulation is relatively costless; 
however, in practice, regulations are not inexpensive to implement, particularly in the banking 
sector. Fifth, the theory has been invalidated by empirical research (see Stigler 1971). Finally, 
capture theorists downplay the degree to which economic and political interests influence 
regulation (see Baldwin and Cave 1999). 
  
                                                          
78 In separate markets, excessive competition usually occurs as an outcome of long-term overcapacity and not 
because they are extremely unstable (see Hertog 2010). 
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2.2. Objectives of bank regulation 
 
In the literature, there are many justifiable objectives79 for bank regulation in addition to the 
public and private interest. For example, according to Budäus (1988) and Rochet (2008a), 
regulations are the result of crisis situations that persist after the end of the crisis. This situation 
is explained by Budäus (1988) by the fact that an existing structure of market participants’ 
rights of action leads to an undesirable outcome in the market process. Nevertheless, there is 
no consensus in academia regarding why banks are regulated because (1) the literature is 
fragmented and no common theoretical foundation for bank regulation exists and (2) there are 
several regulatory causes with different meanings and systematisations. 
According to Seifert (1984), there are two objectives: consumer protection and the 
safety and soundness (stability) of the banking system. For Baltensperger (1990), there are three 
objectives of bank regulation, namely, bank safety and overall financial stability, monetary 
control and monopoly, and concentration and inadequate banking competition. By contrast, 
Llewellyn (1996: 9) suggests that there are three objectives, namely, ‘to sustain systemic 
stability, to maintain the safety and soundness of financial institutions, and to protect the 
consumer’. According to Ogus (2004), the principal function of economic regulation is to 
provide a substitute for competition in relation to natural monopolies. Bernet (2005), 
meanwhile, indicates that these objectives are system stability, system efficiency80 and 
consumer protection. According to the Financial Conduct Authority (FCA) (2015), there are 
two objectives, namely, consumer protection and the control of monopoly power to protect 
financial markets and promote competition. Further, the UK Prudential Regulation Authority 
(PRA) (2015), as part of the BoE, promotes the safety and soundness of banks and insurance 
firms and facilitates effective competition. However, competition as a regulatory objective 
makes little sense for Bernet (2005) because such an objective should be assigned to other 
policy areas. However, Bernet (2005) does not assign the competition objective to any other 
policy area. In contrary to the UK, the competition function in Switzerland is assigned to a 
separate regulatory agency called the ‘Competition Commission’ as part of the Federal 
Administration. Baltensperger (2005) first suggested that the competition objective affects 
other objectives (for instance, the safety and soundness of banking, among other factors). The 
competitive objective can be understood as valuable insights into the effects of bank regulation 
                                                          
79 In other words, there are too many goals. Therefore, we need to identify the market failure (see Tirole 2002). 
80 According to Bernet (2005), system efficiency, which is the allocative efficiency included in the system that 
allows for resources and risk allocation, includes the transaction costs that occur. 
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because ‘[e]fficiency and competition are closely linked together. In a competitive banking 
system, banks must operate efficiently and utilize their resources wisely if they are to keep their 
customers and remain in business’ (Spong 1994: 9).81 On the one hand, system efficiency is 
considered, for this reason, to be the result of the safety and soundness of market structure and 
competition. On the other hand, it seems reasonable to assign the competition objective to bank 
regulatory policy because the focus of bank regulation in the United States – as opposed to 
Europe – has addressed the safety and soundness of markets and competition even over the long 
term (see Baltensperger 2005). These factors were embodied in the restrictions on branches and 
the separation of investment banking from commercial banking (see Baltensperger 2005). 
However, as we noted in section 2.1.2, market structure is not a bank regulatory cause. 
Therefore, competition is not considered to be a rationale for bank regulation. 
Overall, the objectives of bank regulation cannot be classified conclusively; therefore, 
it is difficult to assess the relative benefits of bank regulation without clearly understanding the 
objectives. Moreover, ‘[t]he regulatory community [(such as the BIS)] as well as the industry 
must take the blame for never having specified the objectives and the presumed functioning of 
[..] regulation’ (Hellwig 2010b: 8). We therefore propose an alternative systematisation to better 
categorise bank regulatory objectives, as shown in Figure 2.5. 
 
Figure 2.5 Overview of the objectives of bank regulation 
 
Sources: Authors’ own elaboration. 
 
In the first case, as we noted in the public-interest theory – market failure theory, banks 
are regulated due to anomalies or deviations in the market. In this regard, a failure is a deviation 
from equilibrium theory in the market, that is, economic situations in which the market is unable 
                                                          
81 A competitive market depends ‘on the number of banks operating in a market, the freedom of other banks to 
enter and compete, and the ability of banks to achieve an appropriate size for serving their customers. For instance, 
too few banks in a market could encourage monopolization or collusion, while banks of a suboptimal size might 
be unable to serve major customers and might be operating inefficiently’ (Spong 1994: 9). 
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to coordinate supply and demand because of the system immanence82 of the banking industry 
(see Musgrave 1966, Seifert 1984, Burghof and Rudolph 1996). In a nutshell, market failure is 
the main reason for justifying bank regulation. In this case, there is public interest in avoiding 
the distorting effects of market failure. For this reason, market failures should be identified in 
the banking industry. Tirole (2002: 114) notes ‘a clearly stated objective function, which itself 
must be based on a clear identification of market failure’ because ‘once such a failure has been 
identified we can ask what type of regulation would help to improve the situation’ 
(Baltensperger and Dermine 1987: 70).83 Market failure and the corresponding regulatory 
causes can take different forms in practice. To that end, it is useful to systemise the causes of 
market failure and the corresponding bank regulations. 
The financial crisis of 2007–2009 has provoked a strong controversy about the 
usefulness of a micro-based approach. The outbreak of the financial crisis in 2007–2009 has 
demonstrated that the analysis of market failure from a micro-based perspective has reached its 
limit. As a result, it is no longer justified to base bank regulation on such an approach. Hence, 
many observers, including academics and policymakers, suggest that market failure and the 
resulting need for bank regulation require a micro- and macro-based approach that addresses 
systemic risks and hence focuses on the stability of the financial system as a whole. To that 
effect, we extend the micro-based approach with a macro-based approach for further 
systematisation of regulatory reasons based on various arguments that do not include the micro-
based approach (see Table 2.1). 
 
Table 2.1 The micro- and macro-based approaches of bank regulation compared 
 
Micro-based approach Macro-based approach 
Proximate objective Limit distress of individual 
banks 
Limit financial system-wide 
distress 
Ultimate objective Safety and soundness of 
banks, consumer protection 
Safety and soundness of the 
banking system (avoid 
output (GDP) costs) 
Correlations and common 
exposures across banks 
Irrelevant Important 
Calibration of prudential 
controls 
In terms of risk of 
individual banks; bottom-up 
In terms of system-wide 
distress; top-down 
Source: Adapted from Borio (2003). 
                                                          
82 System immanence is understood to mean that the banking sector cannot be immunised against dangers on its 
own (see Rombach 1993). 
83 In the economic theory of bank regulation, it remains an open question as to how a political decision arises from 
market failure. The theory of representative majority decision that is connected to a theory of market failure 
provides a possible theory to explain the gap (see Blankart 2006). 
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The general view of a micro-based approach attempts to explain the behaviour of the individual 
agents (consumers, employees and so forth) operating in a banking context under various 
conditions (see Kahn 1998). Thus, the micro-based approach is a study of the behaviour of 
individual decision-making units (see Rossi 2010). The aim of the micro-based approach is to 
consider the causes of market failure and the consequent need for bank regulations on individual 
banks (see Crockett 2000, Hanson et al. 2011). To expand upon this point, the narrow view of 
the micro-based approach is defined as follows: 
 
 
 
 
Sources: Authors’ own elaboration based on Crockett (2000), Borio (2003), Rossi (2007), Hanson et al. (2011), 
and Mishkin (2013). 
 
In this case, the ultimate objectives of the micro-based concept involve the safety and soundness 
of banks and consumer protection (see Goodhart et. al 1998). Furthermore, under the micro-
based approach, correlations and common exposures across banks are irrelevant. In addition, 
the calibrations of prudential controls focus on the risks faced by individual banks (see Borio 
2003, see Table 2.1).  
 
The limits of the micro-based approach were shown in the aftermath of the financial 
crisis of 2007–2009. ‘[F]inancial crises are not simply the result of agents’ forms of behaviour, 
but rather the outcome of a monetary–structural process, eventually inducing businesses to 
spend the bulk of their earnings on financial markets rather than in production activities’ (Rossi 
2010: 69). For that reason, ‘owing to a [..] [micro-based] conception of macroeconomics and 
economic policy making, the suggested rules and regulations can, at best, influence agents’ 
behaviour and expectations but cannot […] avoid the occurrence of (further) systemic crises’ 
(Rossi 2010: 69). Further, the ‘regulator pushes a troubled bank to restore its capital ratio, the 
regulator does not care whether the bank adjusts via the numerator or via the denominator – 
that is, by raising new capital or by shrinking assets’ (Hanson et al. 2011: 5). In addition, the 
procyclicality and interconnectivity of the banking industry are not considered part of a micro-
based approach. Further, Blanchard and Johnson (2013: 552) agree that ‘to address bubbles, 
credit booms, or dangerous behaviour in the financial system, the interest rate is not the right 
policy measure. It is too blunt a tool, affecting the entire economy rather than resolving the 
The objective of the micro-based approach is to limit the risk of episodes of financial distress 
at individual banks (namely, idiosyncratic risk) by emphasising the behaviour of individual 
agents (particularly externalities and asymmetric information). 
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problem at hand’. Therefore, many scholars, including Meltzer (1967), Revell (1975), Crockett 
(2000), Borio (2003), Brunnermeier et al. (2009), Rossi (2010), Galati and Moessner (2011), 
Hanson et al. (2011), Blanchard and Johnson (2013), and Mishkin (2013), suggest that banking 
regulation requires a macro-based approach to regulation in addition to a micro-based approach 
(see also BIS 2011, IMF 2011, 2013). The principal question that remains the subject of debate 
today is how to define a macro-based approach to regulation. First, when and where has the 
macro-based approach been used, and can we clearly differentiate between micro- and macro-
based approaches? In fact, it is difficult to say when the macro-based approach of banking 
regulation was first used and to delineate a macro-based approach because the terminology 
currently in use is unclear84 and the examples of many countries suggest wide ranges and 
variations in bank regulations. In addition, it is difficult in practice but useful conceptually to 
clearly separate micro- from macro-based approaches (see Goodhart et al. 1998, IMF 2011, 
Clement 2010). Nevertheless, we attempt to address these difficulties and formulate a macro-
based approach to bank regulation.  
The first basic considerations of a macro-based approach are rooted in the approach of 
Meltzer in 1967. According to Meltzer (1967: 486), ‘the cost of bank-failure […] has both micro 
and macro aspects’. Thus, Revell (1975: 1) concluded that ‘in all countries credit institutions 
are regulated for two quite distinct purposes: (1) to ensure their soundness and prudential 
operation, (2) for reasons of monetary policy and the control of credit. In the economist's jargon, 
the first can be referred to as 'micro' regulation, and the second as 'macro' regulation’. In 1979, 
12 years after Meltzer's definition, the macro-based approach to regulation was named and 
implemented for the first time at a meeting of the BCBS (see Clement 2010). However, the first 
appearance of the macro-based approach to regulation in a public document appears to date to 
1986 in the Euro-currency Standing Committee report on recent innovations in international 
banking. The report defines the macro-based approach as a policy that promotes ‘the safety and 
soundness of the broad financial system and payments mechanism’ (BIS 1986: 2, see Clement 
2010). To that effect, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) added the macro-based approach 
to its regulatory nomenclature and its so-called ‘macroprudential indicators’ to its ‘Financial 
Sector Assessment Program’ in the 1990s for the first time, in response to the Asian financial 
crisis (see Clement 2010, IMF 2011). The Euro-currency Standing Committee generally defines 
the macro-based approach to regulation as an approach that limits the risks and costs of a 
system-wide crisis rather than focusing on behavioural aspects (that is, avoiding output (GDP) 
costs of the bank failure exceeding the private costs) (see Borio 2003, Brunnermeier et al. 2009, 
                                                          
84 Clement (2010: 59) notes that ‘the term’s origins and its exact meaning remain obscure’. 
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Galati and Moessner 2011, see also Table 2.1). The aim of the macro-based approach is to 
consider reasons at the system-wide level, whereas the micro-based approach is to limit the 
distress of individual banks. In the context of the macro-based approach to regulation, the 
consequences of the tight interdependence of many banks in the banking system are studied. 
To expand upon this point, the macro-based concept can be narrowly defined as follows: 
 
 
 
Sources: Authors’ own elaboration based on Revell (1975), BIS (1986), Goodhart et al. (1998), Crockett (2000), 
Borio (2003), Borio and Dehmann (2009), Brunnermeier et al. (2009), Rossi (2010), BIS (2011), and IMF (2013). 
 
In this case, the ultimate objective for macro-based policy involves the safety and soundness of 
the banking system for purely systemic reasons (that is, because the social costs of bank failures 
exceed their private costs) (see Goodhart et al. 1998).  In other words, the macro-based approach 
should protect taxpayers from the need for rescue, also called ‘bail-outs’. Furthermore, the 
correlation and common exposures experienced across banks are important. In addition, macro-
based policies focus on the calibration of prudent system-wide controls (see Table 2.1).  
Several discussion papers have been drafted for purposes of banking regulation (for 
example, see Llewellyn 1999 and Baltensperger 2005). Regardless of whether a normative or 
positive theory model or a micro- or macro-based approach is assumed, there is some consensus 
that banking regulation is based on objectives. In theory and practice, however, there is 
disagreement as to what causes and objectives exist. Based on the considerations discussed 
above, there are four major bank regulatory objectives: consumer protection, the safety and 
soundness of banks, the safety and soundness of the banking system and monetary control. 
Furthermore, these four objectives can be systematised with respect to the micro- and macro-
based approaches. In this connection, the micro-based approach is typically justified by 
consumer protection and the safety and soundness of banks. Conversely, the macro-based 
approach justifies bank regulation on the basis of monetary control and the protection of the 
safety and soundness of the banking system, where the latter is understood as the major macro-
economic reason for bank regulation. In the normative approach, the repercussion of market 
failures in efficiency is shown based on micro- and macro-based objective rationales. To that 
end, regulatory measures in the banking industry should lead, in principle, to positive 
improvements in efficiency (see Bernet 2005). The micro- and macro-based features are 
mutually interrelated, which may mean that individual objectives reinforce or trade-off with 
The macro-based approach focuses on limiting the risk of episodes of system-wide distress 
(systemic risk) that have significant costs for the economy as a whole. 
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one another in practice. For example, on the one hand, bank regulation increases the safety and 
soundness of banks and reduces the risk of system-wide shocks. On the other hand, more 
regulation, such as stricter capital and liquidity standards, simultaneously represents an entry 
barrier85 to new entrants that can lead to less competition due to cost pressure (see Bernet 2005). 
 
2.2.1. Consumer protection as a rationale of bank regulation 
 
The majority of German-language literature discusses the protection of the small depositor as 
the main argument to justify government intervention through bank regulation. Consumer 
protection refers to protecting the underlying trust of consumers against misuse or malfunction. 
In particular, ‘small depositors’ and institutional clients (such as pension funds), which together 
provide a bank with available liquid deposits, are affected. The economic literature on consumer 
protection examines bank regulation in terms of market failure through asymmetric information 
and externalities. The starting point of consumer protection is whether an intervention addresses 
market failures. In this regard, Goodhart et al. (1998) suggest that consumer protection arises 
for two reasons: (1) because the bank where clients hold their deposits fails ‘externality’, that 
is, the ‘theory of market failure’, or (2) because of the adverse selection of a bank by its clients 
or the inability of consumers (less knowledge) to monitor the bank, that is, ‘asymmetric 
information’. Therefore, the information economy is crucial. With regard to the information 
asymmetry discussed above in section 2.1.2 between the client (depositor, investor and so on) 
and the bank, in addition to its position as a lender and the bank itself, the lender hardly appears 
to be in a position to make claims against the bank's assets at an affordable price. This reasoning 
justifies the argument for bank regulation for purposes of consumer protection.  
As a practical example to explain consumer protection, we can use FinSA, which is 
equivalent to MiFID II. The starting point for this regulatory measure is market failure, which 
results from asymmetric information between the consumer and the bank; for example, the 
market for financial services had low transparency in the financial crisis of 2007–2009 (see 
FDF 2013, Eggen and Dorner 2014). To solve the problem of market failure, the FinSA will 
help to ensure the following: (1) the customer will be better informed about financial products 
and thus protected, and (2) the competitiveness of the Swiss banking industry will be 
                                                          
85 In this dissertation, we follow the definition regarding ‘entry barrier’ of Porter (1980) and Viscusi et al. (1998: 
60) that (1) an ‘entry barrier can be thought of as something that makes entry more costly or more difficult’. In 
other words, new banks that bring new capacity and often resources are bid through prices and bank regulation. 
Thus, bank regulation is a threat of entry into the banking industry that is present, ‘coupled with the reaction from 
existing competitors [(banks)] that the entrant can expect’ (Porter 1980: 7). 
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strengthened (see FDF 2013, Eggen and Dorner 2014).86 In this case, banks must offer the 
customer a comprehensive prospectus for securities in the future. In addition, banks must create 
a key investor information document (KIID) and a prospectus for complex financial products 
that are traded in Switzerland or that originate in Switzerland. In addition to standardisation, 
this requirement should achieve a better comparability of investment opportunities between 
suppliers,87 that is, a ‘level playing field’. Clients should be offered a better calculation in the 
future with the help of a KIID such that they are better informed regarding the returns, risks and 
costs of financial services. In other words, more transparency should protect the client more 
effectively. 
Nevertheless, the economic consideration, combined with the history of a depositor’s 
losses, explains much of the public pressure for banking regulation to protect consumers (see 
Meltzer 1967). 
 
2.2.2. Safety and soundness of banks as a rationale of bank regulation 
 
One of the major components of existing bank regulation is justified in terms of the 
consideration of the safety and soundness of banks (see Baltensperger and Dermine 1987, 
Baltensperger 1990). In other words, if a failure in the safety and soundness of banks justifies 
regulatory measures, what are the major causes or threats to the safety and soundness of banks? 
In the literature, we identified the following three major factors affecting the safety and 
soundness of banks: the safety and soundness of bank services, macroeconomic externalities 
and bank runs. In what follows, we briefly describe the major factors that have justified bank 
regulation in this area. 
 
Safety and soundness of bank services 
 
In theory, maintaining the safety and soundness of banks is justified by the necessity of having 
functional and robust fundamental bank services. In other words, banks and their services are 
essential facets for the smooth functioning of the economy. Hence, a failure in bank services 
might disrupt other sectors in the economy, leading to demand for bank regulation to avoid 
these distortions. Although bank services are interrelated, it is helpful and convenient to 
                                                          
86 In theory and practice, how the FinSA better protects customers and improves the competitiveness of the Swiss 
financial industry remains the subject of debate (see PwC 2014, SBA 2015). 
87 In this context, in the future, external asset managers should be treated the same as banks. 
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distinguish them into the following four categories: asset services, liability services, 
transformation services and payment services (see Fama 1980, Baltensperger 1990, Goodhart 
et al. 1998, Jordan 2010).  
 
• Asset services consist of the funding, evaluation, granting and monitoring of loans and 
investments. Thereby, the bank acts as a delegated monitor and an efficient allocation 
mechanism. 
• Liability services consist of accepting deposits and controlling maturity transformations 
between liabilities and assets. 
• Transformation services can be divided into maturity transformation, risk transformation 
and pooling and subdividing shares. 
• Payment services involve managing and facilitating the payment system in the economy. 
 
In light of these four bank services, the threat of a failure in asset services, liability services, 
transformation services and payment services justifies bank regulation. This is particularly true 
in terms of the threat of a potential market failure in risk-sharing services (transformation 
services) in monitoring and information-related services related to loans and mortgages (asset 
services) (see Fama 1980, Baltensperger 1990). Furthermore, as Baltensperger (1990: 4) has 
posited, ‘the recent literature on insurance and monitoring services shows that the contract that 
emerges – illiquid loans financed by short-term deposits [(deposits create loans)] – creates a 
potential market failure’ that also justifies government intervention.  
Nevertheless, two other independent explanations are discussed in the literature 
regarding the safety and soundness of banks, that is, macroeconomic externalities and bank 
runs. Next, we briefly elucidate these two explanations. 
 
Macroeconomic externalities 
 
One source of market failure is that the insolvency of numerous small and medium-sized banks 
or of an SIB can lead to macroeconomic externalities (see Stillhart 2002). On the one hand, as 
we noted in section 2.1.2, in the presence of a bank failure, credit information will be lost in the 
market. Therefore, borrowers must take out new loans under unattractive conditions, which 
means that ‘[m]ore expensive credit terms [are offered that] imply lower investment and 
[possibly] unemployment’ (Baltensperger 1990: 5). On the other hand, a bank failure can 
potentially lead to substantial social costs for the real economy. Likewise, Calomiris (1999: 
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1501) indicated that ‘banks suffer special risks and that their distress entails special social 
costs’. In this context, a bank failure – particularly the failure of an SIB – can have substantial 
spillover effects for the real economy because of banks’ unique positioning in terms of the 
provision of credit and the smooth functioning of the payment system (see Calomiris 1999). 
However, according to Baltensperger and Siebke (1991) and Stillhart (2002), this consideration 
may be limited. Thus, in this context, Baltensperger and Siebke (1991: 5) suggest, first, that ‘a 
large failure is an extraordinary event which does not warrant permanent interventions, 
especially in view of the regulatory costs involved. The second is that insolvent banks are taken 
over by other banks in most cases, precisely to avoid the costs due to losses of information’. 
With regard to the first point, we agree that a large failure is an extraordinary event but believe 
that a well-designed regulatory framework can mitigate the possibilities of such an 
extraordinary event and the enormous costs that can occur with such an event (such as 
substantial spillover effects to other sectors, disruptions in payment systems, and costly 
systemic bank runs (see Calomiris 1999)). In relation to the second point, insolvent banks are 
in most cases taken over by other banks; however, in times of financial distress, banks 
sometimes do not take over other institutions. For example, in the most recent financial crisis, 
no bank took over certain institutions such as Lehman Brothers (although Bear Stearns was sold 
to JPMorgan Chase). Therefore, it is desirable to have an effective regulatory system to combat 
macroeconomic externalities as a source of market failure. Consequently, macroeconomic 
externalities from bank failures are one explanation to justify permanent banking regulation. 
Next, we address the bank run argument. 
 
Bank run 
 
The second possible source of market failure that has been formalised by Diamond and Dybvig 
(1983) is the bank run argument. In general, ‘[b]ank runs are a common feature of the extreme 
crises that have played a prominent role in monetary history’ (Diamond and Dybvig 1983: 401). 
In this regard, the most famous bank run occurred in the United States during the Great 
Depression of the 1930s. Moreover, a few other recent examples are (1) Northern Rock and 
Bear Stearns (interbank and investors’ run) during the financial crisis of 2007–2009; (2) 
IndyMac Bank (mortgage loan run) in 2008 at the time of the largest failed bank resolution for 
the FDIC (USD 32 million); (3) the Bank of Cyprus in 2012; and (4) Greek banks (for instance, 
the National Bank of Greece) in 2015. Bank runs are by definition ‘caused by depositors trying 
to get out, avoiding a loss of capital’ (Diamond and Dybvig 1986: 63). In other words, a bank 
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run consists of the risk that lenders run to withdraw their deposits under the sequential service 
constraint (see Diamond and Dybvig 1983, Gorton 1985). The explanation for the bank run 
phenomenon extends back to Bagehot (2005 [1920]). Bagehot (2005 [1920]: 45) noted that the 
use of credit ‘enables debtors to use a certain part of the money their creditors have lent them. 
If all those creditors demand all that money at once, they cannot have it, for that which their 
debtors have used, is for the time employed, and not to be obtained’. However, the traditional 
explanation for a bank run is based on (1) the illiquid structure of a bank’s balance sheet 
(maturity mismatch) because bank loans are invested (in mortgages and so forth) for several 
years and cannot be withdrawn by lenders as quickly as possible in liquid assets (in particular 
cash) (see Admati and Hellwig 2013); (2) ‘[d]epositors' lack of information about bank 
portfolios’ (Calomiris 1999: 1502); and (3) depositors' behaviour with respect to the confidence 
that the bank can redeem all its liabilities upon request (see Diamond and Dybvig 1983, Dale 
1984, Guttentag and Herring 1987, Dewatripont and Tirole 1994). In this regard, a bank run 
can be systematised from both a micro-based and a macro-based perspective. A micro-based 
view will consider a single run on an individual bank, whereas a macro-based view will 
investigate a system-wide run as a source of contagion that affects the system as a whole.  
Let us consider a bank run without contagion effects. A single run can lead to the 
premature withdrawal of liquid liabilities. It may be that the bank can no longer pay its debts 
because of its lack of liquidity, which means that the bank can no longer perform its functions 
(for example, asset services) (see Diamond and Dybvig 1983). In other words, a single run can 
lead to a bank’s failure. However, the failure of a single bank is not the real problem because a 
single run – as opposed to a system-wide run – poses no threat to a country’s entire economy. 
This process corresponds to the natural selection mechanism of the market. Based on this 
principle, no bank regulation is required to prevent a single bank run. However, the situation is 
different for a bank run on an SIB for an economy. In this regard, a single run on an SIB is a 
threat to a country’s entire economy. Thus, the government will do everything in its power to 
rescue the bank to prevent a single run (see Birchler et al. 2010, IMF 2014). The situation is 
analogous to a system-wide run. In this context, the focal bank’s depositors can affect depositors 
at other banks with the same portfolio in a phenomenon known as the ‘homogeneity 
assumption’.88 Contagion effects can thus affect the stability of the entire banking system. The 
goal of bank regulation is thus to prevent a run across several banks that together reach a level 
                                                          
88 The homogeneity assumption indicates that bank depositors’ close transactions feature comparable risks with 
other banks due to the homogeneous facade of banks’ business policies, which can lead to contagion (see Burghof 
and Rudolph 1996). 
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that threatens the survival of the banks and the banking system. Section 2.2.3 discusses the 
contagion effects in the banking industry. In the literature, a bank run can result from the loss 
of depositor confidence in a bank; however, because we know that a run does not necessarily 
signal a lack of confidence, we also know that there are several other causes that can trigger a 
bank run. For the sake of simplicity, we divide the causes of bank runs into four categories: 
runs of fundamental, speculative, explained and unexplained natures (see Fischel et al. 1987, 
Theurl 2001, Tirole 2002). 
A fundamental view of bank runs might be the problem of asymmetric information (for 
example, regarding the liquidity and solvency of a bank) or negative developments affecting a 
bank (for example, observable macroeconomic shocks89 in banks) (see Diamond 1984, Gorton 
1985, Guttentag and Herring 1987, Theurl 2001, Tirole 2002). In this regard, depositors cannot 
readily estimate the quality of the assets and liabilities of a bank to assess the security or 
insecurity of the bank (the likelihood of failure).  
In contrast to fundamental reasons, speculative reasons for a bank run can connect back 
to depositor expectations (see Brunnermeier 2009a). Depositors who expect that other 
depositors will withdraw their deposits from the bank can initiate a so-called ‘self-fulfilling 
crisis’. To expand on this point, Brunnermeier (2009a: 95) suggests that ‘[i]n a classic bank 
every investor has an incentive to preempt others and run to the bank. A first-mover advantage 
triggers a dynamic preemption motive’ because banks operate on a ‘sequential service 
constraint’. 
A bank run might result from depositors’ unexplained panic ‘phobias’ (‘if depositors do 
not panic, I have no reason to panic’ (Tirole 2002: 45)). The panic view can lead, on the one 
hand, to an inefficient allocation of resources and risks and, on the other hand, to a greater risk 
of banking crises and panic reactions that can initiate the so-called ‘panic-based crisis’. 
However, the panic view has been criticised as lacking predictive power (see Tirole 2002). 
Therefore, models (for example, Rochet and Vives 2008) have been developed that may predict 
unique outcomes (panic or no panic). 
Moreover, a bank run can be based on an explicable matter, or so-called ‘rational 
behaviour’. Gorton (1985) and Jacklin and Bhattacharya (1988) were some of the first studies 
to examine information-based bank runs (see Stillhart 2002). A depositor may be fully informed 
of his/her demand deposits and have the knowledge to use information about other banks to 
                                                          
89 Observable macroeconomic shocks in banks are understood as high annual losses, rumours of high risks or 
potential losses (Guttentag and Herring 1987). In this case, the banking industry’s low capitalisation and poor risk 
management expose governments to large implicit liabilities (see Tirole 2002). 
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evaluate his/her own portfolio. Following the perfect information, the depositor can estimate 
the expected loss of a bank and withdraw deposits before a bank reaches a financial distress 
situation (for instance, temporary liquidity problems). In this sense, depositors tend to withdraw 
deposits faster than in conditions involving asymmetric information because of expected capital 
losses (Gorton 1985, Allenspach 2009). ‘At this stage, allowing for some degree of opacity – 
or in some cases even complete opacity – may keep depositors from running the bank and may 
thus prevent the inefficient liquidation of this bank’ (Allenspach 2009: 3).90 In other words, 
enhancing transparency may increase the likelihood of bank runs before a bank finds itself in 
probable financial distress. In light of this characteristic, it is important to consider this point 
when assessing regulatory actions. 
 
2.2.3. Safety and soundness of the banking system as a rationale of bank regulation 
 
One of the major elements of current bank regulation is the safety and soundness of the banking 
system (see Baltensperger and Dermine 1987, Baltensperger 1990). Before government 
intervention is justified to maintain the stability of the banking industry, the concept of stability 
should be explained. In this context, we ask the following two questions: 
 
• What is meant by the term ‘financial stability’ in the banking industry? 
• What does the term ‘systemic risk’ mean for the banking industry? 
 
‘[S]ince financial stability as a public policy objective has risen to prominence, efforts to define 
it have multiplied’ (Borio and Drehmann 2009: 3). Defining the notion of stability has proven 
to be relatively difficult because (1) there is no consensus at either the national or international 
levels, apart from general objectives; (2) financial stability cannot be numerically91 
approximated in terms of a generally agreed upon index; and (3) directional, rather than 
                                                          
90 Inefficient liquidation lies in the nature of deposit contracts (see Diamond and Dybvig 1983). 
91 Adrian and Brunnermeier (2016) identify a possible approach to measure systemic risk, namely, the CoValue at 
Risk, which focuses on the contribution of a database to systemic risk. In current practice, the risk of an individual 
bank is measured using the value at risk (VaR) method under Basel II (see Crockett 2000, Brunnermeier 2009a, 
Borio and Drehmann 2009, Galati and Moessner 2011). The VaR measure is the standard instrument for the risk 
management of a bank and measures the expected maximum loss that will not be exceeded with a certain 
probability within a certain time horizon and a given confidence interval (see Jorion 1997). In other words, ‘VaR 
measures – estimates of the probability of losses which could be incurred before positions can be closed – play a 
central role’ (Turner 2009: 58). VaR models are designed to estimate potential losses in given portfolios by means 
of several fluctuations (for example, interest rates and exchange rates) via the direct application of historical data 
(see Goodhart et al. 1998). Therefore, the VaR is a historical data-driven simulation and represents the economy 
with some theoretical restrictions. The problem is that the VaR captures an individual bank's risk in isolation and 
may be effective for micro-based – but not macro-based – regulation (see Brunnermeier 2009a). 
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absolute, terms are often used, such as ‘to promote’, ‘to support’ or ‘to endeavour to achieve’ 
(see BIS 2011, Galati and Moessner 2011, SBA 2011).92 However, ‘[m]ost definitions of 
financial stability share three useful elements. First, they focus on the financial system as a 
whole’ (Borio and Drehmann 2009: 4). Second, they do not consider individual banks but rather 
measure economic activity (for example, benefits and costs in terms of economic activity such 
as real GDP) (see Crockett 2000, Borio and Drehmann 2009).93 Third, ‘they make an explicit 
reference to financial instability, the converse of stability, which is more concrete and 
observable’ (Borio and Drehmann 2009: 4). An alternative approach to a definition of this term 
is based on the understanding provided by the Bank for International Settlements (BIS), which 
draws upon the basic idea of Milton Friedman (1962). Friedman (1962) assumed that the safety 
of banks relies on the claim of the ‘inherent instability’ of the banking system. Therefore, the 
instability of the banking industry plays a critical role in the security of a bank. As a result, the 
BIS (2011) – and Friedman (1962) – assume the mirror image of stability, namely, the absence 
of stability. Minsky (1982: 13) defines financial instability as ‘a process in which rapid and 
accelerating changes in the prices of assets (both financial and capital) take place relative to the 
prices of current output’. An alternative definition is that the absence of stability is a 
consequence of systemic risk. In this context, a question arises regarding the meaning of 
systemic risk. 
In a contemporary context, ‘the term systemic risk belongs to the standard rhetoric of 
economic policy discussions related to the banking industry’ (Summer, 2002: 6). Although 
systemic risk is one of the most popular terms in the bank regulation debate, there is no precise 
definition, only a vague understanding that there are special problems from the linkages of 
different banks (see Summer 2002). In short, it is unclear what systemic risk means (see Hellwig 
1997). Therefore, to fill the gap in the literature, we elaborate a possible definition of systemic 
risk. However, before we define the term systemic risk, it is useful to understand what a system 
is because it is not otherwise clear what systemic risk is (see Zigrand 2014).94 The economic 
literature refers to a number of systems, including price systems and payment systems. The 
price system depends on prices’ ‘numeration system’, whereas the payment system depends on 
                                                          
92 No numerical term is ‘available to understand how much promoting, supporting or endeavouring is intended’ 
(BIS 2011: 28). 
93 According to the IMF, the direct costs of banking crises are high and were above 10 per cent in more than a 
dozen cases in the past (see Crockett 2000). 
94 This dissertation follows Zigrand’s (2014: 3) argumentation of ‘systemic risk as a concept distinct from 
‘aggregate risk’ or ‘systematic risk’ even if a commonly accepted definition of systemic is lacking’. In the past, 
systematic risk has been determined with two mechanisms, namely, the domino effect and asymmetric information 
(see Hellwig 2010a). 
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bilateral payments and settlement arrangements. This dissertation focuses on the banking 
system. A set of deposit-taking banks 
 
‛becomes a banking system in the modern era only if the banks have a fundamental reference to a central bank. 
For one, banks rely on the central bank for liquidity. Since banks are required to convert deposits and credits into 
central bank money at the simple request of depositors or creditors, there is a permanent reference to central bank 
money and therefore the central bank [..]. Banks also rely on a central payment and clearing system’ (Zigrand 
2014: 53).  
 
In short, the banking system depends on banks and their main functions in relation to the central 
bank, and the decision of the system (payment system or banking system) determines the 
systemic risk. Thus, the systemic risk is a result of the malfunctioning of banks in relation to 
the central bank.95 
The question arises regarding the type of risks that exist in the banking system. In 
general, the banking system can be affected exogenously, such as through an oil shock, a 
mortgage shock and so forth. Moreover, the banking system can be affected by banks 
(endogenous risk). Failure in bank functions and new technologies such as securitisation (for 
example, synthetic securitisation as a result of capital relief) and, in the future, financial 
technology (FinTech) enhance risk feedback loops and contagion, which can spiral out of 
control and impede the smooth functioning of the banking system. In other words, endogenous 
risk is the likelihood that the potential shocks of banks will spread throughout the banking 
system and ‘has the potential to have serious negative consequences for the real economy’ (FSB 
2009: 2). This spreading effect is commonly called ‘contagion’. Although various economists 
have attempted to formulate a contemporary definition of systemic risk, the basic concept goes 
back to Bagehot (2005 [1920]). Bagehot (2005 [1920]: 91) noted  
 
‘that our industrial organisation is liable not only to irregular external accidents [(exogenous)], but likewise to 
regular internal changes [(endogenous)]; that these changes make our credit system much more delicate at some 
times than others; and that it is the recurrence of these periodical seasons of delicacy which has given rise to the 
notation that panics come according to a fixed rule’. 
 
Given these considerations, one possible definition of systemic risk in the banking 
industry could be the following:  
                                                          
95 Hellwig (2009: 133) notes that systemic risk is ‘risk that has little to do with the intrinsic solvency of the debtors 
and a lot to do with the functioning – or malfunctioning – of the financial system’. 
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Sources: Authors’ own elaboration based on Bagehot (2005 [1920]), Dewatripont and Tirole (1994), Summer 
(2002), IMF (2013), and Zigrand (2014).  
 
Exogenous risks are difficult or even impossible to regulate because each crisis is different and 
has a different trigger. However, endogenous risks, as we have seen in the previous chapters, 
can be regulated, even new technologies in the form of adequate general principles that are 
neutral and do not harm innovation. Risk feedback loops and contagion effects are essential to 
understand systemic risk in the banking sector and to regulate it properly. Therefore, we 
describe a simplified risk feedback loop and the resulting contagion effect. Risk feedback loops 
are characterised by five phases: starting phase 1 (initial losses); phase 2 (a capital effect that 
increases the risk); phase 3 (the synchronised selling of risk; in the extreme, a fire sale); phase 
4 (adverse price effect); and phase 5 (losses on positions), which loops back to phase 2. Figure 
2.6 presents an overview of the five phases with respect to the balance sheet structure of bank 
B1. Consider a representative bank B1 and a number of banks B
N on the mortgage market within 
four time periods t = 0, 1, 2, 3. Our representative bank B1 has the characteristic of an SIB. The 
balance sheet structure is described as follows. The asset side consists of CHF 40,000 million 
reserves96 because bank B1 must hold reserves in the form of bank coins, bank notes and sight 
deposits at the central bank to fulfil the statutory minimum reserve requirements. Moreover, the 
bank holds CHF 10,000 million in various currencies and CHF 450,000 million loans in the 
form of mortgages. In other words, the asset side consists of many illiquid mortgages (CHF 
450,000 million) and few liquid reserves and currency (CHF 50,000 million). Conversely, the 
liability side of the balance sheet consists of CHF 450,000 million deposits and CHF 50,000 
million in equity. Thus, deposits are the bank's principal liability, including interbank deposits 
and funds collected from households and firms. Furthermore, with respect to the balance sheet 
structure, the liability side is more liquid than the asset side. 
Let us suppose in period t1 an initial mortgage-related security shock of five per cent 
(see phase 1). Bank B1 cannot obtain new funding to replace earlier borrowing, which will have 
four effects. The asset shock leads to an immediate corrective action on the asset side. 
According to fair value accounting or mark to market (see Hellwig 2009, 2010b), bank B1 must 
                                                          
96 We assume a reserve ratio of eight per cent. In general, the reserve ratios are one per cent in Europe (ECB), 2.5 
per cent in Switzerland (SNB) and 10 per cent in the United States (Fed). 
Systemic risk includes the exogenous risk to the smooth functioning of the banking system 
as well the risk created endogenously by the banking system.  
 
that leads to the simultaneous failure of many banks.  
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write down mortgages (price) from CHF 450,000 million (book value) to CHF 425,000 million 
(fair value) (∆ CHF 25,000 million). 
 
Figure 2.6 Risk feedback loop on the mortgage market for bank B 
 
Source: Authors’ own elaboration based on Brunnermeier and Pederson (2009). 
 
Consequently, the balance sheet shrinks from CHF 500,000 million to CHF 475,000 million. 
To equalise the balance sheet, shrinking bank B1 begins to deleverage on the liability side (see 
phase 2). Thus, the bank equity declines from CHF 50,000 million to CHF 25,000 million (∆ 
CHF 25,000 million). However, this effect increases the expected risk of further mortgage 
defaults. As a result, bank B1 increases the interest rate on mortgages. Simultaneously, a number 
of banks BN take similar corrective actions (synchronised selling of risk; in the extreme, a fire 
sale)97 that can result in contagion effects on the banking system (see phase 3). Given higher 
                                                          
97 Rationality should be questioned because individuals and banks can predict that they will act rationally in 
maximising their profits or reducing their losses. However, for the entire economy, such as in the financial crisis 
in 2007, individual rationality can lead to collective irrational behaviour and can harm the economy (as in the case 
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interest rates, householders with low income have difficulties or cannot afford to pay back their 
mortgage. Therefore, low-income householders must sell their houses. Consequently, housing 
prices drop with respect to increasing mortgage rates (adverse price effect) (see phase 4). Thus, 
from period t1 to period t2, adverse price effects create an additional impairment on mortgage 
positions from CHF 425,000 million (book value) to CHF 403,750 million (fair value) (∆ CHF 
21,250 million) (see phase 5). Further, bank B1 continues to deleverage. Thus, equity declines 
from CHF 25,000 million to CHF 3,850 million (∆ CHF 21,250 million) (see phase 2). This 
downward spiral continues into period t3.  In t3, bank B1 has no equity available to equalise the 
shrinking of the balance sheet. Therefore, bank B1 equalises the mortgage losses with their 
liquid assets (currency); however, this leads to a liquidity problem. Assume now that lenders, 
investors and other banks (such as B2 and B3) recognise that bank B1 is in a financial distress 
situation (liquidity problem). Consequently, they begin to withdraw their deposits from bank 
B1, and our illiquid bank B1 struggles with a solvency problem.
98 However, these withdrawals 
by other banks lead to spill-over effects on the banking sector because of the interconnectedness 
of the banking sector. In other words, a special feature of the banking sector is the 
interconnection (‘too interconnected’) of the contractual relations of bank participants within 
the clearing and settlement system, or the monetary and credit system on the interbank market 
(see Amara 2005, IMF 2014). In this case, banks play an important role. Figure 2.7 provides an 
example of our representative bank B1 in relation to bank B2 on the interbank market. On the 
interbank market, bank B1 can offer funding in exchange for the securities of bank B2 for a 
given period of time and vice versa (see point one and point two in Figure 2.7). In this case, 
securities must be transferred from the paying bank B1 to the receiving bank B2. In modern 
banking, this principle is defined as ‘delivery versus payment’ and is linked to the security 
transfer system and the funding transfer system (see Committee on Payment and Settlements 
2003, Rossi 2007). Borio (2003) suggests that the key channel to understanding the 
transmission of market failure in the banking industry is the interconnectedness of banks on the 
interbank market (for example, in their gross positions with one another in clearing systems and 
in interbank deposits) because it is much stronger in the banking industry than in other 
industries. Thus, the failure of a single bank B1 could spread to bank B2, which has large credit 
exposures to the failing bank B1 through corresponding deposits, and could spread to other 
banks in a similar manner. 
                                                          
of a fire-sale mechanism during a financial crisis). In other words, individual rationality does not enhance 
collective rationality (see Turner 2009). We call this effect ‘the irrational hypothesis’. This hypothesis has not been 
further investigated, and further academic research would therefore be desirable. 
98 Chapter 7 describes the solvency state of nature. 
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Figure 2.7 An example of interbank relationships 
 
Source:  Authors’ own elaboration.  
 
The failure of one bank on the interbank market can directly cause immediate losses in other 
interconnected banks and can have substantial spillover effects in other industries (see Bagehot 
2005 [1920], Diamond and Dybvig 1983, Brunnermeier et al. 2009).99 
 
Figure 2.8  The domino model of bank contagion 
 
Source: Authors’ own elaboration.  
 
This contagion effect is illustrated in Figure 2.8 with the example of ‘domino’ models. In fact, 
this domino effect ‘happened to the UK Bank Northern Rock, which failed in 2007, as well as 
                                                          
99 The idea of contagion was likely mentioned the first time by Walter Bagehot (2005 [1920]). In this context 
Bagehot (2005 [1920]: 93) indicated that ‘no single industry can be depressed without injury to other industries, 
still less can any great group of industries. Each industry when prosperous buys and consumes the produce 
probably of most (certainly of very many) other industries, and if industry A fail and is in difficulty, industries B, 
and C, and D, which used to sell to it, will not be able to sell that which they had produced in reliance on A’s 
demand, and in future they will stand idle till industry A recovers, because in default of A there will be no one to 
buy the commodities which they create. Then as industry B buys of C, D, etc., the adversity of B tells on C, D, 
etc., and as these buy of E, F, etc.’. 
The economic rationale and objectives of bank regulation   69 
 
 
 
the US securities houses Bear Stearns and Lehman Brothers [(NBFI)], both of which suffered 
crippling runs in 2008’ (Brunnermeier et al. 2009: 15). Despite the convincing arguments, there 
are also criticisms of domino effects in banking. Based on a large number of simulations of 
central banks, it has been found that the domino effect has only a minimal influence and plays 
only a minor role in crises (see Brunnermeier et al. 2009). For this reason, Brunnermeier (2009a: 
18) suggests that ‘the key to understanding the events of the global liquidity and credit crunch 
in 2007-8 is to follow the reactions of the financial institutions themselves to price changes, and 
to shifts in the measured risks’, as shown in the risk feedback loop. 
Summarising the above-described consideration of systemic risk, banking stability 
might be understood as follows: 
 
 
 
Sources: Authors’ own elaboration based on Borio and Drehmann (2009), BIS (2011), Galati and Moesner (2011), 
and SBA (2011). 
 
In summary, bank regulation can be explained as mitigating the exogenous and endogenous 
risks of the banking industry, where exogenous risk could be a macroeconomic shock and 
endogenous risk could be a potential failure in bank functions and new technologies. 
 
2.2.4. Monetary control as a rationale of bank regulation 
 
In the literature, it is assumed that the money stock and the price level without bank regulation 
will feature an excessive amount of variability and that the costs for the economy as a whole 
will be enormous because (1) financial intuitions will create money in the form of bank deposits 
and other liabilities (near-monies) (see Baltensperger and Dermine 1987) and (2) banks 
participate in the money creation process and thus inject undesirable instability into the 
monetary system (via unexpected reserve behaviour) (Baltensperger and Dermine 1987, 
Baltensperger 1990). Therefore, the banking system requires bank regulation in the form of 
reserve requirements100 to mitigate the excessive amount of variability and costs for the 
                                                          
100 In the literature, one common misconception is that minimum reserves are a monetary policy instrument 
because (1) ‘minimum-reserve requirements came to be widely (but falsely) regarded as 'classical' tools of 
monetary policy’ because a change in reserve requirements changes the demand for reserves but not the money 
supply and the interest rates (Niehans 1983: 546); (2) in 1996, the governor of the BoE, Eddie George, backed up 
his view that setting minimum reserves is not part of the objective of monetary policy, as there is no monetary 
policy justification for such reserves (see FAZ 1996)—likewise, Ruckriegel et al. (2000) note that such reserve 
requirements are more indicative of a regulatory policy than of a monetary policy—and (3) minimum reserve 
The term banking stability is understood to mean the smooth functioning of the robustness 
of the banking system in financial distress. 
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economy. Although the money supply and price stability might be enhanced by reserve 
requirements, minimum reserve regulations are a matter of controversy both in theory and 
practice. Moreover, there are various discussions regarding the merits of a ‘high minimum 
reserve’ and a ‘fractional reserve’ banking system. Advocates for a fractional reserve banking 
system argue that such a system may be better in terms of the variability of the reserves, 
although this approach is also a source of negative externalities and increasing instability in the 
money supply (see Baltensperger 1990). Furthermore, such a system can prevent ‘fluctuations 
in business activity and problems at individual banks from interrupting the flow of transactions 
across the economy and threatening public confidence in the banking system’ (Spong 1994: 7). 
In a nutshell, it is not easy to choose between a fractional reserve and a high minimum reserve 
system because both systems have advantages and disadvantages. In this context, the 
advantages and disadvantages of both systems should be compared in terms of their practical 
implementation. Further, advocates for schemes involving minimum reserves typically make 
one of the following three arguments.  
First, certain economists suggest that reserve requirements are necessary to control  
money and price levels (Greenbaum and Thakor 2007 [1995]). However, Baltensperger (1991: 
15) notes that ‘in any reasonable model of the economy, the money stock and the price level 
are determinate and finite even in the absence of legal reserve requirements’. For this reason, 
reserve requirements are not a necessary condition to control money and price levels and can 
be replaced by other measures of monetary policy, such as open market operations (OMOs).101 
By contrast and in accordance with Art. 4 of the NBA (2016 [2003]), minimum reserves (both 
cash and reserves) for refinancing at the central bank and at the bank note monopoly (central 
bank money) together form the money supply, M0, ‘so that the monetary policy can utilize 
measures of the central bank, in particular the open market operations’ (Ruckriegel et al. 2000: 
316; trans.). Thus, minimum reserves cannot be replaced by other measures of monetary policy. 
 Second, ‘as long as the bank keeps enough reserves to cover the withdrawals of the 
depositors who actually need their money, which is much less than the total amount of deposits, 
the system can function smoothly and efficiently’ (Rochet 2008a: 24). Thus, high minimum 
                                                          
requirements are considered as administrative tasks rather than as monetary policy tasks because setting 
requirements is an administrative act (see Hellwig 2014a). Therefore, minimum reserve requirements will be 
viewed in this dissertation as a regulatory policy measure rather than as a monetary policy measure and will be 
subsumed under monetary control because the reserve limits restrain economic decision-making and the freedom 
of banks (see also Baltensperger and Dermine 1987, Greenbaum and Thakor 20007 [1995]). 
101 ‘An open market operation is the purchase or sale of securities or other claims on the money market or capital 
market by a central bank. […]. The SNB mainly uses open market operations, which belong to the monetary policy 
instruments, to manage the monetary base and thereby implement its monetary policy. Open market operations of 
practical relevance for the SNB include repo transactions, foreign exchange market interventions, foreign 
exchange swaps and securities transactions’ (SNB 2015c: Internet, see also section 7.1). 
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reserves represent a balance with demand deposits and contribute to the stability of the banking 
industry as a result. Nonetheless, this assumption is not true in practice for two reasons. First, 
Diamond and Dybvig (1986) and Rochet (2008a: 24) note that ‘the system is intrinsically 
fragile’ and that part of the long-term (illiquid) bank assets are tied to short-term (liquid) 
liabilities (such as maturity transformation). Second, according to Baltensperger (1991: 17), it 
is difficult to demonstrate the effects of high reserve requirements on the stability of the banking 
system because ‘the focus is shifted from short-run money stock stability to the stability of 
aggregate demand and the price level’. 
The third argument involves ‘the sharing of seigniorage on bank deposits between the 
central bank and the commercial banks. The higher the reserve requirement, the greater the 
share of seigniorage that flows to [..] [the SNB] and ultimately back to the [..] Treasury. Lower 
reserve requirements direct these monopoly profits to the privately owned banks’ (Greenbaum 
and Thakor 2007 [1995]: 472). Hence, reserve requirements (cash and reserves) can be thought 
of as a tax or a subsidy on banks depending on the claim to deposit seigniorage (see Greenbaum 
and Thakor 2007 [1995]). 
 
2.3. The alternative bank regulatory view 
 
2.3.1. The safety and soundness of bank services 
 
Following the outbreak of the 2007–2009 financial crisis, certain economists such as Werner 
(2014: 1) indicated 
 
‘that the most widely used macroeconomic models and finance theories did not provide an adequate description 
of crucial features of our economies and financial systems, and, most notably, failed to include banks. These bank-
less dominant theories are likely to have influenced bank regulators and may thus have contributed to sub-optimal 
bank regulation’. 
 
In other words, bank regulators design regulations based on the assumption that the financial 
intermediary theory of banking is correct (see section 1.1.1). However, if the underlying theory 
is flawed, then current bank regulations regarding the safety and soundness of bank services 
– including those in the Basel III Accord – would be questionable. Consequently, it is important 
for both scholars and policy makers to determine which theory accurately describes reality 
because the wrong regulatory measures might be otherwise designed and chosen (see Werner 
2014, Rochon and Rossi 2016). Therefore, we formulate an alternative bank regulatory view 
The economic rationale and objectives of bank regulation   72 
 
 
 
that is drawn from the endogenous nature of money and credit. As we noted in section 1.1.2 
above, the decisive role of a bank is to provide two main functions, that is, asset services and 
payment services, as a result of the endogenous nature of credit and money. In light of these 
two bank services, a bank failure in one of them would justify regulatory measures, particularly 
in asset services. In this context, a failure in asset services, which covers failures in the 
evaluation, granting and monitoring of loans, mortgages, and investments, justifies regulatory 
measures in the banking sector. For a clearer understanding, the following example illuminates 
a failure in asset services. 
 
Figure 2.9 A potential source of market failure resulting from the payment of wages 
 
Sources: Adapted from Rossi (1998, 2007) and McLeay (2014). 
 
Assume that a set of firms F demands loans to pay out their wage earners W, as noted in section 
1.1.2. In the first step, bank B accommodates the loans according to the creditworthiness of 
firms F. In the second step, new loans on the asset side are created, and simultaneously, they 
are matched with the new deposits of wage earners W, which are created on the liability side of 
the bank balance sheet, as shown in Figure 2.9. Therefore, the bank creates its deposits in the 
act of lending (credit) as a result of credit demand. A failure in the lending process, such as the 
careless assessment of the firm’s creditworthiness (solvency state of nature) or risk assessment 
of the firms’ projects, justifies bank regulation. This approach can be used to explain one major 
cause of the most recent financial crisis, namely, the careless assessment in the securitisation 
process. The above-mentioned considerations lead to the conclusion that bank regulation 
regarding the safety and soundness of bank services should be focused on asset services, 
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particularly in the lending process that is driven by demand. In this context, a question arises as 
to what type of bank regulatory measure could prevent a banking crisis. 
One potential alternative regulatory measure that might be adequate involves asset-
based reserve requirements (ABRRs), which require banks to hold reserves against different 
classes of assets. ABRRs have the following advantages: (1) they are easy to implement; (2) 
they are compatible with current bank regulation (capital requirements); (3) they can improve 
the performance of monetary policy as a supplement of the short-term interest rate (see Palley 
2004, 2015); and (4) they can act as automatic stabilisers when asset values rise in price and/or 
with new structural products. The disadvantages of ABRRs include the following: (1) for 
purposes of an effective ABRR, a system-wide standard would be required that is difficult to 
implement politically, and (2) ABRRs would encourage banks to shift their lending outside of 
the banking industry, thereby promoting shadow banking (see Palley 2004, 2015). In examining 
these advantages and disadvantages, ABRRs appear to provide more benefits than costs; 
however, further academic research on the benefits and costs is needed in this regard.  
In addition to a potential failure in asset services, bank regulation is justified in the case 
of asymmetric information, bank runs and macroeconomic externalities. Although the rationale 
for bank regulation with respect to consumer protection remains as in the financial intermediary 
theory, the objective regarding the safety and soundness of the banking system can be explained 
in a different manner. In this regard, Hymen Minsky was one of the first economists to shed 
light on this issue. Therefore, next, we will briefly expand on Minsky’s approach.  
 
2.3.2. The safety and soundness of the banking system 
 
Minsky (1982: 63) recognised that if a crisis is not a rare event, then ‘it is reasonable to view 
financial crisis as systemic, rather than accidental’. In this context, Minsky (1977, 1982) 
elaborates the ‘financial instability hypothesis’ (FIH), which has empirical and theoretical 
elements. Hereafter, the focus is on the theoretical elements. In Minsky’s view, the FIH is an 
interpretation of Keynes’s ‘general theory’ to ‘understand Keynes [in] light of the crunches and 
other financial disturbances of the past decade’ (Minsky 1977: 6). In one sentence, the FIH 
states ‘that changes in cash-flow relations occur over a run of good (or tranquil) years and 
transform an initially robust financial system into a fragile financial system’ (Minsky 1982: 24). 
The starting point in explaining Minsky’s FIH follows from the individual consideration of 
expectations for funding behaviour. In other words, ‘the ability to debt finance new investment 
depends upon expectations that future investment will be high enough so that future cash flows 
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will be large enough for the debts that are issued today to be repaid or refinanced’ (Minsky 
1977: 12). Moreover, Minsky (1977) assumes that (1) demand is credit driven; (2) there is an 
initial stable relation between debt and income; (3) debt is a characteristic of the capitalist 
economy; (4) banking is a profit-seeking activity and strives for banking innovations, such as 
securitisation, to increase the ‘cash flows (or gross profits after out-of-pocket costs and taxes)’ 
(Minsky 1977: 10); and (5) there are three financing forms, namely, hedge finance, speculative 
finance and Ponzi finance (see Minsky 1977, 1982, 1992). In this regard, ‘hedge finance takes 
place when the cash flows from operations are expected to be large enough to meet the payment 
commitments on debts’ (Minsky 1977: 13). Thus, if a bank expects large enough cash flows 
from investment, it can invest more, and the leverage ratio increases (total debt (deposits) to 
total equity). ‘Speculative finance takes place when the cash flows from operations are not 
expected to be large enough to meet payment commitments, even though the present value of 
expected cash receipts is greater than the present value of payment commitments’ (Minsky 
1977: 13).102 Therefore, a ‘rollover’ of liabilities (deposits) occurs (transformation of liabilities 
to new liabilities). Ponzi finance is a situation in which ‘cash payment commitments on debt 
are met by increasing the amount of debt outstanding’ (Minsky 1977: 14). Thus, Ponzi financing 
is when outstanding debts are paid by issuing new debts. For example, suppose an interest rate 
is high and rising. In this context, higher interest rates force hedge financing into speculative 
financing and speculative financing into Ponzi financing, which leads to instability in the 
banking system (Minsky 1977, 1982, 1992). In short, an initially stable banking system turns 
the period of the financing regimes into an unstable system. Thus, we conclude that bank 
regulation should focus on mitigating risk in the three financing forms, particularly the form of 
speculative financing in Ponzi financing. With respect to the leverage ratio and minimum 
requirements for a rollover of liabilities, regulations would be desirable measures to mitigate 
the risk that an initially stable system turns into an unstable system. 
Next, we extend the FIH with the characteristics of the risk feedback loop in section 
2.2.3 in the mortgage market for bank B. Figure 2.10 describes the risk feedback loop in the 
mortgage market for bank B from the endogenous theory of credit and money. According to 
Figure 2.10, we assume a bank B with no pre-existing bank deposits in t0 (before mortgages are 
made). In a second step, the bank accommodates all mortgage demands regarding the 
creditworthiness of the house buyer (assets side). Thus, mortgages create bank deposits 
                                                          
102 Kaldor (1939: 1) defines speculation ‘as the purchase (or sale) of goods with a view to re-sale (re-purchase) at 
a later date, where the motive behind such action is the expectation of a change in the relevant prices relative to 
the ruling price and not a gain accruing through their use, or any kind of transformation effected in them or their 
transfer between different markets’. 
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(liability side) owned by the seller of the house (rather than the householder) from period t0 to 
period t1. In a third step, we assume an initial loss (shock on the mortgage market). The initial 
shock in t2 initiates the risk feedback loop, as we describe in section 2.2.3. In addition, the 
downward spiral is enhanced because of hedge financing, speculative financing and Ponzi 
financing. It should be noted that this enhancement in the risk feedback loop has not yet been 
proven and verified, which makes further analysis desirable in the literature.                                                                                                         
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2.4. Summary 
 
This chapter has shown that there are numerous reasons to justify government intervention in 
the banking industry. However, the problem with modern theories of bank regulation is that 
there is no consensus regarding why banks are regulated because (1) there is a lack of theoretical 
foundation; (2) there are numerous objectives; (3) the meanings of the objectives vary; and (4) 
the objectives cannot be classified conclusively. To fill this gap in the literature, we analyse the 
rationale for bank regulations under the various economic criteria employed by the so-called 
‘theories of economic regulation’, and we analyse what outcome is used to try to justify the so-
called ‘objectives of bank regulation’. Then, we briefly elaborate an ‘alternative bank 
regulatory view’. 
 In the traditional economic regulation literature, government intervention is explained 
in terms of positive and normative approaches. The positive approach can be explicated via the 
following four theories: the capture theory, the theory of economic regulation, the theory of 
bureaucracy and the public financing approach, where the latter is more of an approach than a 
theory. The normative approach involves the public interest theory, which is also known as the 
‘market failure theory’. The normative approach (the market failure theory) is the focus of this 
dissertation because it contains both first- and second-best solutions. Furthermore, there is at 
least one cause for bank regulation that is in the public interest, and it allows us to justify bank 
regulation for a variety of reasons (see Goodhart et al. 1998). In the theory of market failure, 
there are three sources of failures that justify bank regulation: asymmetric information, 
externalities and controlling monopoly. However, with a few minor exceptions, the third reason 
for bank regulation is not relevant in the banking industry (see Goodhart 2010). 
In addition to economic criteria, bank regulation can also be justified by the desirable 
outcome that should be secure. In this sense, we distinguish between four desirable objectives: 
consumer protection, the safety and soundness of banks, the safety and soundness of the 
banking system and monetary control. These objectives can be systematised into two micro-
based objectives (consumer protection and the safety and soundness of banks) and two macro-
based objectives (the safety and soundness of the banking system and monetary control). 
However, although we extend the micro-based approach with a macro-based approach because 
of the limited focus of the micro-based approach regarding the most recent financial crisis, 
various economists have questioned those financial theories, which are and have been broadly 
employed. In light of these considerations, we elaborate an alternative bank regulatory view 
based on the endogenous nature of money and credit. In this sense, two objectives of bank 
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regulation are expressed in a different manner as in the mainstream view, namely, the safety 
and soundness of bank services and the safety and soundness of the banking system. According 
to the former objective, regulation regarding asset services would be justified, particularly in 
the lending process. In this context, stronger requirements in assessing a borrower or setting 
higher capital requirements for house buyers can mitigate a failure in the lending process (see 
section 3.4). In relation to the latter objective, we note that a stable banking system changes the 
period of the financing regimes into an unstable system (see Minsky 1977). Therefore, bank 
regulation should focus on mitigating risk in the three financing forms, particularly in 
speculative financing that becomes Ponzi financing. In this sense, bank regulations such as the 
leverage ratios or minimum requirements for a rollover of liabilities would be desirable 
measures. 
Nevertheless, the following two questions arise. How can we classify regulatory 
measures in the banking industry? What types of measures exist in the recent regulatory 
literature? In the next chapter, we introduce a systematisation and analyse the most current bank 
regulatory measures, including capital adequacy requirements, liquidity requirements and failed 
bank recovery and resolution standards. 
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3. Bank regulatory measures 
 
This chapter provides an overview regarding the main regulatory measures that draw upon the 
rationale for bank regulation in the previous chapter. However, before we can describe the 
various bank regulatory measures, we must first systematise them. Therefore, we proceed as 
follows. In the first step, we outline a possible systematisation based upon our elaborated 
criteria. In the second step, we briefly describe the most current bank regulatory measures and 
provide potential reform options. Finally, we present an alternative reform proposal.   
 
3.1. Systematisation of bank regulatory measures 
 
In practice, bank regulation will be systematised between preventive, which the Anglo-Saxon 
literature describes as prudential, and curative so-called preventive regulation, although 
banking regulatory measures can be classified into various categories (see Niehans 1983, Dale 
1984). This classification is difficult for the following reasons: (1) the meaning of relevant 
terms varies; (2) numerous measures cannot be classified conclusively because of the existence 
of various categories; and (3) it is difficult to evaluate the effectiveness of regulatory measures 
because of the lack of systematisation (see Niehans 1983, Burghof and Rudolph 1996). For 
example, Goodhart et al. (1998) categorise financial regulation into prudential regulation, 
conduct regulation and wholesale versus retail regulation. Llewellyn (1999) goes a step further 
and distinguishes among monitoring, regulation and supervision; thus, Llewellyn (1999: 6) 
understands monitoring as ‘observing whether the rules are obeyed’. However, for Llewellyn 
(1999: 6), supervision is ‘the more general observation of the behaviour of financial firms’, 
whereas regulation is ‘the establishment of specific rules of behaviour’. Moosa (2015) 
distinguishes between safety-and-soundness (or solvency) regulation and compliance 
regulation. As a result of the difficulty regarding the classification of bank regulatory measures, 
we propose an alternative systematisation model based on various criteria to better categorise 
banking regulatory measures. In the course of this proposal, we systematically classify banking 
regulatory measures according to Figure 3.1 on the basis of five criteria allocated among five 
levels. Regulatory measures can be systematically organised according to ‘regulatory policy’ 
(see section 1.2.3); the ‘timing of intervention’ of prudential and protective regulation; the 
‘micro versus macro regulation’ level of governance; the predictability of the ‘discretionary 
versus institutional approach’; and the evaluation of the standard ‘qualitative versus quantitative 
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approach’. In the following paragraphs, we describe these five criteria for a better understanding 
of our classification. 
 
Figure 3.1 Overview of bank regulatory criteria 
 
Source: Authors’ own elaboration. 
 
3.1.1. The timing of intervention: prudential versus protective regulation 
 
National authorities use a variety of approaches and measures to encourage the safety and 
soundness of banks, consumer protection, the safety and soundness of the banking system and 
monetary control. According to Dale (1984), the techniques employed by these authorities fall 
into two main banking regulatory categories under the umbrella of prudential regulation and 
protective regulation. Prudential regulations are ‘designed to curb risk-taking by banks and 
thereby reduce the likelihood of liquidity and solvency problems’ (Dale 1984: 55, see also 
Flannery 1995). In other words, prudential measures are measures that aim to avert future crises 
(see Commission of Experts 2010). Conversely, protective regulations are designed to provide 
support to both banks and their depositors if problems arise. Thus, preventive measures secure 
the continuity of SIBs in the event of insolvency (see Commission of Experts 2010). Drawing 
on Dale (1984) and the Commission of Experts (2010), this dissertation has chosen similar 
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definitions in various debates103 that target the effect of such regulatory measures. 
Baltensperger and Dermine (1987) emphasise that in practice, it is difficult to achieve a 
definitive separation between prudential and protective regulations because the two partially 
influence one another and because both their structure and impact can be simultaneously 
prudential and protective in nature. For example, protective measures such as deposit insurance 
not only help to build trust but also have a preventive effect (see Burghof and Rudolph 1996). 
Conversely, prudential measures such as the capital adequacy requirement reduce the likelihood 
of bank insolvency, resulting in the continued effectiveness of protective measures. 
Consequently, researchers can argue that in the context of prudential and protective regulation, 
it can ‘be seen clearly that this separation is not a clear-cut one’ (Baltensperger and Dermine 
1987: 72). Therefore, a systematisation of regulatory measures that conceptually targets their 
effects appears to be inappropriate because banking supervisory systems always consist of a 
combination of prudential and protective measures.  
An alternative criterion for the systematisation of regulatory measures in the banking 
industry could be the ‘timing of intervention’, according to Principle 22 of the Basel Core 
Principles, as ‘banking supervisors must have at their disposal adequate supervisory measures 
to bring about timely corrective action when banks fail to meet prudential requirements (such 
as minimum capital adequacy ratios), when there are regulatory violations, or where depositors 
are threatened in any other way’ (BCBS 1997: 7). For this purpose, Figure 3.2 depicts an 
alternative systematisation in line with the timing of intervention.  
 
Figure 3.2 Timing of intervention of prudential and protective regulation 
 
Source: Authors’ own elaboration based on Burghof and Rudolph (1996). 
 
                                                          
103 In the literature, various definitions can be found in Niehans (1983), Dale (1984), Baltensperger and Dermine 
(1987), Dewatripont and Tirole (1993), Greenbaum and Thakor (2007 [1995]), Burghof and Rudolph (1996), 
Llewellyn (1999) and Bernet (2003). 
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Prudential measures are thus applied during the normal ongoing course of banking business 
(going concern), whereas protective measures are applied in the event of imminent financial 
distress or after a financial distress event (gone concern) or a bank failure. A time of distress 
(namely, market failure) for a bank is thus determined to be a situation requiring intervention 
based on selected regulatory measures in the banking industry. In connection with the timing 
of intervention for the selection of regulatory measures, we assume the financial distress of the 
bank or the banking system. For that effect, the term ‘gone concern’ covers not only bank 
distress but also the time at which the crisis occurred. The time of the onset of financial distress 
or a banking crisis is therefore of decisive importance for the selection of appropriate banking 
regulatory measures (see BCBS 1997). According to the timing of the intervention, we can 
define prudential regulation as follows: 
 
 
 
 
Sources: Authors’ own elaboration based on Niehans (1983), Dale (1984), Baltensperger and Dermine (1987), 
Dewatripont and Tirole (1993), Flannery (1995), Greenbaum and Thakor (2007 [1995]), Burghof and Rudolph 
(1996), Llewellyn (1999), and Bernet (2003). 
 
With this definition, prudential regulation corresponds to the following established regulatory 
banking measures: capital adequacy requirements, liquidity requirements, countercyclical 
capital buffers (CCBs) (see Appendix 4), accounting standards (see Appendix 7) and 
transparency regulation (see Appendix 5) (see Figure 3.3). In contrast, protective regulation can 
be defined as follows: 
 
 
 
Sources: Authors’ own elaboration based on Niehans (1983), Dale (1984), Baltensperger and Dermine (1987), 
Dewatripont and Tirole (1993), Greenbaum and Thakor (2007 [1995]), Burghof and Rudolph (1996), Llewellyn 
(1999), and Bernet (2003). 
 
With this definition, protective regulation contains deposit insurance (see Appendix 6), failed 
bank recovery and resolution, public guarantees and subsidies by the government and the 
LOLR. The LOLR should be distinguished from deposit insurance, as the former is for banks, 
Prudential regulation includes all regulatory instruments that have the objective of 
rendering improbable the risk prior to (ex-ante) financial distress. 
Protective regulation includes all regulatory instruments that have the objective of 
minimising damage to the economy either during or following (ex-post) financial distress. 
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whereas the latter is for depositors. Moreover, the LOLR is part of a detailed analysis in part II. 
Therefore, no further headway on the LOLR is made in the first part of the thesis.  
 
Figure 3.3 Systematising bank regulation in accordance with the timing of intervention: 
prudential versus protective regulation 
 
Source: Authors’ own elaboration.  
 
In Figure 3.3, the systematisation criteria for the established banking regulatory measures (for 
example, capital requirements, transparency regulations, failed bank recovery and resolution, 
and deposit insurance) are attributed to the prudential and protective regulations according to 
the timing of intervention (going concerns and gone concerns). Figure 3.3 illustrates that the 
vast majority of the banking regulatory measures addressed in this work can be considered 
prudential regulation. These regulatory measures can be systematised according to further 
criteria, such as the intervention level, predictability and evaluation of standards. 
 
3.1.2. The level of intervention: micro- versus macro-based regulation 
 
Another systematisation approach subdivides prudential measures according to their 
‘intervention level’ in micro- or macro-based regulation. We return to the micro- and macro-
based approach from section 2.2 for the systematisation of prudential and protective measures 
discussed in this section. In connection with this approach, Burghof and Rudolph (1996) 
suggest that the level of intervention can be isolated to individual markets, to a bank itself 
(idiosyncratic) or to the bank customer level. Consequently, all regulatory measures that pursue 
micro-based goals are summarised under the category of micro regulation. All regulatory 
measures that pursue macro-based goals are summarised under the category of macro 
regulation.  
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Micro regulation aims to limit the risk of the financial distress episodes of individual 
banks and emphasises the behaviour of individual agents. Therefore, micro regulations 
primarily use prudential tools that focus on the safety and soundness of banks and consider 
consumer protection ‘in that the consumer loses when a bank fails, even when there are no 
systemic consequences’ (Goodhart et al. 1998: 5). Thus, capital adequacy requirements, 
liquidity requirements, accounting standards, transparency regulation, deposit insurance and 
minimum reserve requirements are considered micro regulation.  
Macro regulation reduces the risk of episodes of system-wide distress, which have 
significant costs for the economy as a whole. We pose the following question: which macro 
measures aim to limit the risks and costs of systemic crisis? According to the BIS (2011: 55), 
‘a complete range of instruments uniquely oriented to macroprudential policy has not yet been 
developed’. Nevertheless, we choose one recent measure from a complete range of macro 
measures. Our first step is to search for an overview of possible macro measures used by the 
IMF (for example, CCBs, limits on loan-to-value ratios and so forth) (see Borio 2003, 
Brunnermeier et al. 2009, Galati and Moessner 2011, IMF 2011, SBA 2011). Our second step 
is to analyse the numerous measures of the IMF (2011) according to both their potential 
usefulness (‘potentially useful’) and their actual use (‘actually used’). Thus, the 
macroprudential measures were divided into six groups: 
 
• Group 1: Size, complexity and interconnectedness  
• Group 2: Procyclicality  
• Group 3: Credit growth and asset price  
• Group 4: Leverage and maturity mismatch  
• Group 5: Currency risk 
• Group 6: Capital flow 
 
For example, a CCB measure belongs to Group 2: Procyclicality. A CCB is currently used as a 
regulatory measure by approximately five to 10 countries from a total of 45 countries that use 
these IMF measures. Between 30 and 35 countries are expected to incorporate these measures 
into their macro policy in the future (see IMF 2011). Accordingly, we have selected the macro 
measure, CCB, based on two evaluation criteria: (1) the frequency of expected usage of the 
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measure for more than 20 countries104 and (2) the ‘time dimension’ criteria 105 (because ‘time 
dimension’ measures, according to Brunnermeier et al. (2009), are preferred over ‘cross-
sectional dimension’106 measures). With this systematisation and the classification of section 
3.1.1 between prudential and preventive regulation, we can formulate four regulatory 
categories: microprudential regulation, macroprudential regulation, microprotective regulation 
and macroprotective regulation. For this purpose, Figure 3.4 classifies the prudential and 
protective measures introduced in section 3.1.1 as either micro or macro regulations. Capital 
adequacy requirements, liquidity requirements, accounting standards and transparency 
regulations are thus classified as microprudential regulation. Conversely, CCBs can be 
classified as macroprudential regulation. Deposit insurance can be classified as microprotective 
regulation, whereas failed bank recovery and resolution and public guarantees and subsidies 
can be systematised as macroprotective regulation. However, micro and macro measures cannot 
always be clearly distinguished in practice. 
 
Figure 3.4 Systematising prudential regulation in accordance with the timing and level of 
intervention: micro versus macro regulation 
 
Source: Authors’ own elaboration.  
                                                          
104 The CCB will become available in many countries from 2016 to 2019. In fact, countries such as China, New 
Zealand, Switzerland and the United Kingdom may consider an accelerated phase (see IMF 2013). 
105 The time dimension ‘is based on a collective tendency by economic agents [..] to increase risk exposures during 
the boom-phase of a financial cycle and to become overly risk-averse during the bust phase’ (IMF 2011: 8, 2013). 
In other words, the time dimension examines the development of risk over time. 
106 The ‘cross-sectional dimension’ reflects the distribution of risk in the banking system (such as the solvency risk 
between different banks) (see Borio 2003, Clement 2010, IMF 2013). 
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3.1.3. Predictability: discretionary or institutional approach 
 
The systematisation approach shown in Figure 3.5 subdivides protective measures according to 
their predictability, namely, into discretionary and institutional measures (see Dale 1984, 
Baltensperger and Dermine 1987, Baltensperger 1990, Greenbaum and Thakor 2007 [1995]). 
Protective measures can thus be subdivided according to the certainty with which they can be 
embraced. According to Baltensperger and Dermine (1987) and Burghof and Rudolph (1996), 
the spectrum including ‘contractual’, ‘institutional’ and ‘rule-bound’ interventions is sufficient 
and ‘granted for sure’ (for example, safety nets such as deposit insurance and failed bank 
recovery and resolution), versus discretionary interventions that are not granted ‘for sure’ (see 
Baltensperger and Dermine 1987). In this respect, ‘[d]iscretionary interventions are all those 
that are at the discretion of government: lender of last resort (possibly at a subsidized rate), 
public guarantees and subsidies of all sorts, or nationalization’ (Baltensperger and Dermine 
1987: 73). However, there are arguments in favour of the institutional approach. First, banks 
follow the rules if they are clearly defined. Second, a discretionary approach is a source of 
moral hazard (see section 2.1.2 and chapter 6). 
 
Figure 3.5 Systematising protective regulation in accordance with predictability: 
discretionary or institutional approach 
 
Source: Authors’ own elaboration. 
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Third, Ayadi et al. (2012: 80) note that the institutional approach ‛removes the danger of undue 
political interference in the disciplining of banks’, and fourth, ‛it guards against a ‛collective 
euphoria’ syndrome whereby all agents (including supervisors) are swept along by a common 
euphoria’ (Ayadi et al. 2012: 81). We are sceptical regarding the fourth argument because 
before the financial crisis of 2007–2009, SIBs such as UBS and Credit Suisse gloated over the 
fact that they met the stricter capital requirements of Basel II. In other words, the time before 
the financial crisis of 2007–2009 was a period of collective euphoria by banks and regulatory 
authorities. Therefore, we conclude that rules do not guard against collective euphoria. 
However, further analysis regarding the connection between collective euphoria and bank 
regulation would be desirable. 
 
3.1.4. Qualitative and quantitative standards 
 
Until the mid-1990s, the supervisory authorities predominantly used traditional structural 
standards—also known as quantitative standards—to precisely implement the objective 
function of bank regulation in practice. Quantitative standards were understood as measurable 
and therefore verifiable targets (for example, the equity capital ratio) with the goal of limiting 
financial risks (for example, credit risks, market risks and liquidity risks) (see Burghof and 
Rudolph 1996, Amara 2005, Kunze 2007). Thus, quantitative measures are used for frequent 
bank regulatory changes in value (see Tinbergen 1956). Examples of quantitative standards 
include capital adequacy requirements, liquidity requirements and so forth. The quantitative 
standards shown in Figure 3.6 have the following advantages: (1) they can easily be quantified 
and monitored, and (2) they can be easily communicated and consequently implemented. The 
disadvantages are as follows: (1) they are inflexible and have a strong need for adjustment to a 
changeable economic environment; (2) they are insufficiently applicable to new financial 
products; and (3) they exhibit different margins of interpretation, thus enabling ‘regulatory 
arbitrage’ (see Goodhart et al. 1998, Bernet 2003). Since the mid-1990s, an increasing tendency 
towards qualitative standards has been observed (see Krumnow 1995, Kunze 2007). In this 
context, qualitative standards are understood as non-measurable standards that are used 
predominantly to limit operational risk. Examples of qualitative standards include transparency 
regulation. As opposed to quantitative standards, qualitative standards have the following 
advantages: (1) they are more adaptable to general conditions in the banking industry, and (2) 
they are better at limiting the margin of interpretation. However, qualitative standards have the 
following disadvantages: (1) they are more difficult to communicate, and (2) they can generate 
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higher costs during implementation (see Bernet 2003). In addition, according to Burghof and 
Rudolph (1996), qualitative standards do not achieve their full effectiveness until they have 
been transposed into quantitative standards, enabling a certain control of the consistency of the 
objectives. 
 
Figure 3.6 Bank regulatory square 
 
Source: Authors’ own elaboration.  
 
3.1.5. Summary 
 
The literature examines various bank regulatory measures. The difficulty arises with respect to 
the classification of these measures because (1) the meaning of relevant terms varies; (2) 
numerous measures cannot be classified conclusively because of the existence of various 
categories; and (3) it is difficult to evaluate effectiveness. Therefore, we propose an alternative 
systematisation model based on the following criteria: ‘regulatory policy’, the ‘timing of 
intervention’ of prudential and protective regulation, the ‘micro versus macro regulation’ level 
of governance, the predictability of the ‘discretionary versus institutional approach’ and the 
evaluation of the standard ‘qualitative versus quantitative approach’. In this sense, quantitative 
microprudential institutional regulations include capital adequacy requirements, liquidity 
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requirements, accounting standards and minimum reserve requirements. Qualitative 
microprudential institutional regulations include transparency regulation. An example of 
quantitative macroprudential institutional regulation is the CCB. Conversely, there are three 
preventive regulations in the banking sector: failed bank recovery and resolution, deposit 
insurance as an institutional regulation, and public guarantees and subsidies by the government 
as discretionary measures.  
The next sections will introduce the established regulatory measures, namely, capital 
adequacy requirements, liquidity requirements and failed bank recovery and resolution 
standards because of their relevance in the recent regulatory debate. In this context, we briefly 
describe these regulatory measures and provide potential reform options. In addition, we present 
an alternative regulatory proposal, drawing upon the main causes of the financial crisis in 2007–
2009. 
 
3.2. Current bank regulatory measures 
 
3.2.1. Capital adequacy requirements 
  
From the Great Depression (1930s) to the 1970s, bank regulation focused on the safety and 
soundness of market structure and competition and on asset allocation rules and interest rates 
(see Hellwig 2010b). The subsequent period from the 1970s to the late 1980s was characterised 
by deregulation and bank failures, such as the insolvency of Herstatt Bank (1977) in Germany 
and the US savings and loan crisis (1980s). In response, the Basel Accord of 1988 attempted to 
stop this tendency with capital adequacy requirements. In reality, this tendency did not stop 
because governments permitted banks to price freely and to expand into new financial products 
(such as securitisation) and new geographical markets. Nevertheless, for the purpose of 
illuminating the basic concept of capital adequacy requirements, we consider the following four 
questions: 
 
• What are the objectives of capital adequacy requirements? 
• How can we define capital adequacy requirements? 
• What are potential reform options for capital requirements?  
• What are the effects of capital requirements in the banking sector? 
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In various documents on bank regulation, stricter capital requirements are justified for 
the following reasons: (1) banks have more to lose if they fail; (2) banks are less likely to 
approve risky businesses for depositors, creditors and other bank stakeholders (thus minimising 
moral hazard) because funding for riskier investments requires banks to hold a higher amount 
of capital; (3) banks tend to have safe and sound bank functions; (4) banks’ resilience to future 
shocks will increase as a result of better capitalisation (see BCBS 2016)—in other words, 
‘capital serves as a buffer against unexpected losses’ (Hellwig 2010b: 9)—(5) the ‘capital 
requirement provides the supervisor with room for intervention before the bank becomes 
insolvent’ (Hellwig 2010b: 9); and (6) these capital requirements increase the safety and 
soundness of the banking system and thus end up burdening creditors and taxpayers because 
the solvency risk, the likelihood of liquidity risk and bank runs are reduced as a result that the 
bank holds more capital to absorb the loss (see Baltensperger and Dermine 1987, Dewatripont 
and Tirole 1993, BCBS 1997, Borio et al. 2001, Hellwig 2010b, Ayadi et al. 2012, Admati and 
Hellwig 2013, BCBS 2016). Overall, ‘[i]n principle, capital regulation should contribute to 
maintaining the safety and soundness of banks’ (Hellwig 2010b: 9), on the one hand, and the 
safety and soundness of the banking system, on the other, because a higher buffer also reduces 
the likelihood of bank failure and the expected externalities as a result (see Commission of 
Experts 2010, BCBS 2016). In other words, capital requirements have the objective of 
increasing banks’ resilience to future banking crises (see Liikanen et al. 2012, BCBS 2016). 
Although capital requirements serve these purposes, in the literature, these purposes are ‘not 
explained, at least not beyond the truism that insolvency corresponds to a situation where equity 
is negative’ (Hellwig 2010b: 9).  
To answer the second question, Dale (1984: 91) notes that ‘banks are generally required 
to maintain an appropriate relationship between capital on the one hand and total assets, risk 
assets or liabilities on the other [hand]’. In view of these characteristics, a capital adequacy 
requirement (capital adequacy ratio) is defined as a quantitative regulatory measure that is 
typically assessed in terms of the ratio of total capital assets (tier-one capital ‘core equity’ plus 
tier-two ‘supplementary capital’) that prevents excessive risk-taking by reducing the probability 
of insolvency risk and bank crisis (prudential approach) and is a function of the risk-weighted 
assets that serve as a ‘buffer’107 to minimise the impact of insolvency and economic crises 
(protective approach) (see Baltensperger and Dermine 1987, see 3.1). 
                                                          
107 In the United States, for example, subsidiaries of SIBs must fulfil high standards of equity capital and liquidity 
to be able to overcome a 30-day crisis (see DFA 2010). In this sense, US bank holding companies hold significantly 
more equity capital than the minimum required. Thereby, Berger et al. (2008) estimate the size of the preventative 
equity capital buffer that US bank holding companies hold above the minimum requirements. In this context, they 
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Capital adequacy ratio = 
Tier 1 Capital+Tier 2 Capital
Risk−Weighted Assets
                (3.1) 
 
In other words, although capital adequacy requirements can correspond to both prudential and 
protective regulation, the literature predominantly associates capital adequacy requirements 
with prudential measures (see Dale 1984, Baltensperger and Dermine 1987, Dewatripont and 
Tirole 1994, Goodhart et al. 1998). In practice, the term ‘capital adequacy’ raises two important 
issues. The first problem involves defining the term ‘capital’ with its components, and the 
second problem involves determining the ‘adequacy’ of capital to evaluate the different risks 
and potential consequences for banks (see Dale 1984, Baltensperger and Dermine 1987). To 
address this problem, the BCBS agreed to a standard method to ensure a bank’s capital 
adequacy (see BCBS 1997, Borio et al. 2001, Hellwig 2010b). Using this approach, capital 
adequacy requirements generally take two forms. The first type addresses the leverage ratio, 
which is ‘the amount of capital divided by the bank’s total assets’ (Mishkin 2013: 299). The 
second type addresses the risk-based capital requirements of the BCBS. Over time, many other 
countries have adopted the Capital Accord or a similar approach. The proposed modifications 
to the Capital Accord include changes in capital requirements over time because of subsequent 
adjustments by correcting past errors towards a perfect model (Basel N) (see Ayadi et al. 2012), 
and the framework conditions such as technological innovations and financial innovations 
change over time (see Borio et al. 2001). The current Basel Accord therefore defines a number 
of different quantitative capital components. According to the Basel III Accord, regulatory 
capital consists of the sum of tier-one capital (going-concern capital) and tier-two capital (gone-
concern capital). ‘The total capital (tier one plus tier two) must be at least eight per cent of risk 
weighted assets108 at all times’ without the conservation buffer of 2.5 per cent that was already 
being practiced by the majority of banks (BCBS 2011b: 12, Berger et al. 2008). In other words, 
the minimum capital requirements plus the conservation buffer are 10.5 per cent. Switzerland’s 
capital requirements, also called the Swiss Finish requirements, are higher (28.60 per cent total 
capital (10 per cent) inclusive of the conservation buffer (18.60 per cent)) than those in the 
European Union and the United States (10.5 per cent) (see also Commission of Experts 2010, 
FINMA 2015b). In this sense, Switzerland takes a leading role compared to other countries; 
however, even the Swiss Finish requirements can be criticised on several grounds: (1) they lack 
                                                          
indicated during their sample period from 1992 to 2006 that capital ratios were higher than their actual capital 
ratios and that ‘[bank holding companies] adjusted toward those targets quite rapidly – on average, closing between 
28% and 41% of the distance to their desired capital ratios in a year’ (Berger et al. 2008: 25). 
108 Risk-weighted capital requirements aim to discourage banks from undertaking large amounts of credit risk and 
to increase the likelihood of absorbing losses that occur as a consequence of credit risk. 
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a precise objective; (2) ‘the dynamics of implementation over time have not been given 
sufficient attention’ (Hellwig 2010b: 8);109 (3) they do not take into account systemic risks (such 
as contagion effects) (see Hellwig 2010b); (4) they do not take into account different business 
models (investment banks, retail banks, diversified retail banks and wholesale banks) (see 
Ayadi et al. 2012); and (5) the total economic costs and benefits of these measures are disputed. 
According to the qualitative regulatory impact assessment ‘Regulierungsfolgeabschätzung’ 
(see SIF et al. 2011), the benefits are assumed to exceed the costs in the long term. The 
assessment of the impact of this regulation, however, does not contain a macroempirical cost-
benefit analysis.110 Furthermore, impact assessments should be made before, not after, a 
regulation such as Basel III or the Dodd-Frank Act has been implemented. Hellwig (2010b: 2) 
states, ‘The Basel Committee does not, however, present any systematic analysis of why the 
proposed measures should have the salutary effects that are expected of them’. Furthermore, 
the internal risk manipulation of weighted assets and explicit exception in regulations harm 
capital requirements (see Hellwig 2016). According to the last point, banks group assets into 
buckets and assign them different weights with regard to their internal ratings-based approach 
or using the external rating called the ‘standardised approach’, wherein the external ratings 
come from a recognised authority such as the FINMA or the European Securities and Markets 
Authority. The following example describes the problems with respect to different asset 
weights. 
Suppose a representative European bank B opts for the standardised approach and plans 
to fund business loans, residential mortgages or Greek government bonds. According to these 
three funding propositions, the bank must meet the Basel III and Capital Requirement Directive 
IV (CRD IV) requirements (see EC 2013). In this context, Figure 3.7 shows how high the equity 
ratio must be under the standard approach of Basel III (the same as Basel I and Basel II).111 For 
business loans with an external risk weight of 100 per cent, the required equity capital to the 
sum of business loans is at least eight per cent. For residential mortgages with an external risk 
weight of 50 per cent, the required equity capital to the total amount of residential mortgages is 
at least four per cent. For Greek government bonds with an external risk weight of zero, the 
                                                          
109 In this context, Hellwig (2010b: 9) clearly notes that the conservation buffer moves well in a two-period model, 
but in ‘a real world where financing, investment and payout decisions are taken on an ongoing basis, neither the 
buffer argument nor the incentive argument can be granted’. 
110 A cost-benefit analysis that measures the effects of the higher equity capital requirement on the Swiss economy 
was prepared by Junge and Kluger (2012). These authors conclude that an increase in equity capital with respect 
to GDP would be negligible and that the expected benefit in terms of avoiding GDP decline would be of the 
magnitude of 0.5 per cent to 0.7 per cent (see Junge and Kluger 2012). 
111 The differences between Basel I and Basel III are as follows: (1) 4.5 per cent common equity tier 1 risk-based 
ratio (new to Basel III); (2) 6 per cent tier 1 risk-based ratio (same as in Basel I and II); and (3) 3 per cent tier 1 
leverage ratio (new to Basel III) (see also Berger and Bouwman 2016). 
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equity ratio is zero. Therefore, ‛the ratings of EU countries are not relevant to the capital 
requirement for investments in EU government bonds. Equally, no equity capital has been 
required’ (Schäfer and Meyland 2015: 270). 
 
Figure 3.7 Standardised approach for bank B 
 
Source: Adapted from Turner (2009). 
 
Consequently, bank B has an incentive for funding in Greek government bonds because (1) no 
equity capital is required; (2) they are very liquid; (3) the expected return is high; and (4) there 
is support from the bank to meet the liquidity requirements (see Schäfer and Meyland 2015).112 
In light of the sovereign crisis in Europe, Greek government bonds were downgraded to junk 
status, and therefore, government bonds are not entirely risk-free. Thus, the question arises as 
to why the risk weight of Greek government bonds is zero. The answer lies in the nature of 
bank regulation. In Basel III113 and CRD IV, there are special requirements for EU government 
bonds stating that their risk weight is zero (see EC 2013, Schäfer and Meyland 2015). This 
leads us to the following conclusion: bank regulation (which is a public good and a source of 
market failure) that has an initial focus on stability, such as Basel III/CRD IV, can transform a 
stable system into an instable banking system as a consequence of funding decisions. In this 
regard, we follow Minsky (1977) FIH and formulate our ‘regulatory instability hypothesis’ 
(RIH): 
 
 
 
Source: Authors’ own elaboration. 
                                                          
112 Liquidity requirements will be analysed in section 3.2.2. 
113 Basel III is based on Basel II, which ‘was published with new capital requirements that created arbitrage 
opportunities for banks and, albeit inadvertently, facilitated off-balance-sheet activities’ (PwC 2009: 11). 
Consequently, Basel III creates regulatory arbitrage. 
Bank regulation can transform an initially robust banking system into a fragile banking 
system as a consequence of funding. 
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Another example that promotes the RIH is based on the US Community Reinvestment Act 
(CRA) of 1977 that was implemented by the Regulation of Banks and Banking (BB). The US 
CRA has the regulatory objective to ‘meet the credit needs of its entire community, including 
low- and moderate-income neighbourhoods’ (Art. 228.11 para. b lit. 1 of the BB). This act was 
substantially revised by the Clinton administration in 1995 and updated again by the Bush 
administration in 2005 (see Fed 2016). The substantial revision in 1995 offers banks the 
opportunity to fund mortgages in low-income classes, also called the United States mortgage 
dream. The update in 2005 meant that householders with no assets and no employment could 
also obtain mortgages, called ‘Ninja mortgages’ (see Brunnermeier 2009a, PwC 2009). In other 
words, the US CRA aims to prevent lower-income householders from changing a stable 
mortgage market into a fragile mortgage market. However, empirical studies and analysis such 
as ‘the Staff Analysis of the Relationship between the CRA and the Subprime Crisis’ suggest 
that the CRA did not contribute in any substantive way to the financial crisis of 2007–2009 (see 
Canner and Bhutta 2008, Hellwig 2010a). Nevertheless, we are sceptical about claims that bank 
regulation has no impact on the funding behaviour of banks (such as funding of riskier 
businesses, restructuring portfolios, and creating new financial products that result in an 
inefficient allocation of banking services (regulatory arbitrage, shadow banking)) that can harm 
the financial stability of the banking sector.  
Opponents suggest that the RIH is misleading because bank regulation has the function 
of mitigating market failure and enhancing stability; therefore, an initial failure cannot be 
worsened with new regulatory measures. Notably, bank regulations have the main function of 
mitigating market failure, but only if they are well designed and clearly precise (objective-
targeted bank regulation); otherwise, they enhance funding incentives, such as for Greek 
government bonds or loans for low income holders. 
Next, assume that bank B opts for the internal ratings-based approach and decreases the 
asset weight for business loans and residential mortgages as a consequence of this approach. 
Figure 3.8 shows the internal ratings-based approach for bank B. The main difference between 
the standard approach and the internal ratings-based approach is that bank B has the possibility 
of reducing or increasing the asset weights with respect to internal risk evaluation (market risk, 
liquidity risk, credit risk and so forth). In our case, the bank reduces the asset weight, with the 
following two impacts: (1) for business loans with a risk weight of 80 per cent, the new equity 
ratio is at least 6.4 per cent, which is a difference of 1.6 per cent from the standardised approach, 
and (2) for residential mortgages with a risk weight of 40 per cent, the new equity ratio is at 
least 3.2 per cent, which is a difference of 0.8 per cent from the standardised approach. 
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However, for Greek government bonds, the equity ratio remains zero per cent. In this regard, 
we leave it to the reader to determine the approach our representative bank B chooses. 
 
Figure 3.8 Internal ratings-based approach for bank B 
 
Source: Adapted from Turner (2009). 
 
Based on these considerations, we see potential policy options to reform the capital 
adequacy requirements: 
 
• Precisely systematising capital requirements with respect to the desirable objective (see 
section 2.2); 
• Taking into account systemic risks; 
• Performing an impact assessment before further incremental adjustments of capital 
requirements occur; 
• Removing the zero-risk weighting for EU government bonds or ‘introducing a non-zero risk 
weight floor for sovereign exposures in the standard approach’ or internal ratings-based 
approach (ESRB 2015: 9); 
• Setting a minimum standard in the internal ratings-based approach (see ESRB 2015); and 
• Increasing the unweighted capital requirements114 by ‘ten percent and perhaps even closer 
to the twenty or thirty percent that were common before banks got used to the idea that the 
taxpayer couldn’t afford to let them fail’ (Hellwig 2010b: 11). 
                                                          
114 Opponents, especially bankers and even regulators, argue that with higher capital requirements, ‘banks facing 
capital constraints may cut back the lending, making the recession worse’ (Turner 2009: 59). In the same manner, 
Britain’s SIBs and the British Bankers’ Association note that ‘[t]he banks have also calculated that demands by 
international banking regulators in Basel that they bolster their capital will require the UK's banking industry to 
hold an extra £600bn of capital that might otherwise have been deployed as loans to businesses or households’ 
(Treanor 2010: Internet). Moreover, numerous studies show that an increase in capital adequacy requirements 
reduces credit supply (see Kishan and Opiela 2000). Conversely, Admati and Hellwig (2013:6) clearly disprove 
the misunderstanding of the word capital and indicate that capital requirements are not reserves: ‘– pile[s] of cash 
that banks hold that cannot be used to make loans’. In fact, capital regulation does not tell banks what to do with 
their funds or what they should hold; it tells banks only what portion of the funds they use must be unborrowed. 
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 With these considerations in mind, we examine the effects of capital requirements. 
Although the literature includes numerous studies on the effects of capital regulation (for further 
details, see BCBS 2016), (1) there is less focus on empirical research regarding the estimation 
of benefits (see BCBS 2016); (2) the focus is on optimal capital regulation that requires a careful 
interpretation because there is no consistent definition of capital (as we mentioned at the 
beginning of this section; see BCBS 2016); (3) the social benefits are difficult to evaluate; (4) 
the literature focuses on the total loss-absorbing capacity that is the condition for a bail-in 
instrument where no quantifications of costs and benefits are possible; and (5) the impact 
studies suffer from methodological weaknesses (see Rochet 2014). Consequently, although the 
literature concludes that the net benefit of capital requirements is positive, further academic 
research (particularly from an empirical perspective) is needed to respond to the considerations 
discussed above. Therefore, we agree with Rochet (2014: 4) that ‘it would be hazardous to 
precipitate another round of regulatory reforms, given that we know so little about the long-
term impact that such reforms would have’. 
 
3.2.2. Liquidity requirements 
 
Liquidity requirements are mainly considered prudential regulations that require banks to hold 
a certain amount of liquid assets in case a financial distress event occurs. In other words, 
liquidity ‘requirements were formulated on the basis of liquidity crisis events that were 
insufficiently severe’ (Commission of Experts 2010: 34). In this sense, a question arises 
regarding why liquidity requirements are proposed in the first place. The literature suggests that 
a major problem in the 2007–2009 financial crisis was the lack of liquid assets and liquid 
funding. Therefore, based on Basel III and to increase the resilience regarding dried up liquidity, 
liquidity requirements have been proposed (see Liikanen et al. 2012). However, it is 
questionable whether the 2007–2009 financial crisis was a liquidity problem at all, and thus, 
liquidity requirements are questionable. In the second part of the thesis, we will illuminate this 
controversy (see sections 7.1 and 7.2.2 for further details). Nevertheless, for the purpose of 
elucidating the basic concept of liquidity requirements, the following four questions are 
addressed:  
                                                          
The statement that new regulations would require U.K. banks to ‘‘hold an extra ₤600 billion of capital’’ is 
nonsensical. The implication that loans to businesses or households are automatically reduced by that ₤600 billion 
is false’. In other words, higher capital regulation does not limit the funding of banks. Moreover, higher capital 
requirements increase the likelihood that ‘absorb[ing’] losses without becoming insolvent’ is higher than that 
without requirements and mitigates the fragility of banks (Admati and Hellwig 2013: 94). 
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• What is meant by the term ‘liquidity’? 
• What are the recent liquidity requirements? 
• What are potential reform options for liquidity requirements?  
• What are the effects of liquidity requirements for the banking sector? 
 
Clearly defining the term ‘liquidity’ is difficult because ‘[u]nfortunately the word liquidity has 
so many facets that it is often counter-productive to use it without further and closer definition’ 
(Goodhart 2008: 41). Moreover, there are several definitions in the literature. A more formal 
definition can be derived as follows (see Greenbaum and Thakor 2007 [1995]). Suppose there 
is a full asset price P* (perfectly marketable) and a lesser price Pi (imperfectly marketable) if 
the asset is sold before, where i=0,…,n determines the time of selling the assets, and n represents 
the time of the full asset price (see 3.2). Therefore,  
 
Pn = P*              (3.2) 
 
Based on the time the assets are sold before the full asset price is realised (i<n), liquidity (L) 
can be defined as the ratio of the lesser value and the full-value price of assets (3.3). Hence,   
 
L = 
Pi
P∗
             (3.3) 
 
In this regard, liquidity mainly depends on the valuation of the assets and on the timing of i, 
when the bank is able to sell the assets on the market for cash, which is also called the 
‘marketability concept’.115 In light of these characteristics, liquidity can be defined as follows:  
 
‘[T]he ability to meet all claims that fall due, at any time and without restriction. Under the Banking Act, Swiss 
banks must ensure that they hold sufficient liquidity. Accordingly, a bank or group of banks is referred to as illiquid 
if it does not have sufficient liquid assets to meet all short-term claims. A bank can be solvent but nonetheless 
illiquid: while it may have sufficient assets to cover all debts and not be over-indebted, it may not have sufficient 
liquid assets to meet all short-term liabilities’ (SNB 2015a: Internet).  
Likewise, UBS (2009a: 60) ‘defines liquidity as the ability to meet obligations as they come 
due and to provide funds for increases in assets without incurring unacceptable cost’. Based on 
the considerations discussed above, we define liquidity in a broad sense as follows: 
                                                          
115 In this context, a good indicator to measure liquidity is the average difference between the purchase price (P*) 
and the sale price of an asset (Pi) (see Bundesrat (BR) 2002). 
Bank regulatory measures   97 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Sources: Authors’ own elaboration based on UBS (2009), IMF (2013), SNB (2015a). 
 
In a narrow sense, liquidity can be classified as (and distinguished between) market liquidity 
and funding liquidity. The former represents ‘the ability to buy and sell an asset with a small 
associated price change’ (IMF 2008: xi), whereas the latter involves the ability of a solvent 
institution to make agreed upon payments in a timely manner. With these considerations in 
mind, the question arises as to what the recent liquidity requirements are. As a result of the 
liquidity problems in the 2007–2009 financial crisis, the BCBS under the BIS introduced two 
liquidity requirements. Banks must fulfil a short-term liquidity risk ratio, the ‘liquidity coverage 
ratio’ (LCR), until 1 January 2019 of 100 per cent (2015, 60 per cent LCR; 2017, 70 per cent 
LCR; and 2018, 90 per cent LCR) and a long-term resiliency fund, the ‘net stable funding ratio’ 
(NSFR), until 1 January 2018.  
 The LCR is defined as the ratio of the value of the stock of high-quality liquid assets 
(HQLAs) and the total net cash outflows116 over the next 30 calendar days that is determined 
by expectations to be above 100 per cent (see 3.4, BCBS 2013). 
 
LCR = 
Stock of HQLAs
Total net cash outflow over the next 30 calendar days
 ≥ 100%   (3.4) 
 
HQLAs can be distinguished into two asset classes: (1) Level 1 asset classes, which include 
coins and banknotes, central bank reserves and several marketable securities representing 
claims on or guaranteed by sovereigns, central banks and regulators with a zero per cent risk 
weight asset (for example, Greek government bonds) (see BCBS 2013), and (2) Level 2 asset 
classes, which can be distinguished into two sub-asset classes, namely, Level 2A and Level 2B 
assets, permitted by the supervisor (see BCBS 2013). These sub-asset classes can be included 
in HQLAs and are not subject to a haircut. Level 2A asset classes are certain marketable 
securities representing claims on or guaranteed by sovereigns, central banks and regulators with 
a 20 per cent risk weight under Basel II and corporate debt securities, covered bonds with a 
credit rating of at least AA- and a proven record as a reliable source with a ‘maximum decline 
of price or increase in haircut over a 30-day period during a relevant period of significant 
                                                          
116 ‘The term total net cash outflows is defined as the total expected cash outflows minus the total expected cash 
inflows in the specified stress scenario for the subsequent 30 days (Art. 69 BCBS 2013). 
Liquidity is the ability to meet all obligations as they come due at any time without restrictions 
and provide funds for increases in assets without incurring unacceptable cost. 
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liquidity stress not exceeding 10%’ (Art. 52 para. 52 BCBS 2013). Level 2B assets include 
residential mortgage-backed securities with a credit rating of AA or higher (for example, sub-
prime mortgage securities (US asset-backed securities (ABSs) or US collateralised debt 
obligations (CDOs)) that had a credit rating of AAA before the crisis), as well as certain 
corporate debt securities rated between BBB- and A+ (see BCBS 2013).  
 The NSFR includes a bank’s assets and actives over a one-year period. The NSFR is 
defined as the ratio of the available amount of stable funding (ASF) and the required amount of 
stable funding (RSF) above or equal to 100 per cent (see 3.5, BCBS 2014). 
 
NSFR = 
Available amout of stable funding
Required amout of stable funding
 ≥ 100%     (3.5) 
 
The amount of ASF is the sum of the weighted ASF amounts, which are divided into five ASF 
categories with five ASF factors for liabilities. Category (1) has an ASF factor of 100 per cent 
and is based on the total regulatory capital (excluding tier 2) and other liabilities with a residual 
maturity of one year or more (see BCBS 2014). Category (2) has an ASF factor of 95 per cent 
and is based on non-maturity demand deposits and term deposits of less than one year for retail 
and small business customers (RSCs). Category (3) has an ASF factor of 90 per cent and 
contains non-maturity deposits and term deposits of less than one year for RSCs. Category (2) 
and category (3) are difficult to distinguish with regard to term deposits. Category (4) has a 50 
per cent ASF factor and is based on operational deposits and so forth. Category (5) has a zero 
per cent ASF factor and contains all other liabilities and equity not included in the above-
mentioned categories (see BCBS 2014). The amount of ASF is the amount of RSF determined. 
The main difference between the ASF and RSF categories is that the RSF categories focus on 
the asset side; for example, zero per cent RSF includes coins and banknotes, central bank 
reserves and so forth.  
Overall, liquidity requirements can be criticised as follows: (1) according to Goodhart 
(2010: 175), ‘liquidity requirement is an oxymoron. If you have to continue to hold an asset to 
meet a requirement, it is not liquid’—in this sense, 
 
‘[t]he most salient metaphor and fable in prudential regulation is of the weary traveller who arrives at the railway 
station late at night, and to his delight, sees a taxi there who could take him to his distant destination. He hails the 
taxi, but the taxi driver replies that he cannot take him, since local bylaws require that there must always be one 
taxi standing ready at the station’ (Goodhart 2008: 41);  
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(2) the weakness of treating EU government bonds as highly liquid; (3) complexity with respect 
to different categories and factors and the allocation of cross-border liquidity (see Ayadi et al. 
2012); (4) potential manipulation regarding several asset levels and different credit risks (for 
example, subprime mortgage securities)—in this context, banks could assign the same assets to 
different asset levels because of their internal asset-liability management—(5) LCR and NSFR 
not properly considering liquidity and systemic risks; (6) the lack of a systemic impact analysis; 
and (7) liquidity having nothing to do with the main causes of the financial crisis of 2007 (such 
as excessive maturity transformation and securitisation through SPVs (see Gorton 2008, 
Brunnermeier 2009b, Hellwig 2009)). Therefore, we advocated with Goodhart (2008) to 
establish general principles for liquidity instead of strict requirements. According to our 
critique, we see potential policy options for the recent liquidity requirements: 
 
• Taking into account systemic risks; 
• Removing the zero-risk weighting of EU government bonds or introducing a non-zero risk 
weighting; 
• Simplifying categories and factors and the allocation of cross-border liquidity; 
• Setting standards to mitigate the manipulation of liquidity requirements; and 
• Providing empirical impact assessments before setting further standards.  
 
With these considerations in mind, we next identify the effects of liquidity requirements. 
Although, in the literature, ‘there is very little theoretical or empirical research on the impact 
of minimum liquidity standards on bank liquidity risk or other bank risk-taking behaviour’ 
(DeYoung and Jang 2016: 158), DeYoung and Jang (2016) offer an interesting analysis to fill 
this theoretical and empirical gap by testing US commercial banks regarding the management 
of their liquidity positions between 1992 and 2012. They conclude that ‘as banks increase in 
size, they set lower liquidity targets – often in violation of the coming Basel III standards – but 
manage those targets more efficiently’ (DeYoung and Jang 2016: 143). However, their study 
and other studies in this field (see BCBS 2010) can be criticised because recent liquidity 
requirements are not fully in place (see BCBS 2016). Additionally, ‘the empirical, and some of 
the simulation, studies do not take into account the full welfare impacts of liquidity regulation’ 
(BCBS 2016: 20). In other words, the social benefits of liquidity requirements remain entirely 
theoretical. Therefore, it appears difficult to simulate the effects of and to draw conclusions 
about liquidity regulations before they are fully implemented. Nevertheless, further academic 
research (particularly empirical analysis) on the effects of liquidity regulation would be 
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desirable if the regulation has been fully implemented, as mentioned for the LCR in 2019 and 
the NSFR in 2018. 
 
3.2.3. Failed bank recovery and resolution 
 
In June 2007, the investment bank Bear Stearns was tied up in liquidity problems as a result of 
the failure of subprime mortgage hedge funds. A year later the firm was taken over by JP 
Morgan. In October 2008, when banks threatened to collapse worldwide due to negative 
developments in the financial markets, it became apparent that the banking market was not in 
a position to withstand the market exit of banks (for example, UBS, Royal Bank of Scotland, 
Citigroup and Bank of America) that are too complex to fail, too interconnected to fail or too 
systemic to fail. In other words, a bankruptcy would disrupt any systemically important 
operations (such as payment services), and resolving a bank in an orderly manner was not 
feasible because of the complexity of business relationships (cross-border) within such a short 
period. Based on systemic importance, it was immediately apparent that central banks and 
governments (taxpayers) should rescue the SIBs concerned and thus ensure the solvency of 
these banks as well as the functioning and stability of the financial market. However, the 
explicit guarantees of SIBs impose costs on taxpayers and encourage the potential incentive to 
take excessive risks in the future, also known as moral hazard (see section 2.1.2 and part II) (see 
also Ayadi et al. 2012). As a response, the Financial Stability Board (FSB) was developed, and 
the G20 adopted a recovery and resolution standard known as the Key Attributes of Effective 
Resolution Regimes for Financial Institutions (Key Attributes) to resolve banks in an orderly 
manner without taxpayer exposure and to limit moral hazard (see FSB 2011). In other words, 
the aim of an effective recovery and resolution regime is to ensure ‘that a bank, regardless of 
its size and systemic importance, can be transformed and recovered, or be wound down in a 
way that limits taxpayer liability for its losses’ (Liikanen et al. 2012: IV). These standards must 
be fully implemented by 2019. Thus, we pose the following five questions: 
 
• What are the phases before an SIB has an orderly wind-down?  
• What are the elements of recovery and resolution plans? 
• Can SIBs wind-down in an orderly manner without taxpayer money with regard to the 
recovery and resolution standards? 
• What are potential policy options for recovery and resolution standards? 
• What are the effects of recovery and resolution standards for the banking sector? 
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In relation to the first question, Figure 3.9 illustrates the three phases of a crisis and the two 
defence phases before insolvency appears, namely, the recovery phase and the resolution phase. 
According to Figure 3.9, there are three phases after a financial distress situation of a bank, the 
(1) recovery phase, (2) resolution phase and (3) liquidation phase, although each phase has 
different characteristics. The recovery phase can be distinguished from the resolution phase 
with respect to the point of non-viability (PoNV). The PoNV is understood to be when a bank 
is ‛no longer viable or likely to be no longer viable, and has no reasonable prospect of becoming 
so’ (FSB 2011: 7). Thus, ‛the preferred resolution strategy is activated on a coordinated basis 
with host regulators if recovery does not successfully lead to a stabilisation of the group’ 
(FINMA 2013: 9). 
 
Figure 3.9 Strategy to recover and resolve an SIB 
 
Sources: Authors’ own elaboration based on FSB (2011), FINMA (2013). 
 
The recovery phase is based on (1.1) recapitalisation, (1.2) recovery options, and (1.3) disposal. 
The recovery phase begins with the recapitalisation of the bank. Banks that cannot fund in the 
capital market (such as issuing new shares) automatically increase equity according to the 
conversion of contingent convertible capital (CoCos). This means that when the level of 
common equity tier 1 (CET1) reaches or falls below a certain per cent of risk-weighted assets 
(for example, in Switzerland, five per cent regarding the capital buffer (low trigger) and seven 
per cent with respect to the progressive component (high trigger)), new capital will 
automatically become available through the conversion of short-term liabilities into capital (see 
FINMA 2013). In other words, CoCos are debt obligations that convert to equity when a 
specific event occurs (such as when the common equity ratio falls below seven per cent) (see 
FINMA 2011). In a second step, the recovery plan (1.2) prepared beforehand (ex-ante) by the 
bank will be actualised. The recovery plan shows different recovery scenarios and possibilities. 
In particular, the recovery plan is a road map for resolving the banks. What elements determine 
a recovery plan?  
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The difficulty is that recovery and resolution plans, also called ‛living wills’, are not 
publicly available, and plans vary between different regulatory authorities. Nevertheless, we 
present a possible recovery and resolution plan based on the key elements of FSB (2011), 
Douglas et al. (2011) and the UBS resolution plan (UBS 2014b) with the objective of 
transparency, simplicity and modularity. Figure 3.10 illustrates the recovery and resolution 
plan. According to Figure 3.10, the recovery plan is based on the following: (1) an institutional 
overview that describes the organisational structure of a bank (see Appendix 1); (2) the 
description of business lines (for example, wealth management) and banking activities (such as 
derivative and hedging activities); (3) financial and economic functions for which continuity is 
critical (for example, the payment, clearing and settlement system); (4) financial statements and 
income statements (including market shares, value of deposits, balance sheet size and the GDP, 
risk profile); and (5) stress testing (macro-based market-wide (systemic) stress and micro-based 
bank-specific (idiosyncratic) stress scenarios) and recovery strategies (such as recapitalisation 
and CoCos scenarios). 
 
Figure 3.10 Design of a potential recovery and resolution plan 
 
Sources: Authors’ own elaboration based on FSB (2011), Douglas et al. (2011), and UBS (2014b). 
 
In a third step, banks will attempt to be sold on the financial market if a recovery is not feasible 
(disposal) (1.3). If the bank enters the PoNV, then the bank is part of the second defence line, 
namely, the resolution phase. The resolution phase can be divided into macro-based and micro-
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based strategy. The macro-based strategy, also called a high-level description of resolution, 
‛may consist of either ‛single point of entry’ [(SPoE)] or ‛top down’ approaches and ‛multiple-
entry’ [(ME)] resolution along national, regional or functional lines’ (Hüpkes 2013: 82-83, see 
also Randell 2013). The SPoE approach is based on a single national resolution and the group 
level. Conversely, the ME is based on multiple resolution authorities with respect to national, 
regional or functional business lines (see also Hüpkes 2013). In Switzerland, the resolution 
authority (FINMA) makes the decision regarding the SPoE approach (see FINMA 2011). 
Conversely, the micro-based strategy is determined by the transfer of assets and liabilities, (3.1) 
bridge banks,117 (3.2) and bail-in, also called ‘restructuring’. In this context, observers would 
mention that in reality, CoCos are not different from bail-in, and thus, the recovery phase is not 
different from the resolution phase. This may be true regarding recapitalisation with CoCos, 
but the resolution phase draws upon the transfer of assets and liabilities, bridge bank strategies 
and so forth. Therefore, the recovery phase is different than the resolution phase, (3.3). In this 
regard, the bank has two possible strategies, A and B (see Tucker 2013). Figure 3.11 illustrates 
the two possible strategies as a consequence of hierarchy claims. Thus, a clear strategy is based 
on a clear objective, namely, a hierarchical structure of the claims. Figure 3.11 illustrates five 
hierarchical claims: (1) insured depositors that are covered by deposit insurance; (2) uninsured 
insurance (institutional clients such as insurance companies); (3) senior bond holders;118 (4) 
junior bond holders; and (5) shareholders. In light of this hierarchy structure, the following two 
strategies can be described. 
For Strategy A, in a first step, the equity (shareholders) will be written off entirely before 
uninsured senior and junior bond holders’ bail-in to absorb losses. Simultaneously, selected 
assets, liabilities (insured depositors and uninsured insurance) and essential functions (payment 
services, clearing and settlement systems) are transferred to a bridge bank (see FSB 2011).  
Strategy B is different regarding the restructuring clause because no restructuring is 
imposed for senior and junior bond holders. In this context, senior and junior bond holders and 
non-essential bank functions (such as investment banking) will be transferred to a bad bank. 
Conversely, insured depositors, uninsured insurance and essential bank functions will be 
transferred to a good bank that will be sold (for example, in 2012, the Cyprus banking crisis 
                                                          
117 According to DeYoung et al. (2013: 615), a bridge bank is defined as a temporary national bank created by the 
regulatory agency, where ‘assets and most liabilities of failed bank transferred to new bank. Old ownership, 
holding company creditors, and management are severed from bank’. 
118 The categorisation of senior and junior bond holders aims to treat bond holders equally without making one 
worse off in the liquidation process (see FINMA 2011). 
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followed strategy B; a bad bank, ‛Laiki Bank’, and a good bank, the ‛Bank of Cyprus’, were 
created). 
 
Figure 3.11 Hierarchy of claims and possible strategies 
 
Source: Authors’ own elaboration. 
 
These strategies are part of a resolution plan119 that contains the following: (1) an institutional 
overview; (2) a description of business lines and banking activities; (3) financial and economic 
functions for which continuity is critical; (4) financial statements and income statements; (5) 
material supervisory authorities, indicating which regulatory authorities are involved in the 
resolution phase with respect to cross-border services because different countries have different 
resolution regimes (see also Ayadi et al. 2012, Hüpkes 2013, Randell 2013); and (6) macro- 
and micro-based resolution strategies. After the resolution phase, the bad bank will be insolvent 
and undergo an orderly write-down. In short, recovery and resolution plans indicate specific 
problems (see Liikanen 2012), place failed banks in a bankruptcy procedure (see Tucker 2013) 
and induce a simplified structure in SIBs (see Ayadi et al. 2012). Nevertheless, can SIBs wind-
down in an orderly manner without taxpayer money regarding the recovery and resolution 
standards?  
The answer is no. Additional funding is required to wind-down an SIB that is not 
guaranteed by the recent standards because ‘[d]iscussions about the funding of recovery and 
resolution procedures usually pay too little attention to the distinction between the need to fund 
operations as long as they are ongoing and the need to allocate or to absorb ultimate losses’ 
                                                          
119 The resolution plan is prepared by the resolution authority and includes several resolution strategies (such as 
open bank assistance, forbearance, purchase and assumption, partial payout, and asset liquidation) (see DeYoung 
et al. 2013). 
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(Hellwig 2014a: 19). Certain observers would argue that for this purpose, the European Banking 
Union120 has created a Single Resolution Fund (SRF).121 The SRF should represent 
approximately € 55 or € 70 billion when fully operational (see EC 2014), although € 55 or € 70 
billion is insufficient to fund even one SIB (for example, in 2014, the liabilities of Deutsche 
Bank were valued at € 1,635 billion, which is a difference in the SRF of € 1,580 billion (see 
DB 2014)). Likewise, Hellwig (2014a: 19) notes that the target levels of the fund  
 
‘are much too small to ensure interim funding of institutions like Deutsche Bank or BNP Paribas with liabilities 
on the order of € 2 trillion, a large part of which is wholesale and short-term, i.e., easy to discontinue if 
counterparties get nervous. Promises of support from a fund with € 55 or € 70 billion are not going to stop a run if 
creditors with claims amounting to € 1 trillion or more are worried about a bank’.    
 
In this example, opponents would state that CoCos are excluded; however, even if CoCos are 
included, the SRF fund cannot sufficiently absorb losses. Therefore, some insolvent SIBs 
cannot be resolved without government assistance in Europe. In Switzerland, the situation is 
different for the following reasons: (1) There is no SRF fund available. (2) The regulatory 
requirements are higher than those in the European Union. Despite these higher regulatory 
requirements, discussions about funding operations have devoted insufficient attention to 
Switzerland. Therefore, it is possible that an SIB (such as UBS or Credit Suisse) could be wound 
down in an orderly manner without taxpayer money or with the help of the SNB as the LOLR. 
(3) The SIBs are too complex based on the institutional structure (see Appendix 1). In this sense, 
a substantial challenge for regulatory authorities is to address solvency rules and agencies in 
different countries (see SFBC 2008a). (4) At the time of the transfer and separation of asset and 
liability classes, Tucker (2013: 17) argues that ‛there is not time for a process involving 
negotiations between different classes of creditors and shareholders under the jurisdiction’. (5) 
With respect to the material supervisory agency, there is a cross-border problem. In this regard, 
‛[t]he bail-in changes the ownership of the group but it does not affect the balance sheets of the 
subsidiaries’ (Tucker 2013: 17, see also the subsidiary problem in Appendix 1). In other words, 
Gleeson (2013) notes that ‛if a bank has a branch and a subsidiary in a particular jurisdiction 
[such as Singapore or Hong Kong] the resolution authority in that jurisdiction must be prepared 
to treat the creditors of the branch differently from the creditors of the subsidiary and not seek 
to attach assets belonging to the branch to satisfy creditors of the subsidiary’. (6) As shown in 
                                                          
120 The European Banking Union, based on a single supervisory mechanism and a single resolution mechanism, 
have been expanded with the SRF. 
121 The SRF is funded by European SIBs with regard to the asset size of their balance sheet. 
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Figure 3.11, certain types of claims are ‛exempt’ from bail-in, namely, uninsured insurance (see 
Hellwig 2014a). This exemption creates a moral hazard problem and imposes excessive risk-
taking. (7) Recent recovery standards are based on idiosyncratic risk; however, this is a problem 
because systemic risk will be not taken into consideration. According to our critique, we see 
potential policy options for the recovery and resolution standards: 
 
• Setting a clear solvency framework and, in addition to cross-border resolution cooperation, 
setting various international memoranda of understanding among the appropriate regulatory 
authorities (including explicit rules for times of financial distress); 
• Taking into account subsidiaries in the recovery and resolution plans; 
• Taking into account uninsured insurance in a bail-in process; and 
• Taking into account systemic risks, particularly in the stress tests. 
 
With these considerations in mind, a question arises regarding the effects of recovery 
and resolution standards. In the literature, there is very little theoretical or empirical research 
on the impact of recovery and resolution standards because it is difficult to simulate the effects 
and draw conclusions about recovery and resolution standards before they are fully 
implemented. Therefore, further academic research, particularly a quantitative impact 
assessment on the effects of recovery and resolution standards, would be desirable if the 
regulation have been fully implemented in 2019. 
 
3.3. An alternative regulatory proposal 
 
Next, we discuss an alternative bank regulatory proposal instead of capital requirements, 
liquidity requirements (LCR and NSFR) and so forth. As noted in chapter 2, a clearly stated 
bank regulation ‘must be based on a clear identification of market failure’ (Tirole 2002: 114). 
Therefore, we ask ourselves what the main causes of the financial crisis in 2007–2009 were. In 
this regard, the main causes122 of market failure include the following: (1) a mismatch of 
maturity transformation through the lack of transparency of an SPV (see Gorton 2008, 
Brunnermeier 2009b, Hellwig 2009); (2) asymmetric information in the mortgage securitisation 
process; (3) malfunctioning in fair-value accounting (see Hellwig 2009); and (4) the low 
creditworthiness of householders. Considering the major causes of the financial crisis, we ask, 
                                                          
122 We agree that monetary policy (reducing interest rates) also plays a decisive role (Greenspan put). 
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‘what type of regulation would help to improve the situation?’ (Baltensperger and Dermine 
1987: 70). The answer is based on the four main causes of market failure. Therefore, we propose 
an alternative regulatory proposal, such as the Basel III requirements, because Basel III lacks a 
clear market failure analysis and various problems (see capital requirements, liquidity 
requirements, and recovery and resolution standards). Figure 3.12 illustrates the four steps of a 
regulatory reform programme. In what follows, we describe the alternative regulatory proposal. 
 
Figure 3.12 Four-step regulatory proposal 
 
Source: Authors’ own elaboration. 
 
Removing and modifying fuzzy regulatory instruments  
 
As a first step, the banking sector should remove and modify all fuzzy regulatory measures, for 
instance, by modifying fair-value accounting in a financial distress situation or removing 
liquidity requirements. Next, we briefly expand on the modification of fair-value accounting or 
the removal of liquidity requirements. 
Suppose a bank is in financial distress. In such a situation, a bank reassesses its positions 
(such as trading positions) under fair-value accounting and takes corrective actions regarding 
equity positions. Therefore, a bank is ‘likely to involve some deleveraging […]. If the assets in 
question are the very assets for which markets are not functioning, the book losses turn into real 
losses, which they might not have done if the bank could have held on to the assets’ (Hellwig 
2009: 176). The real losses could spread to other banks as a result of interconnectedness in the 
banking sector. Therefore, fair-value accounting is a source of systemic risk (see IMF 2008, 
Hellwig 2009). Thus, in this regard, the IMF (2008: 65) correctly indicated that ‘fair-value 
[accounting] is compounding market instability by applying the valuations arising from sales 
in these abnormal market conditions [during the financial crisis of 2007–2009] across all fair-
valued portfolios, regardless of the intention of holding them’. In other words, fair-value 
accounting can produce scenarios that generate unnecessary losses and lead to downward 
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spirals in asset prices (see IMF 2008). Therefore, the IMF (2008: 66) proposes that one ability 
‘that should strengthen financial stability would be for financial institutions to define decision 
rules on the basis of fair value milestones that trigger a review of the elements, such as 
assumptions or special circumstances, underlying fair value’. In this context, we propose either 
to remove fair-value accounting in a financial distress situation in which markets are not 
functioning well (see Hellwig 2009) or to simplify fair-value accounting.123 Likewise, the IMF 
(2008) concludes that regulators should pay greater attention to applying fair-value accounting 
results and must rethink the rules in that regard.  
Liquidity requirements are not target orientated to the main causes of the market failure 
of the financial crisis because the dry up in liquidity in the most recent financial crisis was a 
result of a solvency problem, not the cause (see section 7.1). Opponents would argue that 
holding more ‘liquidity’ reduces the likelihood of insolvency and ‘reduce[s] vulnerabilities 
from a system-wide increase in wholesale, short-term and foreign exchange (FX) funding’ (IMF 
2013: 21). This is correct, but bank regulation that comes out of the blue because policy makers 
and regulators want to expand their political agenda increases the cost of banking activities 
(harming bank functions) and the likelihood of regulatory arbitrage124 to fund highly liquid 
products such as the EU government bonds of periphery counties. Therefore, in a financial 
distress situation, liquidity requirements do not mitigate the probability of insolvency and 
system-wide risk.  
                                                          
123 In practice, there are three fair-value accounting instruments: Level 1 – quoted price in active markets, Level 2 
– valuation techniques determined by observable market data, and Level 3 – valuation techniques not based on 
observable market data (see UBS 2015). 
124 Regulatory arbitrage, also called the ‘Delaware effect’ (The state of Delaware in the United States implements 
increasingly lax regulation to attract foreign companies, especially in taxation) and also known as structural 
arbitrage, refers to the utilisation of varying regulation levels among countries in favour of market participants 
(see Goodhart et al. 1998, Calomiris 1999). In other words, regulatory arbitrage occurs when banks seek to 
circumvent bank regulation through financial innovation (securitisation or digital transformation) or by changing 
the business strategy and structure. Banks offload assets from banks’ balance sheets using securitisation (see 
Hellwig 2009, 2010a, 2010b, Ayadi et al. 2012, Admati and Hellwig 2013). Hence, banks create subsidiaries (bank 
activity) to shift out their credit and the liquidity risk of the balance sheet in a structured investment vehicle to 
avoid fulfilling higher regulatory standards. 
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Transparency measures for special purpose vehicles 
 
Second, we propose the implementation of transparency measures for SPVs because ‘in late 
July 2007 […] a vast expansion in off-balance sheet entities (OBSEs) [(such as SPVs and 
commercial paper conduits)] that had taken place since the mid-1990s, which was not 
transparent to many supervisors and regulators’ (IMF 2008: 69), had played a decisive role in 
the most recent financial crisis (for instance, Dillon Read Capital Management in the UBS crisis 
in 2007–2009) (see section 7.1 for further details). These OBSEs allowed banks and other 
financial institutions to transfer risk that was undisclosed to regulators and investors off their 
balance sheets. Moreover, they improved their market liquidity via securitisation and generated 
fee income. In this sense, the question arises as to why OBSEs are less transparent to supervisors 
and regulators. The answer is based upon the accounting standards under IFRS and US GAAP. 
Both accounting methods allow OBSEs to limit transparency to investors and regulators (see 
IMF 2008). ‘In general, OBSEs are structured such that no single institution holds the majority 
of the risks and rewards, thereby avoiding consolidation and appearance on a financial 
institution’s balance sheet’ (IMF 2008: 69). Therefore, the IMF (2008: 69) ‘suggests that 
standard setters [must] reconsider the grounds for consolidation to improve the understanding 
of underlying risks by all parties because of the ability of banks to avoid consolidation’. For 
example, if a bank holds a majority exposure to OBSEs, the accounting rules should determine 
that the bank should consolidate the OBSEs in the bank’s balance sheet (see IMF 2008). Such 
rules would lead to a better understanding of the structure and business model of SPVs for 
regulators and investors (which is not covered in the recovery and resolution plans) because 
they disclose the risk inherent in excessively shifting credit and liquidity risks (risk exposure) 
in banks’ balance sheet.  
 
Regulating or setting general principles for securitisation 
 
The word securitisation refers to the act of an untraded group of (debt) claims in a market (such 
as a bank loan) that is bundled and converted into traded securities by issuing claims against it 
and selling these claims to capital market investors (see Greenbaum and Thakor 2007 [1995], 
Hellwig 2009). Securitisation is ‘sometimes referred to as the originate-and-distribute model of 
mortgage finance, the originating institution, traditionally a bank or a savings institution, will 
transfer mortgage titles to a special-purpose vehicle, a specialized institution that puts a large 
set of mortgages into a package and that redefines itself by issuing mortgage-backed securities’ 
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(Hellwig 2009: 138-139). Although in the aftermath of the recent financial crisis, securitisation 
has been called into question, securitisation is an important part of a well-functioning financial 
system because ‘[i]n principle, [securitisation with respect to] shifting this risk away from the 
originating institution and its debtor makes sense because there are other market participants 
who are better able to bear this risk’ (Hellwig 2009: 140). Moreover, creating packages that 
standardise asset classes can reduce asymmetric information regarding the quality of mortgages 
(see Hellwig 2009). Nevertheless, the reduced monitoring of the creditworthiness of sub-prime 
related mortgages in the securitisation process may require securitisation to be reconsidered. 
Therefore, in autumn 2015, the European Commission proposed a regulation for securitisation 
that creates a framework to identify simple, transparent and standardised securitisations. ‘This 
framework allows investors to evaluate the risks related to securitisation and is accompanied 
by an amendment to the treatment of regulatory capital requirements’ (EPRS 2016: 2). The 
common rules for all securitisations include the following: (1) due diligence requirements for 
investors, (2) risk retention requirements and (3) transparency requirements for originators, 
sponsors and SPVs. Although we agree that the proposed regulation enhances monitoring in 
the securitisation process, an alternative proposal could be to establish general principles to 
mitigate the likelihood of excessive securitisation instead of regulations for the following 
reasons: (1) regulations might harm those securitisations that are important to the creation of 
market liquidity and (2) principle-based rules (a) are neutral as securitisation changes, neither 
encouraging nor hindering securitisation but enabling fair competition, and (b) provide space 
for innovation in the securitisation process, whereas regulation controls everything in detail. 
However, further academic research, particularly a systematic impact analysis for both 
proposals, is required before we begin to regulate or establish principles in this area.   
 
Setting capital requirements for householders 
 
According to the fourth point, one main cause of market failure in the current financial crisis 
was that capital requirements for house buyers were too low. Therefore, to limit the credit risk 
from house buyers, we propose to impose lending restrictions, specifically an international 
capital requirement standard for house buyers at a minimum of 30 to 40 per cent to reduce the 
likelihood of credit risk (insolvency) of borrowers that is created though leverage. In this 
context, we follow Admati and Hellwig (2013) and describe the leverage effect on house buyer 
H. Suppose there are two time periods, t0 and t1, and a creditworthy house buyer H who wants 
to purchase a house for CHF 500,000 (see Figure 3.13). 
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Figure 3.13 Leverage effect on house buyer H 
 
Source: Adapted from Admati and Hellwig (2013). 
 
If H does not have enough money to pay cash for the house, he can obtain a mortgage of at least 
CHF 450,000 from bank B with 10 per cent of the price or CHF 50,000 as collateral. We assume 
that house buyer H pays only interest rates. Moreover, suppose a five per cent change where 
the price increases or decreases. For the first situation, we assume in period t1 that the price of 
the house increases and the house buyer wants to settle the mortgage. This situation has one 
effect. House buyer H settles the mortgage of CHF 450,000 and receives CHF 25,000 from 
selling the house at a higher price of CHF 525,000. In other words, his equity increases and has 
a new value of CHF 75,000. This represents a return on equity of 15 per cent. However, if the 
price in period t1 decreases five per cent, then the house buyer has a loss of CHF 25,000. Thus, 
the house buyer has a return on loss of 50 per cent. In other words, funding creates leverage and 
makes the equity funding of house buyer H riskier, and bank B in a financial distress situation 
must write down its mortgage positions (fair-value accounting) to initiate the risk-feedback loop 
(see Hellwig 2009, see section 2.2.3). Admati and Hellwig (2013) show that increases in equity 
from 10 per cent to 20 or 30 per cent, as in the case for Switzerland, reduce this leverage effect 
significantly. In our view, to mitigate the likelihood of future mortgage crises and to protect 
house buyers from leverage, internationally harmonised higher capital requirements for house 
buyers would be desirable. However, it is unlikely to find political favour for higher 
international capital requirements for house buyers.  
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3.4. Summary 
 
In addition to defining the terms ‘bank’ and ‘bank regulation’, the objective of the first part of 
this dissertation was to summarise in theoretical form the objectives and measures of 
governmental intervention related to the banking industry. Toward this goal, a number of 
banking regulatory theories, objectives and measures were presented. The first part showed that 
government intervention in the banking industry can be explained by either the economic theory 
of regulation (public interest theory or private interest theory) or the outcome to secure banking 
regulation (the safety and soundness of banks and the safety and soundness of the banking 
system). In conjunction with the economic theory of regulation, public interest theory is the 
focus of this dissertation because it contains both first- and second-best solutions. Moreover, 
there is at least one cause for bank regulation that is in the public interest, allowing us to justify 
bank regulation for a variety of reasons (see Goodhart et al. 1998). In relation to the outcome, 
we systematise the various objectives using both a micro-based and a macro-based approach. 
In this regard, there are two micro-based objectives (consumer protection and the safety and 
soundness of banks) and two macro-based objectives (the safety and soundness of the banking 
system and monetary control). However, although we extend the micro-based approach with a 
macro-based approach as a result of the limited focus of the micro-based approach that was 
evident in the most recent financial crisis, various economists have widely questioned the 
finance theories used. In light of these considerations, we elaborate an alternative bank 
regulatory view based on the endogenous nature of money and credit. This view provides an 
alternative justification of bank regulation regarding the safety and soundness of bank services 
and the safety and soundness of the banking system. Regarding the former, regulation would 
be justified with respect to asset services, particularly in the lending process (for example, better 
requirements in the assessment of a borrower or setting higher capital requirements for house 
buyers). With regard to the latter, we note that a stable banking system changes the period of 
financing regimes into an unstable system (see Minsky 1977). Therefore, bank regulation 
should focus on mitigating risk in the three financing forms, particularly from speculative 
financing to Ponzi financing. In this sense, bank regulations such as leverage ratios or minimum 
requirements for a rollover for liabilities would be desirable measures. In a subsequent step, we 
elaborate the following five regulatory criteria for a better systematisation of bank regulatory 
measures:  a ‘regulatory policy’, the ‘timing of intervention’ of prudential and protective 
regulation, the ‘micro versus macro regulation’ level of governance, the predictability of the 
‘discretionary versus institutional approach’, and an evaluation of the standard ‘qualitative 
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versus quantitative approach’. In light of these five criteria, we systematise the main current 
bank regulatory measures (such as capital adequacy requirements, liquidity requirements and 
recovery and resolution standards) and analyse them critically. Further, we propose potential 
policy options to reform current bank regulatory measures, which are summarised in the main 
reform proposal shown in Figure 3.14. In this context, we propose reforming the capital 
requirements as follows: (1) devising a precise systematisation of capital requirements with 
respect to the desirable objective; (2) including a provision for taking systemic risks into 
account; (3) performing an impact assessment before further incremental adjustments of capital 
requirements occur; (4) removing the zero-risk weighting for EU government bonds or 
‘introducing a non-zero risk weight floor for sovereign exposures in the standard approach’ or 
the IRB approach (ESRB 2015: 9); (5) setting a minimum standard in the IRB approach (see 
ESRB 2015); and (6) increasing the unweighted capital requirements to twenty and thirty per 
cent (Hellwig 2010b).  
 
Figure 3.14 Main reform proposal 
 
Source: Authors’ own elaboration. 
 
In relation to liquidity regulation, the following reform options are proposed: (1) taking into 
account systemic risks; (2) as with capital regulation, removing the zero-risk weighting of EU 
government bonds or introducing a non-zero risk weight; (3) simplifying categories and factors 
and allocating cross-border liquidity; (4) setting standards to mitigate the manipulation of 
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liquidity requirements; and (5) providing empirical impact assessments before establishing 
further standards. With regard to recovery and resolutions standards, we posit the following 
reform options: (1) setting a clear solvency framework and various international memoranda of 
understanding among the appropriate regulatory authorities (including explicit rules during 
financial distress); (2) taking subsidiaries into account in recovery and resolution plans; and (3) 
taking uninsured insurance into account for the bail-in. Moreover, an alternative regulatory 
proposal was formulated that is oriented towards the source of market failure of the financial 
crisis in 2007–2009. In this regard, we propose removing or modifying all fuzzy regulatory 
measures (for instance, removing fair-value accounting in financial distress situations and 
setting liquidity principles), implementing transparency measures for SPVs, regulating or 
setting general principles for securitisation and establishing harmonised 20 to 30 per cent capital 
requirements for house buyers, as shown in Figure 3.15. 
 
Figure 3.15 Alternative reform proposal 
 
Source: Authors’ own elaboration. 
 
Based on these two reform proposals, we propose a more effective regulatory system to reform 
the recent regulatory measures or replace them with an alternative regulatory approach that 
focuses on the main causes of the financial crisis of 2007–2009. However, both proposals will 
not definitively exclude the possibility that SIBs in Switzerland or elsewhere will be allowed to 
fail in the future. A ‘high degree of concentration carries with it a high degree of potential 
systemic risk. The distress or failure of one of the top three banks in a country, for example, 
could destabilize that country’s entire financial system’ (IMF 2014: 4). For this reason, 
according to former Federal Reserve Chairman Ben Bernanke (2013) and FSB Chairman Mark 
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Carney (2013), the too-important-to-fail problem is ‘not solved and gone’. Furthermore, risks 
by the central banks have caused multiple bank failures and the destruction of public deposits. 
However, in the recent crisis, ELA was critical in stabilising the banking system. Consequently, 
central banks with the LOLR function are essential to enhance the stability of the economy. 
Therefore, we propose an effective regulatory system that is a combination of bank regulation 
and a well-designed LOLR. Thus, a clearly credible LOLR can be a ‘second-best’ solution to 
solve the too-important-to-fail problem because ‘[i]t is better to establish a credible, ‘second-
best’ safety net that sets clear rules for bailouts than to claim to establish superior non-credible 
(and therefore ineffectual) policies’ (Calomiris 1999: 1517). In this sense, the financial crisis 
of 2007–2009 ‘has raised important questions about the role of the central bank [as the LOLR] 
in the prevention, management and resolution of financial crises’ (BIS 2009: 5). Therefore, part 
II of this dissertation sheds light on the role of the SNB as the LOLR in the prevention, 
management and resolution with ELA to individual banks in Switzerland. 
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Part II –Redesign of Switzerland’s lender of last resort regime for the twenty-first 
century 
 
‘Financial crises are dramatic events. They evoke radical thinking, strong reactions and regime 
changes’ (Goodhart and Illing 2009: 4). In this sense, the financial crisis of 2007–2009 has 
shown that the failure of a systemically important institution, Lehman Brothers, which was too 
interconnected to fail, posed a systemic risk for the entire financial system. In other words, the 
failure of a systemically important institution can destabilise the entire financial system and can 
affect the real economy of a country. Given the threat of the failure of a systemically important 
institution, governments and central banks can prevent it from failing. Therefore, on 16 October 
2008, to avoid the destabilisation of the Swiss financial system, the SNB acted as the LOLR 
and provided direct ELA to strengthen the liquidity structure of the large bank UBS. Although 
the rescue of UBS was successful125 and limited unnecessary risk in the banking industry, ELA 
is subject to various problems: (1) ELA creates an uneven playing field between SIBs126 and 
small to medium-sized banks because SIBs that benefit from ELA have a competitive advantage 
over small to medium-sized banks and benefit from cheaper funding (see Birchler et al. 2010, 
Liikanen et al. 2012,). (2) ELA can lead to excessive risk-taking (moral hazard) because, as 
with any liquidity insurance, the LOLR creates incentives to take more of the insured risk, that 
is, the liquidity risk (see Tucker 2014). In other words, with ELA, ‘investors do not fully price 
in bank risk-taking and banks are incentivised to take more risk than they would if their cost of 
funding reflected their activities’ (Liikanen et al. 2012: 23). (3) ELA creates costs for the public 
sector because if central banks suffer losses, they will transfer these costs to the governments 
(see Hellwig 2014b, Tucker 2014,). Thus, the taxpayer bears a substantial proportion of the 
losses. (4) ELA creates macroeconomic costs; for example, the rescue packages of the Swiss 
Confederation and SNB covered only four per cent of the banks’ balance sheet but cost 13 per 
cent of the GDP in Switzerland (government expenditures for one year) (see Birchler et al. 
2010). (5) ELA represents a reputation risk for the banking sector and affects the confidence in 
banks and shareholders (see Baltensperger 1992, Domanski and Sushko 2014, Tucker 2014). 
To reduce the economic risks posed by systemically important institutions and to mitigate the 
problems of ELA from the SNB and the Swiss Confederation, on 4 November 2009, the Federal 
Council in Switzerland established a commission of experts with the involvement of 
                                                          
125 The rescue of UBS had been successful because, on the one hand, the SNB realised a net benefit from the 
interest rates on the ELA loan. On the other hand, the Swiss Confederation made more than CHF 1 billion via 
interest rates in the sale of ECA to UBS. 
126 The term ‘SIBs’ will be defined in section 7.2.1. 
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representatives from Swiss financial enterprises (such as UBS and Credit Suisse), the FINMA, 
and the FFA. On 30 September 2010, the commission proposed four core regulatory measures 
to mitigate the risks posed by SIBs, namely, capital requirements, liquidity requirements, risk 
diversification requirements and organisational measures (recovery and resolution standards) 
(see part I). All these regulations are subsumed under ‘too-big-to-fail’ regulations, and they 
entered into Swiss law in March 2012 (see Commission of Experts 2010). Although these 
regulatory measures help mitigate the risk posed by SIBs to a certain degree and enhance the 
resilience of the banking industry, these stricter bank regulations will not definitively exclude 
the possibility that SIBs will receive ELA from the SNB in the future for the following reasons: 
(1) The expert group did not analyse the main causes of the crisis and did not elaborate based 
on target-orientated regulatory measures; thus, to a certain extent, the current regulatory 
measures are disputed. Instead, to identify the main causes of the most recent financial crisis, 
the commission analyses the benefits created by SIBs and the repercussions of failure. Although 
this analysis is not necessarily inessential, to create an effective regulatory system, bank 
regulations should consider the main causes of market failure. (2) As we note in part I, the 
proposed regulatory measures are related to several problems (such as the manipulation of risk-
weighted assets for the calculation of the capital adequacy requirements). (3) The current bank 
regulations could not completely (a) exclude macroeconomic externalities, particularly large 
spillover effects on other sectors, (b) prevent disruptions of the smooth functioning of the 
payment system, or (c) mitigate the risk of costly systemic bank runs (see Calomiris 1999). (4) 
Several analyses by the IMF (2014) and Schäfer et al. (2016) show that the reform was able to 
lower bail-out expectations in Switzerland, but the expected probability for future ELA remains 
high. (5) The expert group did not analyse the role of the Swiss LOLR in the most recent 
financial crisis, which would be needed to mitigate the risks associated with providing ELA to 
SIBs. The deficiencies of bank regulations and the LOLR led to continuing calls for further 
reforms; in addition, ‘more rethinking of the LOLR doctrine is needed’ (Grossmann and 
Rockoff 2015: 58). Therefore, for a more effective regulatory system, we propose a 
combination of bank regulation and a well-designed Swiss LOLR. With regard to bank 
regulations, we propose that the recent regulatory measures127 be reformed with respect to our 
main potential reform proposal from part I or be replaced with our alternative regulatory 
approach, which focuses on the main causes of the most recent financial crisis. Furthermore, 
we reconsider the LOLR and consider redesigning the current LOLR in Switzerland. However, 
before we can redesign a potential Swiss LOLR, we must understand the nature of the LOLR, 
                                                          
127 The recent regulatory reforms should be further analysed within a theoretical framework. 
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examine the different LOLR schools of thought and analyse the Swiss LOLR in the most recent 
financial crisis. In this context, the second part of the dissertation elucidates the Swiss LOLR 
during the financial crisis of 2007–2009 and proposes a substantive LOLR regime for 
Switzerland in the twenty-first century.  
 
4. The nature of the lender of last resort 
 
Although the technical academic literature has provided useful insights into the LOLR (see 
Holmström and Tirole 1998, Freixas et al. 2007 [1999], Rochet and Vives 2008), in the central 
banking literature and regulatory debates, the LOLR has been relatively neglected by central 
bankers (see Goodhart and Illing 2009, Tucker 2014). One reason for the relative neglect of the 
LOLR is the controversial discussion of ELA in central banking. On the one hand, ELA is a 
main function of central bank policy in modern economics. On the other hand, direct ELA for 
SIBs introduces several problems (for instance, adverse selection and moral hazard). Despite 
these problems, the financial crisis of 2007–2009 and the corresponding intervention by the 
central banks as LOLRs has shown that an LOLR is needed to prevent financial crises and to 
minimise even greater damage to the economy at the national level. However, this role has 
raised questions about the design of the central bank in terms of prevention, management and 
resolution (see Domanski and Sushko 2014). To answer some of these questions, the BIS held 
a workshop in 2014 that challenged participants to ‘re-think the lender of last resort’, with 
several contributions from academics and central bankers regarding the role of the LOLR in the 
most recent financial crises in the United States, the United Kingdom, the European Union, 
Mexico and Japan. However, the workshop did not provide any systematic and clear analysis 
of the LOLR in Switzerland, the so-called ‘Swiss LOLR’. Furthermore, the literature provides 
no systematic analyses of the Swiss LOLR and its role in the financial crisis of 2007–2009. 
Therefore, to fill this gap in the literature, the second part of the dissertation analyses the Swiss 
LOLR and outlines a real, possibly substantive regime for the twenty-first century. The Swiss 
LOLR for the twenty-first century draws on various principles that are elaborated in the second 
part of this dissertation and on various considerations in the following areas: (1) the nature of 
the LOLR, (2) an overview of the different LOLR schools of thought, (3) a historical analysis 
of the LOLR in Switzerland, and (4) an economic analysis of the Swiss LOLR during the UBS 
crisis of 2007–2009. These principles and considerations are important because 
‘[a]cting as the lender of last resort involves making commitments: to lend in order to stave off or contain systemic 
distress. Those commitments need to be credible, which requires amongst other things that they be time consistent. 
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The regime won’t work well if people believe a central bank will change its mind, or has no clear principles’ 
(Tucker 2014: 11). 
 
Based on these four subject areas, the following questions of particular interest will be answered 
in the second part of this dissertation: 
 
• What is the LOLR, and why does it exist in Switzerland?  
• What are the LOLR schools of thought? 
• What conditions apply to the LOLR in Switzerland? 
• Can its role be carried out via open market operations? 
• Should the Swiss LOLR provide liquidity assistance to non-bank financial institutions? 
• Should the Swiss LOLR provide liquidity assistance against wide or narrow classes of 
collateral? 
• How can a potential Swiss LOLR regime for the twenty-first century be outlined? 
 
To answer these questions, we proceed as follows. In the first step, we provide broad and narrow 
LOLR definitions, consider the rationale of the LOLR, and systematise the LOLR. In the second 
step, we present various LOLR schools of thought, which helps us understand the underlying 
LOLR concepts. In the third step, we provide a historical analysis of the LOLR in Switzerland. 
In the fourth step, we empirically analyse the role of the Swiss LOLR during the UBS crisis 
and raise the following question: Did UBS fulfil the current Swiss LOLR conditions at the time 
of ELA? In other words, we determine whether the bank was systemically important and solvent 
and held sufficient eligible collateral. As such, our main focus lies in the solvency of the nature 
of the bank because the operational concept of solvency is ambiguous in the literature. In the 
fifth step, the principles elaborated in the second part are subsumed into a reform proposal for 
the twenty-first century, which will be qualitatively evaluated. 
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4.1. What is the lender of last resort? 
 
The first time that the term ‘LOLR’ was believed to be used was by Sir Francis Baring 
in ‘Observations on the Establishment of the Bank of England and on the Paper Circulation of 
the Country’ in 1797. Baring (1797) mentioned several banking failures, including the failure 
of Air Bank in 1772 and the Bank of Newcastle in 1793. As a consequence of the analysis of 
bank failures and the demand for money in such distressing situations, Baring (1797) used a 
French legal term for a court of last appeal, dernier ressort, from whom banks can obtain ELA 
(see Grossman and Rockoff 2015). Baring (1797) indicated the BoE as a joint-stock, profit-
maximising bank that should act as the dernier ressort, that is, the so-called lender of last resort, 
from whom all borrowers, typically banks, could obtain ELA in the form of gold and BoE notes 
in times of financial distress (see also Thornton 1965 [1939]). In light of these considerations, 
we can formulate a broad definition of the ‘LOLR’: 
 
 
 
Source: Authors’ own elaboration. 
 
Although Baring (1797) noted that the BoE was the LOLR for banks, no systematic and 
complete analysis about the LOLR concept existed at that time. To fill the gap in the literature, 
in 1802, Henry Thornton (1965 [1939]) provided a complete systematic analysis of the LOLR 
concept in his speeches on the Bullion Report and in his work, ‘An Enquiry into the Nature and 
Effects of the Paper Credit of Great Britain’. He also explained why the BoE was the LOLR, 
noting three of its unique characteristics (see section 5.3 for further details): (1) The BoE was 
the ultimate liquidity source of the banking system. (2) The BoE was responsible for managing 
and holding sufficient gold reserves. In other words, the BoE was the custodian of the gold 
reserves and had to freely provide BoE notes in times of financial distress. (3) The BoE was not 
like any other bank because it had a public responsibility to the entire financial system rather 
than just individual banks. Therefore, the BoE had to hold larger reserves than ordinary banks 
to avert internal and external liquidity drain in times of financial turmoil (see Thornton 1965 
[1939], Humphrey and Keleher 2009 [1984]). 
In 1873, Walter Bagehot (2005 [1920]) provided the strongest contribution to the LOLR 
concept in his book entitled ‘Lombard Street: A Description of the Money Market’. Bagehot 
(2005 [1920]) revived and restated many of Thornton’s arguments (1965 [1939]) and noted that 
The lender of last resort is an institution from whom all borrowers, typically banks, can 
obtain emergency liquidity assistance in a financial distress situation. 
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the BoE, as the central bank,128 was the LOLR and that the BoE was the ultimate liquidity 
source. Therefore, Bagehot (2005 [1920]) concluded that in times of financial distress, the BoE 
was responsible for lending to all solvent banks against good collateral at a very high interest 
rate. Moreover, he agreed with Thornton (1965 [1939]) that the BoE, as a monetary authority, 
must hold sufficient reserves, especially gold, to protect against internal and external liquidity 
drains. Bagehot’s famous rule is to ‘lend freely at a high rate’ to support the stability of the 
financial system rather than individual banks (Bagehot 2005 [1920], Humphrey and Keleher 
2009 [1984]). This review leads us to a narrow definition of the LOLR: 
 
 
 
 
Sources: Authors’ own elaboration based on Baring (1797), Thornton (1965 [1939]) and Bagehot (2005 [1920]). 
 
However, central banks were slow learners of the LOLR concept, and before the 1970s, the 
literature included few theoretical and formal analyses on this topic. The situation changed in 
the early 1970s, particularly after the turmoil of 1972–1973, the Herstatt Bank failure in 
Germany in 1974, the Swiss mortgage crisis in the 1990s, the Mexican peso crisis in 1994, the 
East-Asian crisis in 1997, the Russian and the long-term capital management (LTCM) crisis in 
1998, the 2001–2002 stock market crash, the financial crisis of 2007–2009, and the sovereign 
debt crisis of 2012. With the occurrence of various crises, the analysis of financial crises became 
a hot research topic in modern economics, whereas the analysis of the LOLR has been relatively 
neglected (see Goodhart and Illing 2009). Although several studies attempt to illuminate the 
nature of the LOLR and definitions of the term, the LOLR’s function remains ambiguous. In 
the contemporary literature, possible definitions of the LOLR can be found in Guttentag and 
Herring (1987), Freixas et al. (2007 [1999]), Bordo (2009 [1990]) and Tirole (2002). According 
to Tirole (2002: 110), the LOLR is ‘an institution that provides liquidity to a [bank] when 
commercial lenders no longer want to supply funds’. Likewise, Bordo (2009 [1990]: 109) 
defines an LOLR as a monetary authority who ‘can allay an incipient panic by timely assurance 
that it will provide whatever high powered money is required to satisfy the demand’. A more 
precise definition is provided by Guttentag and Herring (1987) and Freixas et al. (2007 [1999]). 
According to Guttentag and Herring (1987: 150), the term LOLR denotes ‘an agency with the 
responsibility for preventing financial crises by lending directly and freely to a broad range of 
                                                          
128 The BoE became the central bank of England with the passage of the 1844 Bank Charter Act. 
The lender of last resort is an institution from whom all borrowers, typically solvent but 
illiquid banks, can freely obtain liquidity assistance in an emergency situation at an interest 
rate, against good collateral. 
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borrowers during periods of financial strain’. Likewise, Freixas et al. (2007 [1999]: 28) define 
the term LOLR as ‘the discretionary provision of liquidity to a financial institution (or the 
market as whole) by the central bank in reaction to an adverse shock which causes an abnormal 
increase in demand for liquidity which cannot be met from an alternative source’. According to 
these definitions, the term LOLR is closely associated with the term ELA, and they are often 
used interchangeably.  
However, not only banks (or the private banking community) and central banks but also 
governments and international authorities (such as the IMF) that have a function in the 
international financial system can act as LOLRs and provide ELA. In the words of 
Baltensperger (1992: 442), the LOLR function ‘can be shared with other potential suppliers of 
emergency help’ (see also Guttentag and Herring 1987). In this context, we can distinguish 
between four main types of LOLRs that have distinct ELA characteristics, as shown in Figure 
4.1: (1) A private banking community of commercial banks can provide ELA via a 
clearinghouse against loan certificates (see Timberlake 2007 [1984], see section 5.1). (2) The 
government can act as the LOLR and provide ELA in the form of taxpayer money. In this sense, 
‘thanks to its assumed ability to commit future consumer endowments via taxation’ or 
government bonds that can be sold at a liquidity premium to meet the demand on liquidity, the 
government can provide ELA (Holmström and Tirole 1998: 20). However, the government is 
primarily responsible for solvency support – not for liquidity – because otherwise, a boundary 
problem will arise between the central bank and the government. Therefore, in Switzerland, the 
SNB provides liquidity support, whereas, in accordance with Art. 103 of the FCSC (2016 
[1999]), the Swiss Confederation provides solvency support (see Baltensperger and Dermine 
1987, Nyberg 2000, Heller and Kuhn 2007, Illing and König 2014, SNB 2015a).  
 
Art. 103  Structural policy  
 
The Confederation may support regions of the country that are under economic threat and promote specific 
economic sectors [for example, the banking sector] and professions, if reasonable self-help measures are 
insufficient to ensure their existence. In exercising its powers under this Article, it may if necessary depart from 
the principle of economic freedom. 
 
 (3) International authorities can act as international LOLRs and provide ELA in foreign 
currencies because of their decisive role in the economy when the ‘private sector cannot borrow 
foreign currency on acceptable terms in the international money market’ (Goodhart 
2009[1999]: 235). Nevertheless, as a supplier of practically unlimited ELA, the central bank 
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stands alone because it ‘has the instruments for lending available and it has resources in its 
balance sheet or the credibility to get resources if they are needed’ (Nyberg 2000: 2, 
Baltensperger 1992). ‘This is the role of central banks we have in mind when we talk about 
ELA, or Lending of Last Resort’ (Baltensperger 1992: 442). We have this role of the central 
bank in mind in this dissertation. 
Furthermore, we conceptually distinguish between the LOLR and the market maker of 
last resort (MMLR) (see Figure 4.1). The MMLR includes all operations provided through the 
market, particularly OMOs (repo transactions,129 issuing of bills,130 and quantitative easing 
(QE)131) to solvent but illiquid deposit institutions. In addition to OMOs, the MMLR includes 
the discount window (DW) (for example, liquidity-shortage financing facilities and intraday 
facilities) (see Appendix 2 for further details) and other operations (for instance, FX 
transactions,132 FX swaps,133 and derivatives134). Suppose a deposit institution is unable to find 
liquidity on the interbank market (inside liquidity) to settle its interbank market debt. In other 
words, the deposit institution is unable to fund its operations with OMOs, other operations and 
the DW. In this context, a question arises: why are OMOs, other operations and DW 
transactions (as a form of direct lending) insufficient? The answer is that the amount available 
via OMOs, other operations and the DW is limited. Therefore, in special cases, the central bank 
can act as the LOLR and provide direct ELA. The amount provided by the LOLR is unlimited, 
particularly in terms of domestic currency. Nevertheless, the DW is a direct lending operation, 
which opens a controversial discussion around ELA and its operational nature in the literature. 
                                                          
129 ‘In a repo transaction, the cash taker sells securities to the cash provider and simultaneously agrees to repurchase 
securities of the same type and quantity at a later date. The interest rate used in a repo transaction is called the repo 
rate’ (SNB 2015a: Internet). 
130 ‘Debt certificates issued by the SNB with a term of up to one year’ (SNB 2015a: Internet). 
131 In the literature, the concept of QE is ambiguous. One possible definition is provided by the BoE, which defines 
QE as ‘an unconventional form of monetary policy where a Central Bank creates new money electronically to buy 
financial assets, like government bonds. This process aims to directly increase private sector spending in the 
economy and return inflation to target’ (BoE 2016: Internet). In other words, QE is a massive monetary stimulation 
demand for credit in the form of extraordinary monetary support, such as QE and credit easing, with 
‘unconventional’ monetary instruments by central banks in, for example, the United States, the United Kingdom, 
Japan, and Switzerland and in the aftermath of the financial crisis of 2007–2009 for the entire banking system (see 
BoE 2016a). In our view, QE is instead a conventional OMO because transactions via buying financial assets (for 
example, government bonds) can be considered as OMOs. 
132 ‘Foreign exchange market intervention occurs when a central bank buys or sells its domestic currency (spot or 
forward) for one or more foreign currencies with the goal of strengthening or weakening its own currency’ (SNB 
2015a: Internet). 
133 ‘A foreign exchange swap is a combination of a spot transaction and a forward transaction with foreign 
currency. In a liquidity swap, the SNB buys foreign currency from commercial banks against Swiss francs for a 
fixed term and sells it to them, also for a fixed term. At the end of the term, the reverse transaction is carried out 
at a previously agreed exchange rate’ (SNB 2015a: Internet). 
134 ‘Derivatives are financial instruments whose price is derived from that of an underlying asset. Underlying assets 
can be commodities, securities such as shares or bonds, as well as exchange rates, interest rates and indices. 
Derivatives can also be based on the probability of the occurrence of certain events (e.g. default). Call and put 
options, forwards and swaps are examples of derivatives’ (SNB 2015a: Internet). 
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Next, we briefly expand on this controversial discussion, which is useful in understanding the 
LOLR concept and a narrower definition of the term. 
 
Figure 4.1 Conceptual framework of the LOLR 
Sources: Authors’ own elaboration based on SNB (2015b) and SNB (2015c). 
 
According to Goodfriend and King (2009 [1988]), we can distinguish between LOLR 
OMOs (MMLR) and non-LOLR OMOs (non-MMLR) (for example, the DW). The MMLR is 
considered to provide ELA through the market. In this sense, Goodfriend and King (2009 
[1988]: 162-163) suggest that ELA in the form of ‘high-powered money can be managed with 
open market operations in government bonds. [...]. [Moreover,] there is little evidence that 
public lending to particular institutions is either necessary or appropriate’. Thus, according to 
Goodfriend and King (2009 [1988]), an ELA credit to a direct financial institution is not needed, 
and the LOLR is of an operational nature, meaning that the LOLR is undertaken through general 
market operations (Goodhart (2009 [1999]). Although distinguishing between LOLR OMOs 
and non-LOLR OMOs is impossible (except in rare circumstances),135 Goodhart (2009 [1999]: 
231) criticised Goodfriend and King’s view because ‘it is practically impossible then to 
distinguish LOLR OMOs from non-LOLR OMOs’. The following examples elucidate this 
problem. With the outbreak of a stock market crash in 1987, the Bank of Japan (BoJ) 
                                                          
135 One such occasion was the announcement of the Fed after the 1987 stock market crash (when the S&P 500 
stock market index fell approximately 20 per cent) due to the difficulty of gathering information in an uncertain 
and chaotic environment (see Goodhart 2009 [1999], Carlson 2006). 
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aggressively increased the monetary base. In the aftermath of the stock market crash, the BoJ 
continuously increased the monetary base with non-LOLR OMOs. Likewise, in the aftermath 
of the financial crisis of 2007–2009, various central banks increased the monetary base with 
LOLR OMOs that are still ongoing (for example, QE operations). Therefore, in practice, 
distinguishing between LOLR OMOs and non-LOLR OMOs or between LOLR QE and non-
LOLR QE was and remains impossible. Furthermore, Flannery (2007 [1996]) formally 
confirms that OMOs are unable to substitute for direct LOLR lending. In addition, as we have 
observed in the most recent financial crisis, OMOs-LOLR actions have not adequately 
stabilised the banking system. Thus, the distinction between direct lending by the central bank 
to an individual institution and OMOs, programmes as a form of QE, to the entire market is 
simple, practical and self-evidently justifiable (see Goodhart 2009 [1999]). The former is 
considered an LOLR, whereas the others concern a completely new role for the central bank, 
namely, as an MMLR136 with new questionable instruments. Therefore, many observers (for 
example, Maux and Scialom 2012) and central bankers incorrectly consider the provision of 
ELA through the market or via new instruments to be an LOLR. In the words of Humphrey 
(2010: 333), in the most recent crisis, the central banks have ‘deviated from the classical model 
in so many ways as to make a mockery of the notion that it is an [LOLR]’. Therefore, the 
MMLR is not an extension of the LOLR (see Dooley 2014). In line with Goodhart (2009 
[1999]), we conclude that the LOLR is non-operational (not a DW operation, OMO or other 
operation (such as FX swaps) because otherwise inside liquidity and thus the provision of high-
powered money via OMOs or DW transactions would be sufficient) and consider it to be an 
institution that provides direct lending to individual institutions (see Figure 4.1). This 
consideration leads us to the first principles for the LOLR in the twenty-first century: 
 
Principle 1: The LOLR is non-operational. 
 
With these considerations in mind, what are the main causes of an LOLR? To answer this 
question, the next section provides a brief overview about the rationale of the LOLR.  
                                                          
136 Tucker (2014) formulated several principles to reconstruct the MMLR. For example, (1) the MMLR should 
intervene in exceptional situations; (2) its objective should be to stabilise a malfunction in the market; and (3) it 
should charge a penalty rate. 
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4.2. The rationale of the lender of last resort 
 
In the literature, liquidity137 is commonly accepted to be created within the banking sector as 
‘inside liquidity’ and outside the banking sector as ‘outside liquidity’. Outside liquidity is 
created by domestic outside liquidity authorities (such as domestic central banks and 
governments that act as LOLRs) or by foreign outside liquidity authorities (such as the IMF) 
(see Holmström and Tirole 1998, Tirole 2002). This dissertation focuses on domestic outside 
liquidity authorities. In general, illiquid and solvent banks should obtain ELA from the LOLR. 
Why, then, should sound banks obtain assistance? After all, with perfect or near perfect 
interbank markets, such banks should always find inside liquidity (see Baltensperger and 
Dermine 1987). However, in the presence of one of the following five conditions, markets do 
not work perfectly; thus, central banks assume and formal analysis confirms that inside liquidity 
is insufficient for the banking sector (see Holmström and Tirole 1998, Tirole 2002):  
 
(1) A bank failure of systemic importance or a number of smaller bank failures have an impact 
on financial stability. In other words, a single bank or a small number of banks that are 
clearly systemic harm the stability of the financial and economic system (see Caprio and 
Klingebiel 1997, see section 2.2.3). 
(2) Macroeconomic externalities faced by the banking sector are not idiosyncratic but rather 
system wide; thus, a bank failure can trigger a contagion effect and introduce spillover 
effects in other sectors (see section 2.2.2). 
(3) Inside liquidity is not properly allocated within the interbank market. Thus, aggregate 
uncertainty exists. 
(4) A coordination failure occurs, meaning that economic agents take a destabilising action 
based on the expectation that other agents will do so as well (strategic complementarities). 
Economic agents refuse to renew the credit line as a result of their strategic 
complementarities, and a fundamental bank run can occur (see Rochet and Vives 2008). 
(5) Asymmetric information makes a solvent bank vulnerable to deposit withdrawals (panic-
based bank run) and/or dries up inside liquidity in the market in times of crisis (see Goodhart 
1988, Freixas et al. 2007 [1999]). 
 
                                                          
137 Liquidity can be interpreted in numerous ways. For example, as Holmström and Tirole (1998: 2) noted, ‘the 
liquidity of an asset is often measured by how quickly it can be sold without a price discount’. 
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Regarding the first condition, single or small numbers of banks that are not systemically 
important have no impact on the safety and soundness of the banking system. Therefore, the 
domestic banking and payment system can absorb the losses if small and medium-sized banks 
fail, and no LOLR is needed. If an SIB fails or numerous small and medium-sized banks that 
are systemically important fail, then the payment and settlement, the banking system and the 
economic system can be negatively affected, and liquidity is in demand. Therefore, inside 
liquidity is insufficient, and outside liquidity in the form of ELA via an LOLR is needed. 
In relation to the second condition, an idiosyncratic shock can be absorbed by the 
domestic banking sector because good banks compensate for bad banks, and no LOLR is 
needed (see Holmström and Tirole 1998, Tirole 2002). However, in the presence of a systemic 
shock, good banks are unable to compensate for bad banks. Consequently, inside liquidity is 
insufficient, and outside liquidity via the LOLR is required to limit the spillover effect. 
Regarding the third condition, Holmström and Tirole (1998) and Tirole (2002: 71) show 
that banks’ pooling of funds (hoarding) leaves banks with no liquidity need ‘with excess 
liquidity and thereby creates a waste of aggregate liquidity’. In other words, banks act as 
liquidity pools or insurers and redistribute excess liquidity to banks that do not need additional 
funding. Consequently, no LOLR is needed. In the presence of aggregated uncertainty, the 
‘market for short-term claims [does] not work well [because] potential lenders faced with such 
uncertainty may ration the borrower instead of raising the rate to cover a greater potential for 
losses’(Guttentag and Herring 1987: 162); thus, a liquidity shortage will occur. Therefore, in 
the presence of aggregated uncertainty, the private sector is unable to provide insurance because 
‘of [the] non-existence of, or the very limited coverage offered by, [the] deposit insurance 
system’ (Baltensperger and Dermine 1987: 81). As such, outside liquidity and the LOLR are in 
demand. 
 According to the fourth condition, Rochet and Vives (2008) formally show that if well-
informed investors have no doubts about the repayment of solvent banks’ credits, they do not 
refuse to renew these banks’ credit lines. However, if they doubt that a solvent bank will repay 
their credit, well-informed investors will refuse to renew the credit line138 despite the bank’s 
solvency. In the literature, the collective refusal to renew solvent banks’ credit lines represents 
a ‘coordination failure’ (see Rochet and Vives 2008). To avoid such coordination failures, 
Rochet and Vives (2008) propose a combination of (1) ex-ante solvency (capital adequacy 
requirements) and liquidity requirements; (2) an LOLR policy; and (3) closure rules that include 
                                                          
138 The assumption that investors will not renew the credit lines is based on various bank failures (such as the 
LTCM failure). 
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two types of policies: prompt corrective action of the LOLR via ELA (a) for illiquid solvent 
banks at a very low interest rate and (b) for illiquid insolvent banks according to an orderly 
resolution mechanism.  
 In relation to the fifth condition, depositors’ asymmetric information about a bank’s 
creditworthiness can make banks vulnerable, and the structure of bank balance sheets makes 
banks particularly vulnerable. As noted in the first part, banks are information specialists 
(‘delegated monitors’), and as Calomiris (1999: 1502) indicated, ‘the gain from banking derives 
from its economizing on information costs. But that specialisation comes at a price. Depositors’ 
lack of information about bank portfolios can create systemic runs on solvent banks’. Therefore,  
 
‘informational asymmetries between depositor and bank, together with the prospect of contagious bank runs, led 
to the need for quality control and supervision. One means of achieving that would be to establish a “club” of 
banks: the Central Bank [(LOLR)] could be regarded as the independent arbiter and head of that “club”’ (Goodhart 
1988: 85).  
 
In other words, the LOLR can prevent runs or make them less likely because uniformed 
depositors who are confident that their bank will receive ELA in the event of a crisis will have 
little incentive to run (see Calomiris 1999). 
Consequently, with respect to the five conditions, at least one rationale for an LOLR 
intervention exists in the current literature. 
 
4.3. The systematisation of the lender of last resort 
 
In the recent literature, no clear systematisation of the LOLR has been available. To fill this 
gap, we fall back on our systematisation scheme from Figure 3.1, namely, the overview of bank 
regulatory criteria. According to our regulatory criteria, we systematise the LOLR marked in 
dark blue in Figure 4.2. In this context, the LOLR is a macro-protective, institutional and 
qualitative safety net policy. Next, we elucidate the LOLR systematisation. 
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Figure 4.2 The LOLR in relation to the overview of banking regulatory measures 
 
Source: Authors’ own elaboration.  
 
First, the LOLR is a monetary policy instrument with regulatory characteristics for the 
following reasons: (1) According to our bank regulation definition from part I, the LOLR is a 
form of government intervention. In this sense, the LOLR is a type of regulatory system of the 
central bank that ‘stand[s] ready to provide help when banks, or the banking system as a whole, 
are experiencing temporary liquidity problems’ (Baltensperger 1990: 10, see also Baltensperger 
and Dermine 1987). (2) The LOLR is an active resolution and crisis measure139 similar to any 
other insurance scheme (for instance, deposit insurance or other guarantees) (see Solow 2007 
[1992], Greenbaum and Thakor 2007 [1995], Tucker 2014). Thus, LOLRs ‘might best be 
classified as instruments of crisis management’ (BIS 2011: 37). (3) The LOLR influences the 
bank’s economic decision-making and activities by subsidising bank activities for liquidity 
funding and encourages risk-taking (see Goodfriend and King 2009 [1988]). (4) The LOLR 
does not change the total volume of high-powered money (currency plus bank reserves) or the 
interest rate on the market as a monetary policy instrument. Opponents would argue that 
providing ELA to individual financial institutions would change the volume of high-powered 
money because the volume would be increased with an ELA credit. This increase may be 
temporarily true, but in the medium and long run, ELA is a credit that will settle down. 
                                                          
139 This also corresponds to the considerations of the BIS (2011: 37) that LOLRs ‘might best be classified as 
instruments of crisis management’. 
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Therefore, the volume of high-powered money will not be changed on the interbank market. 
(5) The LOLR seeks to ensure financial stability rather than price stability. 
Second, is the LOLR a prudential or a protective measure? As we noted in section 3.1.1, 
in practice, clearly distinguishing between prudential and protective measures is difficult. 
However, an alternative criterion that helps us with systematisation is the ‘timing of 
intervention’. In this regard, the central bank must make timely corrective interventions (see 
BCBS 1997). Likewise, Hellwig (2007: 813) noted that a ‘central bank intervention must occur 
before a bank failure, or even the rumour of an impending failure, has put markets into a state 
of panic’. In this context, we conceptually distinguish between prudential and protective 
measures with respect to the ‘timing of intervention’. Prudential measures seek to render risk 
improbable prior to financial distress (ex-ante). Conversely, protective measures include all 
regulatory instruments that seek to minimise damage to the economy either during or following 
(ex-post) financial distress (see section 3.1.1). According to these concepts, the LOLR is a 
protective instrument that protects the bank in the case of actual or impending bank failure (see 
Baltensperger and Dermine 1987). 
Third, is the LOLR a micro-based or macro-based measure? To answer this question, 
we fall back on our micro-based and macro-based concept. As noted in section 3.1.2, the micro-
based approach is defined as limiting the risk of episodes of financial distress at individual 
banks (namely, idiosyncratic risk) by emphasising the behaviour of individual agents 
(particularly externalities and asymmetric information). Conversely, the macro-based approach 
focuses on limiting the risk of episodes of system-wide distress (namely, systemic risk) that 
have significant costs for the economy as a whole. According to this distinction, the LOLR is a 
macro-based measure that is responsible for ensuring the safety and soundness of the banking 
sector rather than a micro-based instrument.  
Fourth, is the LOLR discretionary or institutional in nature? The discretionary or 
institutional approach draws upon the policy decision made by the central bank, which varies 
between different countries and at different times. For example, before the National Bank Act 
(NBA) reform in 2004, the Swiss LOLR was discretionary in nature and not a grant (see section 
6.3 for further details). After the NBA reform, the Swiss LOLR was ‘rule bound’ with respect 
to Art. 5 para. 2(a) and (b), and Art. 9 para. 1 (e) of the NBA (2016 [2003]) and cif. 6 of the 
guidelines of the SNB on monetary policy. 
Fifth, in the context of our systematisation, is the LOLR a qualitative or quantitative 
standard? Although the LOLR is based on measurable standards such as the assessment of SIBs, 
solvency and collateral, the LOLR can be considered a qualitative standard rather than a 
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quantitative standard because it is understood as a non-measurable standard that is 
predominately used to minimise the damaging impact of a bank failure on the entire economy. 
In short, the LOLR is a monetary-regulatory, macro-protective, institutional and 
qualitative safety net policy. 
 
4.4. Summary 
 
We now summarise the main considerations of chapter 4. In this chapter, we answered the 
following three questions: (1) What is the LOLR? (2) What is the rationale for the LOLR? (3) 
How can we systematise the LOLR? 
 The LOLR is an institution that can be the central bank, the government or any other 
organisation with sufficient resources to accommodate demands for money in a period of 
financial distress under certain specific conditions. In the following dissertation, our focus lies 
on the central bank. One specific characteristic of the LOLR is that it is non-operational in 
nature. However, the recent literature does not necessarily view all interventions in a period of 
financial distress as LOLR functions, although numerous central bankers and academics 
incorrectly consider all central bank interventions to be LOLR interventions. Consequently, we 
should differentiate between new questionable instruments (for example, QE) and direct 
lending to individual institutions. The former instruments are considered new central bank 
instruments, whereas the latter is considered an LOLR.  
In a further step, we briefly describe the main rationale for the LOLR as follows: First, 
because an SIB failure or a number of small and medium-sized bank failures have an impact on 
the payment and settlement system and the financial system, an LOLR is needed. Second, if a 
system-wide shock leads to contagion effects, an LOLR is needed. Third, in the case of 
aggregated uncertainty, inside liquidity is insufficient and cannot be allocated on the interbank 
market; therefore, an LOLR is needed. Fourth, in a case of coordination failure, well-known 
investors refuse to renew the credit lines of SIBs, which requires an LOLR intervention; 
otherwise, the banking system will tend to break down. Fifth, in the case of asymmetric 
information, particularly if depositors begin to withdraw their money from solvent banks, an 
LOLR is needed.  
Moreover, we systematise the LOLR with respect to our five criteria: policy, the timing 
of the intervention (thus, between prudential and protective measures), micro- and macro-level 
governance, the predictability of a discretionary versus institutional approach and the standards 
between a qualitative versus quantitative approach. In this context, the LOLR is a monetary 
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policy instrument with regulatory characteristics. The LOLR is a protective measure rather than 
a prudential measure because it is used during a period of financial distress, whereas prudential 
instruments are used before a period of financial distress. With regard to predictability, the 
LOLR depends on the central bank’s chosen strategy, which can change across country lines 
and over time. In relation to quantitative and qualitative approaches, the LOLR is qualitative in 
nature. In a nutshell, the LOLR is a monetary-regulatory, macro-protective, institutional and 
qualitative safety net. 
Next, we consider the different schools of thought that help us to understand the concept 
of the LOLR and to design the LOLR. 
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5. The lender of last resort schools of thought 
 
The literature includes different schools of thought with different conditions. Therefore, as a 
first step, systematising the schools of thought is important before we expand into greater detail. 
The literature distinguishes between the following four schools of thought: (1) the free banking 
school, which abolishes the central bank and any form of LOLRs; (2) the ‘classical Bagehot’ 
view, or classical school of thought, which states that the LOLR should provide funding to all 
solvent but illiquid firms against good collateral at a very high rate of interest; (3) the 
Goodfriend and King view, also known as the ‘Richmond Fed view’, which makes a pivotal 
proposition regarding lending via OMOs and abolishes direct lending (for example, via the 
DW); and (4) the Goodhart (and others) view, also known as the ‘New York Fed’ view, which 
proposes lending to any solvent or temporarily insolvent banks, when necessary to sustain the 
financial system. For a better overview, we provide an alternative systematisation and introduce 
two new LOLR views, namely, the Tiberian view and the alternative view. Figure 5.1 shows 
the broad and narrow views of the LOLR schools and their representatives.  
 
Figure 5.1 LOLR schools of thought and their representatives 
 
Source: Authors’ own elaboration. 
 
We broadly identified four major LOLR schools of thought, namely, the free banking school, 
the ancient school of thought, the classical school of thought, and the contemporary school of 
thought. The ancient school of thought includes the narrow ‘Tiberian view’. The classical 
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school of thought includes both the ‘Henry Thornton view’ and the ‘Walter Bagehot view’. The 
contemporary school can be divided into the ‘Goodfriend and King view’, the ‘Goodhart (and 
others) view’ and the ‘Alternative LOLR view’. To analyse the different schools of thought, we 
can develop an LOLR analysis scheme through our analysis of the different schools of thought. 
All these LOLR views can be analysed according to the following five characteristics, as shown 
in Figure 5.2: (1) the type of objective, (2) the type of institution, (3) limited and ultimate 
liquidity sources, (4) the ELA mechanism, and (5) ELA conditions. 
 
Figure 5.2 LOLR analysis scheme 
 
Source: Authors’ own elaboration. 
 
First, in general, the LOLR’s objective is to support the safety and soundness of the 
banking system (see section 2.2.3) and, in turn, the financial system. In this sense, the LOLR 
seeks to support the smooth functioning of the robustness of the banking system in a period of 
financial distress due to systemic risk. Systemic risk is thereby the exogenous and endogenous 
risk of the banking system. However, in practice, the LOLR objective type can vary between a 
macro-based objective and a micro-based objective (see section 2.2). Therefore, for an effective 
LOLR, a clearly defined objective is a mandatory condition. 
Second, the LOLR is an institution, typically the central bank, but as we noted, it can 
also be the government, a deposit insurance regime, or an international regime.140 Likewise, 
                                                          
140 However, international regimes such as the IMF lack ‘the capacity to serve as their banks and, more generally, 
their financial system’s lender of last resort. They can[not] create high-powered base money in their own national 
currency, they can[not] act quickly, and they need the consent of […] another agency to act’ (Schwartz 2009: 454). 
Nevertheless, an interesting analysis of an international liquidity provision through the IMF can be found in 
Tirole’s ‘Financial crisis, liquidity, and the international monetary system’ (2000). In this context, Tirole (2002) 
indicated that the IMF could act as a delegated monitor; therefore, the IMF plays the role of crisis manager and a 
limited role as an LOLR. 
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Guttentag and Herring (1987: 150) indicated that ‘[s]ince the nineteenth century, the lender of 
last resort [..] has been viewed as an agency with responsibility for preventing financial crises 
[…]. The [..] [LOLR] responsibility is usually associated with central banks, although in the 
absence of a central bank other agencies can assume the responsibility’. Consequently, various 
institution types can fulfil the role of the LOLR.  
Third, the institution is characterised as a limited or ultimate liquidity source that 
controls and issues money in its domestic and/or foreign currency. In this sense, Schwartz 
(2009: 450) emphasised that ‘[t]he only institution that had the resources to provide […] loans 
in a [liquidity] crisis is the central bank, which could create high-powered money without limit, 
and hence was the lender of last resort’. Conversely, Goodhart (2009 [1999]) indicated that the 
domestic central bank was a limited source of high-powered money, especially in the creation 
of foreign high-powered money (see section 5.4 for further details). We will discuss the limited 
and unlimited sources of liquidity in the different schools of thought before we advocate for 
one view. 
Fourth, in general, the ELA provision can be fulfilled via direct lending (for instance, a 
DW) and/or via OMOs through the market. A DW is a mechanism by which banks are allowed 
to borrow to meet short-term liquidity needs. Thus, banks take the initiative in the transaction, 
and the central bank play a passive role in the transaction. A DW can be used under different 
circumstances: 
 
‘we should distinguish between routine operation of the discount window for normal monetary policy purposes, 
with often formalized access […], for example for short-term interest rate stabilization or to meet seasonal 
variations in liquidity demand, and emergency type measures for troubled banks’ (Baltensperger and Dermine 
1987: 79, see also Baltensperger 1992). 
 
The DW includes intraday and overnight facilities in normal times, whereas it can extend ELA 
to individual banks in a period of financial distress. As an alternative to the DW, economists 
such as Goodfriend and King (2009 [1988]) advocate for ELA that can be provided via OMOs 
through the entire interbank market. As noted in section 4.1, the LOLR is non-operational in 
nature, particularly in direct lending to individual banks, and is considered an ELA mechanism. 
Nevertheless, for the sake of completeness, we consider the arguments of Goodfriend and King 
(2009 [1988]).  
Fifth, what are the ELA conditions? This question is closely related to the type of 
borrower, the characteristics of the borrower and the lending conditions. With regard to the first 
point, in practice, different types of borrowers exist, and we can broadly distinguish between 
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all borrowers or specific types of borrowers. Two specific types of borrowers are systemically 
important borrowers and non-systemically important borrowers. Although we are not in favour 
of distinguishing between systemically and non-systemically important institutions due to 
potentially adverse selection and, in turn, discrimination, we can conceptually distinguish 
between three clusters: banks, NBFIs and non-bank, non-financial institutions (NBNFIs). In 
relation to the second point, the characteristics of the borrower can vary between illiquidity and 
two forms of insolvency, namely, fundamental insolvency and temporary insolvency. The 
borrower can be illiquid and fundamentally insolvent or illiquid and temporarily insolvent. With 
regard to the third point, the lending conditions range from a zero interest rate to very high 
interest rates and from a narrow range of good collateral to a broad range of collateral that also 
includes bad collateral.  
Nonetheless, as a consequence of the different characteristics of the different schools of 
thought, the next section provides a detailed analysis of the main LOLR schools in the literature. 
 
5.1. The free banking school 
 
As Goodhart (1988: 13) clearly noted, ‘there are several stands in the case for free banking [and 
one is by analogy] with the general case for free trade. If free trade and free competition are 
beneficial in other economic activities, what is so special about banking that justifies imposing’ 
bank regulation? A groundswell in favour of bank regulation has developed in the academic 
and political milieu (see chapter 2) (see Goodhart 1988). Nevertheless, advocates of the free 
banking school are opposed to any government and central bank intervention and are in turn 
opposed to the LOLR. They suggest that government intervention, particularly bank regulation, 
leads to banking crises. This view corresponds with our RIH from section 3.2.1, that is, that 
bank regulation can transform an initially robust banking system into a fragile banking system. 
However, our view is not as radical as the free banking school, and as a result of the rationale 
of the LOLR, we believe that having a well-designed LOLR is necessary. Conversely, free 
banking scholars believe that in the absence of bank regulation and the LOLR, market pressures 
are more preventative such that banking crises will be less frequent. In other words, free market 
pressures will produce a panic-proof banking system because in the absence of an LOLR, banks 
must be careful in lending because they cannot assume that their losses will be recapitalised 
(Dowd 1992). In addition, although banks can fail in a free banking system, failures have been 
limited and have not been contagious. In this context, Dowd (1992: 14) indicated that 
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‘[f]ree banking systems were rarely subject to major banking crises, and there is evidence that the crises that did 
occur were usually caused by major external factors, such as a crisis in a regulated banking system nearby or by 
government intervention of some sort’. 
 
In practice, Scotland before 1844, Canada before 1935 and Switzerland before 1881 had stable 
banking systems without bank regulation. However, according to Dowd (1992), instability was 
caused by banking crises in London and New York, where banking was more regulated than it 
was in Scotland, Canada and Switzerland. Given these practical examples, does the free market 
provide a better alternative than the LOLR? Timberlake (2007 [1984]) analysed the free market 
solution of ‘clearinghouses’141 over a fifty-year financial crisis in the United States from 1875 
to 1907 before the Fed was founded. Timberlake (2007 [1984]: 140) concluded that ‘the issue 
of clearinghouse currency put the brakes on the development of an unstable bank credit 
contraction. It did not prevent the demise of inefficient banks; it only stopped the fractional 
reserve collapse that might otherwise have occurred’. However, the free banking solution has 
been criticised on several grounds: (1) By 1907, the clearinghouse issues were considered 
illegal as a result of ‘lower denominational currency of different types [because] a law passed 
in the early 1860s had prohibited the private issue of token and subsidiary coin, and the national 
bank act had a like effect on state chartered banks’ notes by taxing them 10 percent a year’ 
(Timberlake 2007 [1984]: 132), and in turn, clearinghouse currency was illegal. (2) Historical 
evidence shows that such clearinghouses struggled with coordination problems. (3) In the 
presence of aggregate shocks, the clearinghouse or free market solution is limited (see 
Holmström and Tirole 1998, Tirole 2002). Therefore, scholars generally agree that an LOLR is 
required to prevent a banking crisis and further damage at the national level (see Goodhart and 
Illing 2009). 
 
5.2. The ancient school of thought 
 
Although the term LOLR was used the first time by Baring (1797), the concept has its origin in 
the early pre-classical economic era. In the Roman Empire under the Roman Emperor Tiberius 
                                                          
141 The clearinghouse is an institution wherein ‘every bank sends a representative to one place – the clearinghouse 
– where its debit items are cleared against its credit items. Then the balance is struck, and payment is due from 
debtor banks to creditor banks. Originally, one bank in the association was assigned the “central” administrative 
role for clearing the other member banks accounts’ (Timberlake 2007 [1984]: 128). In this context, all banks hold 
commercial reserves (bank money) as a deposit with this bank against a clearinghouse certificate at a particular 
interest rate. 
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Julius Caesar Augustus (14 to 37 A.D.) (Tiberius Caesar), the ‘Tiberian view’142 developed in 
response to the liquidity and solvency crisis of 33 A.D. In this context, the following three 
questions arise: 
 
(1) What were the main causes of the financial crisis in 33 A.D.? 
(2) How did the financial crisis end? 
(3) What are the main conditions of the Tiberian view? 
 
The first question is difficult to answer because of (1) the lack of monetary data; (2) the different 
causes of market failure in 33 A.D. (for instance, government expenditures in foreign provinces, 
default on foreign debt, and domestic and international contagion); and (3) various ambiguous 
explanations about the main causes in the literature. For example, according to Frank (1935), 
the liquidity and solvency crisis of 33 A.D. had its roots in previous Roman administrations 
under Gaius Octavius, named Augustus Caesar, whereas Levick (1999 [1976]) suggests that 
the main causes rested in the Tiberius Caesar administration. We agree that both explanations 
are potentially justifiable, but an account of the 33 A.D. crisis would be limited by only 
considering one view. Therefore, in our view, the crisis had several causes. Next, we provide a 
brief overview of the 33 A.D. crisis. 
In the early years of Augustus Caesar’s regime, government expenditures had risen 
considerably because of the security policy on the Roman frontier in Germania. Hence, 
government expenditures led to a drain of Roman coinage (money drain) into Roman provinces 
for security policy. However, the money drain in the early years of Augustus Caesar was not a 
major cause of the 33 A.D. crisis because the coinage during, especially in the early years of, 
Augustus Caesar’s regency was enormous (see Frank 1935). Therefore, on the one hand, the 
money drain in the early years of Augustus Caesar’s rule could be balanced by coinage. 
However, on the other hand, the enormous coinage under Augustus Caesar had the following 
two repercussions: (1) prices, especially land prices, rose and were subject to speculation, and 
(2) it facilitated credit access, especially for landowners. Despite the enormous coinage in the 
early years of Augustus Caesar’s rule, after 10 B.C., ‘the coinage dwindled to a miserable trickle 
and governmental expenditures at home diminished at the very time when currency began more 
and more to flow abroad’ (Frank 1935: 340). Moreover, the money drain had been increasing 
through the Roman aristocracy, which imported luxury goods from foreign provinces (for 
                                                          
142 Although the ancient school of thought is considered government support (solvency support) rather than central 
bank support (liquidity support), we take the ancient school of thought into account for the sake of completeness. 
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example, Achaea, Aegyptus, and Hispania), and through funding in foreign lands because 
funding in secure industries had not created the expected return on equity (see Frank 1935). 
Arguably, the money drain had been balanced by taxation in the Roman provinces. Therefore, 
enough money would flow back and could be used to further fund propositions by Augustus 
Caesar and, thereafter, by Tiberius Caesar. However, in the later years of the Augustus regency 
government, expenditures diminished. Moreover, Tiberius Caesar followed a restrictive fiscal 
policy (money hoarding). ‘At his death it was found that he had stored up 2,700,000,000 
sesterces in his treasury’, which was an enormous amount of money compared with the 
circulated sesterces (Frank 1935: 339). Levick (1999 [1976]) correctly suggested that the 
shortage of money was a consequence of Tiberius’ restrictive fiscal policy. Nonetheless, the 
trigger of the financial crisis of 33 A.D. was an increase in illegal interest rates by money lenders 
and ‘the prosecution of money lenders’ (Frank 1935: 340), resulting in ‘a sudden shortage of 
money [(market liquidity problem)] and a contraction of credit which threatened to bankrupt 
some of Rome’s most respected citizens [and numerous landowners (solvency problem)]’ 
(Thornton and Thornton 1990: 655). To stabilise the liquidity and solvency crisis, the Senate 
reintroduced an early regulation, Caesar’s law of 49 B.C. This law aimed to prevent the money 
drain and to stabilise Italian land prices as the coinage dwindled (see Frank 1935). Therefore, 
money lenders had to fund two-thirds of their funds in Italian land. However, the regulatory 
measure steepened the decrease in Italian land prices because money was scarce.143 Moreover, 
the downward spiral had been enhanced through speculative financing (see section 2.3.2), 
which decreased land prices and jeopardised the stability of the Roman economy. In this sense, 
how did the liquidity and solvency crisis of 33 A.D. end? The answer to this question lies in the 
government support of Tiberius Caesar, which can be considered an early LOLR concept. 
Tiberius Caesar, who had the monopoly on issuing money, coordinated with a commission to 
lend directly to landowners in distress ‘a hundred million sesterces [(silver coins)] without 
interest for a period up to three years. This apparently ended the crisis’ (Frank 1935: 337). Thus, 
the emperor acted as an early LOLR and provided emergency assistance (in the form of silver 
coins) under the following three conditions: 
 
(1) In times of financial distress that jeopardised the safety and soundness of the Roman 
economy;  
(2) To illiquid and insolvent landowners freely (without interest); and  
                                                          
143 This early regulation also partially supports our RIH from section 3.2.1, namely, that regulation can enhance or 
lead to instability due to funding. 
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(3) For a given period of time (namely, three years). 
 
Based on these considerations, can the Tiberian view be considered an LOLR? According to 
the five characteristics elaborated in chapter 5 and our definition, the answer is yes. Figure 5.3 
summarises the Tiberian view. First, the Tiberian LOLR sought to create stability in the Roman 
economy. Thus, it had a macro-based objective that focused on the entire Roman economy.  
 
Figure 5.3  The ancient school of thought – The Tiberian view 
 
Source: Authors’ own elaboration.  
 
Second, the institution type was the government, which was represented by the Roman emperor. 
Third, the emperor was the ultimate source of liquidity because he had the exclusive right to 
issue money (gold and silver coins) and broad tax power with respect to his tax income from 
several Roman provinces. In this sense, one decisive characteristic of the Tiberian LOLR is that 
if the government acts as the LOLR, emergency assistance depends on a country’s tax power. 
Based on this characteristic, we can formulate our tax power LOLR hypothesis: 
 
 
 
Authors’ own elaboration. 
 
However, observers and opponents might raise the following points. First, they might ask what 
the tax power of the government is. Second, they might note that in practice, the tax power 
LOLR hypothesis does not reflect reality because if the government acts as the LOLR, the 
emergency assistance to a borrower depends on various components (for example, the 
creditability of a borrower). In relation to the first consideration, the tax power of the 
government is based on various variables, such as the tax base and tax honesty, which further 
draw upon tax fraud and tax evasion. With regard to the second point, it is a hypothesis that has 
The better a government’s tax power is, the less limited the emergency assistance for the 
borrower is. 
The lender of last resort schools of thought   141 
 
 
 
not yet been proven and verified. However, history, especially the recent sovereign crisis in 
Europe, particularly in Greece, appears to support the tax power LOLR hypothesis. Thus, 
further academic research is desirable. Fourth, in the Tiberian view, the ELA mechanism was 
of a direct lending nature to landowners. In this sense, what are the conditions for emergency 
assistance? Tiberius provided emergency assistance under the following three conditions: (1) 
in a period of financial distress; (2) to illiquid and insolvent landowners; and (3) freely (with 
no interest rate) for a given period (three years). Consequently, according to our analysis, the 
earliest LOLR traces back to the Roman Empire, not to Baring (1797), Thornton (1802) and 
Bagehot (2005 [1920]), as mentioned in the literature. 
Nonetheless, opponents would argue144 that landowners cannot be considered banks; 
therefore, the above-mentioned criteria had nothing to do with the classical Bagehot view. In 
addition, the provision of ELA only occurs under stringent conditions, such as good collateral; 
therefore, the ancient LOLR is significantly different than the contemporary LOLR. According 
to the first point, landowners are not considered banks, but landowners freely receive 
emergency assistance for a given period, which corresponds with the classical LOLR doctrine 
of the nineteenth century attributed to Thornton (1965 [1939]) and Bagehot (2005 [1920]). In 
relation to the second point, with respect to the stringent conditions such as good collateral, the 
ancient LOLR had nothing to do with the contemporary LOLR. However, the contemporary 
LOLR is based on the historical evolution of the LOLR, has a macro-based objective function, 
and is also an institution that provides emergency assistance during a period of financial 
distress. Consequently, the Tiberian view is an alternative design of the LOLR.  
 
Nevertheless, with the establishment of the first banking houses in the late Middle Ages 
(1300–1500), the ancient school of thought ended, falling into oblivion. The banking houses in 
Italy and Germany funded governments (for example, the Fugger provided loans to Holy 
Roman Emperor Maximilian I of the House of Habsburg against land, mines, and royal titles) 
and the papacy against sources of royal income. Consequently, the first banking houses acted 
as a source of emergency assistance. However, banks often went bankrupt, as the governments 
were unable to settle their credits. 
                                                          
144 Moreover, some opponents argue that the emergency assistance of Tiberius Caesar had more things in common 
with QE than lending to individuals. Based on this argument, an article in the ‘Business Insider’ stated that 
‘Tiberius [u]sed Quantitative Easing [QE] [t]o [s]olve [t]he [f]inancial [c]risis [o]f 33 A.D.’ (see Taylor 2013). In 
this context, Taylor (2013: Internet) noted that ‘similar policies were used by Tiberius during the [f]inancial [c]risis 
of 33 A.D., almost 2000 years ago’. Thus, was the liquidity provision through Tiberius Caesar an early form of 
MMLR rather than an LOLR? The answer is no because QE is an MMLR operation through the market, whereas 
Tiberius Caesar is considered an LOLR who lends directly to individual borrowers. In short, Tylor (2013) wrongly 
considered QE to be a similar policy in the times of Tiberius Caesar. 
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5.3. The classical school of thought 
 
Although the LOLR concept was first used in the early pre-classical period, the first complete 
and systematic elaboration was provided in the nineteenth century by Henry Thornton in his 
speech on the Bullion Report and in ‘An Enquiry into the Nature and Effects of the Paper Credit 
of Great Britain (1802)’. By 1873, Thornton’s considerations had been accepted and extended 
by Walter Bagehot (2005 [1920]). ‘Since then, LOLR [has become] standard practice among 
central banks’ and will be considered the classical school of thought (Goodhart and Illing 2009: 
1). In what follows, we describe Thornton’s and Bagehot’s theories of the LOLR in detail. 
 
Henry Thornton’s view 
 
Thornton (1965 [1939]) indicated that the BoE145 was an LOLR. He described three 
characteristics of the LOLR, the policy issues between monetary policy and the LOLR, and the 
micro-based and macro-based LOLR functions (see Thornton 1965 [1939], see also Humphrey 
and Keleher 2009 [1984], Humphrey 1989). Moreover, Thornton (1965 [1939]) was the first to 
address the ‘moral hazard’ problem.  
 
First, Thornton (1965 [1939]) identified the following three LOLR characteristics: (1) the 
unique monopoly function with regard to the BoE’s high-powered money; (2) the role of 
holding sufficient reserves and freely providing assistance (BoE notes) in a period of financial 
distress; and (3) the public duty of expanding notes during temporary financial distress. Next, 
we describe these characteristics in detail.   
First, Thornton (1965 [1939]) indicated that the BoE had a unique role in relation to its 
stock of high-powered money (gold and BoE notes) because no other bank had the right to issue 
BoE notes. Thus, the BoE was responsible for holding gold reserves from which banks could 
withdraw and for supplying non-gold, namely, BoE notes, as gold equivalents. Hence, Thornton 
(1965 [1939]) considered the BoE to be a monopoly that could satisfy the demand for bank 
liquidity in times of financial distress with high-powered money (see also Humphrey and 
Keleher 2009 [1984]). In this context, Thornton (1965 [1939]: 305) argued the following: 
 
                                                          
145 The BoE became the central bank after the 1844 Bank Charter Act was passed, as the BoE received the exclusive 
right to provide banknotes and was responsible for monetary policy in the United Kingdom. 
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‘Bank of England have obtained the Monopoly of supplying the Metropolis with its whole Means of Circulation, 
and have, by their superior Credit, excluded entirely all other Paper, and have also bound themselves, as far as 
long Custom can bind them, to a Number of General Rules, such as that of discounting daily for the Public; and 
since they have also become so considerable, that their individual Conduct operates upon the Credit of the whole 
Nation’.  
 
Second, because the BoE held gold, Thornton (1965 [1939]) indicated that the BoE  was 
responsible for managing and holding sufficient central gold reserves. In addition, ‘[n]ot only 
must it hold sufficient reserves to inspire full confidence in their ready availability in times of 
stress, but it must also rely on its own resources (since as the last resort, it can turn to no other 
source) to protect the reserve from gold-depleting specie drains’ (Humphrey and Keleher 2009 
[1984]: 79). Thus, in a period of financial distress (in particular, a temporary liquidity problem), 
the BoE as the LOLR must freely provide BoE notes for the safety and soundness of the banking 
system. Otherwise, depositors ‘seek to switch from country bank notes to gold or its equivalent’ 
(Humphry 1989: 9). To expand on this point, Thornton (1965 [1939]) suggested that temporary 
withdrawals of gold could induce external146 money drains and increase the inflationary over-
issuance of BoE notes. Therefore, ‘to prevent external drains caused by persistent inflationary 
over-issue of paper, it must hold so large a reserve as to be able to withstand those temporary 
and self-reversing external drains’ (Humphry 1989: 9). 
Third, Thornton (1965 [1939]) noted that, unlike other commercial banks, the LOLR 
had a public responsibility to the entire economy based on its unique role in the provision of 
high-powered money. In this context, in times of financial distress, the LOLR must expand its 
notes when banks contract loans (hoard money), which can lead to a credit freeze. Therefore, 
Thornton (1965 [1939]) distinguished between bank credit (loans) and the stock of money 
(high-powered money). Thornton (1965 [1939]) noted that bank credits and money stock tended 
to increase and decrease together and that bank credits were based on high-powered money. 
Consequently, ‘the limitation on Bank Notes or the Means of Circulation that produces 
Mischiefs’147 is more harmful than a contraction of bank credit (Thornton 1965 [1939]: 307). 
Furthermore, Thornton (1965 [1939]) distinguished between bank failure and government 
                                                          
146 Thornton (1965 [1939]: 39) distinguished between internal and external drain. ‘Internal drain was to grant 
credits liberally, and then, in learning this lesson, it forgot that in the case of an external drain exactly the opposite 
measures were called for’. In other words, an external drain is, for example, ‘an outflow of gold which is primarily 
caused by an unfavourable change in the balance of trade’ (Thornton 1965 [1939]: 47). 
147 Thornton (1965 [1939]: 273) defined mischiefs as ‘the following: first, the great enhancement of the price of 
British labour and commodities, an evil with which we ought unquestionably to connect that of the diminution of 
the sale of our manufactures in foreign markets; secondly, the inconvenience to which we may be exposed in time 
of war through the want of sufficient means of making remittances in bullion to other countries; and, thirdly, the 
confusion which the failure of paper credit may produce at home in the event of any great disorder in the nation’.  
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failure or ‘LOLR failure’. Thornton (1965 [1939]) observed that a bank failure had less of an 
impact than an LOLR failure. We agree with Thornton (1965 [1939]) that an LOLR failure is 
more dangerous than a bank failure, but we further differentiate between a government failure 
and a central bank failure. With regard to the former type, orderly winding down a bank is more 
appropriate than allowing a government to fail. In relation to the latter type, a central bank 
cannot fail and thus cannot be insolvent. Therefore, recapitalising a bank is better if the bank is 
not able to wind down in an ordinary manner, particularly in the case of systemically important 
institutions. 
 
Second, Thornton (1965 [1939]) commented on the policy issues between monetary policy and 
the LOLR. According to Thornton (1965 [1939]), the LOLR is a monetary policy instrument 
because it relates to the temporary provision of high-powered money. In his view, monetary 
policy and the LOLR are consistent (no boundary problem) due to the policies being effective 
over different times (temporary and long-term policy). In this context, monetary policy is a 
long-term instrument, whereas the LOLR is a temporary instrument for a few days. According 
to Thornton (1965 [1939]: 259), the main tasks of the BoE are as follows: 
 
‘[t]o limit the total amount of paper issued, and to resort for this purpose, whenever the temptation to borrow is 
strong, to some effectual principle of restriction; in no case, however, materially to diminish the sum in circulation, 
but to let it vibrate only within certain limits; to afford a slow and cautious extension of it, as the general trade of 
the kingdom enlarges itself’.  
 
Therefore, the main task of the central bank is to control the money stock (paper money) so that 
the long-term growth of the economy ‘expands at a steady noninflationary pace’ (long-run 
target growth of money stock) (Humphrey 1989: 10). In addition, Thornton (1965 [1939]: 259) 
noted that the BoE had 
 
‘to allow of some special, though temporary, increase in the event of any extraordinary alarm or difficulty, as the 
best means of preventing a great demand at home for guineas [a gold coin worth £1.05]; and to lean on the side of 
diminution, in the case of gold going abroad, and of the general exchanges continuing long unfavourable; this 
seems to be the true policy of the directors of an institution circumstanced like that of the Bank of England. To 
suffer either the solicitations of merchants, or the wishes of government, to determine the measure of the bank 
issues, is unquestionably to adopt a very false principle of conduct’. 
 
Thus, the central bank had to prevent gold drains. In this sense, Thornton (1965 [1939]) 
distinguished between temporary external drains and long-term external (or foreign) drains 
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related to the export of gold. Temporary external drains are not as serious a problem because, 
as Thornton (1965 [1939]) assumed, a temporary outflow will be balanced by reserve flows 
later on. Therefore, temporary external drains can be covered by the LOLR characteristic, 
namely, holding sufficient high-powered money. Conversely, an external (or foreign) drain that 
is an outflow of gold due to an unfavourable change in the balance sheet should be limited with 
the suspension of convertibility (see Thornton 1965 [1939], Humphrey and Keleher 2009 
[1984]). As a result of temporary and long-term drains, Thornton concluded that no boundary 
problem existed between monetary policy and LOLR policy because of the timing of 
intervention. In other words, monetary policy is a long-term policy, whereas the LOLR is a 
temporary policy. 
 
Third, Thornton (1965 [1939]) analysed the micro-based or macro-based function of the LOLR. 
According to Thornton (1965 [1939]), the micro-based LOLR concerns the assistance to 
individual banks, whereas the macro-based LOLR is the responsibility to provide assistance to 
the entire banking system. In light of these characteristics, Thornton (1965 [1939]: 188) noted 
the following: 
 
‘It is by no means intended to imply, that it would become the Bank of England to relieve every distress which the 
rashness of country banks may bring upon them: the bank, by doing this, might encourage their improvidence. 
There seems to be a medium at which a public bank should aim in granting aid to inferior establishments, and 
which it must often find very difficult to be observed. The relief should neither be so prompt and liberal as to 
exempt those who misconduct their business from all the natural consequences of their fault, nor so scanty and 
slow as deeply to involve the general interests. These interests, nevertheless, are sure to be pleaded by every 
distressed person whose affairs are large, however indifferent or even ruinous may be their state’. 
 
In this passage, Thornton (1965 [1939]) clearly noted four LOLR characteristics. First, the 
primary objective is the safety and soundness of the markets (in particular, the banking system) 
– not the safety and soundness of individual banks. Second, the LOLR is confronted with the 
moral hazard problem (see section 2.1.2). In this sense, Thornton (1965 [1939]) was against 
any form of liquidity assistance because subsidising banks would increase the speculative risks 
of funding due to explicit guarantees (moral hazard) and because banks ‘would encourage other 
banks to take excessive speculative risks without fear of the consequences’ (Humphrey and 
Keleher 2009 [1984]: 83). To mitigate excessive speculative risks, banks should pay a high 
interest rate. However, the LOLR should only intervene if the ‘repercussions of such 
punishment threaten to become widespread [contagion]’ (Humphrey and Keleher 2009 [1984]: 
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83). Third, Thornton (1965 [1939]) was sceptical about the assistance for SIBs, but he was 
aware of the public interest. Therefore, Thornton (1965 [1939]) suggested that the LOLR should 
be prudential in nature and minimise secondary negative externalities on the banking system. 
In this context, the BoE is responsible for arresting a banking crisis that is spreading though the 
banking system in case of a general run or solvency problem. Thus, the LOLR must 
accommodate the demand for high-powered money.  
 
• ‘If any one bank fails, a general run upon the neighbouring ones is apt to take place, which if not checked in 
the beginning by a pouring into the circulation a large quantity of gold, leads to very extensive mischief’ 
(Thornton 1965 [1939]: 180).  
• ‘At the time of the distress of 1793, some great and opulent country banks applied to the Bank of England for 
aid, in the shape of discount, which was refused on account of their not offering approved London securities: 
some immediate and important failures were the consequence. The Bank of England was indisposed to extend 
its aid to houses in the country. The event, however, shewed that the relief of the country was necessary to the 
solvency of the metropolis. A sense of the unfairness of the burthen cast on the bank by the large and sudden 
demands of the banking establishments in the country, probably contributed to produce an unwillingness to 
grant them relief’ (Thornton 1965 [1939]: 181). 
 
Humphrey and Keleher (2009 [1984]: 85) translated this idea into New-Keynesian terminology: 
the LOLR ‘must be prepared to offset falls in the money multiplier [(5.1)] arising from panic-
induced rises in currency and reserve ratios with compensating rises in the monetary base’. The 
money multiplier is defined as ‘the ratio of the money supply to the monetary base [or high 
powered money (or sometimes M0)], it tells how much the money supply will change for a 
given change in high-powered money’ (Goodwin et al. 2009: 269). The money multiplier is the 
ratio of the money supply to high-powered money (for instance, if the SNB increases its 
reserves by CHF 10 million, the total increase in the money supply would be CHF 20 million). 
The money multiplier model is described by following equation: 
 
Money multiplier = 
Money supply 
(High−powered money)
     (5.1) 
 
Alternatively, the LOLR can be explained from an endogenous money view148 as follows: the 
LOLR accommodates the demand for high-powered money in times of financial distress due to 
the nature of money and credit. In other words, if banks demand emergency high-powered 
                                                          
148 Section 5.4 describes the alternative LOLR view in an endogenous money framework. 
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money, the central bank acts as the LOLR and offers high-powered money, on which the LOLR 
sets an interest rate according to its creditworthiness (solvency).  
 
Regardless of the different interpretations of money, Thornton (1965 [1939]) justified the 
LOLR with the concept of a general run (see section 2.2.2) and with the bank’s creditworthiness 
(solvency, insolvency). In this context, Thornton (1965 [1939]) advocated for not solving the 
initial market failure and instead providing liquidity assistance to the entire banking sector. 
Thus, Thornton can be considered an early advocate of the MMLR. According to these 
considerations, we use our five characteristics to systematise and summarise Thornton’s view. 
Figure 5.4 outlines Thornton’s view. 
 
Figure 5.4 Classical school of thought – Thornton’s view 
 
Source: Authors’ own elaboration.  
 
Thornton (1965 [1939]) considered the objective of the BoE and the LOLR to be limiting 
system-wide distress for the entire economy. In other words, the objective of Thornton (1965 
[1939]) was macro-based in nature. Moreover, Thornton (1965 [1939]) referred to the problem 
of systemically important institutions and the public interest in preventing a crisis for the entire 
economy, particularly ‘the prevention of panic-induced declines in the money stock, declines 
that could produce depressions in the level of economic activity’ (Humphrey and Keleher 2009 
[1984]: 83-84). Furthermore, Thornton (1965 [1939]) considered the BoE (which was a bank 
until 1844) to be an LOLR institution with a unique monopoly on high-powered money and the 
responsibility of managing and holding sufficient reserves. In terms of the ELA mechanism, 
the liquidity provision of the BoE operates through the DW via bills149 of exchange (non-
interest-bearing written orders). Although Thornton had not known about OMOs, several 
contemporary experts (Humphrey and Keleher 2009 [1984]: 99, see also Goodfriend and King 
                                                          
149 In this context, a good bill is characterised by the borrower paying on the maturity date to settle the transaction 
(see Goodhart 2009 [1999]). 
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2009 [1988]) suggest that the LOLR had been ‘accomplished either through open market 
operations or loans made at the penalty rate’ to mitigate moral hazard in the form of speculative 
funding. In relation to ELA conditions, Thornton (1965 [1939]) indicated that the BoE should 
lend freely to illiquid and solvent borrowers in a temporary period of distress. 
 
Walter Bagehot view  
 
After Thornton’s (1965 [1939]) work, ‘An Enquiry into the Nature and Effects of the Paper 
Credit of Great Britain (1802)’, the economist Walter Bagehot (2005 [1920]) expanded 
Thornton’s ideas in what became known as the ‘classical’ Bagehot doctrine in his essay 
‘Lombard Street: A Description of the Money Market (1873)’. In 1873, he invented the LOLR 
in the United Kingdom in response to the financial credit crises of 1825, 1847, 1857 and 
particularly 1866 and the subsequent collapse of Overend, Guerney & Company (see 
Grossmann and Rockoff 2015). After the financial credit crisis, Bagehot (2005 [1920]) noted, 
as Thornton (1965 [1939]) did before him, the essential role of the BoE as the central bank in 
times of financial distress. In this context, the BoE was not responsible for preventing the initial 
failure ‘but rather [for preventing and protecting] a subsequent wave of failures spreading 
through the system’ (macro-based objective) (Humphrey and Keleher (2009 [1984]: 93). Based 
on this consideration, Bagehot (2005 [1920]) formulated the classical doctrine, which holds that 
the central bank as an LOLR should lend money to ‘solvent but illiquid’ banks under two main 
policy prescriptions (see Grossmann and Rockoff 2015): 
 
(1) Lending only against good collateral; 
(2) Lending at a ‘very high’ interest rate.150  
 
The cardinal principle of Bagehot (2005 [1920]) involves lending to solvent but illiquid banks. 
Bagehot (2005 [1920]: 139) noted the following: 
 
‘That in a panic the bank, or banks, holding the ultimate reserve should refuse bad bills or bad securities will not 
make the panic really worse; the “unsound” people are a feeble minority, and they are afraid even to look frightened 
for fear their unsoundness [(insolvency)] may be detected. The great majority, the majority to be protected, are the 
“sound” [(solvent)] people, the people who have good security to offer’.  
                                                          
150 A high interest rate should not be exclusively considered a penalty rate because (1) Bagehot did not use the 
word penalty in his essay about ‘Lombard Street: A Description of the Money Market’ and (2) the ELA rate should 
be higher than the market rate compared with the pre-crisis level (see Manna 2009). 
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Thus, Bagehot (2005 [1920]) treated sound people as solvent people. However, one critique of 
Bagehot’s (2005 [1920]) definition is that the term ‘solvency’ is ambiguous and that, in turn, 
the distinction between solvency and liquidity is unclear. Let us expand on this point. We agree 
that Bagehot (2005 [1920]) did not clearly distinguish between solvency and liquidity, but he 
elaborated an implicit solvency and liquidity relationship that is not clearly reflected in his 
book. The main question arises: who are good/solvent people? Bagehot (2005 [1920]) indicated 
that good/solvent people are related to good securities. Therefore, solvency is determined by 
good securities, and vice versa. In this sense, good securities are regarded as money that ‘in 
ordinary times can be readily obtained’ (Bagehot 2005 [1920]: 139). Thus, solvency depends 
on the convertibility of securities into liquid assets in ordinary times. Therefore, solvency and 
liquidity are closely related with respect to the time dimension; thus, solvency and liquidity 
should not be distinguished.  
Nevertheless, we elaborate Bagehot’s (2005 [1920]) three conditions in detail. Similar 
to Thornton (1965 [1939]), Bagehot 2005 [1920] indicated the BoE’s key role in the credit 
system. Bagehot (2005 [1920]: 32) noted that 
 
‘[a]ll banks depend on the Bank of England, and all merchants depend on some banker. If a merchant have £10,000 
at his banker’s and wants to pay it to someone in Germany, he will not be able to pay it unless his banker can pay 
him, and the banker will not be able to pay if the Bank of England should be in difficulties and cannot produce his 
“reserve”’.   
 
Therefore, the BoE is different from other banks (particularly given its large reserves in BoE 
notes) and, in turn, should be managed differently. Moreover, similar to Thornton (1965 
[1939]), Bagehot (2005 [1920]) distinguished between internal drain,151 also called domestic 
drain, and external drain. In this context, Bagehot (2005 [1920]: 41) ‘supposed the best way for 
the bank or banks who have the custody of the bank reserve to deal with a drain arising from 
internal discredit [152], is to lend freely [153]’. In this case, another question arises: under what 
conditions? Bagehot (2005 [1920]: 43) responded that 
                                                          
151 A domestic drain ‘arises from a disturbance of credit within the country, and the difficulty of dealing with it is 
the greater, because it is often caused, or at least often enhanced, by a foreign drain [(external drain)]’ (Bagehot 
2005 [1920]: 40). 
152 According to Bagehot (2005 [1920]: 41), discredit is defined as ‘an opinion that you have not got any money. 
And to dissipate that opinion, you must, if possible, show that you have money: you must employ it for the public 
benefit in order that the public may know that you have it’. In this context, Bagehot (2005 [1920]: 41) noted that 
‘[a] good banker will have accumulated in ordinary times the reserve he is to make use of in extraordinary times 
[financial distress situation]’. 
153 In this context, Manna (2009) noted that the concept of lending freely involves a hard and a soft dimension. 
The former is based on the fact that the central bank should not fix the volume of ELA, whereas the latter draws 
upon the communication of the central bank. 
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‘[a] panic, in a word, is a species of neuralgia, and according to the rules of science you must not starve it. The 
holders of the cash reserve must be ready not only to keep it for their own liabilities, but to advance it most freely 
for the liabilities of others. They must lend to merchants, to minor bankers, to “this man and that man,” whenever 
the security is good. In wild periods of alarm,[154] one failure makes many, and the best way to prevent the 
derivative failures is to arrest the primary failure which causes them’. 
 
In other words, as the LOLR, the BoE should lend freely to related borrowers, namely, 
‘merchants, minor bankers,’ and to ‘this and that man’, in times of financial distress against 
good collateral (Bagehot 2005 [1920]: 43). Thus, Bagehot’s (2005 [1920]) first contribution 
beyond Thornton’s (1965 [1939]) considerations was the classification of different borrowers. 
A second contribution relates to the definition of good collateral. Bagehot (2005 [1920]: 139) 
broadly identified good collateral as ‘every kind of current security, or every sort on which 
money is ordinarily and usually lent’. In a narrow sense, good collateral includes ‘securities on 
which money in ordinary times can be readily obtained [liquid assets] and by which its 
repayment is fully secured’ (for instance, eligible bills, government bonds and railway 
debenture stock) (Bagehot 2005 [1920]: 143). A third contribution concerns the second Bagehot 
(2005 [1920]: 138) doctrine, namely, that lending  
 
‘should only be made at a very high rate of interest. This will operate as a heavy fine on unreasonable timidity, 
and will prevent the greatest number of applications by persons who do not require it. The rate should be paid early 
in the panic, so that the fine may be paid early. […]. That at this rate these advances should be made on all good 
banking securities [as defined above] and as largely as the public ask for them’.   
 
Consequently, the BoE should only lend against a very high interest rate because a high interest 
rate ‘would ration scarce liquidity to its highest-value uses just as high price rations any scarce 
commodity in a free market [and] it being fair that borrowers should pay [it]’ (Humphrey and 
Keleher 2009 [1984]: 94). Furthermore, Bagehot (2005 [1920]) offered another relevant 
proposal for the LOLR role. The BoE should come to a clear understanding with the public 
because the BoE holds the ultimate banking reserves (see Bagehot (2005 [1920]). In other 
words, Bagehot (2005 [1920]) suggested that the BoE should have a clear commitment with 
respect to the public, or a ‘constructive clarity strategy’ (see section 6.3).   
 
In light of these considerations, we summarise the Bagehot doctrine as shown in Figure 5.5. 
                                                          
154 ‘An “alarm” is an opinion that the money of certain persons will not pay their creditors when those creditors 
want to be paid’ (Bagehot 2005 [1920]: 44). 
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Figure 5.5 Classical school of thought – Bagehot’s view 
 
Source: Authors’ own elaboration. 
 
As we have already noted, Bagehot (2005 [1920]) accepted and extended Thornton’s view. 
Therefore, the objective, the ultimate source of liquidity, and the ELA mechanism remained the 
same as in Thornton’s view. However, the primary difference between Bagehot (2005 [1920]) 
and Thornton (1965 [1939]) was that the BoE was a bank in Thornton’s view, whereas Bagehot 
considered the BoE to be a central bank as a result of the 1844 Bank Charter Act. Similar to 
Thornton (1965 [1939]), Bagehot (2005 [1920]) elaborated the classical ELA conditions in 
detail. In his view, the BoE was responsible for providing emergency assistance under the 
following three conditions: (1) the borrower must be illiquid but solvent and the loan must be 
made (2) against good collateral and (3) at a very high interest rate. These three conditions are 
known as the classical doctrine of the LOLR. 
Although the LOLR concept was developed in the early and mid-nineteenth century, the 
BoE and other central banks (such as the Fed and the SNB) were slow learners of the LOLR 
concept. For example, in the United Kingdom, ‘[a] series of financial panics in 1825, 1847, 
1857, and 1866 occurred before [the BoE] developed the appropriate response to restore public 
confidence in the financial system’ (Schwartz 2009: 450). Moreover, as a result of several 
financial crises in the nineteenth, twentieth and twenty-first centuries (such as the Herstatt Bank 
failure in Germany in 1974 and the 1990 mortgage crisis in Switzerland), central banks began 
to act as LOLRs and ‘provided a stabilizing insurance mechanism against liquidity shocks’ 
(Goodhart and Illing 2009: 1). These financial crises renewed interest in the analysis of the 
LOLR in the modern economic arena. Therefore, contemporary economists (such as 
Goodfriend and King 2009 [1988] and Goodhart 2009 [1999]) provide an analysis of the LOLR, 
thereby constituting the contemporary school of thought. 
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5.4. The contemporary school of thought 
 
The contemporary school of thought can be divided into three different views: the Goodfriend 
and King view, the Goodhart (and others) view, and the alternative LOLR view. In the 
following sections, the three contemporary schools of thought will be described. 
 
Goodfriend and King’s view 
 
In 1988, Goodfriend and King published Financial Deregulation, Monetary Policy, and 
Central Banking, concluding that the central bank could protect the banking system against 
financial crises via OMOs. In an emergency, the central bank, as the MMLR, provides ELA to 
the entire banking sector – not to individual banks that cannot selectively purchase assets – and 
cannot discriminate between different banks. Regarding the Goodfriend and King (2009 
[1988]) view, we raised an initial question: can this role be carried out via OMOs? 
 
Before Goodfriend and King (2009 [1988]) analysed the role of the LOLR, they distinguished 
between two central bank functions, namely, banking policy and monetary policy. Banking 
policy is regarded as policy that ‘influence[s] outcomes in banking and financial markets by 
subsidizing certain economic activities, prompting the erosion of private arrangements for 
liquidity and encouraging risk-taking’ (Goodfriend and King (2009 [1988]: 146).  
Banking policy includes the DW (regular direct lending to financial institutions) and, as 
a supportive function, provides bank regulation and supervision, called ‘oversight’, for banks 
and the banking system.  
Conversely, monetary policy is determined by a change in high-powered money. In 
relation to the DW, particularly the provision of ELA through the DW, Goodfriend and King 
(2009 [1988]) observed no rational evidence for such liquidity provisions via the DW for the 
following reasons: (1) ‘[F]inancial markets provide highly efficient means of allocating credit 
privately’ (Goodfriend and King (2009 [1988]: 163). In other words, the interbank market 
provides an efficient allocation of liquidity to satisfy a temporary increase in high-powered 
money. (2) It is unclear that the central bank can provide ELA via the DW at a lower cost than 
the interbank market with respect to the asymmetric information problem of the borrower. In 
this context, ‘[e]fficient lending involves the costly accumulation of detailed information about 
borrowers. […]. Like many other economic activities, information production is highly costly’ 
(for example, the pooling of diverse risk groups, costly auditing of banks, timely auditing for 
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short periods, and supervision costs with respect to discriminating between different types of 
banks) (Goodfriend and King (2009 [1988]: 147). Consequently, oversight, particularly the 
associated monitoring costs, must be considered to establish an appropriate price for ELA and 
to determine in times of financial distress the assets of the depository institution (such as 
commercial banks that have sight deposits at the central bank) and, in turn, its solvency or 
liquidity state. Goodfriend and King thus argued that if the information were provided freely, 
the interbank market ‘would stand ready to lend any bank the present value of the expected 
income streams from its assets, discounted at a rate appropriate for risk’ (Goodfriend and King 
(2009 [1988]: 153). In cases of asymmetric information, distinguishing between illiquidity and 
insolvency is difficult because  
 
‘[if there are] strong and weak banks, then it will only lend to any individual bank at a rate appropriate for the 
entire pool of borrowing banks. For any strong bank needing to borrow funds, then, the private market will charge 
a higher rate under incomplete information than under complete information because the rate takes into account a 
probability that the bank is bad, even though it may not be’ (Goodfriend and King (2009 [1988]: 154). 
 
Consequently, direct lending via the DW cannot determine banks’ individual situations; 
therefore, whether direct lending can provide ELA at a lower cost than lending via OMOs is 
unclear.155 Goodfriend and King (2009 [1988]) further noted that the market will do a better job 
of separating solvent institutions from insolvent ones because its participants are motivated by 
profits and losses and because lending through the market eliminates the problem of pricing 
assets. Likewise, Kaufman (2007 [1991]: 181) noted that ‘open market operations eliminate the 
need to price LLR [156] assistance correctly’. (3) Goodfriend and King (2009 [1988]: 159) 
explained that the LOLR is a monetary policy instrument 
‘because it works by providing an elastic supply of high-powered money to accommodate precautionary demands 
to convert deposits into currency. Further, central bank lending, in the sense of advancing funds to particular 
institutions, is not essential to the policy since it can be executed by buying government securities outright’. 
 
Moreover, they indicated that according to Bagehot, the LOLR should lend at a high interest 
rate that is ‘above [..][the] market rates, making central bank borrowing generally unprofitable 
and minimizing’ implicit government subsidies that encourage moral hazard (Goodfriend and 
                                                          
155 In this sense, an OMO eliminates the need to evaluate the price of assets because in efficient markets, liquidity 
provision via an OMO is market to market. Conversely, liquidity via the DW must be valuated at the correct price. 
‘[I]f priced incorrectly, [it] may reduce the effectiveness of the assistance. If the discount rate charged is too low, 
too much assistance is likely to be provided with resulting subsidies and encouragement to risk taking. If the 
discount rate is too high, insufficient assistance is likely to be provided’ (Kaufman 2007 [1991]: 181). 
156 LLR corresponds to the LOLR. 
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King (2009 [1988]: 159). Goodfriend and King (2009 [1988]) thereby suggested that Bagehot’s 
theory meant that the LOLR should provide ELA via OMOs157 rather than via direct lending. 
Consequently, according to Goodfriend and King (2009 [1988]), ELA can be better fulfilled 
via OMOs than through the DW.  
However, Goodfriend and King (2009 [1988]) also indicated that if ELA in the form of 
the DW and direct lending is ‘desirable, then it must be accompanied by central bank regulation 
and supervision just as private line of services require[s] restrictions and continual monitoring’ 
(Goodfriend and King (2009 [1988]: 153). In practice, in times of financial distress such as the 
financial crisis of 2007–2009, ‘[a] stable monetary regime – or, in the language of the Federal 
Reserve’s founders, an “elastic currency” – cannot be assured by open market operations alone’ 
(Tucker 2014: 18). Therefore, in times of financial distress, particularly in cases of aggregated 
uncertainty, the central banks should first act as the MMLR and as the LOLR under special 
circumstances because if the MMLR intervention is successful, no further LOLR intervention 
is needed and the market discipline will be not undermined. This consideration leads us to our 
second principle: 
 
Principle 2: In times of financial distress, the central bank should primarily act as the MMLR 
and, if required, as the LOLR.  
 
In light of these considerations, can the role of the LOLR be carried out via OMOs? The answer 
is yes, depending on the severity of the financial crisis. In some crises, an MMLR would be 
sufficient, whereas a combined MMLR and LOLR is needed in other financial crises. In other 
words, central bank interventions such as the MMLR are sufficient in certain cases; however, 
as previously noted, a combined MMLR and LOLR was necessary in the recent financial crisis. 
Nevertheless, according to our five characteristics, Goodfriend and King’s view can be 
summarised as shown in Figure 5.6.  
 
                                                          
157 We do not agree with Goodfriend and King (2009 [1988]) that lending through the entire market is considered 
an LOLR function for the following reasons. First, it is a completely new role for the central bank (see section 
4.1). Hence, the MMLR cannot be considered Bagehot’s LOLR. Second, Bagehot’s LOLR is non-operational and 
is considered a crisis and resolution instrument. 
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Figure 5.6 Contemporary school of thought – Goodfriend and King’s view 
 
Source: Authors’ own elaboration. 
 
The objective of Goodfriend and King’s view concerns the stability of the banking system, 
which will be fulfilled through price stability. Therefore, no regulatory intervention by the 
central bank is needed. The institution type is the central bank, which is also characterised as 
the ultimate source of liquidity; in other words, the central bank has the power to create high-
powered money. Similarly, Schwartz (2009: 450) noted that ‘[t]he only institution that had the 
resources to provide such loans in a crisis [is] the central bank, which could create high 
powered-money without limit,158 and hence [is] the lender of last resort’. Although 
Baltensperger (1992: 442) noted that the LOLR function ‘can be shared with other potential 
suppliers of emergency help, such as the government itself ([such as] the taxpayer), or the 
private banking community’, the central bank ‘as a supplier of (potentially unlimited) 
“liquidity” assistance’ stands alone (Baltensperger 1992: 442). Moreover, in times of financial 
distress, ELA will be provided through OMOs to solvent but illiquid deposit institutions (see 
also Kaufman 2007 [1991]). In other words, as we noted in section 4.1, the central bank acts as 
the MMLR.  
                                                          
158 Unlimited liquidity provision is advocated for a national central bank, whereas an international bank such as 
the IMF is restricted (see Goodhart 2009 [1999]). 
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The Goodhart (and others159) view 
 
In 1999, Charles Goodhart (2009 [1999]) illuminated the myths behind the real issues 
surrounding the LOLR. In the following section, we describe the four Goodhart myths 
regarding the LOLR: 
The first Goodhart (2009 [1999]) myth is that distinguishing between illiquidity and 
insolvency160 is generally impossible because prior to providing ELA, the central bank requires 
good knowledge about the bank and the market value of its trading positions (see the balance-
sheet test161 and fair value approach). In this sense, Goodhart (2009 [1999]: 232) clearly noted 
that ‘in a crisis situation, liquidity can disappear and values become very volatile; moreover, 
the true value of a complex position in derivatives markets can be far from easy to ascertain’. 
Likewise, Staub (1998: 196; trans.) noted that in the presence of illiquid markets, ‘there is 
considerable leeway in the valuation of assets, and the concept of insolvency becomes vague’. 
In this sense, Guttentag and Herring (1987) indicated that evaluating perfect marketable bank 
assets (loans) is difficult because they are imperfect.162 In other words, asymmetric information 
about the market value of trading positions means that liquidity and solvency are difficult to 
distinguish in times of financial distress. However, it does not mean that liquidity and solvency 
can never be distinguished (see Goodhart 2009 [1999]). Moreover, illiquidity and insolvency 
depend on the judgement of the central bank and the regulatory authority according to their 
knowledge about the bank and the market value of its trading positions (see BIS 2014).  If an 
illiquid bank requires ELA, a suspicion of solvency must exist – otherwise, under normal 
economic conditions, the bank will receive liquidity against good collateral on the interbank 
market (inside liquidity) because the interest rate for good collateral on the market is lower than 
the discount rate163 of the central bank.164 However, when a bank cannot obtain inside liquidity, 
the bank is likely ‘running out of good security for collateralized loans and other (bank) lenders 
will not lend to it on an unsecured basis in the quantities required (at acceptable rates)’ 
(Goodhart 2009 [1999]: 231). In addition, as previously noted by Bagehot (2005 [1920]), 
solvency depends on securities rather than on the borrower. Bagehot (2005 [1920]) indicated 
                                                          
159 For example, Solow (2009 [1992]) and Flannery (2007 [1996]) are advocates for Goodhart’s view. 
160 The solvency state of nature will be analysed in section 7.2.2. 
161 Section 7.2.2 presents several tests to determine the solvency of a bank. 
162 ‘A sudden increase in a bank’s cash needs would not cause an illiquidity loss if the bank’s assets were perfectly 
marketable’ (Guttentag and Herring 1987: 152). 
163 However, ‘[t]he greater the insistence of the [..] [central bank] on charging a “penalty rate” on its own LOLR 
loans, the greater the endeavour of commercial banks to use their existing good collateral to borrow in the market 
place first’ (Goodhart 2009 [1999]: 231). 
164 Goodhart (2009 [1999]) noted that the discount rate is lower than the market rate at times, but he did not 
elaborate on this point. In this context, chapter 7 considers the cases of lower interest rates. 
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that the timing of securities is necessary to distinguish between good loans (solvent people) and 
bad loans (suspiciously solvent people). In this context, Goodhart (2009 [1999]: 230) argues 
that 
 
‘Bagehot’s proposal related simply to the collateral that the applicant could offer, and the effect in practice was to 
distinguish, in part, between those loans on which the central bank might expect with some considerable 
probability to make a loss (bad bills and collateral) and those on which little, or no, loss should eventuate’. 
 
Thus, Goodhart (2009 [1999]: 233) believes ‘[w]hen the [..][central bank] discounted “good 
bills” for a financial intermediary, it did not and could not at the same time estimate the 
borrower’s solvency’. Given these considerations, ‘liquidity and solvency are the heavenly 
twins of banking, frequently indistinguishable [because] an illiquid bank can rapidly become 
insolvent and an insolvent bank illiquid’ (Goodhart 2008: 40). Similarly, Baltensperger (1990), 
Llewellyn (1999), Tirole (2002), Schwartz (2008, 2009), and Admati and Hellwig (2013) 
indicated that distinguishing between a liquidity problem and a solvency problem in times of 
financial distress is difficult and misguided (see also Baltensperger and Dermine 1987, 
Kaufman 2007 [1991], Crockett 1997, Freixas et al. 2007 [1999], Hirsch 2007 [1977], Birchler 
2007a, Nakaso 2014). In this context, Baltensperger (1990: 11) noted ‘[a]lthough, on a 
conceptual basis, liquidity and solvency can be distinguished neatly, it is difficult, in practice, 
to separate them completely. In practice, the public perception of a ‘liquidity problem’ usually 
means that some doubts exist about the bank's solvency too’. Llewellyn (1999: 18) noted that 
‘it is in practice a blunt instrument and cannot, at the time it is used, and with incomplete 
information possessed by the central bank, always discriminate between fundamentally sound 
but illiquid banks and those that are in truth insolvent’ (see also Freixas et al. 2007 [1999]). In 
other words, when the central bank must make a decision regarding ELA, there may be not 
enough time to assess the banks’ solvency or insolvency. Likewise, Tirole (2002: 111) indicated 
that 
 
‘[m]any observers make a distinction between “illiquidity” and “insolvency”. This distinction is unwarranted. 
There is never illiquidity without at least some suspicion regarding insolvency. If it were known that a [bank (or 
for a country)] in distress were solvent, then the [bank] would immediately receive liquidity assistance from a 
private financier (or a consortium of private financiers)’. 
 
Furthermore, Schwartz (2008) indicated that if a bank enters into an ELA transaction (for 
example, the current financial crisis) and the bank accepts liquid assets (for example, mortgage-
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backed securities (MBS)) that cannot be sold on the money market in time because the value is 
unknown in the balance sheet, the solvency status will be unknown. Thus, because ‘a large part 
of a bank’s assets consists of nonmarketable loans to customers, the repayability of these loans 
at par cannot be known with certainty to the potential last resort lender’ (Crockett 1997: 25). 
Therefore, the central bank as the LOLR does not know if the borrowing bank is solvent. 
Consequently, the LOLR cannot distinguish between an illiquid bank and an insolvent bank; 
therefore, ‘it may be desirable to rescue an insolvent bank because of contagion effects on sound 
banks’ (Schwartz 2009: 452). In addition, Admati and Hellwig (2013: 93) noted that addressing 
liquidity problems ‘without considering solvency is misguided because solvency problems are 
much more dangerous than liquidity problems. Indeed, liquidity problems are quite often caused 
by solvency problems, because concerns about solvency induce creditors to pull out’.165 
Similarly, Nyberg (2000: 2) indicated the following: 
 
‘[t]raditionally, ELA provided by central banks has been seen as a measure to deal with pure liquidity problems in 
banks that essentially are solvent. In practice, situations where pure liquidity problems arise seem to be rare. In 
most cases where banks face liquidity problems, there is some uncertainty about the solvency of the institutions 
involved’.  
 
Conversely, opponents would argue that if a bank is insolvent, then ELA will not be 
able to survive.  
 
‘Furthermore, the redistribution of wealth from taxpayers to depositors, creditors and/or shareholders which occurs 
when an LLR offers assistance to an insolvent bank lacks political legitimacy and is difficult to justify on equity 
grounds. Moreover, market discipline may be seriously undermined if bank managers and creditors need not be 
concerned that the bank will lose access to emergency liquidity assistance when its net worth approaches zero’. 
(Guttentag and Herring 1987: 164) 
 
Moreover, the competence of national regulatory authorities and fiscal authorities involves 
intervening with respect to insolvency problems, whereas the central bank’s task is to intervene 
if liquidity problems arise (see Baltensperger and Dermine 1987, Heller and Kuhn 2007, Illing 
and König 2014). Therefore, in this dissertation, the cardinal principle is also that the central 
bank should not provide ELA to fundamentally insolvent institutions (see Tucker 2014).166 
                                                          
165 Conversely, if a lender is confident that a bank is solvent and even illiquid (meaning the absence of uncertainty), 
he or she is unlikely to withdraw his or her deposits from the bank (see Admati and Hellwig 2013). 
166 ‘The challenge is how to articulate and maintain a regime that does not slip (back) into supporting fundamentally 
bust firms’ (Tucker 2014: 19). A possible solution would be to provide a clear solvency framework that assesses 
the bank’s solvency as part of a cost-benefit analysis (see section 7.2.2). 
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Although we follow the cardinal principle, in practice, it is generally impossible to distinguish 
between illiquidity and insolvency. Based on this consideration, we formulate the third principle 
for the Swiss LOLR in the twenty-first century: 
 
Principle 3: Lending freely to illiquid–solvent and temporarily insolvent banks.  
 
Opponents would criticise lending to temporarily insolvent banks. However, distinguishing 
between fundamental insolvency and temporary insolvency is useful here. Fundamental 
insolvency means that a bank is insolvent and unable to return to viability, even in the medium 
and long run. Temporary insolvency means that in times of distress, the bank can be referred to 
as insolvent, but it can become viable and thus solvent in the medium and long run. According 
to this conceptual distinction, the political legitimacy used to justify the central bank’s ELA on 
equity grounds is easier than in the case of fundamental solvency. Furthermore, solvency 
support (fundamental insolvency) by the government and liquidity support (illiquidity and 
temporary insolvency) by the central bank can be better distinguished in this way. Moreover, 
ELA is closely related to the characteristics of the borrower type. In the case of a temporarily 
insolvent, systemically important institution, the political legitimacy of the SNB will be easier 
because of its systemically important role in the economy. Furthermore, market discipline will 
be less undermined in the case of temporary insolvency than in the case of fundamental 
insolvency. Despite all these intentions, how to make solvency–insolvency operational remains 
a difficult question. Therefore, in section 7.2.2, we elaborate a potential solvency framework to 
make solvency operational.  
The second myth is that domestic central banks are limited in the provision of high-
powered money because, as Goodhart (2009 [1999]) indicated, (1) they cannot create foreign 
high-powered money; (2) ‘they cannot force foreign creditors to accept payment in domestic 
liabilities, if the contract specifies otherwise’ (Goodhart 2009 [1999]: 235); and (3) if they 
create additional domestic high-powered money to buy foreign high-powered money, for 
example, via FX swaps to steer liquidity, ‘this would usually be largely or entirely offset by 
depreciation in the international value of the domestic currency’ (Goodhart 2009 [1999]: 235). 
Consequently, the central bank’s funding is limited. Furthermore, the central bank’s capital is 
limited because behind its liabilities are the strength and taxing powers of the government rather 
than the capital of the central bank (see Goodhart 2009 [1999]).  
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The third myth is ‘that moral hazard is everywhere and at all times a major 
consideration’ (Goodhart 2009 [1999]: 238). The LOLR is a form of insurance in the banking 
sector, and any form of insurance must grapple with the moral hazard problem. As we noted in 
section 2.1.2, moral hazard is a result of asymmetric information that appears after the 
transaction between the principal (the central bank) and the agent (the bank). Likewise, 
asymmetric information exists about the bank and the central bank that provides ELA. The 
central bank faces certain difficulties because with the provision of ELA, the banks may take 
excessive risks to maximise their profits because they know that they will not suffer any losses 
from the LOLR if they behave carelessly. Likewise, Goodhart (2009 [1999]: 238) indicated that 
 
‘loss will generally fall on those who have had no responsibility [(central bank)] for the decisions that led to the 
loss. This shifting of the burden from those closer to the source of the loss-making decisions [(banks)] to those 
further away, taxpayers, may cause the decision-makers [(banks)] to take riskier decisions for well known reasons 
– that is, moral hazard’. 
 
In the same manner, Guttentag and Herring (1987), Baltensperger (1992), Llewellyn (1999) 
and Tucker (2014) noted that the LOLR threatens to create adverse effects and moral hazard. 
Thereby, the LOLR affects the behaviour of protected or insured bank agents to accept a greater 
risk and thus undermines the incentives of bondholders and other unsecured, uninsured 
creditors to monitor them. Although moral hazard is often considered a serious problem in the 
literature, the primary challenge lies between the economic costs (social costs) of allowing a 
domicile bank, particularly an SIB, to fail and the benefits of enhancing market discipline 
instead of refusing the provision of ELA by the central bank. In this context, the central bank 
must weigh costs, where moral hazard is part of the cost of the LOLR scheme, the cost of a 
bank failure and the cost of systemic panic and benefits (see Baltensperger 1992, Goodhart 
2009 [1999]). Similarly, Solow (2007 [1992]: 205-206) noted that ‘to protect the monetary-
financial system against socially destructive disturbance, then the failure of a large bank is 
clearly costlier than the failure of a small bank’ (see also Hirsch 2007 [1977]). In this sense, the 
financial crisis of 2007–2009 has shown that the cost of allowing a systemically important 
institute to fail (Lehman Brothers) is higher than the benefit of enhancing market discipline. 
Although the costs of the moral hazard problem must clearly be compared with its benefits, 
whether the benefits of future LOLR interventions are higher than the costs remains an open 
question (for example, in 1931, the German Reichsbank provided ELA to the insolvent, 
systemically important Danat Bank, but the Danat Bank was unable to return to viability; the 
Danat Bank went bankrupt in July 1931, creating enormous costs for taxpayers and the German 
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economy (see Schnabel 2004)). Thus, an LOLR intervention should be determined on a case-
by-case basis and based on a clear systemic cost-benefit analysis (see the seventh principle in 
section 7.1).  
The fourth myth is that the LOLR can be abolished. This myth relates to the third myth 
and to the myth of Goodfriend and King that ELA can only be provided through the market as 
a whole via OMOs. In this regard, Goodhart (2009 [1999]: 241) noted that 
 
‘given our history, it is unthinkable that any government or central bank would now stand idly by and watch the 
closure of any of its major banks, the realization of large-scale losses [of SIBs] on bank deposits of its citizens and 
the collapse of its financial markets, if the authorities could avoid such events. And they could avoid them by 
judicious LOLR’.  
 
Therefore, the main challenge is ‘how best to organise the LOLR function that will continue to 
exist both nationally and internationally’ rather than abolishing it (Goodhart 2009 [1999]: 241, 
see also Goodhart and Illing 2009).  
Given the above-mentioned considerations, we can summarise the LOLR with respect 
to our five characteristics. Figure 5.7 summarises the considerations of the Goodhart (and 
others) view. First, the objective of Goodhart’s LOLR is focused on the safety and soundness 
of the banking system, not on individual banks, because of  
 
‘[t]he possibility of large shocks – for example, large jumps in asset prices, especially in crises when such a jump 
is downwards [(see section 2.2.3 on the risk-feedback loop)] – means that there may be multiple equilibria, to use 
the current jargon. Panic conditions can lead to circumstances where firms that would be viable during normal 
times become insolvent, though perhaps only temporarily. This syndrome may be especially serious in commercial 
banks’ (Goodhart 2009 [1999]: 229-230).  
 
Similarly, Solow (2007 [1992]: 210) indicated that the purpose of ‘the lender of last resort is 
not to preserve individual banks from failure but to preserve the monetary-financial system’. 
Second, the central bank is the type of institution to provide domicile ELA, whereas the IMF 
can play the role of the LOLR on the international level. Third, Goodhart (2009 [1999]) 
indicated that the domestic and the international LOLR are limited sources of liquidity. A 
domestic LOLR has limited liquidity because it cannot create foreign currency and it has limited 
capital, as the strength and taxing power of the government is behind the liabilities rather than 
the capital of the central bank. Fourth, according to Goodhart (2009 [1999]), the ELA 
mechanism operates through the DW rather than OMOs because ELA is a direct bilateral loan 
from the central bank to the bank. Fifth, if a bank (borrower type) asks for assistance in a period 
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of financial distress, the liquidity and solvency problem can be neglected because central banks 
struggle to assess a bank’s solvency (or lack thereof) during a period of distress. Furthermore, 
if a bank demands ELA, then the bank is of suspicious solvency because otherwise, it could 
have received inside liquidity on the market. Consequently, the LOLR should provide ELA to 
illiquid but temporarily insolvent institutions. 
 
Figure 5.7 Contemporary school of thought – the Goodhart (and others) view 
 
Source: Authors’ own elaboration. 
 
The alternative LOLR view 
 
In the post-Keynesian literature, the central bank’s role is explained according to two functions, 
namely, setting the interest rate in the short term or acting as the LOLR in times of financial 
turmoil. However, as Rochon and Rossi (2007: 542) clearly noted, the central bank ‘not only 
sets the rate of interest, but it also intervenes on markets on a regular basis’. Therefore, the PK 
analysis is limited with respect to the central bank’s functions and, in turn, with respect to the 
interpretation of the LOLR in modern economics. To fill this gap, Rochon and Rossi (2007) 
and Rossi (2007) provide a theory of endogenous money in central banking by combining the 
elements of circuit analysis (reflux mechanism) and PK theory (see section 1.1.2). We adopt 
the theory of endogenous money in central banking and show an alternative LOLR regime in 
the modern economy. However, before we extend beyond the LOLR, we consider the PK 
functions of central banking. 
In the PK theory of central banking, we can distinguish between two functions, the 
accommodative function and the defensive function (see Eichner 1987, Rochon and Rossi 
2007).  
On the one hand, the accommodative function is the traditional function that is activated 
when an urgent need for commercial bank reserves arises.   
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‘In this role the central bank agrees to supply reserves to the banking system on demand, usually as a result of 
increased economic activity. As the demand for bank credit increases and banks respond by increasing the supply 
to creditworthy borrowers, deposits are created against which banks must hold reserves with the central bank’ 
(Rochon and Rossi 2007: 542). 
 
On the other hand, the defensive function is a consequence of the central bank’s daily 
activities via OMOs on the interbank market. Although PK theory has downplayed this function 
because the total amount of commercial bank reserves remains unchanged, in central banking, 
OMOs play an essential role in daily operations, which goes beyond PK theory that primarily 
focuses on the accommodative function (see Rochon and Rossi 2007). According to the 
defensive function,  
 
‘any fall in liabilities will need to be offset by a sale of securities. Similarly, any changes in central bank assets 
will need to be neutralised by the sale or purchase of securities: an increase in central bank assets will need to be 
offset by the sale’ (Rochon and Rossi 2007: 543).   
 
In other words, OMOs adjust the overall commercial bank reserves based on the demand of the 
banking sector. Consequently, the central bank is omnipresent in the daily operations of the 
banking system, which goes beyond PK theory. Therefore, in a theory of endogenous money 
and central banking, both functions must be considered under PK and circuit theory. Next, we 
expand upon these considerations. For PK economists, the central bank acts as the LOLR and 
provides ELA at a high interest rate based on a bank’s creditworthiness due to the demand for 
high-powered money, which is aligned with the classical Bagehot doctrine; the supply of money 
is thereby endogenous because it is demand-driven. According to double-entry accounting, 
whenever a central bank makes an ELA credit, it simultaneously creates a new eligible 
collateral of equal size on the liability side. Figure 5.8 illustrates the lending mechanism before 
and after an ELA credit is made by the central bank. Suppose SIB B requests an urgent ELA 
credit when no pre-existing ELA credit is available (before an ELA is made). The central bank 
offers an ELA credit and establishes an interest rate according to the creditworthiness related 
to the ELA credit of bank B. A new ELA credit is thus created on the liability side, and matching 
new eligible collateral is simultaneously created on the asset side on the central bank’s balance 
sheet. In other words, the central bank creates its high-powered money by lending, and vice 
versa. Moreover, regarding the principle of double-entry accounting, the total central bank loan 
– in the form of an ELA credit – is equal to the total eligible collateral at any time. The ELA 
credit must be settled by bank B, which implies that its commercial bank reserves are not 
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available for funding when the bank repays the ELA credit (today and tomorrow). As previously 
mentioned in section 1.1.2, this phenomenon is called the reflux mechanism. Conversely, the 
flux mechanism is the creation of an ELA credit. Consequently, the central bank acts as an 
intermediary between one and the same agent, namely, bank B in different time periods, and 
bank B acts as the financial intermediary between one and the same agent (lender and borrower) 
in different time periods (today and tomorrow). 
 
Figure 5.8 Before and after an ELA credit is made 
 
Source: Authors’ own elaboration. 
 
The relationship between the central bank, the bank and the agent represents the ‘tripartite 
relationship’ between the payers, the payee and the banking system (Rochon and Rossi 2007). 
Table 5.1 describes the tripartite relationship of the central bank and two banks, B1 and B2, and 
the result of a payment between two agents of the two banks B1 and B2.  
 
Table 5.1 High-powered money as a means of interbank settlements 
 
Source: Adapted from Rochon and Rossi (2007).  
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We assume the following: (1) a central bank deals with two SIBs, B1 and B2; (2) both banks are 
involved in a transaction between a payer, ‘Agent I’ of bank B1, and a payee, ‘Agent II’ of bank 
B2, under (3) normal circumstances and distressing circumstances. We first consider the 
situation in normal times. Table 5.1 describes the records of the changes in the accounting 
positions of the relevant agents in relation to a transaction between banks B1 and B2 before and 
after the central bank intervention (see Rochon and Rossi 2007, see also Rossi 2007). Suppose 
that in normal circumstances, Agent I (payer) initiates a payment worth -CHFx. On the one 
hand, in the books of bank B1, +CHFx is transferred from the account of Agent I (see entry 1) 
to the account of bank B2 (see entry 2). On the other hand, bank B2 records the incoming 
payment from bank B1 and credits the amount of +CHFx to Agent II’s account (see entry 3). 
Thus, bank B1 is indebted to bank B2 in the amount of +CHFx as a result of the payment between 
Agent I and Agent II. However, Agent II has no further claims on Agent I. To settle the daily 
interbank positions of credit money167 between Agent I and Agent II, bank B1 requires high-
powered money from the central bank. Based on its unlimited creation of high-powered money, 
the central bank offers high-powered money through OMOs (for example, repo transactions 
and the purchase of SNB bills) and/or standing facilities (for instance, intraday and/or overnight 
facilities) to bank B1 at an interest rate. Thus, bank B1 is now indebted to the central bank for 
an amount of central bank money equal to CHFx (see entry 5) (see Rochon and Rossi 2007), 
and bank B2 is entitled to an equivalent deposit at the central bank (see entry 4). The high-
powered money received from the central bank is used by bank B1 to settle its payment to bank 
B2. As shown in Figure 5.9 (circuit 1), this central bank money moves in a clockwise circular 
flow that will be repeated. Overall, high-powered money on the interbank market is created 
based on the demand of bank B1 to settle its debt to bank B2. Therefore, the central bank acts 
as a financial intermediary between banks B1 and B2 and provides credit money to bank B1 on 
the grounds of the deposit of high-powered money in bank B2’s account (see Rochon and Rossi 
2007). In addition, bank B1 can find credit money (CHFx) on the financial market by entering 
into a bilateral transaction with bank B2. To settle the financial payment, bank B1 provides 
collateral to bank B2 against credit money; thereby, bank B1 forms deposits on the central bank, 
and bank B2 demands high-powered money from the central bank via OMOs or standing 
facilities to settle the payment on the financial market, which is described in detail in Table 5.1 
(see anticlockwise circuit 2 in Figure 5.10). ‘Hence the central bank’s financial intermediation 
                                                          
167 Likewise, Thornton (1965 [1939]) conceptually distinguished between bank money or ‘credit money’ and 
central bank money or ‘high-powered money’, whereas high-powered money is a flow rather than a stock, as 
Thornton (1965 [1939]) mentioned. For a detailed discussion about money, see Rossi (2007), Rochon and Rossi 
(2013) and Rochon and Rossi (2016). 
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between bank B1 and bank B2 can be interpreted as a bilateral or multilateral transaction on 
securities’ (Rochon and Rossi 2007: 551, see also Rossi 2007). 
 
Figure 5.9 The two circuits of central bank money 
 
Sources: Rochon and Rossi (2007), Rossi (2007). 
 
Table 5.2 A multilateral delivery-versus-payment transaction on collateral 
 
Source: Adapted from Rossi (2007). 
 
Figure 5.10 Bilateral and multilateral financial market between banks 
 
Source: Rochon and Rossi (2007). 
 
The analysis above shows the central bank’s essential defensive role via OMOs and standing 
facilities on the interbank market and the financial market in daily business. ‘In other words, 
provided the defensive role is carried out effectively, thereby preventing systemic risk, the 
lender-of-last-resort role does not arise as often as the old literature has it’ (Rochon and Rossi 
2007: 551). The analysis also reveals ‘a twofold endogenous phenomenon involving a money 
Collaterals 
(sold to CB) -CHFx Agent I -CHFx
Collaterals 
(sold by CB) +CHFx Agent II +CHFx
Bank B1 Bank B2
Assets Liabilities Assets Liabilities
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creation, as well as a credit operation between the central bank and the banks that participate in 
the national payment system’ (Rossi 2007: 79). In addition, the analysis suggests that the 
‘[p]ost-Keynesian theory [of LOLR] and the theory of the monetary circuit are compatible and 
complement each other’ (Rochon and Rossi 2007: 540). In light of these considerations, under 
normal circumstances, the central bank provides high-powered money via OMOs and standing 
facilities as a consequence of the demand for high-powered money to settle payments.  
 In times of financial distress, the above-mentioned mechanism can be regarded as 
similar but more complex. The main differences between normal times and times of distress are 
as follows: (1) bank B1 is considered solvent and illiquid or temporarily insolvent in times of 
distress, whereas bank B1 is considered solvent and liquid under normal circumstances; (2) the 
central bank acts as the LOLR as a result of the demand for ELA; and (3) the role of the LOLR 
can only be conducted via direct lending. Otherwise, inside liquidity, and thus the provision of 
high-powered money via OMOs or DW transactions, would be sufficient. Suppose that a 
solvent or temporarily insolvent bank B1 is unable to find liquidity on the interbank market 
(inside liquidity) to settle its interbank market debt. Bank B1 decides to use its commercial bank 
reserves, which usually bear no interest rate, to purchase collateral at an interest rate. In such a 
situation, the central bank acts as a financial intermediary between one and the same bank at 
different times (today and tomorrow) and provides ELA credit in high-powered money to B1 as 
a result of its demand for credit money to settle a payment against eligible collateral at an 
interest rate (see Figure 5.11). 
 
Figure 5.11 ELA in a multilateral interbank market between banks 
 
Sources: Authors’ own elaboration based on Rochon and Rossi (2007), Rossi (2007). 
 
To offset the ELA payment in the amount of CHFx, the LOLR enters into a repo transaction 
with bank B2 and sells collateral II in the amount of CHFx. Consequently, bank B1 can ‘clear 
its position towards the banking system as a whole, that the central bank intervenes by granting 
it a credit’ (in the form of a repurchase agreement) (Rossi 1998: 78). In a nutshell, the reason 
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for an LOLR intervention depends on the presence of a market or bank failure that leads to a 
situation in which banks are unable to find inside liquidity on the interbank market to settle the 
final payment. This finding leads us to the same conclusion as in normal times, whereas the 
major finding is that the credit money and ELA provided by the LOLR are endogenous and 
created based on demand. In other words, the LOLR is ‘a twofold endogenous phenomenon 
involving a money creation, as well as a credit operation between the central bank and the banks 
that participate in the national payment system’ (Rossi 2007: 79). In this sense, we can 
formulate a fourth principle for the LOLR: 
 
Principle 4: ELA from the LOLR is endogenous and created based on demand.  
 
An additional finding is that PK theory and the theory of the monetary circuit are compatible 
and complement one another in relation to central banking (see Rochon and Rossi 2007). In 
short, the LOLR facilities ensure payment finality on the interbank market, financial stability 
in the banking system, and financial stability in the economic system. In other words, the LOLR 
has three macro-based objectives, namely, to guarantee the functioning of the payment system, 
to stabilise and create confidence in the banking system, and to do the same for the economic 
system. All these considerations are subsumed under the alternative LOLR view in Figure 5.12. 
 
Figure 5.12 Overview of the alternative LOLR view 
 
Source: Authors’ own elaboration. 
 
5.5. Summary 
 
Next, we review the main considerations in chapter 5, in which we have presented the different 
schools of thought and provided detailed answers regarding the role of the LOLR that can be 
conducted via OMOs.  
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A controversial debate rages between two schools of thought regarding whether the 
LOLR can operate via OMOs. According to Goodfriend and King (2009 [1988]), the role of 
the LOLR can be performed via OMOs because financial markets are highly efficient in 
allocating credit. In addition, it is unclear whether the DW provides assistance at a lower cost 
than OMOs because the DW must evaluate asset prices correctly to provide an accurate discount 
rate; however, in times of distress, correctly evaluating asset prices and, in turn,  liquidity and 
solvency is difficult. Hence, OMOs eliminate the need to evaluate asset prices. Because OMOs 
would be a better alternative for lending to individual institutions, the DW or any form of direct 
lending should be abolished. However, we do not agree with Goodfriend and King (2009 
[1988]) on abolishing the DW and any form of direct lending for the following reasons: (1) In 
practice, both instruments are used, especially the LOLR, when SIBs fail. We use an analogy 
from medicine to explain this idea. Suppose that a patient suffers from a particular illness. A 
doctor has various instruments to heal the patient. In this sense, he or she is able to provide 
general health measures or direct targeted measures. In our context, the LOLR is the latter 
measure, whereas the MMLR is the former measure. To effectively heal the patient, a doctor 
would recommend an objective-oriented measure, that is, the LOLR. Therefore, abolishing the 
DW or any form of direct lending would be foolish. (2) As Humphrey (2010) clearly noted, the 
LOLR OMOs and other new crisis instruments are wrongly considered to be LOLRs. (3) As 
Goodhart 2009 [1999]) mentioned, distinguishing between the LOLR OMOs and the non-
LOLR OMOs and between the LOLR QEs and the non-LOLR QEs is difficult; thus, as noted 
in chapters 4 and 5, the LOLR is non-operational and is considered to be direct lending. (4) 
Lending to individual institutions is required if inside liquidity is insufficient due to a shock 
that has system-wide impacts or aggregated uncertainty (see Holmström and Tirole 1998, Tirole 
2002). Therefore, in normal times, OMOs are sufficient, but in irregular times, the LOLR may 
be needed if the MMLR cannot provide sufficient ELA. Consequently, in our view, if the 
MMLR does not have the desired effect on the interbank market, a combined MMLR and LOLR 
is needed. In other words, the challenge is to use the proper instrument in times of financial 
distress rather than abolishing direct lending. In this context, further academic research is 
desirable. 
 Next, in identifying the different LOLR schools of thought, we determined that the 
schools vary but also have similarities. For a better analysis of the LOLR schools of thought, 
we elaborate an LOLR analysis scheme that draws upon five characteristics: (1) the objective; 
(2) the institution type; (3) the limited and unlimited sources of high-powered money; (4) the 
emergency liquidity mechanism; and (5) emergency liquidity conditions. Based on these 
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characteristics, we analyse the four different schools of thought, namely, the ancient school of 
thought, the classical school of thought, the free banking school of thought, and the 
contemporary school of thought. The main representative of the ancient school of thought is 
Tiberius, whereas the classical school is characterised by the essential writings of Henry 
Thornton and Walter Bagehot. The contemporary school of thought can be divided into the 
Goodfriend and King view, the Goodhart (and others) view, and the alternative LOLR school 
of thought. According to our systematisation scheme, we find the following: (1) in all six views, 
the objective of the ELA is generally focused on a macro-based perspective regarding the safety 
and soundness of the entire economy or banking system. Thus, all schools of thought view the 
role of the LOLR as macro-based, namely, to limit system-wide financial distress and to avoid 
macroeconomic costs. (2) A broad range of institutions can act as LOLRs. In this sense, the 
Tiberian view regards the government as the LOLR institution; the Thornton view considers a 
bank (BoE) with specific characteristics to be the LOLR; and contemporary economists regard 
the central bank as the LOLR on the national level. (3) All schools of thought except the 
Goodhart view regard the LOLR as the ultimate source of high-powered money. Goodhart 
(2009 [1999]) counters this common assumption with the following arguments: (a) Central 
banks have limited capital. (b) Behind the liabilities of the central bank is the government (with 
taxpayers) rather than capital. Thus, the strength of the government determines the power of 
the central bank. (c) The central bank is unable to create foreign high-powered money, and 
when buying foreign high-powered money, the national currency would be depreciated. (4) 
According to the ELA mechanism, all schools of thought except the Goodfriend and King view 
consider the LOLR to be a concept through which central banks directly lend to individual 
banks rather than through the market. (5) ELA conditions vary with respect to borrowers – from 
NBNFIs to banks and NBFIs – as shown by the solvency-insolvency statuses and interest rates 
in Figure 5.13. For a better overview, see Figure 5.13, which summarise all LOLR schools of 
thought.  
 
Nonetheless, the following four questions remain unanswered: (1) Why does the LOLR exist 
in Switzerland? (2) What conditions apply to the Swiss LOLR? (3) Should the LOLR provide 
ELA to NBFIs? (4) Should the LOLR provide ELA against wide or narrow classes of collateral? 
The next chapter answers the first two questions, whereas chapter 7 addresses the other two. 
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6. A historical perspective of the Swiss lender of last resort 
 
The role of the Swiss LOLR is indispensable in relation to the evolution of the SNB, and the 
evolution of the SNB is closely linked with the political evolution of Switzerland (see Weber 
1992). Therefore, a historical overview of the SNB is necessary to understand the key role of 
the Swiss LOLR. Based on numerous historical data, Figure 6.1 provides a comprehensive 
overview of the evolution of the SNB and decisive key events of the LOLR. Figure 6.1 shows 
the economic schools of thought,168 the LOLR schools of thought periods, and the historical 
evolution of the Swiss LOLR. The evolution of the Swiss LOLR is marked in blue and can be 
broadly divided into three time periods: the free-banking period from 1826 to 1881, the 
transition period from 1881 to 1907, and the central bank period from 1907 until today. 
Furthermore, the central bank period can be divided into two subperiods: the constructive 
ambiguity period from 1907 to 2004 and the constructive clarity period from 2004 until today. 
These decisive historical data, which have an impact on the evolution of the SNB and the Swiss 
LOLR, are presented in bold. In this context, the following data are essential: the Franco-
Prussian War of 1807, also known as the German-French War; the Federal Banking Law of 
1881; the establishment of the SNB in 1907; the 1990 Swiss mortgage crisis; and the revision 
of the NBA in 2004. In the following sections, we describe the evolution of the SNB and the 
Swiss LOLR. 
 
6.1. Switzerland before the Swiss National Bank from 1826 to 1881 
 
The period between 1826 and 1881 is described as the free banking169 period, a designation 
agreed upon in the literature by free-banking proponents such as Ritzmann (1996) and Weber 
(1992) and central bank proponents such as Bordo and James (2007). This period was closely 
linked to the political evolution of the federal republic, the close relationship with the French 
banking sector and the Franco-Prussian War.  Let us briefly illuminate the period from 1826 to 
1881.  
  
                                                          
168 The different economic schools of thought will be analysed in Appendix 3. 
169 As we noted in sections 1.2.2 and 5.1, a free banking system is understood as a banking system without any 
government intervention, particularly without any central bank. For free-banking economists (Weber 1992, 
Ritzmann 1996), the Swiss free banking period is a perfect example of the absence of government intervention 
because no Swiss banking crisis of systemic importance appeared until the mid-nineteenth century (see Weber 
1992, Bordo and James 2007, Fink 2013). 
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From 1826 until the mid-1840s, the Swiss banking sector was dominated by private bankers 
with close relationships to the aristocracy. In 1826, the first domestic Swiss bank was 
established, namely, the Depositokasse der Stadt Bern (see Weber 1992, Fink 2013). The 
Depositokasse der Stadt Bern was followed by the Kantonalbank von Bern (1834), the Bank of 
Zürich (1837–1906) and the Bank of St. Gallen (1837–1907). In the aftermath of a liberal 
revolution in 1830s and 1840s, the Swiss banking sector was deregulated, and banks could issue 
free banknotes in various forms and denominations.  
After the mid-1840s, the liberals (Protestants) gained more control in the industrialised 
cantons, and a brief civil war in 1848 broke out against the Alpine cantons (Catholics); the 
victory of the liberal cantons converted Switzerland into a federal republic (Weber 1992). As a 
result of the civil war in 1848, the first Federal Constitution of the Swiss Confederation (FCSC) 
established that the Swiss Confederation had the exclusive right to mint coins. In 1850, the 
federal republic reformed the Swiss currency system, merging the multiple Swiss currency 
system into a single currency system (namely, the Swiss franc) and leaving the control to issue 
banknotes to the domestic banks in a ‘decentralised banking system’. Therefore, the number of 
banknote issuers increased considerably until the 1880s.170 
Another characteristic of the Swiss banking system was its close relationship with the 
French banking sector until the mid-nineteenth century. Thereby, the Banque de France171 
practically played a central banking role in the Swiss banking system (see Bordo and James 
2007). Through this close relationship, domestic Swiss banks could convert French banknotes 
into Swiss gold, silver coins and banknotes, and vice versa. This French connection played an 
essential role in Switzerland’s transition period from a decentralised system to a centralised 
system. Overall, the Swiss free banking system was characterised as a decentralised and 
deregulated system without any considerable degree of bank regulation.172 Weber (1992) 
indicated that no legal tender laws existed. Under the Swiss free banking system, there was a 
combination of Swiss banknotes and French banknotes, and domestic banks had the exclusive 
right to issue banknotes without any requirements. Every domestic bank could create and design 
banknotes of 50, 100, 500 or 1000 Swiss Francs on their own. Thus, on the one hand, gold, 
silver coins, various Swiss banknotes and French banknotes guaranteed a liquid banking 
system. On the other hand, the presence of various banknotes meant that the banking system 
                                                          
170 ‘By 1850, 11 banks issued notes in Switzerland. […]. In 1865, 29 banks issued banknotes. […]. By 1880 the 
number of note issuing banks increased to 37’ (Fink 2013: 4, see Weber 1992). 
171 The Banque de France was founded in 1800. 
172 Opponents question the accuracy of this point because private banks should meet reserve and capital 
requirements with respect to their articles of association. Although this is true, with regard to issuing banknotes, 
the system was free from regulation. 
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could have been experiencing banknote chaos. However, the free banking model worked well 
because no banking crisis of systemic importance occurred. Consequently, Weber (1992: 205) 
suggested that ‘competition provided a stable monetary system in Switzerland in which the 
purchasing power of bank notes equalled that of specie and only one bank failed’. 
However, in the 1860s and 1870s, the political climate change against the liberals in 
favour of the radicals was enhanced by the outbreak of the Franco-Prussian War in 1870, 
opening the way for a centralised banking system. 
 
6.2. The origins of the Swiss National Bank from 1870 to 1907 
 
The years between 1870 and 1907 constituted a transitional phase during which Switzerland 
moved from a free banking system towards a centralised central bank system. The free banking 
model was in doubt for the following reasons: (1) The political climate changed as a result of 
industrialisation. On the one hand, the Swiss economy grew rapidly and demanded more 
banknotes, whereas, on the other hand, social regulations were also in demand. (2) A tax of one 
per cent per annum on the circulation of banknotes was imposed by several cantons, which 
particularly affected the costs of the Bank of Zürich and its supply of banknotes. (3) A market 
failure due to asymmetric information occurred as a result of the Franco-Prussian War in 1870. 
Let us expand on this point. The Banque de France increased its monetary base of French 
banknotes to fund the enormous military expenditures during the war. The increase in French 
banknotes led to a depreciation of the French currency and a suspicion in Switzerland regarding 
the value of French banknotes (asymmetric information). Therefore, the Swiss banks decided 
to suspend the conversion of French banknotes into Swiss gold, silver and banknotes. As a 
result, a reflux of French banknotes occurred, leading to a drying up of banknotes that could 
not be balanced with domestic banknotes (temporary liquidity problem). This event called the 
free banking system into question. Furthermore, Weber (1992), Bordo and James (2007), and 
Fink (2013) indicated that the effect had been enhanced by Switzerland’s membership in the 
Latin Monetary Union173 with Italy, France and Belgium since 1865 (see Kindleberger 2006 
[1984]). In the words of Fink (2013: 13), ‘the Swiss Franc was continually pushed beyond the 
upper gold point. Arbitrageurs grasped the opportunity and used Swiss banknotes to buy gold 
in Switzerland only to cross the border to France and sell it again’. (4) The banknote chaos 
                                                          
173 The rationale for the Latin Monetary Union was to reduce the fineness of the 5-franc pieces of the member state 
to limit their disappearance because of mint undervaluation (see Kindleberger 2006 [1984]). According to 
Kindleberger (2006 [1984]: 66), ‘[f]rom 1865 to 1867, the Latin Monetary Union worked reasonably well, and its 
success suggested the desirability of expanding it to arrive at a “universal money”’. 
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exacerbated the temporary liquidity problem because a decentralised system was assumed to be 
too inflexible to accommodate the demand for banknotes. Therefore, at the end of the nineteenth 
century, a system with many issuing banks was generally assumed to be more disadvantageous 
than a system with a smaller number of regulated issuing banks, thereby providing at least one 
reason for bank regulation in Switzerland.  
Hence, in 1881, the Federal Banking Law came into force to mitigate the banknote 
chaos. Thereafter, the Swiss banking system could no longer be considered a free banking 
system. The Federal Banking Law stated that joint stock banks174 and cantonal banks175 had the 
privilege of issuing banknotes under five regulatory requirements. First, they had to have 
minimal reserve requirements of precious metals (such as gold and silver). The banks thus had 
to have at least 40 per cent of their banknote circulation in reserves. Second, the regulatory 
capital had to correspond to at least one-third of the banknote circulation. Third, each bank had 
to accept the Swiss banknotes of other banks. Fourth, banknotes had to be standardised to 
mitigate the banknote chaos (see Weber 1992). Fifth, the banks had to submit weekly and 
monthly statements to the government. Moreover, the tax of one per cent had been reduced to 
0.6 per cent. However, the Federal Banking Law176 did not have the desired success because 
the circulation of banknotes could not accommodate the demand for banknotes. Therefore, 
‘[c]alls for the creation of a central bank endowed with a money-issuing privilege became 
increasingly vociferous’ (SNB 2015b: 6). In 1891, the Federal Assembly revised Art. 39 of the 
FCSC, giving the Confederation the exclusive right to issue banknotes. In other words, an early 
decentralised system became a centralised system with the government as the early monetary 
authority.  
However, after the revision of Art. 39 of the FCSC, the SNB was founded sixteen years 
later; its foundation was delayed because of a controversial discussion between radicals and 
liberals in the Swiss parliament regarding the design of the monetary architecture. For example, 
in 1894, the radicals proposed establishing a state bank, but the proposal was rejected by the 
                                                          
174 Joint stock banks are stock corporations with shares owned by private investors. In this context, Bagehot (2005 
[1920]) was one of the first to analyse joint stock banks. According to Bagehot (2005 [1920]: 167), joint stock 
banks have the following three characteristics: ‘- 1st. Those in which the capital is used not to work the business 
but to guarantee the business. Thus a banker’s business – his proper business – does not begin while he is using 
his own money; it commences when he begins to use the capital of others. […]. 2ndly. Those companies have 
answered which have an exclusive privilege which they have used with judgment, or which possibly was so very 
profitable as to enable them to thrive with little judgment. 3rdly. Those which have undertaken a business both 
large and simple – employing more money than most individuals or private firms have at command’. 
175 Cantonal banks are stock corporations with shares owned by investors but primarily by the Swiss cantons. Thus, 
cantonal banks hold an implicit guarantee of the assets by the Swiss canton. 
176 This presents an additional argument for our RIH because the regulatory policy was not target oriented to the 
market failure. 
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Swiss people in a national referendum and provided the opportunity for a compromise (see BR 
2002, SNB 2015b). 
 
6.3. The Swiss National Bank as the LOLR from 1907 to 2016 
 
In 1906, an acceptable compromise between radicals and liberals led to the foundation of the 
SNB as a joint-stock company, with two head offices in Bern and Zurich (see Art. 3 para. 3 of 
the NBA 2000 [1953] and Art. 3 para. 1 of the NBA 2016 [2003]). In the same year, the NBA 
came into force, and in June 1907, the SNB was finally founded. The SNB had an exclusive 
note-issuing privilege and a mandate to conduct the country’s monetary policy. In accordance 
with Art. 99 para. 1 of the FCSC (2016 [1999]), the SNB acted independently and served in the 
interest of Switzerland. Thereby, the SNB had two objectives: (1) price stability and, (2) after 
the 2004 revision of the NBA, financial stability, an assumed prerequisite177 for an effective178 
monetary policy (see BIS 2011, Hellwig 2015b). Although the SNB had no clear commitment 
to act as the LOLR from 1907 to 2004, the public perception was that if inside liquidity was 
insufficient and the stability of the Swiss banking system was in jeopardy, the SNB had the 
public duty to act as the LOLR and to provide domestic liquidity in the interest of Switzerland 
(see Art. 99 para. 1 of the FCSC (2016 [1999])). Thereby, the SNB would determine whether 
to save a crisis-stricken bank with ELA or allow it to fail. The vague strategy that the financial 
institutions take regarding whether they will receive ELA is described as the ‘constructive 
ambivalence strategy’,179 which seeks to mitigate moral hazard and enhance market 
discipline180 (see Guttentag and Herring 1987, Blattner and Manz 2005, Schwartz 2009, 
Zürcher and Held 2009, Birchler et al. 2010). Conversely, the SNB can clearly communicate 
its liquidity provision to a financial institution, which is known as a ‘constructive clarity 
strategy’, a clear explicit commitment of the central bank. According to these strategies, the 
SNB faces a trade-off as the LOLR. On the one hand, the LOLR can provide ELA to banks, 
                                                          
177 According to the BIS (2011), financial stability is a key prerequisite and support of the effectiveness and 
efficiency of monetary policy (and vice versa). Similarly, Hellwig (2015b: 11) noted ‘that financial stability is a 
prerequisite for macroeconomic stability or at least the reliability of the monetary transmission mechanism’. 
Although financial stability is commonly known to be a prerequisite of price stability, we should consider this 
relationship more critically. For example, Schwartz (1998: 41) indicated that ‘monetary stability is a prerequisite 
of price stability, and price stability is a prerequisite of financial stability’. Therefore, a clear analysis of the 
direction of the main objective of central bank policy is needed to resolve the controversial discussion surrounding 
price and financial stability. 
178 Here, ‘effective’ means that the central bank intervention is problem oriented (see part I and Hellwig 2007). 
179 The constructive ambivalence strategy has its origins in the language of diplomacy and will be used between 
controversial negotiation partners to achieve a partial solution via ambiguous remarks (see Heller and Kuhn 2007). 
180 Market discipline fails to enhance stability in practice because markets have asymmetric information with which 
to evaluate the safety and soundness of banks (see Guttentag and Herring 1987). 
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providing sufficient liquidity during a panic or crisis.181 On the other hand, a banking panic, 
particularly an SIB panic, should not be exacerbated by an intervention, which could lead to a 
collapse of the banking system. The bank can pursue two independent strategies. In the first 
strategy, the bank does not expect to be rescued, which is also consistent with the selection 
mechanism of the market. Therefore, the bank has no incentive to invest in risky businesses. In 
the second strategy, an SIB expects to be rescued by the SNB in the event of either danger or 
the collapse of the banking sector. Given the strategies presented, four possible payouts can be 
made, as listed in Table 6.1: (1) the ideal case, (2) laissez-faire, (3) panic or crisis, and (4) too 
important to fail. 
 
Table 6.1 ELA and no ELA payoff matrix 
 
Source: Adapted from Birchler et al. (2010). 
 
Given the four possible payouts, what is a realistic LOLR policy? The ideal case is based on an 
irrational (‘ethical’) bank decision that is unlikely to occur. Second, a panic or crisis is the 
opposite situation. The 2007 financial crisis showed that given authorities’ initial passivity 
regarding Lehman Brothers and the subsequent rescue of several SIBs, the safety of the banking 
system was no longer believable (see also Zürcher and Held 2009 and Kashyap et al. 2011). 
Consequently, a de facto government guarantee for SIBs is mentioned. The realistic objectives 
of measures thus lie between ‘laissez-faire’ and ‘too important to fail’ (see Table 6.1). With 
regard to the ambivalence and clarity strategy, there is a controversial discussion in the 
literature. In the follow paragraphs, we expand on this point. 
                                                          
181 Similar to Schwartz (2007), we distinguish between a banking panic and a banking crisis. Schwartz (2009: 457) 
indicated that a ‘panic occurs in the money market and is a threat to the economy’s payments system. A panic can 
be quickly ended by a lender of last resort. […]. A financial crisis occurs when asset prices plunge, whether prices 
of equities, real estate, or commodities, when the exchange value of a national currency experiences substantial 
depreciation; when a large financial or nonfinancial firm or an industry faces bankruptcy, or a sovereign debtor 
defaults’. 
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The following arguments elucidate the discussion of both strategies. (1) According to 
Guttentag and Herring (1987), ambiguity discriminates against institutions such as small and 
medium-sized banks because depositors, based on their expectations, are encouraged to make 
their deposits in an SIB that has an implicit government guarantee (see Guttentag and Herring 
1987). Conversely, Baltensperger (1992: 447) clearly indicated that if depositors expect that 
SIBs are rescued, then irrespective of the use of a constructive ambivalence strategy or an 
explicit strategy, ‘the degree of financial market stabilisation reached should also be the same, 
regardless of the announcement policy perused’. Thus, the first argument cannot be the main 
reason for a constructive clarity strategy. (2) Ambiguity is difficult to define because the timing 
of an intervention is unclear, which creates uncertainty for market participants and a loss of 
confidence (see Freixas et al. 2007 [1999]). Therefore, ambiguity incentivises a panic-based 
run, thus weakening the stability of the banking system. It also creates ‘bad equilibria’ (see 
Guttentag and Herring 1987, Illing and König 2014). In other words, ‘[a]mbiguity led to 
significant – and ultimately damaging – uncertainty about the circumstances in which the bank 
would lend, and the terms and conditions at which it would do so’ (Hauser 2014: 86). 
Furthermore, Hauser (2014) noted that banks’ expectations vary from optimistic ELA support 
in the pre-crisis period to excess pessimism later in the crisis because of no clear commitment 
(for example, the Continental Illinois case,182 the East Asian crisis in the 1990s183 and the 
financial crisis of 2007–2009). (3) The constructive clarity strategy cannot fully eliminate the 
possibility of a bank run; for example, if depositors expect that other depositors will withdraw 
their deposits, a fundamental bank run will occur (see section 2.2.2). (4) Compared with an 
ambiguity strategy, clear and transparent commitment reduces aggregate uncertainty in the 
fragile banking system because ‘at a certain point in [a period of financial distress], when the 
system became too fragile to withstand disruption associated with a major failure, constructive 
ambiguity [will be seen] as impossible. That was true not only for banks but also for bank-like 
institutions’ (Domanski et al. 2014: 61). Therefore, the banking sector’s role as a source of 
fragility justifies an explicit commitment rather than a vague one. (5) In addition, although the 
LOLR is averse to ex-ante guarantees (time inconsistency problem), Guttentag and Herring 
(1987: 171) believe ‘this is a very weak case because the implicit guarantees offers large banks 
under the policy of ambiguity result in only minimal ex-ante discipline’. (6) According to 
Bagehot (2005 [1920]), the central bank should follow a policy that the public can clearly 
                                                          
182 Guttentag and Herring (1987) describe the Continental Illinois case. 
183 Nakaso (2014) analyses the LOLR policy during the East Asian crisis in the 1990s. 
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understand because the central bank is the ultimate source of domestic high-powered money. 
In relation to the controversial discussion on strategies, which strategy does the SNB follow? 
In Switzerland, a series of bank crises occurred in 1906, 1914, 1916, the 1930s,184 and 
particularly the 1990s before the SNB decided to follow a constructive clarity strategy. 
Although the SNB eventually made this decision, it had acted as the LOLR and provided ELA 
during different crises. As the LOLR, the SNB provided the first ELA during the banking crises 
of 1906 and 1914 to the Banca Popolare Ticinese in the amount of CHF 1,5 million. However, 
the amount of ELA was insufficient. Therefore, the bank went bankrupt (see Wetter 1918, 
Bordo and James 2007). During this banking crisis, numerous small banks (in total, 83 banks) 
went bankrupt. The repercussions in the Swiss banking sector were a capital loss of CHF 53,5 
million and credit defaults in the amount of CHF 59 million. The second provision of ELA 
occurred in 1916, when the SNB acted as the LOLR against rediscounted bills to rescue the 
Basler Hyphotekenbank (see Bordo and James 2007). The LOLR’s third ELA provision 
occurred from 2007–2009. Notably, from 1906 until today, the SNB has provided corrective 
actions through the market. 
Nevertheless, several financial crises in the 1970s (such as the oil crisis, 1973–1975) 
and 1990s (the real estate crisis, 1991–1994) occurred before the SNB began thinking about 
implementing a constructive clarity strategy as an LOLR. The Swiss real estate crisis in the 
1990s was what set the ball rolling towards a constructive clarity approach for the twentieth 
century. Let us illuminate the real estate crisis of 1991 and 1992. In the literature, four main 
causes have been detected concerning the real estate crisis (see Birchler 2007b): (1) The cartel 
arrangements in the Swiss banking sector are one cause. Until the end of the 1980s, the Swiss 
banking sector was characterised by several cartel arrangements under the Swiss Bankers 
Association. Towards the end of the 1980s, the bank cartels were dissolved voluntarily or under 
pressure from the Competition and Markets Authority. The end of the bank cartels meant that 
less-profitable banks faced difficulties and went bankrupt (see Birchler 2007b). (2) The Swiss 
economy and the real estate market were overheated and characterised by low interest rates and 
high prices.185 Birchler (2007b) indicated that the prices for single-family houses doubled 
                                                          
184 With the outbreak of the financial crisis in 1929 and the bankruptcy of several banks in Germany and Austria, 
the liquidity situation of several Swiss banks deteriorated because they held approximately 13 per cent of the total 
short-term current liabilities of Germany. In this context, the balance sheets of the eight largest Swiss banks were 
cut in half (see Bordo and James 2007). In response to the German banking crisis in the 1930s, the former FINMA, 
namely, the SFBC, was founded. The Swiss banking sector thus was and is closely linked to the EU banking sector. 
Because of this interconnectedness, a crisis in the EU banking sector can spill over into the Swiss banking sector 
and harm the real economy. 
185 Similarly, as in 1991, the Swiss housing market is currently characterised as follows: (1) housing prices are 
high; (2) interest rates are low (zero); and (3) mortgage rates are low. Therefore, the probability of another Swiss 
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between 1980 and 1990. In other words, the housing boom was the cause of banks continuing 
to increase their exposure186 to the Swiss commercial real estate mortgage market (see Birchler 
2007b). (3) The Swiss mortgage business had been expanded considerably as higher house 
prices allowed householders to receive higher mortgages. Higher mortgages triggered an 
upward price trend in the housing market (hidden mortgage exposure for banks) (see Hellwig 
1995). (4) Furthermore, in 1991, the upward price trend ended as the SNB, in agreement with 
the Federal Council, decided to adhere to a restrictive monetary policy.187 In this sense, a 
medium-term expansion of money supply by approximately one per cent per year was instituted 
to stabilise the pricing system. As a result of restrictive monetary policy, interest rates for 
mortgages increased from five per cent to approximately eight per cent. Given these causes and 
our risk feedback loop on the mortgage market (see Figure 2.5), we can explain the real estate 
crisis of the 1990s. As we noted, the SNB initiated a mortgage-related shock of three per cent. 
The asset shock led to an immediate corrective action on the asset side of several domestic 
banks because numerous householders had difficulties or could not afford to settle their 
mortgages. Consequently, numerous banks increased their interest rates on mortgages to reduce 
the expected risk of further mortgage-related defaults. Therefore, housing prices dropped due 
to increased mortgage rates (adverse price effects), which led to further impairments of the 
mortgage positions on the banks’ balance sheets. According to Birchler (2007b), the mortgage 
positions of SIBs, namely, UBS and Credit Suisse, were impaired by 10 per cent. However, 
UBS and Credit Suisse balanced their losses through gains in other business areas, particularly 
the investment banking division. Therefore, we are sceptical today that a less-intensive 
investment banking strategy had the desirable effects under a regulatory perspective. The 
cantonal and regional banks had to write off five per cent of their mortgage positions, which 
led to the bankruptcy of the medium-sized regional bank Spar- und Leihkasse Thun (SLT), 
which had approximately 46,000 deposit accounts, approximately CHF 1 billion in assets, and 
an expensive 14-year liquidation process (see Birchler 2007b, SFBC 2008a).188 The bankruptcy 
of SLT directly caused immediate losses and liquidity problems for other interconnected Swiss 
regional banks (see Figure 2.7 on the domino model of bank contagion). Birchler (2007b) 
indicated that as a consequence of the SLT bankruptcy, 180 regional banks disappeared from 
                                                          
mortgage crisis is practically a given. However, a detailed analysis of the mortgage market, particularly of the 
securitisation of Swiss mortgage-related securities, is desirable. 
186 'Exposure describes the extent to which a position is exposed to a risk. In this context, exposure may be 
expressed as a nominal figure (e.g. credit risk) or mark-to-market exposure (fair value) after taking into account 
current market fluctuations (market prices)’ (FINMA 2009: 59). 
187 The following question remains unanswered: when does the SNB decide to adhere to a restrictive monetary 
policy that will have an impact on the real estate market? 
188 In 2005, the liquidation process had been completed (see SFBC 2008a). 
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the Swiss banking sector. To overcome liquidity problems and restore confidence in regional 
banks, a special committee of the SNB and the major domestic banks was established by the 
Swiss Federal Banking Commission (SFBC, the forerunner of the FINMA). The special 
committee proposed various solutions to end the real estate crisis (for example, the SNB should 
act as the LOLR and provide ELA to all solvent banks that fulfil the capital requirement of 
Basel I). Although the SNB could have acted as the LOLR, the liquidity problem had been 
managed by the Swiss banking sector (through collective action) without any form of 
government or central bank intervention.  
Nevertheless, the real estate crisis opened up a discussion about the role of the SNB 
during the crisis and the ways in which the solution was organised. In the aftermath of the real 
estate crisis, the vice president of the SNB’s board of directors, Markus Lusser, proposed an 
explicit commitment. The SNB would act as the LOLR and provide ELA under the following 
three conditions: (1) against good eligible collateral, (2) to solvent but illiquid banks and (3) on 
a discretionary basis (see Lusser 1993). Because of the real estate crisis in 1990, the SNB 
concluded that the NBA and the constructive ambivalent strategy of the LOLR was not up to 
date (see BR 2002), the collective crisis management of the Swiss banking sector was unreliable 
(see BR 2002), and the NBA of 1953 limited the role of the SNB as the LOLR in terms of the 
narrow range of collateral and would thus be inflexible in any forthcoming periods of financial 
distress (see Birchler 2007a). In other words, Art. 14 para. 4 of the NBA (2000 [1953]) limited 
the provision of ELA as follows: 
 
Art. 14  Scope of Business of the National Bank 
 
4. The granting of the interest-bearing loans on a current account basis with a maximum of ten days' period of 
notice to pledging bonds in Switzerland, Swiss debt-register claim, discounted drafts and gold. Shares and 
cooperative shares are excluded. 
 
When providing ELA to a solvent bank, the SNB required a legal basis for doing so, namely, 
an emergency ordinance of the Federal Council (see Heller and Kuhn 2007, Kuhn 2007). In a 
period of financial distress, distinguishing between insolvent and illiquid banks is difficult.  The 
SNB had to strike the proper balance between moral hazard and the execution of the Swiss 
LOLR. In this context, the SNB concluded that the moral hazard problem was relatively 
negligible under a constructive clarity strategy because the constructive ambiguity policy did 
not prevent the build-up of excessive maturity and currency mismatches (see also Domanski et 
al. 2014). Moreover, the SNB had to weigh the benefits of ELA (such as the safety and 
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soundness of the banking system) with the cost of a bank failure and the associated costs for 
the banking system (for example, capital losses and credit-default losses). If the costs exceeded 
the benefits, the ambiguous view would not always be constructive. Therefore, the SNB 
assumed that in the case of temporary liquidity problems, banks would obtain inside liquidity. 
In other words, banks would have access to the liquidity of the SNB as long as they were 
solvent. However, as we noted in section 4.2, they also considered the presence of aggregate 
uncertainty and concluded that with a ‘constructive clarity strategy’ as a transparency measure, 
the liquidity problem could be better mitigated. Therefore, compared with other central banks 
(for example, the BoE and the ECB),189 the SNB was a pioneer and re-learned one of Bagehot’s 
lessons – that clarity is more constructive in central banking. The revision of the NBA in 2004 
gave the SNB a statutory objective to maintain financial stability and to change the Swiss LOLR 
strategy to a ‘constructive clarity strategy’. In this sense, the Swiss LOLR is broadly derived 
from Art. 5 para. 2(a) and 2(3) and Art. 9 para. 1 (e) of the NBA 2016 [2003].  
 
Art. 5   Tasks 
 
a. It shall provide the Swiss franc money market with liquidity 
e. It shall contribute to the stability of the financial system 
 
In accordance with Art. 5 para. 2(e) of the NBA, the SNB is tasked with contributing to 
the stability of the financial system, that is, to ‘financial stability’.190 For the SNB, financial 
stability, particularly in the banking system, is assumed to be a prerequisite for an effective 
monetary policy (see BIS 2011, Hellwig 2015b).191 Given the importance of the banking sector 
in Switzerland and the interconnectedness of Swiss SIBs with other countries (such as the 
United States and the EU) (see SNB 2007b, 2009), a potential problem such as the US subprime 
mortgage crisis can affect the Swiss banking sector, harming the safety and soundness of the 
banking system and the financial and economic stability of Switzerland. Therefore, if Swiss 
banks are no longer able to fund their operations on the market (inside liquidity), the SNB must 
act as the LOLR. Consequently, the Swiss LOLR appears with market failures, namely, if a 
                                                          
189 After the financial crisis of 2007–2009, the BoE and other central banks decided to change their strategy from 
ambivalence to clarity. 
190 As we noted in section 2.2.3, financial stability is understood to mean the smooth functioning of a robust 
financial system in times of financial distress due to systemic risk. 
191 In this context, Hellwig (2014b: 19) indicated that ‘financial stability under this mandate [price stability] is 
problematic because in some situations [for example, in times of financial distress] the two mandates can be in 
conflict’. Therefore, the SNB should discuss price stability and financial stability together, and ‘it is desirable to 
bring the conflict open’ (see Hellwig 2014b: 19, see also BIS 2011). 
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bank is unable to find inside liquidity. According to our conceptual distinction between micro-
based and macro-based approaches from section 3.1, the Swiss LOLR primarily has a macro-
based function because it focuses on limiting the risk of episodes of system-wide distress 
(namely, systemic risk), which may have significant costs for the economy as a whole, rather 
than on the safety and soundness of individual banks. In addition, the Swiss LOLR has a public 
responsibility to the entire Swiss economy to enhance financial stability. However, the Swiss 
LOLR also has a micro-based objective, namely, the safety and soundness of banks through its 
direct loans to SIBs. Although the Swiss LOLR has a macro- and micro-based objective, the 
main goal is the macro-based objective of financial stability, particularly the safety and 
soundness of the banking system. According to these considerations, our finding corresponds 
with the different LOLR schools of thought in the literature (see Thornton 1965 [1939], Bagehot 
2005 [1920]). These considerations can be used to formulate the fifth principle as follows: 
 
Principle 5: The Swiss LOLR’s main objective is to ensure financial stability. 
 
However, the Swiss LOLR objective overlaps with the objective of the FINMA, namely, 
financial stability. In other words, a boundary problem exists between the SNB and the FINMA, 
which can reduce the effectiveness and efficiency of the Swiss LOLR and result in biases 
towards their policy instruments. Therefore, before the collapse of Lehman Brothers on 23 May 
2007, the SNB and the FINMA had signed a memorandum of understanding (MoU) regarding 
financial stability to mitigate the boundary problem and to facilitate their interaction with one 
another.192 However, even the MoU presents several problems: (1) The MoU’s main function 
is to encourage the SNB and the FINMA to discuss the topic of financial stability, but in 
practice, no operational functions have been defined, particularly in times of financial distress. 
Therefore, the MoU’s effectiveness is questionable in light of the financial crisis of 2007–2009. 
                                                          
192 The MoU provides ‘(1) a clear division between the individual tasks, (2) their common areas of interest and (3) 
governs their collaboration in the area of financial stability’ (MoU 2010: 1). According to the first point, the SNB 
monitors the banking industry from a macro-based perspective, whereas the FINMA is responsible for banking 
supervision and enforcing bank regulation from a micro-based perspective. Moreover, the SNB acts as the LOLR 
in the event of a crisis according to the criteria of systemic importance, solvency and sufficient collateral (see 
section 7.2). Consequently, the MoU indirectly justified our fifth principle that the objective of the Swiss LOLR 
is the safety and soundness of the banking system. In relation to the second point, both institutions have a common 
interest in the following areas: (1) the assessment of the soundness of SIBs and/or the banking system; (2) bank 
regulation with a focus on the safety and soundness of banks and the banking system (for example, capital 
adequacy requirements, liquidity requirements and so forth); and (3) resolution and crisis management. In these 
three areas, the SNB and FINMA work closely to coordinate their activities, exchange information (for example, 
about the solvency of SIBs, the state of SIBs and the interconnections between banks, markets and the system (see 
also BIS 2011)) and share their opinions about the banking sector. According to the third point, ‘where there are 
common areas of interest, collaboration is managed at the strategic level in the Steering Committee and at the 
operational level in the Standing Committee for Financial Stability’ (MoU 2010: 3). 
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(2) An SIB (for instance, UBS or Credit Suisse) that provides bank services on national and 
international levels requires multiple central banks and supervisory authorities to mitigate 
potential systemic risk (see Hellwig 2007). (3) The ‘manifold linkages of financial institutions 
in Switzerland with financial markets and financial institutions in other countries imply that 
any crisis of systemic dimensions in another country can have systemic repercussions for 
Switzerland’ (for example, the collapse of Lehman Brothers) (Hellwig 2007: 777). Thus, 
intensive coordination and collaboration between the different central banks, supervisory 
authorities, and governments is necessary. Although cooperation and coordination have been 
enhanced since the financial crisis of 2007–2009, we can elaborate the sixth principle as 
follows: 
 
Principle 6: The Swiss LOLR requires a clear MoU with respect to its operational functions, 
especially in times of financial distress that involve different central banks and regulatory 
authorities. 
 
Nonetheless, in accordance with Art. 9 para. 1 (e) of the NBA (2016 [2003]), the LOLR can 
enter into a transaction if the participants hold sufficient collateral for a loan. 
 
Art. 9   Transactions with financial market participants 
 
1. In performing its monetary tasks pursuant to Article 5 paragraphs 1 and 2, the National Bank may: 
e. Enter into credit transactions with banks and other financial market participants on condition that 
sufficient collateral is provided for the loans. 
 
Thus, if a domestic bank is no longer able to re-fund its operations via inside liquidity, then the 
SNB can act as the LOLR against sufficient collateral for solvent SIBs. Consequently, we can 
answer the initial question: the SNB acts as the LOLR if the following three conditions are 
fulfilled (see cif. 6 SNB 2015c): 
 
(1) ‘The bank or group of banks seeking credit must be of importance for the stability of the financial system. 
(2) The bank seeking credit must be solvent. 
(3) The liquidity assistance must be fully covered by sufficient collateral at all times. The SNB determines what 
collateral is sufficient. 
To assess the solvency of a bank or group of banks, the SNB obtains an opinion from FINMA’. 
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These guidelines are not binding. However, the SNB binds itself to a certain degree because of 
its statutory tasks (see SNB 2008a). In relation to the first condition, the SNB binds itself with 
respect to the type of borrower, namely, SIBs. Thus, this is a double restriction because the type 
of borrower must be a systemically important institution and a bank or a group of banks. With 
regard to the second condition, the bank must be solvent, and solvency is often difficult for 
regulatory authorities or the central bank to evaluate in times of financial distress. According 
to the third condition, the SNB accepts a wide range of collateral, thereby enhancing its 
flexibility. 
 
6.4. Summary 
 
Next, we review the history of the Swiss LOLR and answer the two questions initially raised: 
(1) Why does the LOLR exist in Switzerland? (2) What conditions apply to the LOLR in 
Switzerland? With regard to the first question, the role of the Swiss LOLR is closely linked to 
the foundation of the SNB. Furthermore, the SNB is closely related to the political evolution of 
Switzerland. Therefore, the Swiss LOLR is closely linked to the political evolution of 
Switzerland and the foundation of the SNB. In this regard, the Swiss LOLR can be divided into 
two broad periods and three narrow time periods. In a broad sense, we distinguish between the 
LOLR before the foundation of the SNB and the LOLR after the foundation of the SNB. In a 
narrower view, the period before the SNB can be divided into two time periods, the free banking 
period from 1826 to 1881 and the transition period from 1881 to 1907. After the foundation of 
the SNB, the third time dimension stretches from 1907 until today. Although the SNB was 
founded in 1907, the SNB had no clear commitment to act as the LOLR from 1907–2004, but 
it was called to act as the LOLR in the public interest if the Swiss banking system was in 
jeopardy. Thereby, the SNB could permit a distressed bank to receive ELA or allow it to fail. 
This discretionary approach is called a ‘constructive ambivalence strategy’. A series of banking 
crises in 1906, 1914, 1916, the 1930s, and the 1990s occurred before the SNB decided to change 
its strategy. In this regard, the real estate crisis of 1990 played an important role in rethinking 
the role of the LOLR because the Swiss LOLR concept presented various difficulties (such as 
the old NBA 2000 [1953]) and limited the role of the SNB in a distress situation. Therefore, the 
SNB decided to change the LOLR strategy from a ‘constructive ambivalence strategy’ to a 
‘constrictive clarity strategy’ to enhance the effectiveness of the modern SNB if the following 
three conditions were fulfilled: (1) the bank must be of systemic importance in the Swiss 
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banking sector; (2) the bank must be solvent but illiquid; and (3) the bank must have sufficient 
eligible collateral, as shown in Figure 6.2.  
 
Figure 6.2 The current view of the Swiss LOLR 
 
Source: Authors’ own elaboration. 
 
Moreover, the Swiss LOLR has the macro-based objective to ensure financial stability. 
Furthermore, in light of the Goodhart view, the SNB has limited capital, cannot create foreign 
currency, such as USD, and provides credit to distressed individual banks rather than through 
the market. The former limitation will be discussed again in the next chapter. With the current 
Swiss LOLR in mind, another question arises: are these considerations still valid in the twenty-
first century, or should they be redesigned? The recent financial crisis has raised fundamental 
questions about the design of the Swiss LOLR in the twenty-first century. To answer these 
questions, the next chapter will analyse the role of the SNB during the UBS crisis of 2007–
2009. 
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7. The Swiss LOLR in the UBS crisis of 2007–2009 
 
To understand the design of the Swiss LOLR in the twenty-first century, we will analyse the 
role of the Swiss LOLR in the UBS crisis of 2007–2009. At the time of ELA, did UBS fulfil 
the conditions of the Swiss LOLR? To answer this question, understanding the UBS crisis is 
vital. Although the recent literature has generated several useful insights into the UBS crisis, 
no systematic analysis has been conducted regarding the UBS case that includes all parties 
involved (UBS, the SFBC/FINMA, the SNB and the Swiss Confederation). Therefore, to fill 
the gap in the literature, we describe the UBS crisis of 2007–2009 by drawing upon the different 
perspectives of UBS, the SFBC/FINMA, the SNB and the Swiss Confederation.  
 
7.1. The UBS crisis of 2007–2009 
 
When conducting a systematic analysis of the UBS crisis and the Swiss LOLR between 2007 
and 2009, it is important to provide a chronological overview of key dates. The scope of our 
dissertation covers the first quarter of 2007, when the prices of sub-prime MBS began to fall, 
to the second quarter of 2009, when the transfer of assets to the StabFund193 was completed. 
For this period, we compare and combine the perspectives of the main parties involved, namely, 
UBS, the SNB, the SFBC/FINMA and the Swiss Confederation, whereas the later draws upon 
the Control Committees of the Federal Assembly (CCFA) Report entitled ‘The Swiss 
authorities under the pressure of the financial crisis and the disclosure of UBS customer data 
to the USA’. For our analysis, we use several sources that provide us with the key events of the 
UBS case, including (1) all UBS quarterly reports and annual reports between 2007 and 2009; 
(2) shareholder reports on the write-downs of UBS; (3) the SFBC investigation of the sub-prime 
crisis regarding the causes of the write-downs of UBS; (4) the FINMA report regarding the 
financial market crisis and financial market supervision; (5) the above-mentioned report of the 
CCFA; and (6) the SNB’s Financial Stability Report of 2009 and Annual Report 2007/2008. 
The key dates are summarised in Table 7.1, which shows the chronology of the UBS crisis from 
the first quarter of 2007 to the second quarter of 2009 (when the SNB finalised the UBS asset 
transfer). The major three events are marked in light blue in Table 7.1.  
                                                          
193 The StabFund will be analysed in section 7.2. 
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The main events in the chronology of the UBS financial crisis are as follows: 
 
• In February 2007, the prices of high-risk mortgages in the United States, or ‘sub-prime’ 
mortgages, began to fall194 in the markets (the initial MBS shock),195 and financial 
institutions (UBS, Bear Stearns, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, and American International 
Group (AIG)) around the world had to write down196 losses of several billion dollars (in 
euros or Swiss francs) in their trading positions in relation to the structuring, trading and 
investment activities surrounding mortgage- and asset-backed securities (see UBS 2008b, 
Brunnermeier 2009b, Hellwig 2009).197 In Switzerland, UBS was the bank with the largest 
exposure to sub-prime markets. Although the Swiss Financial Banking Commission first 
broached the sub-prime topic at a meeting in March 2005 and again at a meeting in 
September 2005, ‘UBS made no mention of any market risk from this area’, even though 
the bank was extensively involved in the sub-prime market (FINMA 2009: 21). In February 
2007, the prices of sub-prime mortgages started to fall, and the Swiss Financial Banking 
Commission raised the topic again in March 2007 at a meeting with the UBS investment 
bank department in London (see FINMA 2009). At this meeting, the chief risk officer of 
the department explained that UBS was aware of the risk exposure in the US mortgage 
market, that the bank held a short position on sub-prime related mortgages and that it hoped 
to benefit from the collapse of the sub-prime market (see FINMA 2009, CCFA 2010). 
Although UBS sought to profit from the collapse, the figures from the investment bank 
department did not reveal the actual sub-prime-related exposure of UBS because the bank 
                                                          
194 In the literature, the causes of the financial crisis of 2007–2009 have been analysed by numerous economists, 
including Gorton (2008), Brunnermeier (2009b), and Hellwig (2009). According to these authors, the main causes 
included (1) a mismatch of maturity transformation through a lack of transparency from an SPV, (2) mortgage 
securitisation, (3) a malfunctioning of fair-value accounting that led to systemic risk, and (4) the low 
creditworthiness of householders. In combination with falling prices, these causes triggered the financial crisis of 
2007–2009. 
195 We can use our risk-feedback loop from section 2.2.3 to explain the recent financial crisis. In this sense, an 
MBS shock (phase 1) sparked the crisis. 
196 In Switzerland, the SFBC prepared a report on the causes of the write-downs of UBS AG in September 2008. 
In the ‘Shareholder Report on UBS’s Write-Downs’, the SFBC indicated several failures with respect to the 
assessment of risks, risk control systems, overly optimistic stress scenarios, unlimited trading book capacities, and 
insufficient monitoring, among others (see SFBC 2008b, UBS 2008a). 
197 For instance, ABS, MBS, and even more complex products, namely, CDOs. ABS are used by companies to 
generate liquidity, and they are created by selling a loan asset to an SPV, which in turn generates funds by issuing 
securities backed by these loans (securitisation) on the capital market (FINMA 2009: 56). To mitigate funding 
costs, ABS are divided into tranches with various risk profiles. Similarly, as with ABS, MBS are securities 
guaranteed by mortgage loans that create funding by issuing securities backed by mortgage loans on the capital 
market. Similar to ABS and MBS, CDOs are created by securitising debts and issuing debt-backed securities 
through an SPV (see FINMA 2009). 
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did not take into account the risk exposure of Dillon Read Capital Management (DRCM).198 
DRCM, an OBSE, was an SPV (an alternative investment management fund) that was 
established for high-risk, high-net worth individuals; it primarily sought to diversify capital 
and risk and to accommodate the demand of high net worth individuals. DRCM used a 
number of trading strategies with respect to high-risk, sub-prime-related securities (see UBS 
2008b, SFBC 2008b).199 Moreover, for UBS, DRCM had the advantages of transferring risk 
from UBS’s balance sheet and allowing exposure to remain primarily undisclosed to 
regulators and investors; improving the liquidity of loans through securitisation; generating 
fee income; and achieving relief from regulatory capital requirements (see IMF 2008). The 
result of the meeting was that the SFBC had no reason to doubt UBS’s risk exposure in the 
sub-prime market because the bank took into account the scenario of a collapse in the sub-
prime market. 
 
• In March 2007, prices in the high-risk mortgage market in the United States continued to 
fall. DRCM also announced a loss of approximately USD 150 million, and several of the 
positive features of DRCM became less attractive to UBS as uncertainties about asset 
valuation increased and caused systemic disruptions in money markets (see IMF 2008). 
 
• Consequently, on 3 May 2007, UBS announced the integration of DRCM (with all risk-
related securities in the mortgage market in the United States) because of their losses and 
internal difficulties (for example, operational complexity and client expectations) (see UBS 
2007a, UBS 2008b). Although UBS integrated DRCM, in the first quarter of 2007, the bank 
realised a net profit of CHF 4,385 million that was primarily driven by the investment 
banking department, which had a net trading income gain of CHF 4,535 million. Figure 7.1 
provides a clearer overview, showing UBS’s consolidated net profit/loss (pre-tax)200 and 
net trading gain/loss during the financial crisis of 2007–2009; notably, ‘[w]ritedowns and 
credit valuation adjustments are reported in the net trading income, along with realized 
losses from the sale of assets and gains on hedges’ (UBS 2008a: 18). According to Figure 
7.1, between the third quarter of 2007 and the third quarter of 2009, UBS had write-downs 
and credit valuation adjustments of approximately CHF 43 billion.  
                                                          
198 ‘This is explained by the fact that the risk management system run by UBS did not include the exposures that 
turned out to be the most problematical because of the a priori good Triple A rating they had been awarded by the 
international agencies (CCFA 2010: 3). 
199 For further details, see the ‘Shareholder Report on UBS’s Write-Downs’, dated 18 April 2008. 
200 We use pre-tax incomes to remove potential tax benefits during the financial crisis of 2007–2009 that distort 
our analysis. 
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Figure 7.1  UBS consolidated net profit and trading performance during the financial 
crisis of 2007–2009 
 
Source: Authors’ own calculations based on (unaudited) quarterly income statements of UBS between 2007 
and 2009.  
 
In the first quarter of 2007, the Tier 1 core capital ratio was 11.7 per cent. Figure 7.2 
provides an overview of the core Tier 1 capital ratio during the financial crisis of 2007–
2009. The blue-framed ring shows the Tier 1 capital ratio at the time that ELA was provided 
by the SNB and the Swiss Confederation.201 
 
Figure 7.2 UBS Tier 1 capital development during the financial crisis of 2007–2009 
 
Source: Authors’ own elaboration based on (unaudited) UBS quarterly report between 2007 and 2009. 
                                                          
201 Furthermore, opponents would argue that the calculation of the leverage ratio, which would be required for a 
better analysis, is missing. The ratio of a bank’s non-risk-weighted assets to its capital is missing because the Basel 
III leverage ratio is a relative new framework (since 2013) and because certain data (particularly exposure 
measures such as derivative exposures) were unavailable or even incomplete at the time of ELA. Therefore, we 
exclude the leverage ratio from our analysis.   
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Nevertheless, in May 2007,202 the SFBC and the SNB held a meeting with representatives 
of UBS and Credit Suisse regarding ‘market risks and stress testing’. In the context, a stress 
test was conducted for both banks. The stress test calculated a net loss between CHF 2 
billion and 3 billion. In the fourth quarter of 2007 alone, the net loss (pre-tax) was 
approximately CHF 14 billion. According to the results of the stress test, the SNB prepared 
the Financial Stability Report for 2007 and published it in June of the same year.203 The 
overall results of the report estimated a positive outlook. In this context, the SNB (2007b: 
5) argued as follows: 
 
‘Our expectations regarding the stability of the Swiss banking sector are essentially positive. Despite the fact 
that economic growth is expected to remain strong, there are, however, initial signs that the extremely 
favourable overall situation may normalise. In 2006, for example, Moody’s downgraded the ratings of more 
European companies than it upgraded. Furthermore, household insolvencies have risen in Switzerland as well 
as in Germany, the UK and the US. Such a normalisation, should it occur, would have only a moderate impact 
on banks' earnings and the level of stress for the Swiss banking sector is likely to remain below average in 
medium term’.  
 
Given this statement, observers might question the usefulness of financial stability reports. 
For example, Geiger (2010) criticised the SNB with respect to assessing an accurate 
outlook in Switzerland. However, opponents might argue that the SNB also noted 
deteriorations in the sub-prime mortgage market in its Financial Stability Report for 2007; 
that is, ‘the events in the US sub-prime mortgage markets could turn out to be early warning 
signs of a larger crisis to come in the US property market’ (SNB 2007b: 5). In this sense, 
why did the SNB estimate an overall positive outlook? One possible answer could be based 
on the stress test, but the question of the effectiveness of the stress test in the banking 
industry then arises. In this regard, further academic research is desirable. 
 
• On 9 August 2007, as several financial institutions were forced to make write-downs, 
market participants questioned these institutions’ stability. In other words, asymmetric 
information created aggregate uncertainty and converted a stable interbank market into an 
unstable market, which dried up market liquidity and spread to the real economy in the form 
of a credit freeze. Thus, another major cause of the most recent financial crisis was 
                                                          
202 In addition, on 23 May 2007, the SFBC and the SNB signed a MoU providing a clear division of the tasks, 
common interest areas, and collaborations in the area of financial stability (see MoU 2010). 
203 In June 2007, Moody’s downgraded the sub-prime MBS, and the SNB raised the target range for the three-
month Libor rate (see SNB 2009). 
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asymmetric information. However, the lack of market liquidity caused 9 August 2007 to be 
commonly viewed as the first day of the financial crisis of 2007–2009. Thus, how was the 
recent dry-up in market liquidity brought to an end?  
 
• On 9 and 10 August 2007, the SNB and other central banks acted as MMLRs and began to 
provide extraordinary temporary liquidity to all markets via OMOs to ensure that the 
interbank markets would continue to function (see SNB 2009). Thus, the lack of liquidity 
was halted because the central banks acted as MMLRs; however, these interventions did 
not end the crisis. Furthermore, the SNB simultaneously increased its monitoring activities 
in the sub-prime market, particularly with regard to MBS. In addition, based on the MoU, 
the SFBC, in cooperation with the SNB, increased its supervision of the two largest banks 
in Switzerland (UBS and Credit Suisse). Moreover, the SFBC ‘revised its working methods 
and reorganised its Major Banks Department’ (see CFFA 2010: 4). 
 
• On 14 August 2007, UBS published the second-quarter report of 2007, showing a net profit 
of CHF 6,236 million, a net trading income gain of CHF 4,121 million, and a Tier 1 capital 
ratio of 12.3 per cent. According to the market liquidity dry-up in the interbank market and 
the problems on the sub-prime mortgage market, UBS issued a profit warning and ‘reported 
that if the current turbulent conditions prevail throughout the quarter, UBS will probably 
see a very weak trading result in the Investment Bank, and this makes it likely that profits 
in the second half of 2007 will be lower than in the second half of [2006]’ (UBS 2008b: 6).  
 
• On 24 August 2007, based on a request by the SFBC, UBS provided an internal report that 
revealed a net exposure of USD 53 billion in the sub-prime market, marking the first time 
that the SFBC had a clear overview of UBS’s exposure in the sub-prime market. As a result 
of the internal report, the SFBC provisionally decided to increase the capital requirements 
for the two largest banks. Therefore, UBS and Credit Suisse were required to hold a capital 
buffer between 20 and 30 per cent (see FINMA 2009, CCFA 2010).204 
 
• In September 2007, the SNB made the first cut in the three-month Libor rate (see SNB 
2007a). Furthermore, the SNB provided additional extraordinary temporary liquidity 
assistance to the market.  
                                                          
204 The SFBC was the only regulatory authority worldwide to take this type of corrective action. 
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• On 1 October 2007, UBS announced further write-downs in foreign currency (USD) of 
between CHF 600 million and CHF 800 million. The announcement of further write-downs 
was realised on 30 October 2007 as UBS published the third-quarter report of 2007. UBS 
announced a loss (pre-tax) of CHF 815 million, a net trading loss of CHF 3,546 million 
through write-downs, and credit valuation adjustments in MBS and ABS that were ‘driven 
by markdowns in the CDO portfolio and mortgage trade business’ (UBS 2007c: 13). 
Therefore, as a result of the risk-feedback loop from part I, the banks’ Tier 1 capital ratio 
decreased from 12.3 per cent to 10.6 per cent. As a consequence of the write-downs, the 
bank had to take corrective actions to equalise its losses and to continue deleveraging on 
the liability side (see phase 2 of the risk-feedback loop (section 2.2.3)). 
 
• By 10 December 2007, UBS had made additional write-downs of approximately USD 10 
billion (see UBS 2008b).205 Therefore, Moody’s, Standard and Poor’s, and Fitch206 
downgraded UBS. Nevertheless, in the fourth-quarter report of 2007, UBS presented an 
optimistic outlook with respect to its capital positions (UBS 2008a: 2-3): 
 
‘In addition, during fourth quarter 2007, we reduced the Investment Bank's balance sheet in trading assets, 
collateral trading and the loan book. This resulted in a lower level of risk-weighted assets in the Investment 
Bank and for UBS as a whole. Together with the rededication of treasury shares for disposal and the effect 
of replacing the cash dividend with the proposed stock dividend, this allowed us to end the year in a strong 
capital position’. 
 
Although UBS suggested a positive outlook, its funding liquidity and capital position 
worsened as a result of further write-downs and aggregate uncertainty in the interbank 
market. Therefore, the SNB renewed its temporary USD liquidity assistance to UBS; 
however, this assistance was insufficient, and the bank struggled to obtain inside liquidity. 
In other words, at the beginning of December 2007, UBS had a liquidity problem. 
Therefore, the following question arises: what were the main corrective actions that UBS 
took to create new funding liquidity? To depict the various strategies, we apply the recover 
and resolve concept from section 3.3.2 to the UBS crisis. Figure 7.3 illustrates the recovery 
phase. The main differences between Figure 7.3 and Figure 3.7 from section 3.3.2 are that 
                                                          
205 A detailed analysis with respect to the balance sheet from the third quarter to the fourth quarter is not provided 
here because the fourth-quarter balance sheet is missing in the quarterly report. Therefore, we focus on the income 
statement. 
206 Moody’s, Standard and Poor’s, and Fitch are rating agencies. 
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the former figure lacks the resolution and liquidation phase and the recovery plans and 
CoCos in the recovery phase. Although the SNB and the SFBC had elaborate resolution 
plans for the UBS crisis, even recovery plans and CoCos were clearly insufficient in 
mitigating the UBS failure of 2007–2009, given the balance sheet of approximately two 
trillion Swiss francs. 
 
Figure 7.3 Recovery phase of the UBS crisis 
 
Source: Authors’ own elaboration. 
 
According to Figure 7.3, UBS took advantage of several recovery options and participated 
in overnight liquidity facilities with the SNB to obtain funding liquidity (see SNB 2009). 
Moreover, in December, UBS initiated its first successful recapitalisation of CHF 13 billion 
by placing mandatory convertible notes (MCNs) in a Singapore sovereign wealth fund and 
among various Middle Eastern investors to increase its capital base (see UBS 2008b, 
FINMA 2009). These recovery strategies will be discussed later in this section (for 
example, a second recapitalisation). 
 
• On 19 December 2007, UBS provided a report requested by the SFBC about the causes of 
and persons responsible for UBS’s write-downs. Furthermore, in December 2007, the major 
central banks (the Fed, BoE, ECB, BoJ and SNB) again announced that they were 
coordinating their liquidity provisions to the market as a whole. Hence, the SNB began to 
provide temporary USD liquidity to repo counterparties.  
 
• On 30 January 2008, UBS pre-announced a loss of approximately CHF 4,400 million in the 
fourth quarter of 2007. The SNB also renewed its temporary USD liquidity provision. 
Moreover, the head of the Federal Department of Finance (FDF) was informed by the 
presidents of the SNB and the SFBC that UBS required the action of an LOLR because 
The Swiss LOLR in the UBS crisis of 2007–2009   197 
 
 
 
UBS was struggling to create liquidity within the banking sector. As such, in late January, 
a high-level crisis management organisation, with top officers from the SNB and the SFBC 
and the head of the FDF, was activated to prepare a possible resolution strategy (see section 
3.2.3). ‘At that stage, the Federal Council was not informed about the seriousness of the 
situation by the Head of the FDF’ (CCFA 2010: 4). 
 
• On 14 February 2008, UBS announced the largest loss in the bank’s history, namely, a net 
loss (pre-tax) of CHF 17,733 million and a net trading loss of CHF 11,643 million in the 
fourth quarter of 2007.207 According to the mechanism of the risk-feedback loop, these 
losses led to a decrease in the Tier 1 capital ratio from 10.6 per cent to 8.8 per cent and the 
practical equalisation of the first recapitalisation.208 To enhance the capital ratio, the SFBC 
renewed its efforts to tighten UBS’s requirements for an additional capital buffer; in 
addition, with respect to the funding liquidity problem, the SFBC proposed selling a certain 
amount of sub-prime MBS.209 
 
• In March 2008, drawing upon the UBS report regarding the causes of the write-downs, the 
SFBC proposed that Marcel Ospel step down as chairman of the UBS board of directors 
(see FINMA 2009, CCFA 2010). 
 
• In April 2008, UBS published the ‘Shareholder Report on UBS’s Write-Downs’ and 
fulfilled the first proposition of the SFBC. Based on this report, the SFBC investigated the 
causes of UBS’s significant write-downs in the sub-prime mortgage market in the United 
States. On 30 September 2008, the SFBC published the ‘UBS Sub-Prime Report’ (see SFBC 
2008b). As a result of the shareholder report and the ongoing financial distress experienced 
by UBS, Standard and Poor’s, Moody’s, and Fitch downgraded the bank. To address its 
ongoing funding liquidity and capital problems, UBS began a successful second 
recapitalisation and issued new shares worth CHF 16,000 million, which strengthened the 
bank’s capital base. In addition to strengthening the funding liquidity base, in May 2008,210 
                                                          
207 In 2007, the total net losses (pre-tax) amounted to CHF 8,805 million. 
208 However, at that time, the lower-core Tier 1 rate did not violate the Basel II requirements in Switzerland because 
banks that followed an internal ratings-based approach (such as UBS and Credit Suisse) had to fulfil the Basel II 
requirements in January 2008. 
209 In this context, did the SFBC or any other regulatory authority have the right to make proposals that could be 
misunderstood and exacerbate a bank’s financial situation in times of financial distress? This question arises 
because regulatory authorities have insufficient information about the banking business (asymmetric information), 
and even if they do have sufficient information, banks have incentives to hide information. 
210 In addition, in May 2007 the SNB increased the amount of USD repo auctions (see SNB 2009). 
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UBS sold USD 11 billion MBS to BlackRock, thus fulfilling the second proposition of the 
SFBC. At the end of May 2008, UBS announced a net loss (pre-tax) of CHF 11,799 million 
and a net trading income loss with respect to US sub-prime mortgages of CHF 11,643 
million for the first quarter of 2008. In addition, from the first quarter of 2007 to the third 
quarter of 2008, lenders withdrew CHF 80,111 million in deposits, revealing the crumbling 
confidence in UBS (see also SNB 2013). Figure 7.4 depicts the deposits due to customers 
between the first quarter of 2007 and the second quarter of 2009.211 
 
Figure 7.4  Deposits due to customers 
 
Source: Authors’ own elaboration based on (unaudited) UBS quarterly reports between 2007 and 2009. 
 
The light-blue bar shows the deposits due to customers at the time of ELA. Furthermore, 
UBS announced that Chairman Marcel Ospel would be replaced by Peter Kurrer; thus, the 
UBS fulfilled the third proposal of the SFBC (see UBS 2008c). In July 2008, Moody’s 
downgraded UBS. 
 
• On 12 August 2008, UBS announced a net loss (pre-tax) of CHF 4,090 million and a net 
trading income loss of CHF 3,543 million for the second quarter of 2008. In August 2008, 
the SFBC noted an enormous discrepancy (in billions) between the figures that had been 
presented in the meeting in March 2007 and the actual exposure to sub-prime mortgages 
(see CCFA 2010). Thus, the opacity of OBSEs (such as DRCM) was one main cause of the 
UBS crisis and the financial crisis of 2007–2009. Therefore, we propose to impose 
transparency principles for OBSEs (for example, rules for consolidating OBSEs (see also 
IMF 2008)) instead of the current regulatory measures that do not relate to the main causes 
of the recent financial crisis (see part I). 
                                                          
211 The balance sheet for the fourth quarter of 2007 is missing from the UBS quarterly report. 
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• In August 2008, a successful recapitalisation increased the core capital ratio from 6.9 per 
cent in the first quarter of 2008 to 11.6 per cent. In other words, the capital base of UBS had 
been stabilised with respect to the Basel II accord. The due-to-customer deposit amount 
decreased from CHF 567,023 million in the first quarter of 2008 to CHF 556,223 million in 
the second quarter of 2008 (∆ CHF 10,800 million). 
 
• On 15 September 2008, Lehman Brothers filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy,212 shocking the 
entire financial system and plunging the world economy into a financial crisis213 as market 
conditions deteriorated. Thus, the Lehman Brothers collapse aggravated the suspicious 
solvency state of various financial institutions and enhanced aggregate uncertainty. 
Aggregate uncertainty thereby had two main effects: (1) Solvent institutions struggled to 
find inside liquidity. Therefore, ‘institution[s] which significantly relied on short-term 
wholesale funding had to resort to state aid’ (Liikanen et al. 2012: 7). (2) As a consequence 
of suspicious solvency, depositors began to withdraw their money from their accounts (a 
fundamental bank run). For example, from the second quarter to the third quarter of 2008, 
UBS depositors withdrew CHF 36,192 million. 
 
• UBS also announced that it had direct counterparty exposure to Lehman Brothers, which 
restarted the risk feedback loop mechanism. As a consequence of the direct counterparty 
exposure to Lehman Brothers, UBS had to take large-scale write-downs in foreign currency 
according to fair-value accounting on illiquid sub-prime mortgages. To equalise the 
shrinking balance sheet, UBS began to deleverage on the liability side. Thus, the equity 
position in the balance sheet declined. To halt the decrease in equity, UBS announced a 
third recapitalisation. However, as the third recapitalisation failed, UBS was likely to be 
no longer viable, thus requiring ELA via the LOLR.  
 
• On 21 September 2008, the SNB, the SFBC, and the FDF were informed that UBS would 
require ELA. 
 
• As the UBS situation worsened, on 13 October 2008, the SNB instructed its internal legal 
department to provide a legal assessment of the legitimacy (from a central bank law 
                                                          
212 In other words, Lehman Brothers was filing for bankruptcy (insolvency). 
213 As a consequence, the major central banks increased USD liquidity in the money markets. Moreover, the SNB 
announced a new overnight USD repo auction for a maximum of USD 10 billion to devaluate the Swiss franc and 
stabilise the market (see SNB 2009). 
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perspective) of the SNB’s participation in a package of measures designed to strengthen 
the financial system (‘UBS transaction’) (see SNB 2008c). The SNB’s legal department 
concluded that (1) the transaction was in line with the SNB’s mandate; (2) the transaction 
fell within the scope of the SNB’s business, regardless of whether the transaction qualified 
as granting a loan or making an equity purchase; (3) the proposed acquisition of the SPV 
at a price of USD 1 was unobjectionable from the legal perspective of the SNB; and (4) the 
responsibility for decisions regarding the implementation of the transaction fell to the SNB 
board, which is subject to the accountability of Parliament (see SNB 2008a).  
 
• On 14 October 2008, UBS officially demanded ELA. In this context, the SFBC informed 
the SNB in writing that the stability of UBS would be threatened if no further steps were 
immediately undertaken. Moreover, the SFBC confirmed that UBS was solvent at that time, 
although no publicly available document clearly showed that UBS was absolutely solvent. 
Therefore, the next section analyses whether UBS was solvent at the time of ELA. 
 
• Nevertheless, due to the systemic importance of UBS and the assumption that its failure 
could lead to the collapse of the banking system, thereby harming the Swiss economy, 
employment and growth, the crisis committee214 decided (without any cost-benefit 
analysis) to strengthen UBS’s liquidity base by reducing its balance-sheet risks through the 
transfer of sub-prime assets with ELA and to strengthen its capital base by providing 
government support. The LOLR decision to provide ELA to UBS without any cost-benefit 
analysis implies a seventh principle for a Swiss LOLR in the twenty-first century:  
 
Principle 7: The Swiss LOLR should be based on a systemic cost-benefit analysis.  
 
Similarly, Kaufman (2007 [1991]) and Rochet (2008b: 51) indicate that ‘some form of 
cost-benefit analysis of LLR interventions would be useful in order to evaluate the exact 
costs of liquidity provision by the Central Bank, and the social cost of excessive liquidity’. 
However, opponents might argue the following: (1) Conducting a systemic analysis with 
respect to the LOLR concept would take too much time and would be impossible in practice 
because the central bank would be working against the clock. (2) In addition, with or 
without a cost-benefit analysis, the central banks would always provide ELA to distressed 
                                                          
214 The crisis committee provided different solutions to resolve UBS (a scenario analysis), though not a clear cost-
benefit analysis that drew upon the LOLR conditions of the SNB. 
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systemically important institutions; thus, ‘[w]e do not want to have another Lehman 
experience! This is the lesson learnt in 2008, and in many respects it is the right lesson’ 
(Hellwig 2014a: 21). Therefore, a cost-benefit analysis would be useless because every 
systemically important institution would obtain ELA to avoid a second Lehman 
experience. 
In relation to the first point, the crisis committee would be working against the 
clock. However, as we noted, based on the close cooperation between the SNB and the 
SFBC/FINMA through the MoU,215 the SNB as the LOLR had enough time to prepare a 
systematic analysis for ELA. For example, the SFBC was first clearly informed about 
UBS’s sub-prime exposure on 24 August 2007. If the SFBC had informed the SNB in a 
timely manner, both authorities would have had until 15 October 2008 – more than fourteen 
months’ time – to conduct a proper analysis. Consequently, this working-against-the-clock 
argument does not appear to hold water.  
In relation to the second point, of course we do not want to have another Lehman 
experience. However, ‘too big’ does not mean that the institutions in question are 
systemically important to an economy. In other words, relative to global SIBs (G-SIBs), 
SIBs should not be of systemic importance to an economy. For example, in the United 
States, Washington Mutual Bank was also ‘too big’, but the bank was not of systemic 
importance to the economy. Therefore, differentiating between SIBs and G-SIBs is helpful. 
In addition, the liquidity assistance provided to a fundamentally insolvent, systemically 
important institution can be dangerous for the institution that provides the assistance (the 
central bank and/or the government) (for example, the Reichsbank’s ELA to the insolvent, 
systemically important Danat Bank in 1931216 created higher costs than benefits; in 
addition, when the Greek government recapitalised the Greek banking sector in 2007 and 
2008, the government struggled with a temporary insolvency problem). On the one hand, 
recapitalisation would be dangerous for the government because the potential losses would 
have to be covered by higher taxation or public spending cuts. On the other hand, central 
banks cannot enter into bankruptcy; therefore, they can absorb losses with no limitations. 
However, this is not true in reality because central banks can suffer losses that affect 
taxpayers (see Hellwig 2014b, Tucker 2014).  
 
                                                          
215 If the cooperation between the SNB and the SFBC/FINMA in times of crisis is insufficient, then the MoU is a 
dubious instrument. 
216 Schnabel (2004) analyses the causal links between the banking and currency problems during the German crisis 
of 1931. 
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‘As central banks today are mainly owned by governments, this means that profit distributions from central 
banks go into the governments’ budgets. If the central bank makes losses on its assets and if, therefore, its 
profit distribution to the government is reduced, the government must either reduce some expenditures or 
raise taxes (or borrow more, which implies lower expenditures or higher taxes in the future)’ (Hellwig 2014b: 
11, see also Illing and König 2014).217 
 
Consequently, if central banks suffer losses, they transfer the cost to the government, which 
must cover the cost through higher taxation or public spending cuts. This transfer of fiscal 
cost is an implicit fiscal carve-out (FCO). Therefore, the LOLR regime requires a broad 
FCO condition. We thus follow Tucker (2014) and Hellwig’s (2014b) fiscal implications 
for central banking to formulate the eighth principle: 
 
Principle 8: The Swiss LOLR should be based on a broad, explicit, and transparent fiscal 
carve-out condition. 
 
• After the third recapitalisation failed, on 15 October 2008 the SNB and the Swiss 
Confederation acted as LOLRs, undertaking measures on the asset side and the liability 
side of UBS to strengthen its balance sheet via an SPV, the stabilisation fund ‘StabFund’218 
under the SNB. Moreover, in October 2008, the following events occurred: (1) The SNB 
and major central banks coordinated their market liquidity provisions and announced a 
joint reduction of their interest rates to very low levels. The low interest rates contributed 
to a contagion effect by reassessing the net present value of investment projects and 
counteracted the negative effects of the liquidity shortage on asset prices (see Maux and 
Scialom 2012). In addition, the rates reduced banks’ costs to obtain liquidity from the 
central banks, a potential source of bank failure (see Maux and Scialom 2012). (2) Fitch 
downgraded the United States. (3) The SNB introduced a new monetary policy instrument 
by issuing SNB bills (see FINMA 2009, SNB 2009). 
 
• On 4 November 2008, UBS announced a net loss (pre-tax) of CHF 3,655 million, a net 
trading income loss of CHF 1,509 million, an outflow of deposits due to customers of CHF 
36,192 million and a decreased Tier 1 rating of 10.8 per cent for the third quarter of 2008 
                                                          
217 In this context, Illing and König (2014: 18) noted that the ‘problem is particularly relevant when the resolution 
of a bank is associated with high fiscal costs which would put significant strain on the government’s budget’. 
218 The StabFund was the ‘bad bank’, and the remainder of UBS was the ‘good bank’ (see IMF 2009). 
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(see UBS 2008e). On 26 November 2008, the SNB established the SNB StabFund and 
made two cuts in the three-month Libor rate (see SNB 2009). 
 
• ‘On 16 December 2008, the SNB StabFund acquired a first tranche of 2,042 securities from 
UBS for USD 16,4 billion. […].The purchase price was USD 0,3 billion lower than the 
value UBS assigned to these securities on 30 September 2008’ (UBS 2009a: 6). On 19 
December 2008, UBS announced the first tranche of illiquid assets for approximately USD 
16,4 billion. On 30 December 2008, on the insistence of the SFBC, UBS sold its USD 3,4 
billion stake in Bank of China (see UBS 2008h).  
 
• By January 2009, the SFBC had been replaced by the FINMA, which began its operations 
(see FINMA 2009). 
 
• On 10 February 2009, UBS announced a net loss (pre-tax) of CHF 13,290 million, a net 
trading loss of CHF 8,779 million, a decrease of deposits due to customers of CHF 45,287 
million, and a Tier 1 capital ratio of 11.5 per cent for the fourth quarter of 2009 (see UBS 
2009a). Furthermore, according to all quarterly reports in 2009, UBS had an (unaudited) 
loss (pre-tax) of approximately CHF 32,834 million. In addition, in February 2009, the 
SNB announced the issuance of SNB bills in USD; a three-month Libor rate cut occurred 
in March. Moreover, the SNB announced that it was considering further unconventional 
measures (such as a minimum exchange rate for CHF and a negative interest rate policy) 
(see SNB 2009). 
 
• In April 2009, the SNB finalised the transfer of UBS assets for a total of USD 38,7 billion. 
Moreover, on 20 April 2009, UBS announced that it was selling its Brazilian financial 
service business for CHF 2,8 billion (UBS Pactual) (see also UBS 2009b). 
 
• On 5 May 2009, UBS announced a net loss (pre-tax) of CHF 1,558 million, a net trading 
loss of CHF 630 million, a relatively stable deposits-due-to-customers position, and a Tier 
1 ratio of 10.5 per cent for the first quarter of 2009 (see UBS 2009b). As a consequence of 
the low Tier 1 ratio, on 25 May 2009, UBS announced that it would increase the Tier 1 
ratio by at least 10 per cent, which led to a higher Tier 1 ratio, namely, approximately 13.2 
per cent, in the second quarter of 2009 (see UBS 2009b).  
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Considering the chronological overview, the following two questions arise: 
 
• How did the Swiss LOLR provide ELA to UBS in the most recent financial crisis? 
• Did UBS fulfil the Swiss LOLR’s conditions at the time of ELA? 
 
To answer these two questions, the next section briefly explains the Swiss LOLR mechanism 
and reveals whether UBS fulfilled the SNB’s LOLR conditions at the time of ELA. 
 
7.2. An evaluation of the Swiss LOLR policy during the crisis 
 
The Swiss LOLR mechanism was a combination of asset sales to an asset management fund 
(the bad bank, also known as the StabFund) and recapitalisation via MCNs to the Swiss 
Confederation that provided emergency capital assistance (ECA). This form of SPV had been 
chosen for following reasons: (1) a separation between the SNB account and the StabFund 
allowed for more transparency; (2) it provided positive incentives for management and better 
accountability in case of losses; and (3) it strengthened the capital base of UBS by issuing CHF 
6 billion of MCNs (see also UBS 2009d). Figure 7.5 shows emergency assistance via the 
StabFund; however, the SNB acted as the LOLR and provided indirect ELA, whereas the 
Confederation acted as a supportive LOLR and provided direct ECA.  
 
  Let us first observe the asset-side intervention. On the asset side, UBS’s balance sheet 
had been strengthened by long-term credit. In this context, UBS was allowed up to USD 60 
billion in illiquid assets to sell to the StabFund, whose assets totalled USD 1,875 billion (CHF 
1,980 billion) at an interest rate of one-month Libor plus 250 basis points (see entry 4) (see 
UBS 2008e).219 
 
                                                          
219 The term of the ELA loan was 8 years but could be extended to a maximum of 12 years to permit an orderly 
liquidation of assets (see SNB 2008a, 2008b). 
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Figure 7.5 Emergency assistance via StabFund 
 
Source: Adapted from SNB (2013).  
 
ELA from the SNB in the form of high-powered money in USD was provided indirectly to UBS 
via the StabFund due to its demand on funding liquidity in the form of foreign high-powered 
money. After the settlement of the ELA, the SNB was party to the profits and losses generated 
by the SPV, with USD 1 billion up front and with 50 per cent of the remaining equity value (see 
SNB 2008a, 2008b). However, instead of CHF 60 billion in illiquid assets, UBS sold USD 38,7 
billion in illiquid assets for USD 25,8 billion in ELA to the StabFund (see point 1). This transfer 
of assets occurred in the fourth quarter of 2008 and the first quarter of 2009; it was priced at 
fair value220 on 30 September 2008 and was verified by independent third parties (see UBS 
2008g). On the asset side, one interesting finding is that the SNB provided foreign high-
powered money, not though reserves on their own currency but through a dollar-Swiss franc 
swap line221 between the SNB and the Fed (see entry 5), thereby challenging Goodhart’s (2009 
                                                          
220 In this context, what is the correct fair value of the sub-prime MBS that are not sellable on the market at that 
time? An external observer would say that if the assets are not sellable on the market, the value of the assets is 
zero. However, this is only a half-truth because behind the illiquid sub-prime MBS, the real value of a house exists. 
Although the value of sub-prime MBS was difficult to assess based on the securitisation process and market 
uncertainty, the value of a sub-prime MBS was above zero; therefore, a price could be determined by the bank and 
verified by an independent third party. 
221 The swap line enables the SNB to provide Swiss banks with foreign currency (such as USD and EUR) (SNB 
2015a). According to the swap line, the SNB would first purchase dollars from the Fed with CHF at prevailing 
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[1999]) view of the limited creation of money (see section 5.4). The SNB justified its creation 
of money with a strategy regarding the depreciation of the Swiss franc, which had been 
criticised at the beginning of the financial crisis by several central banks; however, these central 
banks (such as the BoE) followed the SNB. Therefore, we conclude that the central banks are 
not limited in their provision of high-powered money. Opponents would suggest that the SNB 
is limited in its provision of foreign high-powered money because the volume of a dollar-Swiss 
franc exchange agreement is limited and depends on the counterparty’s consent. They are 
correct on this point; however, when systemic crises occur, central banks work together and 
coordinate their operations to restore financial stability. Therefore, central banks can create 
unlimited domestic and foreign high-powered money when a systemic crisis occurs, which 
leads us to the ninth principle: 
 
Principle 9: The SNB can create unlimited domestic and foreign high-powered money when a 
systemic crisis occurs. 
 
On the liability side, the Swiss Confederation acted as the LOLR and provided ECA in domestic 
currency against MCNs in the amount of CHF 6 billion222 at a coupon rate of 12.5 per cent 
payable annually (see entry 1) for an 8-year term. Furthermore, the payment period could be 
extended to a maximum of 12 years to permit the orderly liquidation of the assets (see SNB 
2008a, 2008b, UBS 2008g). Moreover, the new capital had been used to cover 10 per cent of 
USD 38,7 billion, that is, USD 3,9 billion, to the StabFund (see entry 3). The remaining amount 
in CHF was used to strengthen the capital position of UBS. In this context, why did the Swiss 
Confederation decide to obtain MCNs? The Confederation made this decision because (1) from 
its perspective, MCNs fulfilled the high transactional security that it desired; (2) it would not 
become a co-owner of the bank and was able to withdraw ECA during the term of the loan (30 
months);223 and (3) MCNs compensated for the ECA that it provided (coupons of 12.5 per cent) 
(see Federal Council 2008). In short, through the ECA injection, the capital base of UBS had 
been strengthened at a cost to the Swiss taxpayer. 
 
                                                          
market exchange rates; the dollars and CHF would then be swapped back at the same exchange rate at an agreed-
upon date in the future (see SNB 2015a). 
222 ‘The proceeds were intended to finance UBS’s equity injection in the StabFund, which was immediately valued 
at USD 1’ (IMF 2009: 30, see also UBS 2008g). 
223 Further details are provided in the summary term sheet of the mandatory convertible notes (UBS 2008g). 
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On the liability side, one interesting finding is that the Swiss Confederation’s provision of 
emergency assistance was offered at a very high interest rate. This consideration led us to 
conclude that lending at a very high interest rate would be a possible LOLR condition in the 
twenty-first century to mitigate the moral hazard problem. Moreover, lending at a risk premium 
could be very profitable, as noted in Switzerland. In the words of Hellwig (2015b: 5), 
 
‘acting as a lender of the last resort under Bagehot’s rule and lending to solvent banks at high rates, could be very 
profitable. Profitability would also benefit if the support given to the financial system actually managed to forestall 
a deeper crisis that might have compromised the central bank’s other assets’. 
 
However, we are sceptical about lending at a very high interest rate because such a rate could 
be self-defeating if ‘the cost of assistance would exceed the cost of liquidating illiquid assets’ 
(Guttentag and Herring 1987: 166-167). Commercial banks would then use their existing good 
collateral to borrow in the marketplace (Goodhart (2007 [1999]). Therefore, instead of lending 
at very high interest rate, we propose lending at a high interest rate, the so-called ‘risk-
premium’, based on the normal market rate (before the crisis) and a risk premium (for example, 
250 basis points). Thus, our tenth principle for the Swiss LOLR is in line with Guttentag and 
Herring (1987) and Tucker (2014): 
 
Principle 10: The Swiss LOLR should charge a risk premium. 
 
The risk-premium proposal can be criticised from different angles. For example, lending at a 
very high interest rate might reduce the effectiveness of ELA in the early phase of a crisis (see 
Domanski et al. 2014). However, as we noted, UBS was able and agreed to pay a very high 
coupon rate during the financial crisis. Thus, the effectiveness of ELA in the early phase was 
not undermined. Another criticism is that a very high interest rate might exacerbate a bank’s 
distress. In this context, Crockett (1997: 25) noted that when ELA institutions are in ‘a fragile 
condition, the risk is that penalty-rate financing will make their position even more untenable 
and will promote further withdrawals of funds’. UBS was in a fragile condition, and lending at 
12.5 per cent could have exacerbated the situation. Therefore, to avoid this problem, we propose 
a risk premium that falls below a very high interest rate. Further, ‘implying a higher cost to a 
bank in the case of the occurrence of a large liquidity withdrawal, should lead the bank to be 
more careful and increase its propensity to avoid the occurrence of such a state’ (Baltensperger 
1992: 446-447). Similarly, Freixas et al. (2007 [1999]: 40) noted that a high interest rate 
‘send[s] a signal to the market that precipitates an untimely run, unless it is provided covertly’. 
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In this sense, a run on UBS deposits did occur after ELA was initiated (for example, the deposits 
due to customers decreased from CHF 520,031 million in the third quarter of 2008 to CHF 
474,744 million in the fourth quarter of 2008). However, the idea of the interest rate signalling 
market participants is questionable. We are sceptical about the interest rate triggering the bank 
run and incentivising the bank to gamble on resurrection (see Freixas et al. 2007 [1999]). 
Although we agree with Freixas et al. (2007 [1999]) that gambling on resurrection is a risk with 
which the central bank struggled, all forms of insurance systems encounter these problems. 
Therefore, the main question is not how such gambling can be avoided but how it can be 
mitigated. Thus, to internalise the externality of gambling on resurrection, clear principles can 
mitigate the problem in times of financial distress. In a nutshell, although lending at a risk-
premium rate can be criticised from several angles, the majority of these arguments can be 
countered.  
 
With these factors in mind, we consider whether UBS fulfilled the Swiss LOLR conditions at 
the time of ELA. In the following section, we thus analyse whether UBS at the time of ELA (1) 
was of systemic importance, (2) was solvent and (3) had sufficient collateral, focusing primarily 
on the solvency question. 
 
7.2.1. Analysis of systemic importance 
 
In academia and in practice, the terms ‘too big to fail’, ‘too important to fail’ and ‘too 
interconnected to fail’ have been hotly debated, particularly in the aftermath of the financial 
crisis of 2007–2009. Based on the Global Financial Stability Report of the IMF (see IMF 2014), 
‘too big to fail’, ‘too important to fail’ and ‘too interconnected to fail’ banks are referred to as 
SIBs in this dissertation. Although the acronym ‘SIB’ was first elaborated in the aftermath of 
the financial crisis, namely, submitted to the G20 finance ministers and central bank governors 
by the IMF, the FSB and the BIS in 2009 (see IMF et al. 2009), the concept probably originated 
in the writings of Bagehot. Bagehot (2005 [1920]: 180-181) indicated that ‘the ruin of one of 
these great banks [SIBs in the City of London] would greatly impair the credit of all’; therefore, 
if ‘one of the greater London joint stock banks [an early form of SIBs] failed, there would be 
an instant suspicion of the whole system [(that is, aggregated uncertainty)]’. More than 130 
years passed and numerous financial crises occurred before the IMF, the FSB, the BIS and 
particularly the G20 finance ministers and central bank governors integrated the concept of the 
‘systemic importance of financial institutions’ into their political agendas. Although G20 
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members do not have a consistent formal definition of systemic importance, in practice, they 
broadly consider an institution to be ‘systemically important if its failure or malfunction causes 
widespread distress either as a direct impact or as a trigger for broader contagion’ (IMF et al. 
2009: 5). Similarly, the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (DFA) 
in the United States defines systemic importance as follows: 
 
SEC 803 (9) systemically important and systemic importance:  
 
The terms “systemically important” and “systemic importance” mean a situation where the failure of or a 
disruption to the functioning of a financial market utility or the conduct of a payment, clearing, or settlement 
activity could create, or increase, the risk of significant liquidity or credit problems spreading among financial 
institutions or markets and thereby threaten the stability of the financial system of the United States. 
 
In accordance with Art. 7 para. 1 of the BA (2015 [1934]; trans.), systemic importance is 
defined as follows: 
 
Art. 7   Definition and purpose 
 
Systemically important banks are banks, financial groups and bank-dominated financial conglomerates whose 
failure would do considerable harm to the Swiss economy and the Swiss financial system. 
 
The difference between these two definitions concerns the adverse effects of an SIB’s failure 
on the financial system and/or the real economy. For example, in the DFA, the term ‘systemic 
importance’ relates to the effects of an institution’s failure on the financial system, whereas, in 
Switzerland, the term is linked to the effects of an institution’s failure on the entire Swiss 
economy and the Swiss financial system. In other words, the Swiss definition takes into account 
the banking sector, NBFIs (such as hedge funds, insurance companies, and pension funds) and 
NBNFIs (systemically important firms such as Novartis and Nestle).  
In the narrow sense, systemic importance is defined by assessment criteria, namely, size, 
lack of substitutability and interconnectedness. In this context, size, lack of substitutability and 
interconnectedness are defined as follows (IMF et al. 2009: 9): 
• ‘Size: The importance of a single component for the working of the financial system increases with the 
amount of financial services that the component provides. 
• Lack of substitutability: The systemic importance of a single component increases in cases where it is 
difficult for other components of the system to provide the same or similar services in the event of a 
failure. 
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• Interconnectedness: Systemic risk can arise through direct and indirect interlinkages between the 
components of the financial system so that individual failure or malfunction has repercussions around the 
financial system, leading to a reduction in the aggregate amount of services’. 
 
In other words, SIBs are ‘those institutions whose distress or disorderly failure would cause 
significant disruption to the wider financial system and economic activity, due to their size, 
complexity, systemic interconnectedness or lack of good substitutes that can readily take over 
their activities’ (Liikanen et al. 2012: 38). The IMF et al. (2009) developed various indicators 
to assess these criteria.   
Size can be determined using three indicators (see IMF et al. 2009, FSB 2009). (1) 
Clearing and settlements: In this context, the amount of financial services provided to the 
clearing and settlement system is an indicator of systemic importance. (2) Financial 
intermediation: An institution that (a) has a large market share in liabilities (such as short-term 
and long-term deposits) and claims, (b) boasts a high asset-to-GDP ratio (see FSB 2009), (c) is 
a market maker, and (d) has a significant market share in loans on the market is systemically 
important. (3) Risk control and management: Systemic importance is determined by the role of 
risk management and mitigation (for example, over-the-counter (OTC) derivatives activities).  
 Although the lack of substitutability is difficult to assess, one simple indicator is the 
Hirschman-Herfindahl Index. ‘[T]he Hirschman-Herfindahl Index is based on the distribution 
of market shares across all market participants/suppliers of a service’ (IMF et al. 2009: 16). 
 The IMF et al. (2009) noted that interconnectedness can be measured via exposure and 
cross-ownership/cross-institutional linkages. Indicators include the share of domestic and 
foreign subsidiaries’ assets to total assets, the amount of intra-group exposure, the consolidation 
of international claims, and the exposure to countries under stress tests. In light of these 
indicators, the SNB has the mandate to identify systemically important firms. For this purpose, 
the SNB uses four indicators224 (see Art. 8 para. 2 of the BA 2015 [1934]; trans.): 
                                                          
224 Although these indicators are useful when assessing systemic importance, we propose extending the criteria 
with an additional criterion, namely, ‘complexity’, because ‘[a financial institution] with greater complexity [is] 
likely to be more difficult to resolve and therefore cause[s] significantly greater disruption to the wider financial 
system and economic activity’ (BCBS 2011a: 4). According to the BCBS (2011a), indicators of complexity are 
based on business, structural and operational complexity. In this context, the following are indicators of 
complexity: (1) operations through numerous legal entities and jurisdictions; (2) the amount of OTC derivatives 
not cleared by a central counterparty (according to the BCBS (2011a: 9), ‘[t]he greater the number of non-centrally 
cleared OTC derivatives a bank enters into, the more complex a bank’s activities. This is especially so in the 
context of resolution as highlighted in the failure of Lehman Brothers’); and (3) Level 3 assets that do not fulfil 
the HQLAs (including Level 1, Level 2A and Level 2B asset classes) because, as the BCBS (2011a: 9) clearly 
noted, these are ‘assets whose fair value cannot be determined using observable measures, such as market prices 
or models. Level 3 assets are illiquid, and fair values can only be calculated using estimates or risk-adjusted value 
ranges’. Based on the complexity, we see a potential policy option to reform the valuation indicators of SIBs in 
Switzerland, namely, taking into account complexity. 
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• ‘Market shares associated with systemically important functions 
• The value of insured deposits 
• The relationship between the balance sheet size and the gross domestic product  
• The bank’s risk profile based on its business model, balance sheet structure, quality of 
assets, liquidity and leverage ratio’.  
 
With these considerations in mind, another question arises: if UBS was of systemic importance 
at the time of ELA, would UBS’s failure have caused considerable harm to the Swiss economy 
and the Swiss financial system (see Art. 7 para. 1 of the BA 2015 [1934])?  
In the third quarter of 2008, the answer was a clear ‘yes’ for the following reasons: (1) 
The Swiss economy was characterised by its competitive banking sector with two dominant 
SIBs, UBS and Credit Suisse (today, five SIBs, namely, UBS, Credit Suisse, Raiffeisen 
Switzerland, Zürcher Kantonalbank and Post Finance AG, dominate the banking sector; in the 
future, Julius Bär will probably be considered an SIB because of its interconnectedness). Based 
on the size of the Swiss banking sector (ratio of total assets to annual GDP) at the end of 2008, 
its total assets amounted to CHF 4,361 billion – more than eight times the Swiss GDP – whereas 
UBS held approximately half of the total assets, amounting to CHF 1,999 billion (see SNB 
2009). In other words, at the time of ELA, UBS’s assets amounted to CHF 1,999 billion 
(approximately CHF 2 trillion) – more than three and a half times the Swiss GDP (which is a 
sign of an institution’s systemic importance to a country’s economy). (2) The market 
concentration (the assets of the three largest banks as a percentage of total assets) of the banking 
industry is relatively high in Switzerland. The assets of the three SIBs accounted for 76 per cent 
of total assets in 2008, whereas the assets of UBS and Credit Suisse accounted for 73 per cent 
of total assets, showing the dominance of the two largest banks in the Swiss banking sector with 
respect to market concentration. The assets of UBS accounted for more than half of this 73 per 
cent, showing its relative importance with respect to market concentration. (3) In relation to the 
ratio of deposits due to customers to the GDP, the total UBS deposits due to customers 
amounted to CHF 475 billion, corresponding to 87 per cent of the GDP at the time of ELA, 
which is an additional indicator of a financial institution’s systemic importance with respect to 
systemic risk (49 per cent for Credit Suisse, 19 per cent for Raiffeisen Switzerland, 18 per cent 
for Zürcher Kantonalbank, and 12 per cent for Post Finance AG). (4) UBS and Credit Suisse 
are the representative paying agents in Switzerland. A default by one of the two banks would 
harm the payment system. (5) The SNB estimated that, in the case of default, (a) the cost to the 
economy would be between 15 and 30 per cent of the Swiss GDP, that is, between CHF 81,77 
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billion and CHF 163,54 billion, and (b) 70,000 companies would have found themselves in 
financial distress (see SNB 2008c, Birchler et al. 2010, Jordan 2011).  
Based on these considerations, UBS was of systemic importance at the time of ELA, 
which corresponds with the views of the SNB, the SFBC/FINMA, and the Swiss 
Confederation.225 
 
Nevertheless, the recent financial crisis shows that not only banks but also NBFIs received 
emergency assistance. Furthermore, the rationale for the LOLR is not limited to banks. In this 
regard, we ask what would happen if a systemically important NBFI (such as Zürich Insurance 
or SwissRe) failed (from a macro-perspective, we should also pay attention to global asset 
managers such as BlackRock). The answer for the banking sector also applies here; a 
systemically important shock (from banks or NBFIs) would harm the Swiss economy. In the 
words of Nakaso (2014: 106), 
 
‘we have also learned that it is not only banks that can trigger a systemic crisis. Indeed, we were forced to recognise 
that non-bank financial institutions, such as security firms and insurers can be the source of a market-induced 
systemic crisis’.  
 
Therefore, the concept of the LOLR should be extended to the insurance and asset management 
sector. However, if the market is able to absorb the domestic shocks, no Swiss LOLR is needed. 
Furthermore, to mitigate the moral hazard problem, we propose a constructive ambivalence 
strategy at a risk-premium rate. In light of this consideration, the eleventh Swiss LOLR 
principle for the twenty-first century is proposed as follows: 
 
Principle 11: The Swiss LOLR should be extended to systemically important NBFIs. 
                                                          
225 However, the following arguments have questioned UBS’s status up until this point: (1) At the time of ELA, 
the SNB, the SFBC/FINMA and the Swiss Confederation considered UBS systemically important, but at that time, 
no clear definition or indicators were used to determine whether a financial institution was systemically important. 
Consequently, how were the SNB, the SFBC/FINMA, and the Swiss Confederation capable of assessing the 
systemic importance of UBS? The answer is based on the above-mentioned considerations. (2) On 16 November 
2012, the SNB ‘issued decrees designating UBS as financial groups of systemic importance in accordance with 
articles 7 and 8 of the Banking Act’ (SNB 2012). In this context, why did it take so long (three years) for UBS to 
receive SIB status from the SNB, even though the IMF, the FSB, and the BIS provided a report to G20 finance 
ministers and governors entitled ‘Guidance to Assess the Systemic Importance of Financial Institutions, Markets 
and Instruments: Initial Considerations’ in 2009? (3) We agree that UBS was a large bank in terms of size, but 
‘too big’ does not mean that a bank is of systemic importance. For example, in the United States, the Washington 
Mutual Bank was also ‘too big’, but the bank was not of systemic importance to the economy. (4) Finally, 
according to the Financial Stability Report of 2009, UBS and Credit Suisse dominated the Swiss market in terms 
of total assets; however, both banks were relatively less significant in the domestic credit market, thereby 
questioning the potential for bank failure in the credit market business (see SNB 2009). 
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7.2.2. Solvency analysis 
 
In the literature, researchers examine whether the most recent financial crisis was a liquidity 
crisis and/or a solvency crisis. As we noted in the chronological overview, in our view, the 
recent crisis was a solvency crisis rather than a liquidity crisis. Similarly, Schwartz (2008) 
indicated that the crisis of 2007–2009 was not a liquidity problem but rather an insolvency 
problem. Schwartz (2008) suggests that during the financial crisis, banks such as the Royal 
Bank of Scotland, UBS, and Bear Stearns held toxic assets (sub-prime mortgages that related 
to (US) ABS and (US) CDOs) that were unsellable on the market and of an unknown value. 
Therefore, these banks were not credible and were therefore temporarily insolvent, leading to 
the drying up of liquidity (see Schwartz 2008). Admati and Hellwig (2013: 40) note the 
following: 
 
‘some believe that the financial crisis of 2007–2009 was primarily caused by the liquidity problems of financial 
institutions that did not have access to the safety net. The liquidity problems came about when lenders to banks 
and other financial institutions withdrew their funding and, at the same time, the markets for mortgage-backed 
securities broke down. The focus on liquidity problems, however, avoids the critical question of why lenders 
withdraw their funding to begin with. The breakdown of funding for banks and other institutions during 2007–
2009 did not come out of the blue. Rather, it reflected investors’ legitimate concerns that these institutions were 
no longer sound and that they might actually be unable to pay their debts ever. The concern, in other words, was 
whether these banks might be insolvent’.  
 
In this sense, the literature primarily focuses on the wrong market failure, namely, the liquidity 
problem, and on ineffective regulatory measures (such as liquidity requirements), whereas 
solvency analyses have been relatively neglected in the literature because of their operational 
difficulty (see Baltensperger and Dermine 1987, Admati and Hellwig 2013). Although ‘[t]he 
distinction between solvent and insolvent banks is a feature of the academic literature’ (see 
Freixas et al. 2007 [1999]: 28), we attempt to elucidate this operational element to answer the 
question of whether UBS was solvent at the time of ELA. Our answer does not reflect the 
financial situation of other distressed institutions, such as Bear Stearns, Fannie Mae and Freddie 
Mac, AIG, Hypo Real Estate, and Dexia, during the crisis. Therefore, our analysis is limited 
with respect to the above-mentioned contentious discussion.226 Nevertheless, in this context, 
the following four main questions arise: 
                                                          
226 To determine whether the recent crisis was a solvency crisis, an overall multiple regression analysis is needed; 
this analysis would be based on solvency test variables that measure the solvency of all financially distressed banks 
that obtain ELA from the central bank and the government. Cline and Gagnon (2013) provided an analysis of the 
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• What does solvency–insolvency mean? 
• How can solvency–insolvency be measured in the banking sector? 
• Was UBS solvent at the time of ELA? 
• Which agency in Switzerland is responsible for assessing an SIB’s solvency? 
 
What does solvency–insolvency mean? 
 
In the literature, ‘insolvency’ can be defined both broadly and narrowly. In the broad sense, 
insolvency is ‘the state of not having enough money to pay what you owe’ (Parkinson and 
Noble 2008: 285). In other words, an economic agent or an institution is insolvent if their 
liabilities exceed their assets and their equity is below zero. 
 
 
Source: Parkinson and Noble (2008: 285). 
 
In the narrow sense, insolvency can be defined with solvency tests that lead to different 
definitions. For instance, in bankruptcy and corporate law, three tests generally provide a 
narrow definition of solvency–insolvency: the capital-adequacy solvency test, the ability-to-
pay solvency test, and the balance-sheet test (see Heaton 2007, IFRS 2012, Cline and Gagnon 
2013). However, in addition to these solvency tests, several other tests can be used (for example, 
the short-term solvency test,227 the funding liquidity test,228 the share price test,229 the credit 
default swap test, the rating test, the collateral test,230 and the repayment test231). Although these 
tests appear in the literature, no clear framework for the LOLR explains how 
soundness/solvency will be assessed (see Tucker 2014). In this sense, although we agree with 
                                                          
solvency of Lehman Brothers, Bear Stearns, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, and AIG and showed that these 
financial institutions had been solvent at the time of ELA. However, their analysis was based on different solvency 
tests; therefore, a comparison of the solvency situations would be questionable. As such, we propose using a 
homogenous approach with multiple solvency tests for an effective comparison. 
227 The short-term solvency test, the so-called current ratio or acid-test ratio, is calculated as the ratio of current 
assets to current liabilities. The current ratio should be 2:1, meaning that CHF 2 of cash and assets should be 
converted into cash in the near future to pay CHF 1 of current liabilities. 
228 Admati and Hellwig (2013: 41) indicated that another ‘possible insolvency test is whether it can raise new 
equity from private investors. An inability to raise equity at any prices is a clear sign that [the bank] is weak and 
might be insolvent’. 
229 The share price test analyses the value of shares. 
230 The collateral test analyses whether a bank has sufficient eligible collateral (for further details, see 7.2.3). 
231 The repayment test considers whether a bank is able to repay ELA in a reasonable period (see also Cline and 
Gagnon 2013). 
Insolvency is the state of not having enough money to pay what you owe. 
The Swiss LOLR in the UBS crisis of 2007–2009   215 
 
 
 
Goodhart (2009 [1999]) that estimating the borrower’s solvency is difficult during a financial 
crisis, the twelfth principle regarding the Swiss LOLR is as follows: 
 
Principle 12: The Swiss LOLR requires a clear solvency framework as part of a cost-benefit 
analysis. 
 
How can solvency–insolvency be measured in the banking sector, and was UBS solvent at 
the time of ELA? 
 
A solvency framework should help the Swiss LOLR to evaluate the solvency of a bank in 
distress. Acknowledging the lack of a clear solvency framework, we propose a potential 
framework for the banking sector (see Figure 7.6) that aims (1) to assess a bank’s solvency; (2) 
to better know its customers; (3) to help the SNB act in a timely manner and be more effective 
in times of distress; and (4) to close the gap in the literature.  
 
Figure 7.6 Overview of the bank solvency framework 
 
Source: Authors’ own elaboration. 
 
In a broad view, we propose combining a know-your-customer framework for the Swiss LOLR 
with a standard solvency test approach. Moreover, the framework can be extended with other 
tests. Although identifying the above-mentioned tests is simple, in practice, they are difficult to 
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apply (see also Heaton 2007, Admati and Hellwig 2013). Therefore, we first review the three 
main solvency tests.232 
 
  The capital-adequacy test assesses whether a bank has adequate capital (for instance, a 
bank should meet the minimum capital requirements of the Basel accords). The SNB uses the 
capital-adequacy test. In this context, the SNB (2015a) finds a bank or group of banks to be 
solvent if it meets the capital adequacy regulations that are currently in force. However, the 
capital-adequacy test is not well-defined and presents several problems: (1) it does not account 
for systemic risk, and (2) it is based on a risk-weighted approach that allows systemically 
important institutions to manipulate the weighting. Therefore, a reform of the capital-adequacy 
requirements is necessary to improve the effectiveness of the capital-adequacy solvency test. 
With the capital-adequacy solvency test in mind, we ask ourselves whether UBS fulfilled the 
capital requirements at that time. The answer is yes because, according to Figure 7.2 from 
section 7.1, UBS’s Tier 1 capital ratio was 10.8 per cent in the third quarter of 2008 – above 
the required 10 per cent of the Basel II Accord that constituted the requirements at that time. 
Therefore, UBS was solvent with respect to the capital-adequacy solvency test. 
 
The ability-to-pay solvency test, or the ‘cash-flow solvency test’, assesses whether a 
bank is able to pay its obligations (the bank’s current or future debts) at any time without 
restrictions (see Heaton 2007, IMF 2013). Conversely, if a bank is unable to pay its debts with 
sufficient cash or collateral,233 then the bank is insolvent. The simple notation of the ability-to 
pay solvency test is linked with the definition of liquidity in section 3.2.3. Therefore, the ability-
to-pay solvency test is often considered a ‘liquidity test’.234 To measure the bank’s ability to 
pay in practice, the discounted cash-flow method (DCF) can be used (7.1).235 The ability-to-
pay solvency test measures the net present value (NPV), which is the expected net cash flow 
(calculated as the difference between future cash inflows and outflows) discounted to its present 
value, where t is the cash flow period and i the discount rate or assumed interest rate (see 7.1). 
                                                          
232 A good initial analysis of the solvency tests is provided by Heaton (2007). 
233 The risk of a bank being unable to pay its debts with sufficient cash or collateral is a ‘funding liquidity risk’. In 
contrast to the funding liquidity risk, the market liquidity risk is the risk that an asset cannot be sold in time on the 
market at a high discounted price. 
234 In accordance with Art. OB20 of the conceptual framework for financial reporting (IFRS 2010: A28), liquidity 
is described as follows: ‘[The] entity’s cash flows during a period also helps users to assess the entity’s ability to 
generate future net cash inflows. It indicates how the reporting entity obtains and spends cash, including 
information about its borrowing and repayment of debt, cash dividends or other cash distributions to investors, and 
other factors that may affect the entity’s liquidity or solvency’. 
235 The DCF is also used for the balance-sheet test. 
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NPV = ∑
𝑁𝑒𝑡 𝐶𝑎𝑠ℎ 𝐹𝑙𝑜𝑤𝑡
(1+𝑖)𝑡
𝑁
𝑡=0  ≥ 0 (7.1) 
 
If the NPV is greater than or equal to zero, the institution is considered to be solvent, whereas 
an NPV below zero indicates that the bank will probably be deemed insolvent. The ability-to-
pay solvency test can be criticised from multiple angles. First, the test is forward-looking  
because it estimates future bank cash flows over a certain number of years. In this context, we 
could argue that the ability-to-pay test is not adequate to assess a bank’s solvency because the 
future is uncertain and cannot be assessed. Thus, estimating future cash flows is a daunting task 
because it requires a reasonable justification for the estimated cash outflow and a thorough 
understanding of the bank and the banking industry. In other words, information about the 
bank’s solvency (or lack thereof) is required. However, banks ‘have strong incentives to hide 
any adverse information’ from a solvency valuator (Admati and Hellwig 2013: 41 and Hellwig 
2014b). Therefore, a hidden insolvency problem often exists, and the valuator must also 
determine whether a bank is able to raise funds on the market. To avoid these problems, we 
used actual income and expenses from 2008 to 2015 instead of expected income and 
expenses.236 Further, for the 2015–2018 period, we project net profit (pre-tax)237 according to 
the average rate from 2013 to 2014 because these two years entailed relatively small 
adjustments with respect to fair-value accounting in the sub-prime mortgage market.238 Table 
7.2 depicts the calculated going-concern total free cash flow of UBS between 2008 and 2018.  
 
Table 7.2 Going-concern total free cash flow of UBS, 2008–2018 (in million CHF) 
 
Source: Authors’ own calculations based on the UBS annual report between 2008 and 2009 (audited). 
                                                          
236 In practice, different forecast methods can be used to determine income and expenses. 
237 We use pre-tax incomes to remove potential tax benefits during the financial crisis of 2007–2009 that may 
distort our analysis. 
238 Moreover, taking into account 2016–2018, a constant net operating profit (pre-tax) can be considered optimistic, 
but from a narrow perspective, a constant income for the future net profit (pre-tax) is rather conservative because 
of no further upside on profitability. 
Going concern operations 31.12.2008 31.12.2009 31.12.2010 31.12.2011 31.12.2012 31.12.2013 31.12.2014 31.12.2015 31.12.2016 31.12.2017 31.12.2018 Total
Other operating income 27'019         22'925         24'523         23'445         21'963         22'602         24'185         24'909         2'244           2'244           2'244           0
Net trading income gain/loss 25'818 -        324 -            7'471           4'343           3'480           5'130           3'841           5'696           0 0 0 0
Total operating income 1'201           22'601         31'994         27'788         25'443         27'732         28'026         30'605         0 0 0 0
Total operating expenses 28'555         25'162         24'539         22'439         27'219         24'461         25'557         25'198         0 0 0 0
Net operating profit/loss (pre-
tax) 27'354 -        2'561 -          7'455           5'349           1'776 -          3'271           2'469           5'407           2'244           2'244           2'244           15'616 -        
+Depreciation (of property and 
equipment and amortisation of 
intangible assets) 1'454           1'248           1'035           888             795             999             900             1'025           0 0 0 8'344           
-Capital expenditure (purchase of 
property and equipment) 1'217 -          854 -            541 -            1'129 -          1'118 -          1'236 -          1'915 -          1'841 -          0 0 0 9'851 -          
Free Cash Flow 27'117 -        2'167 -          7'949           5'108           2'099 -          3'034           1'454           4'591           2'244           2'244           2'244           2'515 -          
Emergency liquidity assistance 15'771         9'717           0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 25'489         
Confederation transaction / ECA 
vs MCN 6'000           0 1'200 -          0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 4'800 -          
Repayment StabFund 0 3'414 -          3'414 -          3'414 -          3'414 -          3'414 -          0 0 0 0 0 17'071         
Repurchase of StabFund from 
SNB (incl. interest income) 0 0 0 0 0 3'618 -          0 0 0 0 0 3'618 -          
Total FCF 5'346 -       4'136        3'335        1'694        5'513 -       3'998 -       1'454        4'591        2'244        2'244        2'244        34'141      
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To calculate the total free cash flow per year, the net operating profit/loss (pre-tax), which is 
the difference between the total operating income (other operating income, net trading income 
gain/loss) and operating expenses, must be determined in the first step. In the second step, we 
calculate the free cash flow as the sum of the net operating profit/loss (pre-tax) and the 
depreciation (of property and equipment and the amortisation of intangible assets) minus capital 
expenditures. In the third step, the total free cash flow will be calculated as the sum of free cash 
flow, ELA, and ECA minus the repayment and repurchase of the StabFund from the SNB. To 
calculate the total FCF and the NPV, the following information is needed: 
  In December 2008, UBS transferred the first tranche of 2,042 illiquid assets (such as US 
sub-prime, US Al-A, US prime, commercial real estate, and student loans) and obtained ELA 
of USD 16,4 billion239 (CHF 17,455 million)240 and CHF 6 billion from the Swiss 
Confederation, whereas CHF 3,9 billion were used to finance the equity of the StabFund (see 
SNB 2008b, c, UBS 2008g, CCFA 2010).  
  In January 2009, UBS transferred the remaining illiquid assets and obtained a second 
tranche of ELA from the StabFund, namely, USD 9,4 million (CHF 9,717 million).241 In total, 
UBS transferred USD 38,7 billion in illiquid assets (the net of the pricing adjustment) against 
USD 25,8 billion ELA from the StabFund (see UBS 2009b).  
  According to the agreement between the SNB and UBS, as soon as UBS repaid the 
ELA, the StabFund could be purchased. The repayments were thus based on the following 
positions: sales, repayments, interest received, and other factors valued at CHF 17,071 million 
(USD 17,751 million).242 In 2010, UBS paid interest in the amount of CHF 1,200 million to the 
Swiss Confederation. Furthermore, the Confederation purchased MCNs from a consortium of 
investors. Consequently, the Confederation realised a gain through the UBS transaction.  
  In 2013, UBS repaid the ELA and could thus purchase the StabFund from the SNB at a 
price of USD 3,762 million (CHF 3,618 million) (see SNB 2013). For the sake of simplicity, 
we divided the repayment amount into five repayment periods from 2009 to 2013 (CHF 3,414 
million per year). In this context, what is the right choice for the potential time period? Why 
did we choose a ten-year period? We know that the chosen time period affects the NPV. From 
the literature, a long time period is assumed for firms (for example, banks or hedge funds) 
engaging in risky businesses.  Therefore, because UBS is engaging in a risky business, we use 
                                                          
239 The purchase price was, according to UBS (2009), 0.3 billion lower than the value that UBS assigned to its 
illiquid assets on 30 September 2008. 
240 The following exchange rate was used: USD 1 = 1.0643860 CHF in 2008 (see FTA 2016). 
241 The following exchange rate was used: USD 1 = 1.0337340 CHF in 2009 (see FTA 2016). 
242 The following average exchange rate between 2008 and 2013 was used: USD 1 = 0.9616712 CHF (see FTA 
2016). 
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a time horizon of ten years, which is the average of the minimum ELA repayment period (eight 
years) and the extended payment period (twelve years) for the orderly liquidation of assets. 
  What discount rate should be used to calculate the NPV? We know that an overly low 
discount rate biases the nature of bank solvency, whereas an overly high discount rate may 
inappropriately find that a bank is insolvent.243 Nevertheless, we use a very high discount rate, 
the reference value of the SNB, and the risk premium as discount rates and compared the results 
to one another.  
   
Given all these considerations, we can calculate the NPV. If we take a very high discount rate 
of 12.5 per cent into account, UBS had a positive NPV in the amount of CHF 2,053 million in 
the year of ELA. With the SNB’s referenced discount rate (US Libor plus 250 basis points), the 
NPV was CHF 3,482 million higher than the NPV with a very high interest rate, namely, CHF 
5,535 million. With the proposed risk-premium interest rate of 5.89 per cent,244 which is below 
a very high interest rate and above the pre-crisis interest rate (12.5% >ip> US Libor + 2.5%), 
UBS had a positive NPV of CHF 3,967 million at the time of ELA. Consequently, according to 
the ability-to-pay solvency test, UBS was solvent at the time of ELA based on all three discount 
rates. 
  Next, we consider the balance-sheet test. This test uses different valuation methods to 
assess a bank’s assets245 and liabilities. According to the balance-sheet test, a bank is solvent if 
its assets exceed its liabilities. In the literature, three different valuation methods dominate: (1) 
the market approach or fair value approach; (2) the cost approach; and (3) the income approach.  
 The fair value approach is often referred to as the traditional balance-sheet test of 
insolvency. According to Art. B5 para. 61-66 of IFRS 13 (IFRS 2012: A634), the fair value 
approach ‘uses prices and other relevant information generated by market transactions 
involving identical or comparable assets, liabilities, or a group of assets and liabilities, such as 
a business’. Thus, the fair value of a bank’s assets is compared with the fair value of its 
liabilities. This approach has several advantages. It provides accurate valuations of assets and 
liabilities on an ongoing basis and limits a bank’s ability to potentially manipulate its reported 
                                                          
243 Opponents might argue that the weighted average cost of capital (WACC) can be used as a representative 
discount rate to solve this problem. Although we agree, the WACC can also be criticized for multiple reasons. The 
WACC is based on the expected returns of a market that is based on uncertainty, the right choice for the risk-free 
rate, and the correct calculation of the beta coefficient. 
244 A risk premium of 5.89 per cent will be calculated as the sum of the pre-crisis interest rate for repo transactions 
and the risk premium of 2.5 per cent. On 1 August 2007, the special repo transaction interest rate (before the crisis 
occurred on 9 August 2007) was 3.390 per cent (for further details, see Zinssätze der Nationalbank/Taux d'intérêt 
de la Banque nationale/SNB interest rates (SNB 2016b)) plus 2.5 per cent, equalling 5.89 per cent. 
245 In normal times, asset quality reviews are a helpful instrument in determining solvency (see also Tucker 2014). 
The Swiss LOLR in the UBS crisis of 2007–2009   220 
 
 
 
net income. However, the fair value approach also can be criticised from various angles. In 
normal times, prices can become volatile and fluctuate; thus, the revaluation of assets and 
liabilities becomes volatile. This volatility has an impact on the reporting of gains and losses, 
which can temporarily change and provide misleading information. In addition, in cases of 
aggregate uncertainty such as the recent financial crisis, market prices may be unavailable. 
Therefore, assets and liabilities may be practically impossible to valuate (see Hellwig 2014a). 
Hellwig (2014a: 20) indicated that, ‘[a]t the time of entry of the resolution authority into the 
bank, the bank’s prospects and the value of its assets are highly uncertain. The uncertainty about 
the value of the assets may itself be a key factor in the difficulties’. Moreover, fair-value 
accounting is a source of systemic risk (see Hellwig 2009). For example, as we noted regarding 
the risk-feedback loop in section 2.2.3, after assets have been revalued downward, the lower 
value of the assets may initiate more asset sales, which may lead to a systemic crisis. Therefore, 
we propose removing or regulating fair-value accounting in times of market distress, 
particularly in cases of aggregate uncertainty. Instead of using fair-value accounting, a possible 
alternative would be to use either the book value approach or the ‘market-to-funding’ approach 
that assesses assets and liabilities, ‘not according to the intention of the holder, but according 
to the funding capacity of the holder’ (Brunnermeier et al. 2009: 41). To simplify, we use the 
book value approach to valuate assets and liabilities, as shown in Figure 7.7. On the asset side, 
the total assets are the sum of CHF 16,239 million in reserves (1 per cent of total assets), CHF 
346,267 million in loans (17 per cent of total assets), CHF 456,748 million in the trading 
portfolio and pledged as collateral related to the sub-prime mortgage market (23 per cent of 
total assets), and CHF 1,177,465 million in other assets (for example, positive placement values, 
property, and equipment) (59 per cent of total assets).  
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Figure 7.7 UBS balance sheet for the third quarter of 2008 at the time of ELA 
 
Source: Authors’ own elaboration based on the UBS third-quarter report of 2008 (unaudited). 
 
Table 7.3 UBS’s financial statement for the third quarter of 2008 at the time of ELA 
 
Source: Authors’ own elaboration based on the UBS second-, third-, and fourth-quarter reports of 2008 
(unaudited). 
 
The liability side is valuated as the sum of CHF 520,031 million in deposits due to customers 
(26 per cent of total liabilities), CHF 1,421,828 million in other debts (71 per cent of total 
liabilities), and CHF 54,860 million in equity (3 per cent equity-to-asset ratio). The crucial 
points on the balance sheet are as follows: (1) On the asset side, UBS had very low reserves. 
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UBS held approximately one per cent in cash and balances with central banks and 3 per cent 
capital for funding liquidity. (2) In addition, 23 per cent of the assets were related to various 
trading positions that were primarily driven by the exposure in the sub-prime mortgage market. 
(3) Seventy-one per cent of the total liabilities were other debts, including repurchase 
agreements, negative replacement values, and financial liabilities designated by fair-value 
accounting.  (4) Finally, the liability side showed a low equity-to-asset ratio of three per cent, 
which, from a regulatory perspective, was insufficient to absorb losses, although the risk-
weighted core capital ratio (Tier 1) was fulfilled through risk-weight manipulation (Tier 1 is 
10.8 per cent) at the time. 
According to the figures on the balance sheet, we can ask ourselves whether UBS 
fulfilled the balance-sheet test at the time of ELA. Although UBS’s financial situation in the 
third quarter deteriorated due to its direct exposure to Lehman Brothers, the balance-sheet test 
shows that UBS was solvent because the total liabilities (CHF 1,941,859 million) were less than 
the total assets (CHF 1,999,719 million).  
  In contrast to the fair-value accounting approach, ‘[t]he cost approach reflects the 
amount that would be required currently to replace the service capacity of an asset (often 
referred to as current replacement cost)’ (Art. B8 para. 61-66 of IFRS (IFRS 2012: A634)). 
However, the cost approach can be criticised with respect to the limited information regarding 
a bank’s cost positions. Therefore, no further elaboration is provided here.  
  The income approach ‘converts future amounts (for example, cash flows and expenses) 
to a single current (that is discounted) amount [(DCF)]. When the income approach is used, the 
fair value measurement reflects current market expectations about those future amounts’ (Art. 
B10 para. 61-66 of IFRS 13 (IFRS 2012: A635)). Because we replace fair-value accounting 
with book values, the income approach corresponds to the ability-to-pay solvency test; thus, no 
further elaboration of the income approach is provided here. 
   
Nonetheless, the following question arises: which solvency test should be chosen in the case of 
inconsistent results among the capital-adequacy test, the ability-to-pay test, and the balance-
sheet tests? According to Heaton (2007: 985) ‘[i]f the right assumptions [(discount rate, time 
period)] are made, then it is easy to conclude that the ability-to-pay solvency test is the optimal 
solvency test [because] [i]t best captures what creditors care most about – the match between 
their matured obligations and the [banks’] cash flow at the contracted payment date [maturity 
transformation]’. In other words, if the proper assumptions are made, the ability-to-pay 
solvency test is better than the capital-adequacy test and the balance-sheet test. However, we 
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are uncertain whether the ability-to pay test is the best one because it presents several problems, 
including the uncertainty of future cash flows and assumptions about the discount rate and the 
time period that can be manipulated. Therefore, we recommend using multiple solvency tests; 
if the tests produce less than perfectly correlated results, we suggest pronouncing a bank 
insolvent if any one of the three major tests indicates insolvency (see Heaton 2007). In a 
nutshell, if one of the tests reveals insolvency, then the investigated institution has suspicious 
solvency. Consequently, according to the main three solvency tests, UBS was solvent. 
However, additional tests would be required to provide a better valuation of UBS’s solvency 
status. Therefore, we implement seven additional solvency tests.  
  First, the short-term solvency test, also called the current ratio test, measures a bank’s 
ability to pay short-term and long-term debts. The formula to calculate a bank’s current ratio is 
as follows: 
 
Current ratio = 
Current Assets
Current Liabilities
 (7.2) 
 
A current ratio of 1 means that CHF 1 of cash and assets can be converted into cash in the near 
future to pay CHF 1 of current liabilities. The current ratio should be greater than 1 but less 
than 2. If a bank’s current ratio falls below 1, it signals insolvency. According to these 
considerations, the current ratio of UBS was 1.03 at the time of ELA; thus, UBS’s solvency 
was not suspicious with respect to the short-term solvency test. 
  The second test is the share-price test. In this test, shares are indicators of a bank’s 
expected profits. If future profits decline, the share prices decline; thus, suspicions regarding 
solvency may increase. In extreme cases, a bank is considered insolvent if the share price is 
zero. Using this rule, was the share price of UBS zero at the time of ELA? The answer is no 
because the share price (blue-framed ring in Figure 7.8) was CHF 18.84 (closing price) – above 
zero. Consequently, based on the share-price test, UBS was solvent at the time of ELA if we 
consider market values.246 
                                                          
246 This solvency assessment may differ if we use another share-price instrument (for example, the price-to-book 
ratio or the price-to-earnings ratio). 
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Figure 7.8 UBS share prices at the time of ELA 
 
Source: Authors’ own elaboration based on data from SIX Swiss Exchange. 
   
  The third test involves the credit-default swap (CDS), an instrument that can be used by 
central banks to assess a bank’s soundness and solvency. ‘CDS are credit derivatives that 
provide insurance against the default of some reference entity’ [in our case, UBS] (SNB 2009: 
39). Therefore, a CDS purchaser makes periodic payments, called the CDS premia, to the seller 
against a bond that is subject to entity defaults. Thus, a CDS premium is an indicator of a bank’s 
solvency. The higher the CDS premium of an SIB is in relation to the average CDS premium 
of the G-SIBs,247 the higher the probability of default and thus insolvency. In relation to the 
UBS case, before Lehman Brothers collapsed, the CDS premium of UBS was below the average 
CDS premium of the G-SIBs (see SNB 2009). Therefore, UBS was considered to be sound and 
solvent. With the collapse of Lehman Brothers, the CDS premium of UBS increased and was 
60 basis points above the G-SIBs average at the time of ELA, which marked a historical high 
(see SNB 2009) and indicated that UBS had suspicious solvency. On 16 October 2008, the 
Swiss Confederation and the SNB announced that they would act as LOLRs to provide ECA 
and ELA to UBS; the CDS price declined to the average CDS price of the G-SIBs. Although 
UBS had suspicious solvency at the time of ELA, we cannot assert that it was insolvent because 
we do not know the CDS premium level at which a bank is considered insolvent and the CDS 
premium can be high even when a bank is solvent. Consequently, the test reveals a tendency 
rather than a clear response regarding a bank’s solvency.   
                                                          
247 G-SIBs refer to the largest banks worldwide, namely, global SIBs. 
The Swiss LOLR in the UBS crisis of 2007–2009   225 
 
 
 
  The fourth test draws upon the ratings of rating agencies. Although ratings can be useful 
indicators to assess a bank’s solvency, they can also provide misleading information. For 
example, sub-prime-related securities were considered AAA securities before the financial 
crisis of 2007–2009; after the outbreak of the crisis, these securities were downgraded to CCC 
securities, or junk bonds. In this context, why did rating agencies make such a mistake? The 
literature provides several answers (such as the influence of the banking industry or less product 
knowledge), which will not be further analysed here. Nevertheless, the following question 
arises: was UBS solvent with respect to the rating agency test at the time of ELA? The answer 
is yes, as UBS had a long-term rating of A+ by Fitch, Aa2 by Moody’s and A+ by Standard & 
Poor’s (see UBS 2009a). In relation to these ratings, UBS was considered a sound and thus 
solvent bank. In addition to these ratings, Moody’s gave UBS a ‘bank financial strength rating’, 
and Fitch gave the bank an ‘individual’ bank rating, which are similar ratings (see Figure 7.9).  
 
Figure 7.9 Moody’s and Fitch Financial Service ratings 
 
Sources: Adapted from SNB (2009). 
 
According to Moody’s bank financial strength rating, UBS had a B- rating at the time of ELA, 
meaning that UBS possessed good but not strong (B rating) and acceptable (C rating) intrinsic 
financial strength (for instance, good financial fundamentals, within a less predictable and 
stable operating environment) (see Moody’s 2011). Likewise, Fitch downgraded UBS’s 
individual bank rating from an A/B rating to a B/C rating, meaning that UBS had between a 
strong and adequate rating because it possessed one or more troublesome aspects (see Fitch 
2014). Given these ratings, UBS was considered solvent at the time of ELA. 
  The fifth test is the repayment test. If a financial institution is able to repay its assistance 
on time, then the institution is considered solvent. The repayment test is a forward-looking test, 
and assessing a bank’s ability to repay its assistance in the future is difficult. However, we can 
use the test to determine whether UBS was able to repay the claims of the SNB and the Swiss 
Confederation. The answer is yes because UBS purchased the StabFund on November 2013, 
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seven years before the required deadline for resettling the StabFund. Consequently, according 
to the repayment test, UBS was solvent at the time of ELA.  
  The sixth test is the funding liquidity test, which determines whether a financial 
institution is able to fund itself in the market on its own (inside liquidity). As we noted in section 
7.1, after a second recapitalisation, UBS was unable to fund itself in the market. Therefore, 
UBS was insolvent with respect to the funding liquidity test. 
  The seventh test is the sufficient collateral test, which assesses whether a financial 
institution holds sufficient collateral. According to the sufficient collateral test, UBS held 
sufficient collateral; thus, UBS was considered solvent. The sufficient collateral test is 
discussed in the next section. 
The results of the above-mentioned tests are summarised in Table 7.4. Solvency tests that found 
UBS to be solvent are marked in green. Conversely, solvency tests that found UBS to be 
insolvent are marked in red. In addition, solvency tests that revealed suspicious solvency are 
marked in orange.  
 
Table 7.4 Solvency assessment of UBS 
 
Source: Authors’ own elaboration.  
 
Among these ten solvency tests, only one test found that UBS was insolvent, and only one test 
considered UBS’s solvency to be suspicious at the time of ELA. Moreover, the essential three 
solvency tests, namely, the capital-adequacy solvency test, the ability-to-pay solvency test, and 
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the balance-sheet test, concluded that UBS was solvent at the time of ELA. Overall, UBS was 
solvent at the time of ELA, which supports the conclusion of the FINMA. Consequently, UBS 
fulfilled the second Swiss LOLR condition, and the SNB did not bail out an insolvent SIB. 
 
Which agency is responsible for assessing the solvency of an SIB in Switzerland?  
 
The FINMA is responsible for determining the solvency of a bank or a group of banks (see 
SNB 2015c). In the financial crisis of 2007–2009, the debate regarding the responsibilities of 
central banks and financial market authorities was rekindled because the SNB’s emergency 
assistance and the UBS case naturally led to concerns about solvency assessment (see Goodhart 
and Schoenmaker 1995).  
In the literature, three main arguments are in favour of giving the SNB the responsibility 
of solvency assessments: (1) solvency information can be used in daily monetary policy 
business, which facilitates coordination among different measures (see Goodhart and 
Schoenmaker 1995); (2) the SNB may be able to better distinguish between illiquidity and 
temporary insolvency problems (see Goodhart and Schoenmaker 1995); and (3) in times of 
financial distress, the coordination problem among different authorities can be mitigated.  
Arguments against solvency assessment by the SNB are as follows: (1) solvency 
assessment is a regulatory instrument that might lead to a conflict of interest with monetary 
policy; (2) the combination of solvency assessment and monetary policy ‘might lead to 
expectations on the part of the private sector that the central bank might be influenced by 
financial system stability considerations when determining monetary policy’ (Goodhart and 
Schoenmaker 1995: 546); (3) the independence of the SNB could be reduced as a result of the 
responsibility of assessing banks’ solvency; and (4) a mistake in solvency assessments can harm 
the SNB’s reputation via ‘reputational spillover’ (see Goodhart and Schoenmaker 1995).  
Based on these considerations, should the SNB assess the solvency of a bank? In our 
view, solvency assessments should be made by the Swiss LOLR, which leads us to our 
thirteenth principle: 
 
Principle 13: To improve LOLR operations, the SNB should assess the solvency of SIBs. 
 
If the status quo remains (namely, the FINMA alone is responsible for these assessments), then 
we offer the following potential reform proposal: 
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• Information about solvency should be frequently exchanged (daily or weekly) between the 
FINMA and the SNB;  
• A clear solvency framework should contain the following tests: (1) the capital-adequacy 
test; (2) the ability-to-pay test; (3) the balance-sheet test; (4) the short-term solvency test; 
(5) the market share test; (6) the rating test; (7) the CDS test; (8) the funding liquidity test; 
(7) the repayment test; and (8) the sufficient collateral test.  
 
7.2.3. Collateral analysis 
 
For the SNB, collateral analysis is essential in the provision of ELA. In the following 
paragraphs, we present a simplified analysis that addresses the following main questions: 
 
• Under what collateral conditions do banks receive ELA from the SNB? 
• What types of collateral are considered sufficient in times of financial distress?  
• Who decides what qualifies as sufficient collateral?  
• Did UBS hold sufficient collateral at the time of ELA?  
 
According to the first question, banks should hold sufficient collateral; otherwise, they 
will not be given ELA (see the guidelines of the SNB on monetary policy measures (SNB 
2015c)). In accordance with cipher 4 of the guidelines, the SNB acts as the LOLR if the bank 
or group of banks that requires assistance can be fully covered by sufficient collateral at all 
times. Furthermore, banks should hold sufficient collateral for the following three reasons: (1) 
to mitigate the problem of adverse selection, thereby excluding insolvent banks’ liquidity 
support; (2) to limit potential losses on risky assets; and (3) to distinguish between solvency 
and liquidity support. In this sense, the SNB provides liquidity support, whereas in accordance 
with Art. 103 of the FCSC (2016 [1999]), the Swiss Confederation provides solvency support 
(see Baltensperger and Dermine 1987, Nyberg 2000, Heller and Kuhn 2007, Illing and König 
2014, SNB 2015a).  
 
Art. 103  Structural policy  
 
The Confederation may support regions of the country that are under economic threat and promote specific 
economic sectors [for example, the banking sector] and professions, if reasonable self-help measures are 
insufficient to ensure their existence. In exercising its powers under this Article, it may if necessary depart from 
the principle of economic freedom.  
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Based on Art. 103, observers might assume that the Swiss Confederation provided solvency 
support to UBS. However, the Federal Council would counter this argument because the Swiss 
Confederation received sufficient collateral, namely, MCNs, and according to Art. 184 para. 3 
and Art. 185 para. 3 of the Federal Constitution, this collateral justified the liquidity support as 
follows: 
 
Art. 184  Foreign relations  
 
Where safeguarding the interests of the country so requires, the Federal Council may issue ordinances and 
rulings. Ordinances must be of limited duration.  
 
Art. 185  External and internal security  
 
It may in direct application of this Article issue ordinances and rulings in order to counter existing or imminent 
threats of serious disruption to public order or internal or external security. Such ordinances must be limited in 
duration. 
 
The second question is difficult to answer because no answer can establish the type of 
collateral that will be considered sufficient,248 and the meaning of the term ‘sufficient’ is 
unclear.  
We ask ourselves what type of collateral would be considered sufficient in normal times. 
The answer is provided by the collateral management of the SNB, which has become an even 
more important central bank activity in the aftermath of the recent financial crisis. In 
Switzerland, the SNB’s collateral management is essential because it assesses whether banks 
hold sufficient collateral to enter into an active (for example, an OMO or FX swap) or passive 
(for instance, intraday and overnight facilities) transaction (see Art. 9 para. 1 (e) of the NBA 
(2016 [2003])). Thereby, the SNB determines what types of collateral are sufficient. In a period 
of financial distress, the types of collateral vary from HQLAs to low-quality liquid assets with 
high credit ratings. Let us explore what types of collateral are considered sufficient in normal 
times and which can also be considered sufficient in times of financial distress. According to 
the SNB guidelines on monetary policy instruments and the instruction sheet on the eligible 
collateral for SNB repos, the SNB primarily accepts two types of collateral in normal times 
(SNB 2015d): 
                                                          
248 The reason for the vague formulation of the SNB is to be more flexible with respect to the choice of collateral 
in times of financial distress. 
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• ‘Collateral with a fixed principal amount and unconditional redemption’ (SNB 2015d: 2) 
• ‘Collateral with a fixed rate, floating rate, or zero coupon interest’ (SNB 2015d: 2) 
 
However, under certain circumstances, the following three types of collateral are also accepted 
(see SNB 2015d): 
 
• Covered bonds that are issued by financial institutions if the issuer is not a domestic 
financial institution or its foreign subsidiary 
• Collateral by the mortgage bond bank of the Swiss mortgage institutions and the mortgage 
bond institutions of Swiss cantonal banks  
• Collateral issued by the Swiss Confederation, the SNB, the ECB, the EU, the BIS, the IMF, 
and certain multilateral development banks designated by the FINMA as eligible collateral 
 
These types of collateral must meet the following requirements, as shown in Figure 7.10: 
currency requirements, rating requirements, eligible issuer and market requirements, and  
volume requirements. If the types of collateral meet all the requirements, then they are rated as 
eligible (sufficient) collateral and can be delivered through SIS (settlement procedure). In the 
following section, we briefly expand on these four requirements. 
 
Figure 7.10 SNB criteria for the eligibility of collateral 
 
Source: Authors’ own elaboration based on SNB (2015d). 
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With regard to the first requirement, collateral will be accepted in the following 
currencies: ‘Swiss francs, euros, US dollars, pounds sterling, Danish kroner, Swedish kronor or 
Norwegian kroner’ (see SNB 2015d: 2).  
In relation to the second condition, the credit rating required from Standard & Poor’s, 
Moody’s, and Fitch must be at least AA-/Aa3. In case of collateral for the public sector, where 
no ratings are available, the rating of the institute may be used. 
The third requirement states that the collateral must meet eligible issuer and market 
requirements. In this context, eligible issuers include central banks, public sector entities, and 
international or supranational organisations. Furthermore, eligible markets are those whose 
price charts are published on a regular basis, such as the Swiss stock market (the so-called SIX 
Swiss Exchange).  
According to the fourth requirement, the volume issued must be at least CHF 100 
million at the time of admission, and the requirement for foreign currency is a minimum of one 
billion (such as USD).  
After meeting the four main requirements and gaining the approval of the FINMA, the 
collateral is delivered via SIS249 to an ultimate security depository in Switzerland, the EU or 
the European Economic Area member states. Consequently, if a form of collateral fulfils all 
these criteria, it will be considered eligible and thus sufficient. Table 7.5 shows a sample of 
eight SNB eligible collateral out of 16,793 SNB eligible collateral that will be used for repo 
transactions (dated 18 April 2016), including a note issued by HSH Nordbank (3 per cent 
coupon rate) and a bond issued by Bayerische Landesbank (LB) (2.75 per cent coupon rate).250 
 
Table 7.5 Collateral eligible for SNB repos 
 
Source: Adapted from a list of collateral eligible for SNB repos (dated 18 April 2016). 
                                                          
249 SIS is a bank and part of the SIX Group Ltd. ‘It provides for the custody and settlement of tradable financial 
instruments in Switzerland and as global custodian offers its participants access to over fifty foreign financial 
markets’ (BIS 2011: 393). 
250 In the fall of 2008, several banks besides Lehman, such as HSH Nordbank and Bayerische Landesbank, had 
been recapitalised to avoid bankruptcy. In this context, HSH Nordbank had been recapitalised with EU 30 billion 
of German special financial market stabilization funds, and Bayer LB received approximately EU 15 billion from 
the Free State of Bavaria (follow-up costs, such as reputation costs, are not included). 
ISIN Valor 
Num ber (CH)
Issuer Issuer 
Dom icile
 Issue Date Maturity Coupon Currency Am ount 
Outstanding
Asset T y pe Basket HQLA
CH0030985599 3098559
HSH Nordbank AG 
Hamburg/Kiel DE 14.06.2007 14.06.2019 3 CHF 250'000'000 Note L2a, L2a CHF L2a
DE000BLB6C82 12346990
Bay erische Landesbank 
München DE 25.01.2011 25.07 .2016 2.7 5 EUR 1'000'000'000 Bond L2a L2a
DE000HV0EDV7 2567 516
UniCredit Bank AG 
München DE 24.05.2006 24.05.2016 4 EUR 1'500'000'000 Bond L2a L2a
EU000A1U9803 22865527 ESM LU 20.11 .2013 20.11 .2023 2.125 EUR 3'990'7 50'000 Bond L2a L2a
FR001117 9852 14683687
Credit Agricole Home Loan 
SFH France 17 .01.2012 17 .01.2022 4 EUR 1'289'100'000 Medium Term Note                        L2a L2a
FR001067 07 37 462197 4 République Française France 25.10.2007 25.10.2018 4.25 EUR 30'947 '000'000 Bond L1 L1
GB0008931148 359097 United Kingdom UK 30.04.1992 25.08.2017 8.7 5 GBP 11 '025'000'000 Bond L1 L1
XS0055498413 339011
EIB European Investment 
Bank LU 14.02.1995 25.08.2017 8.7 5 EUR 1'000'000'000 Bond L1 L1
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Eligible collateral is characterised by the ISIN, Valor No., issuer, issuer domicile, issue date, 
maturity, currency, amount outstanding, asset types, basket with respect to the liquidity 
requirements, and HQLA rating (see section 3.2.2). With these considerations in mind, sub-
prime-related securities, thus the total illiquid amount of USD 38,7 billion in toxic assets251 
transferred from UBS to the StabFund, were considered eligible and sufficient collateral for 
SNB repos before the financial crisis because the above-mentioned criteria were fulfilled as 
follows: (1) it was a mortgage security; (2) the currency was primarily in US dollars; (3) the 
credit rating was AAA before the crisis; and (4) it had an eligible issuer, the US Stock Exchange. 
However, during the financial crisis of 2007–2009, these assets did not fulfil the eligible 
collateral requirements and were regarded as unsafe assets. In this context, Tucker (2014: 27) 
indicated, ‘if they are not safe enough for the central bank, then the authorities should be 
worried about whether the money market’s liquidity is sustainable’. This understanding leads 
us to our fourteenth principle (see Tucker 2014): 
 
Principle 14: The function of the Swiss LOLR makes it a de facto monitor of high-quality liquid 
assets and of systemically significant markets. 
 
Consequently, the SNB ‘will need to have a well-established collateral pricing policy to avoid 
taking undue credit and liquidity risks into their own balance sheet’ (IMF 2008: xv). Moreover, 
the SNB violated the classical Bagehot concept by accepting collateral (sub-prime-related 
securities – toxic papers) against ELA, which many private banks would not do. However, the 
role of the SNB in accepting bad collateral – including some structured products that many 
private banks would not accept (23 per cent of the total assets) – calls into question whether the 
SNB fulfilled the third LOLR condition. In this context, there are two possible answers.  
First, if bad collateral is considered sufficient collateral, ELA was fully covered by 
sufficient collateral at all times; thus, the third Swiss LOLR condition was fulfilled at the time 
of ELA. However, the basic idea behind sufficient collateral might be questioned because bad 
collateral (1) did not mitigate the problem of adverse selection, whereby insolvent banks were 
excluded from liquidity support; (2) did not limit potential losses on risky assets; and (3) did 
not distinguish between solvency and liquidity support.  
 Second, if bad collateral is not considered sufficient collateral, the SNB violated the 
third Swiss LOLR condition; thus, it had no right to provide ELA. As noted, the SNB 
                                                          
251 US sub-prime, US Alt-A, US prime, US RLN program, commercial real estate, and without student loans (see 
UBS 2008g). 
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considered bad collateral to be sufficient collateral; however, doing so calls into question the 
major principles behind the idea of collateral.  
Consequently, to establish a credible third condition, we propose reforming the third 
Swiss LOLR condition to reflect Bagehot’s doctrine to lend only against good collateral. Thus, 
the SNB should lend against collateral on which money can be readily obtained in normal times, 
although the SNB determines what types of collateral are good. 
 
7.3. Summary 
 
To sum up, as the prices of high-risk mortgages in the United States began to decline in 
February 2007, several financial institutions had to write down substantial losses. The 
substantial write-downs in the trading positions raised doubts about the solvency of several 
financial institutions, and the subsequent dry-up of market liquidity reached a peak on 9 August 
2007, which marked the beginning of the financial crisis of 2007–2009. In Switzerland, the 
most affected bank was UBS. On 15 September 2008, Lehman Brothers went bankrupt, and the 
financial situation of UBS worsened because it had direct counterparty exposure to Lehman 
Brothers. As a third recapitalisation failed on 21 September 2008, UBS informed the SNB, the 
SFBC/FINMA, and the FDF that it would require ELA. By 14 October 2008, the three 
authorities had been officially informed that UBS required ELA. On 15 October 2008, the SNB 
and the Swiss Confederation implemented measures on the asset side and the liability side to 
strengthen UBS’s balance sheet. Therefore, they used an SPV, the ‘StabFund’. On the asset 
side, UBS sold illiquid assets in the amount of USD 38,7 billion to the StabFund and received 
USD 25,8 billion of ELA in the form of high-powered money from the StabFund, as the ELA 
amount had been first transferred from the SNB to the StabFund. The SNB thereby created 
foreign high-powered money via a dollar-Swiss franc swap of USD 25,8 billion to depreciate 
the Swiss franc. On the liability side, the Swiss Confederation provided direct ELA (taxpayer 
money) in the amount of CHF 6 billion, whereas 10 per cent of the transferred assets (namely, 
CHF 3,9 billion) had to be funded by the equity of the StabFund. The remaining CHF 2,1 billion 
strengthened the equity base of UBS. Although UBS received ELA from the SNB, the literature 
remains ambiguous regarding whether UBS fulfilled the Swiss LOLR conditions. To fill the 
gap in the literature, we illuminate the three ELA conditions: (1) the bank or bank group must 
be of systemic importance to the financial system; (2) the ELA-seeking institution must be 
solvent; and (3) liquidity assistance must be fully covered by sufficient collateral.   
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  According to the first condition, UBS was of systemic importance to the Swiss economy 
because the Swiss economy was characterised by a competitive banking sector with two 
dominant SIBs, namely, UBS and Credit Suisse. Based on the size of the Swiss banking sector 
(ratio of total assets to annual GDP), at the end of 2008, the banking sector’s total assets 
amounted to CHF 4,361 billion – more than eight times the Swiss GDP – whereas UBS held 
approximately half of the total assets, amounting to CHF 1,999 billion. The market 
concentration of UBS in the Swiss banking industry was relatively high. The three SIBs’ assets 
amounted to 76 per cent of the total assets in 2008; UBS and Credit Suisse accounted for 73 per 
cent of the total assets, showing the dominance of the two largest banks in the Swiss banking 
sector with respect to market concentration. Of this 73 per cent, UBS accounted for more than 
half, showing its relative importance with respect to market concentration. As such, a UBS 
default would harm the payment system and cost the economy approximately 15–30 per cent 
of the Swiss GDP (between CHF 81,77 billion and CHF 163,54 billion); in addition, 70,000 
companies would find themselves in financial distress. Therefore, UBS was considered a 
systemically important institution at the time of ELA. 
In relation to the second ELA condition, it was difficult to provide a solvency–
insolvency definition and various solvency measures that would help us assess the bank’s 
solvency because the literature lacks an operational approach to solvency. Therefore, to fill the 
gap in the literature, we elaborate a potential solvency definition and solvency framework. 
Solvency can be defined in both broad and narrow terms based on the solvency test used. 
Broadly, ‘insolvency’ is the state of not having enough money to pay what you owe. Narrowly, 
solvency can be defined with respect to the solvency test used. In the literature, there are three 
main solvency tests: the capital-adequacy test, the ability-to-pay test, and the balance-sheet test. 
The capital-adequacy test assesses whether a bank has adequate capital. Thus, if the bank fulfils 
the capital-adequacy requirements, it is considered solvent. The ability-to-pay test assesses 
whether a bank is able to pay its debts at any time without restrictions. The ability-to-pay test 
measures the net present value of a financial institution with a discounted cash-flow method. A 
net present value greater than or equal to zero indicates that the bank is solvent. In contrast to 
the ability-to-pay test, the balance-sheet test valuates assets and liabilities. The cardinal rule of 
the balance-sheet test is as follows: if a bank has fewer assets than liabilities, it is considered 
insolvent, and vice versa. In practice, the assets and liabilities can be valuated with respect to 
fair-value accounting, the cost approach and the income approach, but the income approach is 
primarily covered by the ability-to-pay test. If one of these three tests indicates that the bank is 
insolvent, then the bank must be assumed to be insolvent. Moreover, the valuator’s decision 
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can be enhanced though additional solvency tests (for example, the short-term solvency test, 
the market share test, the rating test, the CDS test, the funding liquidity test, the repayment test, 
and the sufficient collateral test). According to the findings of the various tests, we concluded 
that UBS was solvent at the time of ELA, which corresponds with the valuation of the FINMA. 
Given the lack of a solvency framework, we recommend that the Swiss LOLR be based on a 
clear solvency framework in the twenty-first century. 
Given the third condition, the following questions arise: (1) What type of collateral is 
sufficient? (2) Who determines what qualifies as sufficient collateral? (3) Did UBS hold 
sufficient collateral at the time of ELA? To answer the first and second questions, the SNB 
determines what qualifies as sufficient collateral, which varies from HQLAs to low-quality 
liquid assets with high credit ratings, such as mortgages. In light of the collateral analysis, UBS 
held sufficient collateral, including property and equipment. However, whether sub-prime-
related securities can be considered sufficient collateral is questionable. According to the SNB, 
sub-prime-related securities were sufficient collateral, but we leave it to the reader’s judgement 
to determine whether these types of securities should be considered sufficient. If so, the basic 
idea behind sufficient collateral will be challenged (for example, (a) to mitigate the problem of 
adverse selection, where an insolvent bank is excluded from liquidity support; (b) to limit 
potential losses on risky assets; and (c) to distinguish between solvency and liquidity support). 
To establish credibility, we propose replacing the word ‘sufficient’ with ‘good’ to avoid 
upending the main principles behind collateral.  
 
As a result of our analysis of the three Swiss LOLR conditions, using the UBS crisis to illustrate 
our case, we concluded that UBS was systemically important to the Swiss economy, was 
solvent, and held questionable sufficient collateral. Therefore, from an economic point of view, 
our conclusion is aligned with the legal assessment of the SNB. However, our findings cannot 
be used to label the recent financial crisis as a solvency crisis or a liquidity crisis. To do so, a 
similar analysis using the same concept as this dissertation could be conducted on all banks that 
received ELA during the financial crisis of 2007–2009. Therefore, further academic research is 
needed. Using the different considerations and the elaborated principles, we can begin to design 
an LOLR for the twenty-first century. 
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8. The Swiss LOLR for the twenty-first century 
 
Recently, the Swiss LOLR has been solely focused on the banking sector and has drawn upon 
three main conditions for obtaining assistance in an emergency: (1) the bank must be solvent 
but illiquid; (2) the bank must be systemically important to the financial system; and (3) the 
liquidity assistance must be fully covered by sufficient collateral at all times. However, as we 
noted in our analysis of the different schools of thought and our analysis of the Swiss LOLR 
during the UBS crisis of 2007–2009, we see the potential for a reform proposal to redesign the 
LOLR that will help the SNB take more effective action when a financial institution demands 
assistance in an emergency. In this sense, the next section subsumes our considerations and 
principles into a redesigned Swiss LOLR for the twenty-first century. Moreover, in section 8.2, 
we will qualitatively assess the redesigned LOLR because a successful LOLR must be effective, 
timely, sustainable, and credible. 
 
8.1. Redesign of the Swiss LOLR for the twenty-first century 
 
The experience of the Swiss LOLR during the recent financial crisis raised fundamental 
questions about the design of the LOLR framework and the execution of a more stable financial 
system in the twenty-first century. In this context, a challenging task is how to design an LOLR 
regime that financial institutions are prepared to use to contain liquidity and solvency crises and 
their wider social costs before it is too late (see Tucker 2014). In light of the different LOLR 
schools of thought and our analysis of the UBS case, we can design a Swiss LOLR for the 
twenty-first century. In this context, the SNB acts as the LOLR for one or more domestic banks 
if they are no longer able to fund their operations on the market and are no longer temporarily 
viable but are viable in the medium and long run. For this purpose, the form of emergency 
assistance varies between ELA via direct bilateral lending (standing facilities) and direct 
extraordinary actions (the transfer of assets and liabilities via SPVs). In the former case, ELA 
‘involves making commitments: to lend in order to stave off or contain systemic distress. Those 
commitments need to be credible, which requires amongst other things that they be time 
consistent. The regime won’t work well if people believe a central bank will change its mind 
or has no clear principles’ (Tucker 2014: 11). In this sense, the Swiss LOLR for the twenty-first 
century depends on the following three conditions: 
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(1) The liquidity-seeking bank or group of banks must be of systemic importance to the 
financial system’s stability. 
(2) The bank must be solvent or temporarily insolvent. 
(3) The liquidity assistance must be fully covered by good collateral at all times on a risk-based 
premium. The SNB will determine what types of collateral are good.  
 
These three principle are the result of the historical and economical evolution of the Swiss 
LOLR, which has been affected by the different LOLR schools of thought, including the 
classical Bagehot doctrine: (1) lend only against good collateral to solvent and illiquid or 
temporarily insolvent banks; (2) lend at a risk premium; and (3) lend freely in times of financial 
distress. In addition to these three principles, we can add the following fourteen principles: 
 
(1) The LOLR is non-operational. 
(2) In times of financial distress, the central bank should primarily act as the MMLR and, if 
required, as the LOLR. 
(3) ELA from the LOLR is endogenous and created based on demand. 
(4) The Swiss LOLR’s main objective is to ensure financial stability. 
(5) The Swiss LOLR requires various MoUs with different central banks and regulatory 
authorities. 
(6) The Swiss LOLR should be based on a systemic cost-benefit analysis. 
(7) The Swiss LOLR should be based on a broad, explicit, and transparent fiscal carve-out 
condition. 
(8) The SNB can create unlimited domestic and foreign high-powered money when a systemic 
crisis occurs. 
(9) The Swiss LOLR should be extended to systemically important NBFIs under a constructive 
ambivalence strategy. 
(10) The Swiss LOLR requires a clear solvency framework as part of a cost-benefit analysis. 
(11) To improve monetary policy operations and LOLR operations, the SNB should assess 
the solvency of SIBs. 
(12) The function of the Swiss LOLR makes it a de facto monitor of high-quality liquid assets 
and of systemically significant markets (see Tucker 2014). 
(13) The Swiss Confederation should be excluded from liquidity support.252  
                                                          
252 Although the SNB acts primarily as the LOLR and provides liquidity support and the Swiss Confederation 
generally provides solvency support, during the UBS crisis, both institutions provided liquidity support. However, 
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(14) Fundamentally insolvent financial institutions should be allowed to enter into debt 
resolution or liquidation/bankruptcy (see Tucker 2014). 
 
With these principles in mind, we can design the Swiss LOLR for the twenty-first century using 
our LOLR scheme, which draws upon the following five main characteristics: (1) the type of 
objective; (2) the type of institution; (3) the ultimate source of liquidity; (4) the ELA 
mechanism; and (5) ELA requirements. Figure 8.1 illustrates the potential reform proposal with 
respect to these five characteristics.  
 
Figure 8.1 The Swiss LOLR for the twenty-first century 
 
Source: Authors’ own elaboration. 
 
The Swiss LOLR’s main objective is the safety and soundness of the financial system. 
In this sense, the SNB is not responsible for preventing the initial failure but for keeping a 
subsequent wave of failures from spreading through the system. The LOLR thereby provides 
ELA to banks that are systemically important to the Swiss economy. In addition to banks, the 
SNB should also act as the LOLR for systemically important NBFIs that can have an impact on 
the Swiss economy. 
In relation to being a limited or ultimate source of liquidity, we indicate the following: 
(1) according to Art. 4 of the NBA [2016 (2003)], the SNB had a unique role in terms of the 
stock of high-powered money (SNB notes) because no other bank has the right to issue SNB 
notes. Thus, the SNB has a monopoly on high-powered money and is responsible for managing 
asset and liability positions that determine its functions. As a consequence of its unique role in 
                                                          
because of the Confederation’s relatively minor participation in the StabFund compared with that of the SNB and 
the risk of the social cost to the taxpayer, we propose that as an LOLR, the Confederation should be excluded from 
crisis management actions; otherwise, its liquidity support could be interpreted as solvency support and create 
moral hazard. 
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the creation and management of high-powered money, the SNB is limited with respect to its 
mandate (price stability). However, we noted that the SNB can create unlimited foreign high-
powered money. To do so, the SNB had to enter into a swap arrangement. The foreign currency 
swap arrangements were an efficient mechanism for the provision of direct ELA in foreign 
currencies. 
According to the ELA mechanism, the Swiss LOLR can provide direct ELA in three 
forms: (1) single bilateral lending via the DW, the SPV, or a new operational tool; (2) direct 
foreign currency swap lines; and (3) extraordinary actions such as asset and liability 
transformation to an SPV or directly to the SNB. 
 
8.2. An evaluation of the Swiss lender of last resort 
 
A successful Swiss LOLR for the twenty-first century must be effective, timely, sustainable 
and credible (see Guttentag and Herring 1987, Hellwig 2007). Given these four requirements, 
we provide a qualitative evaluation253 of the status quo and compare it with the proposed Swiss 
LOLR for the twenty-first century. Our finding is that overall, the Swiss LOLR for the twenty-
first century is a better option than the status quo. To evaluate the different LOLRs, Table 8.1 
shows the four criteria and the evaluation indicators of excellent, good, satisfactory, poor and 
very poor.  
According to the first requirement, in broad terms, central bank interventions are 
considered effective if the instrument is aligned with the discovered problem (see Hellwig 2007, 
Tucker 2014). In this sense, the central bank’s intervention as the LOLR is aligned with the 
problem of liquidity (the status quo LOLR) and/or a temporary solvency problem (the LOLR 
in the twenty-first century). In a narrow sense, we distinguish among seven characteristics of 
effectiveness: (1) sensitivity to macroeconomic costs; (2) sensitivity to social costs; (3) a large 
source of liquidity; (4) moral hazard; (5) adverse selection; (6) reputational risk; and (7) 
boundary problems.  
 
                                                          
253 The evaluation can be criticised with respect to the following points: (1) It is only a qualitative assessment and 
does not consider a quantitative assessment. Thus, a quantitative assessment should be provided here. However, 
in practice, quantifying a reform proposal is difficult. (2) The assessment is based on the authors’ own evaluation; 
therefore, some may claim that it lacks objectivity. 
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Table 8.1 Evaluation of the Swiss LOLR for the twenty-first century 
 
Source: Authors’ own elaboration.  
 
In relation to the first point, an effective Swiss LOLR is sensitive to macroeconomic 
costs that may result if the LOLR does not intervene in the market. In Switzerland, the cost of 
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the recent financial crisis amounted to CHF 30 billion or 6 per cent of the GDP (see Birchler et 
al. 2010). Several studies estimated that the cost would have been higher if the SNB had not 
acted as the LOLR. Therefore, both concepts are justifications for the LOLR in Switzerland. 
However, the status quo LOLR is not based on a cost-benefit analysis, which is necessary to 
measure the risks before an intervention. Conversely, the Swiss LOLR in the twenty-first 
century uses cost-benefit analyses to assess the macroeconomic costs to the economy. 
With regard to the second point, an effective LOLR is less sensitive to social costs that 
may result from an LOLR failure (see Guttentag and Herring 1987). Compared with the Swiss 
LOLR for the twenty-first century, the status quo LOLR is more sensitive to social costs 
because if the central bank suffers losses, it transfers the costs to the government, which then 
increases taxes and cuts public expenditures to cover the costs. In addition, the government may 
also provide emergency assistance, resulting in the same repercussions for the government. In 
contrast to the status quo LOLR, the Swiss LOLR for the twenty-first century will abolish any 
form of government intervention to address liquidity problems and is based on an explicit and 
transparent FCO condition. With regard to the latter point, we follow Hellwig (2007: 814), who 
suggests that the Swiss LOLR ‘requires some agreement with the government, more precisely, 
the minister of finance’. In addition, a cost-benefit analysis will help mitigate the SNB’s 
decision-making process in terms of ELA provision, thereby helping the FINMA better wind 
down a bank.  
In relation to the third point, according to Guttentag and Herring (1987), an effective 
LOLR should have a large source of liquidity. In this sense, both LOLR concepts refer to the 
LOLR as a practically unlimited source of ELA because of its creation of domestic high-
powered money and its swap transactions in foreign high-powered money.  
With regard to the fourth and fifth points, an effective LOLR ‘is able to limit the moral 
hazard and adverse selection problem which access to emergency liquidity assistance may 
create’ (Guttentag and Herring 1987: 173). However, the status quo LOLR did not mitigate the 
problem of excessive risk-taking. Conversely, the Swiss LOLR for the twenty-first century 
better addresses the problem of moral hazard. The risk-based premium above the market rate 
and below a very high interest rate helps mitigate the moral hazard problem, and the cost-benefit 
analysis becomes a form of ambivalence strategy that mitigates the moral hazard problem. For 
instance, suppose the cost-benefit analysis found that the bank should be allowed to enter into 
bankruptcy; the explicit commitment to SIBs could change to ambivalence. Consequently, the 
Swiss LOLR for the twenty-first century is more effective than the status quo with regard to 
moral hazard.  
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In relation to the fifth point, two adverse selection problems exist. Both concepts have 
created an uneven playing field. In this context, SIBs could obtain funding liquidity with a risk-
free interest rate in normal times, irrespective of their solvency, whereas small and medium-
sized banks would have to pay a higher interest rate than SIBs for funding liquidity. However, 
the uneven playing field would be mitigated with the central bank’s cost-benefit analysis and 
the monitoring of the HQLAs,254 a clear solvency framework and higher bank regulatory 
standards for SIBs.  
 With regard to the sixth point, under the status quo, the reputational risk for the SNB is 
low because the solvency assessment is made by the FINMA. However, the reputational risk 
for the FINMA is higher than it is in the Swiss LOLR for the twenty-first century if a failure 
occurs. Nevertheless, with solvency assessments, the Swiss LOLR has better information that 
leads to a better decision-making process, and the assessment cost can be reduced by increasing 
the number of SIB assessments (for example, in 2008, Switzerland had two banks of systemic 
importance, whereas five SIBs are of systemic importance in 2016, indicating an increasing 
trend).255 In other words, according to Diamond (1984), the Swiss LOLR acts as a delegated 
monitor among different banks and mitigates the problem of asymmetric information (for 
instance, moral hazard) (see point 4).  
With regard to the seventh point, an effective LOLR is sensitive to the boundary 
problem if overlapping policy (such as monetary policy overlapping with regulatory policy; see 
section 1.2.3) is a risk. As we noted in section 4.3, the LOLR is a monetary policy instrument 
with regulatory policy characteristics (for example, the Swiss LOLR’s objective is the same as 
that of the Swiss regulatory authority, namely, financial stability). However, the signing of the 
MoU regarding financial stability by the SNB and the FINMA should not only provide a clear 
division between the individual tasks of both authorities but also describe the common areas of 
interest and collaborations in detail, thereby mitigating the boundary problem to a certain degree 
(see MoU 2010). However, in practice, this MoU is questionable because the operational details 
are not clearly elaborated.  
Nevertheless, based on all these considerations, the Swiss LOLR for the twenty-first 
century would be more effective than the status quo. 
                                                          
254 In other words, ‘the central bank as lender of the last resort must be well informed about the situation. It must 
have a clear idea about the reality behind the numbers in the banks’ books. It must also have some appreciation of 
the potential externalities of a bank’s failure on other institutions and on markets’ (Hellwig 2007: 814). 
255 This increase challenged recent regulatory policy that aimed to mitigate the too-big-to-fail problem. However, 
in practice, we observed that additional systemically important institutions would be found. Consequently, recent 
regulatory measures did not mitigate the too-big-to-fail problem; instead, they enhanced it at an enormous cost to 
small and medium-sized banks. 
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In relation to the second criterion, to be timely (see point 8), the Swiss LOLR must occur 
in a gone concern, which covers not only times of financial distress (bank failures) but also the 
time at which the crisis appeared (before bank failures). In this regard, both concepts are 
designed to be timely. In the words of Hellwig (2007: 813), the LOLR must ‘beware of 
intervening prematurely, at a time when private solutions to existing problems are still 
available’. Therefore, the LOLR for the twenty-first century has a better early warning system 
than the status quo because the LOLR provides solvency analyses in normal times.  
 
According to the third characteristic, being sustainable means that the Swiss LOLR must 
respect central bank measures and policy (see Guttentag and Herring 1987, Hellwig 2007). 
However, the LOLR’s role as a monetary policy instrument with regulatory characteristics 
requires clear coordination between the SNB and the FINMA. Therefore, the MoU between the 
SNB and the FINMA closed the gap to a considerable degree. However, the MoU is insufficient 
because an SIB (such as UBS or Credit Suisse) that provides bank services on national and 
international levels requires multiple central banks and supervision authorities to mitigate a 
potential systemic risk (see Hellwig 2007). In addition, ‘the manifold linkages of financial 
institutions in other countries imply that any crisis of systemic dimensions in another country 
can have systemic repercussions for Switzerland’ (for example, the collapse of Lehman 
Brothers) (Hellwig 2007: 819). Therefore, the Swiss LOLR for the twenty-first century includes 
an international MoU between different regulatory authorities in cases of crisis prevention.256 
 
In relation to the fourth property, to be credible, the Swiss LOLR must be based on clear 
principles. In this context, the LOLR in the twenty-first century is based on better and clearer 
principles than the status quo, which has unclear conditions regarding solvency and  ambiguous 
conditions with respect to collateral. Opponents might argue that unclear conditions increase 
the central bank’s flexibility in times of distress. Although this may be true, it also reduces the 
credibility of the central bank. Therefore, the Swiss LOLR for the twenty-first century will 
provide a combination of flexibility and credibility. On the one hand, it proposes clear and 
transparent principles for FCO conditions, the solvency framework and good collateral. On the 
other hand, the SNB remains flexible because it determines what qualifies as good collateral. 
                                                          
256 However, several questions remain with regard to the international MoU. For instance, who will be the 
responsible counterpart, for example, in the EU? Furthermore, such cooperation is subject to friction (for further 
details, see Hellwig 2007). 
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Therefore, the Swiss LOLR for the twenty-first century will be more credible than the status 
quo.  
Overall, the LOLR for the twenty-first century will be more effective, timely, sustainable and 
credible than the status quo. Therefore, the LOLR should be redesigned according to the 
elaborated fourteen principles. 
 
8.3. Summary 
 
This chapter has designed a Swiss LOLR for the twenty-first century that draws upon the 
objective, the institution type, the limited/ultimate source of liquidity, the ELA mechanism, and 
ELA conditions. According to these characteristics, (1) the LOLR has a macro-based objective 
that focuses on the safety and soundness of the financial system; (2) the SNB is considered the 
LOLR; (3) the SNB is an unlimited source of high-powered money (domestic and foreign) 
because of foreign currency swap agreements; (4) the ELA mechanism can generally be divided 
into direct single lending to individual banks, foreign currency swap lines to individual banks, 
and extraordinary actions such as asset and liability transfers from individual banks; and (5) a 
bank can obtain ELA under the following conditions: (a) the liquidity-seeking bank or group of 
banks must be systemically important to the stability of the financial system; (b) the bank must 
be solvent and illiquid or temporarily insolvent; and (c) the liquidity assistance must be fully 
covered by good collateral at all times on a risk-based premium. The SNB determines what 
qualifies as good collateral. We provide a qualitative evaluation that concludes that the Swiss 
LOLR for the twenty-first century will be more effective, timely, sustainable and credible than 
the status quo. Based on this conclusion and the initial problems (for instance, moral hazard, 
adverse selection, social costs, and macroeconomic costs), the SNB should redesign its role as 
the LOLR for the twenty-first century. The regime outlined in this dissertation could be a 
substantive LOLR regime under the following cardinal principle: ‘no lending to fundamentally 
insolvent institutions’ (Tucker 2014:37). 
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Conclusion 
 
The primary objective of this dissertation has been to provide a comprehensive economic theory 
of bank regulation, addressing the lack of consensus in the recent literature regarding why and 
how banks are regulated. Therefore, to fill this gap in the literature, we elaborated an economic 
theory of bank regulation that described the economic rationale and objectives of bank 
regulation and provided a systematisation scheme for bank regulatory measures. Based on our 
systematisation scheme, we classified the most common bank regulatory measures. We 
analysed capital requirements, liquidity requirements and recovery and resolution standards in 
greater detail because of their fundamental relevance to the recent regulatory debate in this 
regard and proposed potential reform options. In addition, we designed an alternative regulatory 
proposal oriented towards the source of the market failure that resulted in the 2007–2009 
financial crisis. Although our proposals mitigate the economic risk posed by SIBs, they will not 
definitively exclude the possibility that SIBs in Switzerland (or elsewhere) will be allowed to 
fail in the future in the event of another banking crisis. With regard to the LOLR, ‘more 
rethinking of the LOLR doctrine is needed’, given the important role of the LOLR in restoring 
financial stability during the recent financial crisis (Grossmann and Rockoff 2015: 58). 
Therefore, in aiming to craft this bank regulatory system, we sought to articulate not 
only effective bank regulations but also a well-designed LOLR. Although the LOLR has been 
relatively neglected in the central banking literature and regulatory debates, the 2007–2009 
financial crisis demonstrated that an effective LOLR regime is required to prevent financial 
crises and to minimise greater damage to the economy. Therefore, in 2014, the BIS held a 
workshop entitled, ‘Re-thinking the lender of last resort’ that focused on the most recent crises 
in the United States, the United Kingdom, the European Union, Mexico and Japan. However, 
the workshop did not provide any systematic and clear analysis of the LOLR regime in 
Switzerland. Additionally, the literature has not systematically analysed the role of the Swiss 
LOLR. Therefore, as the second objective of this thesis, we sought to fill this literature gap by 
analysing the Swiss LOLR and outlining a real and practical substantive LOLR regime for 
Switzerland in the twenty-first century. Notably, this LOLR regime should enhance stability in 
the banking sector and mitigate the problems that typically accompany ELA (including moral 
hazard, adverse selection, social costs and macroeconomic costs). 
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Principle findings and implications 
 
The dissertation is divided into two parts. The first part focuses on the economic theory of bank 
regulation, whereas the second part concentrates on the redesign of Switzerland’s LOLR regime 
for the twenty-first century. Next, we discuss our main findings.  
 
The economic theory of bank regulation 
 
The first part of the dissertation sought to answer the first set of research questions raised in 
the introduction. 
 
 
 
To answer the first research question, we defined the terms ‘bank’ and ‘bank regulation’. 
Although ‘bank’ can be defined in a variety of ways in the economics literature, in relation to 
the financial intermediary theory that has dominated banking and regulatory policy since the 
1960s, a bank is understood as a financial intermediary that functions in the space between two 
different agents and provides the following four main bank functions: asset services, liability 
services, transformation services and payment services. However, the financial intermediation 
theory came under fire with the outbreak of the 2007–2009 financial crisis because the most 
widely used finance theories did not provide adequate descriptions of the banking system 
(Werner 2014). Therefore, we elaborated an alternative definition of the term ‘bank’ based on 
the theory of endogenous money in banking. In this sense, the decisive role of a bank is to 
provide two main functions: asset services, particularly loans, and payment services. Both 
views have advantages and disadvantages that have been debated in the literature. Overall, 
however, our position is that the decisive role of a bank lies in the provision of these two main 
functions of asset services and payment services as a result of endogenous money and credit for 
the following reasons: (1) ‘[W]hen households choose to save more money in bank accounts, 
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those deposits come simply at the expense of deposits that would have otherwise gone to 
companies in payment for goods and services. Saving does not by itself increase deposits or 
‘funds available’’ (McLeay et al. 2014: 15). (2) There is a misconception that 97 per cent of the 
circulation of money (bank deposits) comes from loans that depositors save at banks (McLeay 
et al. 2014). (3) Rochon and Rossi (2013: 212) clearly show ‘that money has always been 
endogenous’ in the history of banking. (4) ‘[T]he emission of money as means of payment is a 
credit-driven and demand-determined process, quite in line with the endogenous money 
literature’ (Rossi 2007: 35). (5) Regarding the principal of double-entry accounting, new loans 
are equal to new deposits. Finally, (6) money is not a stock (bank deposit), as it has been 
considered for more than 200 years, but rather a flow that occurs within payments issued via a 
credit operation (see Rossi 2007). However, if a reader were to base his/her decision on one 
concept, there would be implications to justify bank regulation with respect to the safety and 
soundness of bank services and the safety and soundness of the banking system. Nevertheless, 
before we describe implications in this regard, we require a clear definition of the term ‘bank 
regulation’.  
Although the term ‘regulation’ primarily has legal and not economic origins – and 
because the term used in this context frequently oscillates between ‘self-regulation’ and 
‘government regulation’ – it is difficult to define the term in an economic sense. Thus, we derive 
the term ‘regulation–bank regulation’ by drawing upon various definitions in the economics 
literature and the degree between self-regulation and government regulation. In this sense, bank 
regulation is understood to mean all government interventions that limit banks’ economic 
decision-making and activities by government laws, rules, or standards divorced from monetary 
policy, fiscal and structural policies, competition policy and other policies. With these 
considerations in mind, we described the economic rationale and objectives of bank regulation 
and answered our second research question. 
 
In the literature, the economic rationale for bank regulation is based upon economic 
regulation theories, which can be classified based on the positive and normative approaches to 
regulation. The positive approach involves economic explanations and impact analyses of 
regulation. This approach focuses on private interest theory, which can be divided into capture 
theory, the economic theory of regulation, the theory of bureaucracy and the public financing 
approach. Next, we briefly describe these theories and apply them in the banking sector. The 
normative approach aims to justify regulation by focusing on market failure; this approach 
contains public interest theory, also known as market failure theory. In this dissertation, the 
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focus was on public interest theory because it contains both first- and second-best solutions. 
Moreover, there is at least one cause for bank regulation that is in the public interest, allowing 
us to justify bank regulation for different reasons (see Goodhart et al. 1998). According to 
market failure theory, banks are subject to regulation because they are characterised by 
asymmetric information and externalities. The former source of market failure is primarily a 
phenomenon of ‘adverse selection’ and ‘moral hazard’. To describe the problem of asymmetric 
information, we used the dual principal-agent relationship by inserting the bank between the 
lender and the borrower. Moreover, we extended the dual principal-agent relationship using the 
theory of financial intermediation and delegated monitoring developed by Diamond (1984) to 
explain the role of the bank regarding the asymmetric information problem. In this sense, 
Diamond (1984) formally showed that the problem of asymmetric information can be 
eliminated. However, the model has limitations in practice, and bank regulation is therefore 
required. Another justification for regulatory interventions in the banking sector involves 
externalities. In this sense, the failure of an SIB or of numerous small and medium-size banks 
can lead to macroeconomic externalities (such as spillover effects into the real economy, 
disruptions in the payment system or systemic bank runs) (see Calomiris 1999). Consequently, 
externalities justify bank regulatory measures in the banking sector. 
In the literature, bank regulation can also be explained by the objective of securing banking 
regulation. However, the difficulty with that framework is that there is no consensus in 
academia regarding the objective of bank regulation, and the financial crisis of 2007–2009 has 
led to heated debate regarding the usefulness of the micro-based approach. Therefore, to fill 
this gap in the literature, we extended the micro-based approach with a macro-based approach 
and classified the objectives. The micro-based approach contains all the objectives meant to 
limit the risk of episodes of financial distress at individual banks (namely, idiosyncratic risk) 
by emphasising the behaviour of individual agents. Conversely, the macro-based approach 
focuses on limiting episodes of system-wide distress (namely, systemic risk) that represent 
significant costs to the economy as a whole. In light of these criteria, the micro-based approach 
contains two regulatory objectives, that is, consumer protection and the safety and soundness 
of banks (which is based upon the safety and soundness of bank services, macroeconomic 
externalities and bank runs). Conversely, the macro-based approach focuses on the safety and 
soundness of the banking system and monetary control. Further, we described in detail the 
regulatory objectives used as the rationale for bank regulation. However, although we extend 
the micro-based approach with a macro-based approach in the most recent financial crisis, 
various economists have questioned these widely used finance theories. Given these 
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considerations, we elaborate an alternative bank regulatory view based upon the endogenous 
nature of money and credit. This view offers an alternative justification for bank regulation 
regarding the safety and soundness of bank services. In this sense, bank regulation emerged to 
address failures in two bank activities, asset services and the payment system, whereas in 
financial intermediation theory, market failures were related to asset services, liability services, 
transformation services and payment services. If bank regulation is justified by the alternative 
view, then regulatory measures should mitigate bank failure concerning asset services and 
payment services, particularly asset services. In this context, regulation would be justified in 
the lending process (for example, stronger requirements for the assessment of a borrower or 
higher capital requirements for house buyers). Moreover, we present an alternative justification 
with respect to the safety and soundness of the banking system. In this context, we note that a 
stable banking system changes the period of the financing regime into an unstable system (see 
Minsky 1977). Therefore, bank regulation should focus on mitigating the risk in the three 
financing forms, specifically when speculative financing turns into Ponzi financing. In this 
sense, bank regulations such as the leverage ratio or minimum requirements for a rollover of 
liabilities would be desirable to mitigate the risk of a stable banking system turning into an 
unstable banking system. 
An economic theory of bank regulation requires a clear systematisation of regulatory 
measures to perform an effective and systematic impact assessment. Although various studies 
(such as Burghof and Rudolph 1996, Bernet 2003) have provided myriad criteria, the literature 
has not identified a conclusive classification scheme for bank regulations. Therefore, to fill this 
gap in the literature and to answer our third research question, we propose an alternative 
systematisation based on the following five criteria to better categorise bank regulations: 
‘regulatory policy’; the ‘timing of intervention’ related to prudential and protective regulation; 
the ‘micro versus macro regulation’ level of governance; the predictability of the ‘discretionary 
versus institutional approach’; and an evaluation of the standard ‘qualitative versus quantitative 
approach’. Employing this systematisation scheme, we classified the most common regulatory 
measures, including capital requirements, liquidity requirements, failed bank recovery and 
resolution standards, and so forth. Moreover, we briefly analysed and proposed policy options 
for capital requirements, liquidity requirements and recovery and resolution standards because 
of their relevance to the regulatory debate. These policy options are summarised in the main 
reform proposal. 
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Furthermore, we designed an alternative regulatory proposal oriented towards the source of the 
market failure that characterised the 2007–2009 financial crisis. In this regard, we proposed the 
following: (1) removing and modifying fuzzy regulatory measures; (2) implementing 
transparency measures for SPVs; (3) regulating or setting general principles for securitisations; 
and (4) setting 20 to 30 per cent harmonised capital requirements for house buyers. All policy 
options are summarised in the alternative reform proposal. 
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Redesign of Switzerland’s lender of last resort 
 
The second part of the dissertation answered the following research questions: 
  
 
 
To design a Swiss LOLR regime, we first had to define and understand the concept of 
the LOLR. Although the term ‘LOLR’ had been defined in numerous ways in the literature and 
had taken on different meanings, we defined ‘LOLR’ by utilising the following insights: The 
LOLR is an institution from whom all borrowers – particularly, solvent but illiquid banks – can 
obtain liquidity assistance in an emergency, freely but at an interest rate, against good collateral. 
Moreover, the role of the LOLR can be undertaken by various institutions, including central 
banks, governments and even international authorities. Furthermore, we attempt to classify the 
LOLR in the regulatory literature. Although the LOLR is typically considered as a protective 
regulatory instrument, there is no clear systematisation available. Therefore, to fill this gap in 
the literature, we used the systematisation scheme developed in the first part of this dissertation 
and classified the LOLR with respect to our regulatory criteria. In this sense, the LOLR is a 
monetary-regulatory, macro-protective, institutional and qualitative safety-net policy. 
With these criteria in mind, we considered the different schools of thought that helped 
us to elucidate the concept of the LOLR and that had been further used to design the LOLR. 
The recent literature includes four LOLR schools of thought: (1) the free banking view that 
abolishes the LOLR; (2) the ‘classic Bagehot view’ that the LOLR should provide emergency 
assistance to all solvent but illiquid institutions against good collateral at a very high interest 
rate; (3) the Goodfriend and King view that abolishes direct lending and proposes to provide 
emergency assistance by means of the market; and (4) the Goodhart view (which is also 
espoused by and associated with other authors) that proposes lending to any solvent or 
temporarily insolvent bank when necessary to sustain financial stability. For an improved 
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overview, we systematise the four different views into four different schools of thought: the 
free banking school, the ancient school, the classical school and the contemporary school. In 
this manner, we introduced two new LOLR schools of thought, namely, the Tiberian view, in 
which the LOLR can be traced back to the Roman Empire under the Emperor Tiberius Julius 
Caesar Augustus (14 to 37 A.D.), and the alternative view, which draws upon the endogenous 
nature of money and posits that the LOLR is created based on demand. In this sense, the central 
bank acts as the LOLR and must ensure the safety and soundness of the banking system as its 
unlimited source of high-powered money. In this manner, the LOLR provides direct assistance 
to solvent and temporarily insolvent but illiquid banks against good collateral. To analyse the 
different LOLR schools of thoughts, we develop an LOLR analysis scheme based on the type 
of objective, the type of institution, limited or unlimited liquidity sources, the ELA mechanism, 
and ELA conditions. 
 
To answer our question as to why an LOLR is necessary in Switzerland, we had to 
understand the evolution of the SNB, which is closely linked with the political evolution of 
Switzerland. However, the recent literature lacks a thorough historical analysis regarding the 
Swiss LOLR. Therefore, we elaborated a historical analysis of the LOLR spanning from 1826 
to 2016 that illuminates and reveals the nature of the Swiss LOLR. The SNB was founded in 
1907, and it was assumed that in a bank failure that threatened the financial system, the SNB 
should act as the LOLR and provide ELA. Thus, from 1907 until 2004, the SNB followed a 
constructive ambivalence strategy, operating as the LOLR in cases of financial distress 
depending on an analysis regarding whether a crisis-stricken bank should receive ELA or not. 
Although the first systemic analysis of the LOLR was provided by Henry Thornton in 1802 and 
extended by Walter Bagehot in 1873, the SNB was a slow learner regarding the LOLR concept. 
Several financial crises occurred before the SNB finally rethought the role of the LOLR. In this 
sense, the Swiss real estate crisis in the 1990s played a decisive role that set the ball rolling 
towards a constructive clarity approach, an explicit commitment by the SNB to act as the LOLR 
in situations of financial distress under certain conditions. With the revision of the NBA in 
2004, the SNB changed the Swiss LOLR strategy to a constructive clarity strategy under which 
the SNB acts as the LOLR in the following three conditions (see cif. 6 SNB 2015c):    
 
(1) ‘The bank or group of banks seeking credit must be of importance for the stability of the 
financial system. 
(2) The bank seeking credit must be solvent. 
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(3) The liquidity assistance must be fully covered by sufficient collateral at all times. The SNB 
determines what collateral is sufficient. 
To assess the solvency of a bank or group of banks, the SNB obtains an opinion from FINMA’ 
(SNB 2015c: 6) 
 
Based on these conditions, we empirically analyse the Swiss LOLR during the UBS crisis of 
2007–2009 to design a potential Swiss LOLR regime for the twenty-first century. Thereby, we 
ask ourselves whether UBS fulfilled the applicable conditions of the Swiss LOLR. To 
understand the UBS crisis, we provided a chronological overview that included for the first 
time in the literature all the involved parties, that is, UBS, the SFBC/FINMA, the SNB and the 
Swiss Confederation. In our second step, we answered the question posed above. In relation to 
our economic analysis, we concluded that UBS was systemically important, solvent and held 
sufficient collateral, although the last condition remained partially open because the SNB 
granted ELA against collateral of questionable value, that is, sub-prime- related mortgages. 
Nevertheless, the major challenge was to determine the solvency of the bank. For this purpose, 
we designed a framework to assess solvency. This solvency framework, which is based on 
various solvency tests, (1) assists in better knowing the applicant; (2) can be used as an early 
warning system for central banks or for OMOs in ‘normal’ non-crisis times to assess the 
solvency of banks in the financial sector; and (3) can be extended to other areas, such as 
assessing the solvency of asset managers and/or insurance companies. 
 
In light of our analysis and its elaborated principles, we redesigned the conditions of the LOLR 
as follows: (1) the LOLR should lend only against good collateral to solvent and illiquid or 
temporarily insolvent banks; (2) it should lend at a risk premium; and (3) it should lend freely 
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in times of financial distress. In addition to these three principles, we can add the following 
fourteen principles: 
 
(1) The LOLR is non-operational. 
(2) In times of financial distress, the central bank should primarily act as the MMLR and, if 
required, as the LOLR. 
(3) ELA from the LOLR is endogenous and created based on demand.  
(4) The Swiss LOLR’s main objective is to ensure financial stability. 
(5) The Swiss LOLR requires various MoUs with different central banks and regulatory 
authorities. 
(6) The Swiss LOLR should be based on a systemic cost-benefit analysis.  
(7) The Swiss LOLR should be based on a broad, explicit, and transparent fiscal carve-out 
condition. 
(8) The SNB can create unlimited domestic and foreign high-powered money when a systemic 
crisis occurs. 
(9) The Swiss LOLR should be extended to systemically important NBFIs under a constructive 
ambivalence strategy. 
(10)  The Swiss LOLR requires a clear solvency framework as part of a cost-benefit 
analysis. 
(11) To improve monetary policy operations and LOLR operations, the SNB should assess 
the solvency of SIBs. 
(12) The function of the Swiss LOLR makes it a de facto monitor of high-quality liquid assets 
and of systemically significant markets (see Tucker 2014). 
(13) The Swiss Confederation should be excluded from liquidity support. 
(14) Fundamentally insolvent financial institutions should be allowed to enter into debt 
resolution or liquidation/bankruptcy (see Tucker 2014). 
 
These principles and the redesign of the Swiss LOLR answered the remaining questions that 
were initially raised, in particular whether the LOLR should provide liquidity assistance via 
OMOs depending on the severity of the financial crises. In certain crises, an MMLR would be 
sufficient, whereas in other financial crises, a combined MMLR and LOLR might be required. 
In addition, the LOLR should provide liquidity assistance to NBFIs that are systemically 
important, and the Swiss LOLR should provide liquidity assistance against good collateral. We 
qualitatively evaluated the LOLR and concluded that the Swiss LOLR regime for the twenty-
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first century will be more effective, timely, sustainable and credible than the current regime, 
although the evaluation was limited because it did not embark upon a quantitative assessment 
and the assessment was based on the authors’ own evaluation. Nevertheless, the outlined regime 
could be a possible substantive LOLR regime for the SNB and could be helpful to other central 
banks in analysing and redesigning their own LOLR function.  
 
Outlook 
 
The research in this thesis presents numerous opportunities to extend its scope and makes 
further academic research desirable. Next, we present the main research topics that are most 
fertile for future investigation. 
 Based on the economic theory of bank regulation, it would be desirable to research the 
following: (1) the effects of bank regulation on the banking sector in greater detail because there 
is little theoretical or empirical research in the literature on the impact of bank regulation, 
particularly with respect to liquidity requirements and recovery and resolution standards; (2) 
the effects of an alternative regulatory proposal, which, in this context, should be based on a 
systematic impact assessment before (and not after) regulations such as the Basel Accord or the 
Dodd-Frank Act were implemented; and (3) the risk feedback loop in connection with the FIH 
because the enhancement of hedge financing, speculative financing and Ponzi financing in the 
risk feedback loop has not yet been proven and verified. 
 In relation to redesigning Switzerland’s LOLR regime for the twenty-first century, it 
would be desirable to examine the following: (1) the quantitative effects of Switzerland’s LOLR 
regime for the twenty-first century; (2) the LOLR regime in greater detail for other central 
banks, extending these details with the principals elaborated, including providing a comparison 
of different LOLRs, such as LOLRs in Switzerland, Europe, the United Kingdom and the 
United States; and (3) the solvency framework, in this case to build a base on the solvency test 
variables for an empirical analysis to investigate whether the financial crisis of 2007–2009 was 
more of a solvency crisis than a liquidity crisis.  
Appendix   256 
 
 
 
Appendix 
 
1. UBS financial group structure  
 
Figure A.1 shows the UBS financial group structure as of December 31, 2014. According to 
the legal structure, the UBS Group AG is a stock corporation and the ultimate parent company 
of the UBS Group. 
 
Figure A.1 Financial group structure of the UBS Group AG 
 
Source: Adapted from UBS (2014). 
 
During 2014, the UBS Group AG, as the holding company of the UBS Group, was established 
in response to evolving ‘too big to fail’ requirements to improve resolvability and support 
businesses with efficient legal, tax and funding services (such as credit, loans and investments) 
(see UBS 2014a). In other words, the UBS Group AG acts as a financial holding company for 
the UBS AG (it is 96.68 per cent owned by the UBS Group AG).257 The UBS AG shifts out 
risks, issues credit and provides capital to its subsidiaries, namely, UBS Americas Inc., UBS 
Limited in the United Kingdom, UBS Switzerland AG and 30 other subsidiaries (owned 100 
per cent by UBS AG). In the United States, the bank provides services under UBS Americas 
Inc., which is divided into three subsidiaries: UBS Bank USA (owned 100 per cent by UBS 
America Inc.), UBS Financial Services Inc. (owned 100 per cent by UBS America Inc.) and 
UBS Securities LLC. (owned 70 per cent by UBS America Inc. and 30 per cent by UBS Group 
                                                          
257 The residual 3.32 per cent is owned by other shareholders of UBS AG. 
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AG) (see UBS 2014). According to the new financial group structure, the UBS AG does not 
classify the other 30 subsidiaries with regard to geographical structure. The UBS AG considers 
the other 30 subsidiaries to be not individually significant because of the contribution of the 
group’s total assets and aggregated profit before tax thresholds and because they are not 
systemically important to winding down the UBS AG in a financial distress situation. In other 
words, under recovery and resolution standards (living will), subsidiaries play a subordinate 
role. Nevertheless, regulatory authorities should pay attention to subsidiaries. The following 
example sheds light on the role of subsidiaries before the financial crisis of 2007–2009. One of 
the 30 subsidiaries is UBS Real Estate Securities Inc. (UBS RESI) (see Figure A.1). From 2002 
to 2007, UBS RESI was involved in the US residential mortgage market. UBS RESI acquired 
pools of residential sub-prime mortgage loans from originators, deposited them into 
securitisation trusts and subsequently converted them into ABSs or CDOs. UBS RESI was 
responsible for selling pools of loans acquired from originators to third-party purchasers. ‘These 
whole loan sales during the period 2004 through 2007 totaled approximately USD 19 million 
in original principal balance’ (UBS 2014a: 460). In this context, UBS RESI played an important 
role in the US sub-prime crises and in the contagion process of the entire banking system. 
 
2. The discount window 
 
The DW is a mechanism by which central banks allow banks to borrow short-term liquidity 
needs. In other words, banks take the initiative in the DW transactions. Consequently, the SNB 
takes a passive role in the transaction and accommodates the need for all short-liquidity with 
respect to the creditworthiness of the bank. Thus, DW ‘lending is the extension of credit, 
virtually always secured by collateral, from the central bank’ to financial institutions 
(Goodfriend and King 2009 [1988]: 149). The DW can be distinguished between ‘routine 
operation of the discount window for normal monetary purposes, often with formalized access, 
for example for short-term interest rate stabilization or to meet seasonal variations in liquidity 
demand, and emergency type measures for trouble banks’ (Baltensperger 1990: 10). 
The liquidity provision through the DW in normal times operated via standing facilities, 
which can be divided into intraday facilities and standing facilities for the liquidity-shortage 
financing facility. Next, we briefly expand on the concepts of intraday and overnight facilities. 
In 1999, the SNB introduced intraday liquidity, in which banks obtain interest-free liquidity 
during the day through repo transactions that must be settled ‘by the end of the same working 
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day at the latest’ (SNB 2015c: 3).258 The objective of an intraday facility is to facilitate the 
settlement of the payment and clearing system. In contrast to intraday facilities, the ‘liquidity-
shortage financing facility [overnight facility] [is] to bridge unexpected, short-term liquidity 
shortages. These mainly occur if expected payments are not received and the required funding 
cannot be obtained quickly enough on the interbank market’ (SNB 2015c: 2). Thus, overnight 
facilities are used to aid temporarily illiquid banks (Goodfriend and King 2009 [1988]). In an 
operational manner, the liquid short-term liquidity is provided to banks against ‘special-rate 
repo transactions and can be used until the next working day’ and is thus called ‘overnight 
facility’ (SNB 2015c: 3).259 The requirements for special-rate repo transactions are as follows: 
(1) granting of a limit by the SNB, (2) opening of an SNB custody cover account and (3) the 
provision of eligible collateral (such as asset-backed securities and so forth) that covers at least 
110 per cent of the limit at all times (see SNB 2015c). Moreover, ‘overnight facilities’ are 
closely linked with reserve requirements because at the end of a reporting period, the bank must 
meet the minimum reserve requirements (see Greenbaum and Thakor 2007 [1995], SNB 
2015c). However, an overnight facility is not only used in a shortage-liquidity situation but also 
in daily banking business. In this regard, Goodfriend and King (2009 [1988]: 147) indicated 
that ‘[t]he demand for line of credit services arises because [..] [banks] often need funds 
suddenly, as a result of unpredictable events. For example, a [..] [bank] may discover a 
potentially lucrative investment opportunity which must be seized quickly’. Although 
Goodfriend and King (2009 [1988]) indicated lucrative funding propositions via overnight 
loans, they neglected to note that funding decisions are also related to risks. Thus, we shed light 
on risk-taking investments with respect to an overnight loan.  First, financial institutions such 
as UBS, Credit Suisse and Goldman Sachs can obtain an overnight loan under a certain interest 
rate against good collateral, namely, HQLAs such as Greek government bonds or asset-backed 
securities. Second, the overnight loan can be used to fund risky investments via securitisation 
to receive a higher return on investment. Third, the high return on investment settles the 
overnight loan with the special rate. Thus, under a regulatory perspective, an overnight facility 
can be viewed as a risky funding activity. Consequently, overnight facilities are a potential 
source of market failure. In this context, regulators would argue in favour of regulating 
overnight facilities. One possible reform proposal is to allow overnight facility against a narrow 
class of eligible collateral (such as AAA government bonds) at a penalty rate to mitigate the 
                                                          
258 Moreover, intraday facilities are not included in the calculation of liquidity and minimum reserve requirements 
(see SNB 2015c). 
259 The special rate for liquidity shortage transactions is based on the Swiss average rate overnight (SARON) plus 
an interest premium (see SNB 2015c). 
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moral hazard risk. However, further research on the regulation of overnight facilities is needed 
because regulation can also harm the banking sector and can enhance regulatory arbitrage 
between different central banks. 
 
3. History of economic thought 
 
The history of economic thought provides an overview of the different schools of economic 
thought in the literature. Figure A.2 illustrates the history of economic thought. Modern 
orthodox economists are marked in blue, whereas modern heterodox economists are marked in 
cyan blue. As indicated in Figure A.2, there are more orthodox economists then heterodox 
economists, who dominate modern economic literature. In general, the history of economic 
thought can be divided into five periods: an early preclassical period from 800 B.C. to 1500, 
the preclassical era from 1500 to 1776, the classical economic era from 1776 to 1870, the 
neoclassical era from 1870 to 1930s, and the modern economic era from the 1930s until today 
(see Landreth and Colander 2002). Next, we briefly expand on the evolution of economic 
thought.  
 
The evolution of economic thought is influenced by the publications of important 
writers. In this context, the first economic analysis in Europe dates back to Hellenic thought 
under Hesiod, whose economic ideas are expressed in ‘Works and Days,’260 ca. 800 B.C.261 The 
main representatives of the early preclassical period include Plato (The Republic, ca. 400 B.C.), 
Aristotle (Politics, ca. 310 B.C.) and St. Thomas Aquinas (Summa Theologica, ca. 1273). After 
the early preclassical period, the preclassical era was characterised by different economic, social 
and political changes (for example, increased trade, the growth of cities, and the building of 
national identities and nation-states) (see Landreth and Colander 2002). This era can be divided 
into two time periods, namely, 1500 to 1750 (mercantilism) and the short period from 1750 to 
1776 (physiocracy). The era of mercantilism is characterised by numerous political and 
economic writers (such as the politician, diplomat, philosopher and humanist Niccolò 
Machiavelli), who wrote about politics, economics and so forth. Therefore, ‘it is difficult to 
generalize about the resulting literature’ because of the various writers active during this period 
(Landreth and Colander 2002: 46). Conversely, physiocrats are characterised primarily by 
French economists (see Francois Quesnay’s ‘Tableau Economique’ of 1758).  
                                                          
260 Hesiod analyses the nature of farmers in light of efficient production. 
261 The dates throughout this paragraph refer to specific publications. 
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In 1776, the preclassical era ended with the publication of Adam Smith’s ‘Wealth of Nations,’ 
which analyses the functioning of markets and price systems. The classical economic era, 
whose notable economists include Adam Smith (1776), David Ricardo (1817), John Stuart Mill 
(1848) and Karl Marx (1867), accounts for more than one hundred years of the history of 
economic thought. The classical economic era ended in the early 1870s as the classical market 
and price system came to be considered from a different angle, namely, a competitive static 
framework that determined relative prices, quantities of goods and so forth. In the early 1870s, 
three different economists, namely, W.S. Jevons (1871), Carl Menger (1871) and Léon Walras 
(1874), suggested that the price of a good depends upon the marginal utility of that good. In 
other words, marginal analysis, or the ‘marginal revolution,’ was the beginning of the era of 
neoclassical economic thought (see Bortis 2013). During this time, a second generation of 
economists, including Francis Y. Edgeworth (1881), Vilfredo Pareto (1897), Knut Wicksell 
(1898), Irving Fisher (1907), Joseph A. Schumpeter (1912) and Arthur C. Pigou (1932 [1920]), 
extended marginal analysis into different economic fields (for example, Pareto (1897) and 
Pigou (1932 [1920]) expanded marginal analysis into policy).262 Nevertheless, Alfred Marshall 
(1842-1924) is noted alongside Léon Walras as one of the major pioneers of neoclassical 
microeconomic theory. Marshall developed an analytical framework for supply and demand 
analysis. Furthermore, Marshall (1997 [1920]) formulated a clear concept of price elasticity in 
relation to demand theory. In contrast to Marshall (1997 [1920]), Walras (1874) modelled the 
general equilibrium system as a formal system. Consequently, neoclassical theory is 
characterised by the combination of the following assumptions: (1) rational behaviour; (2) 
utility maximisation; (3) emphasis on equilibrium or equilibria; (4) neglect of uncertainty; (5) 
flexible prices and market clearing; and (6) rational expectations. However, the neoclassical era 
is an ongoing era, and the date on which it becomes the modern economic era cannot be 
specified. Therefore, it is conceptually helpful to distinguish between the neoclassical era and 
the modern economic era because modern economics is broader than Marshallian supply and 
demand analysis or Walrasian general equilibrium theory. In addition, modern economics is 
confronted with multiple equilibria models and dynamic models. Modern economists also use 
various technical tools beyond marginal analysis (for example, econometrics and game theory). 
In other words, 
‘[m]odern economics cannot usefully be called neoclassical economics because the term 
neoclassical denotes certain ideas, approaches, and assumptions not characteristic of 
contemporary economic analysis, including marginalism, the assumption of global rationality, 
                                                          
262 Pareto and Pigou are also called the fathers of modern welfare economics (see Landreth and Colander 2002). 
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the belief in marginal-productivity theory, Walrasian general equilibrium theory, Marshallian 
supply-and-demand analysis, and a belief in laissez faire. All of these concepts have played 
central roles in economics at various times during the past 130 years, and they are what should 
come to mind when you hear the term “neoclassical economics’ (Landreth and Colander 2002: 
395). In addition,   
 
(5) ‘[t]he inability of neoclassical theory to properly explain the formation of the fundamental prices prevailing in 
modern monetary production economy, the prices of production to wit, through the mechanism of supply and 
demand and to cope with the deep depression of the 1930s initiated a classical-Keynesian counterrevolution’ 
(Bortis 2013: 5).  
 
Therefore, we conceptually distinguish the neoclassical era from the modern era with the 
publication of John Maynard Keynes’ The General Theory (1936). Other major representative 
works of modern economics include John Hicks (1967 [1937]); Paul A. Samuelson’s 
Interaction between the Multiplier Analysis and the Principle of Acceleration (1939) and 
Foundations of Economic Analysis (1947); Kenneth Arrow’s Social Choice and Individual 
Values (1951); Milton Friedman’s Studies in the Quantity Theory of Money (1956); Robert 
Solow’s A Contribution to the Theory of Growth (1956); Gerard Debreu’s Theory of Value and 
Axiomatic Analysis of Economic Equilibrium (1959); and Robert E. Lucas Jr.’s Studies in 
Business-Cycle Theory (1981). Moreover, the literature of modern economics can be divided 
into modern orthodox economics and modern heterodox economics. The former can be divided 
into new-Keynesians, monetarists, financial intermediary theorists and so forth. Heterodox 
economists can be divided into radicals, old American institutionalists, post-Keynesian, public 
choice and neo-Austrians (see Landreth and Colander 2002). In this context, Landreth and 
Colander (2002: 6) indicated that the differences between orthodox and heterodox economists 
are often ‘not diametrically opposed theories’ because  
 
‘modern orthodox theorists have largely focused on the four problems of allocation, distribution, stability, and 
growth, heterodox economists have studied the forces that produce changes in the society and economy. Whereas 
orthodox writers have taken as given (something they are not interested in explaining) the specific social, political, 
and economic institutions and have studied economic behavior in the context of these institutions, heterodox 
writers have focused on the forces leading to the development of these institutions. Often what orthodox writers 
take as given, heterodox writers try to explain; and what heterodox writers take as given, orthodox economists try 
to explain (Landreth and Colander 2002: 6). 
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4. Countercyclical capital buffer 
 
The global financial crisis involved leverage cycles in which the ‘rise in asset prices that 
accompanied the credit boom resulted in higher capital buffers at financial institutions’ 
(Mishkin 2013: 453), which led to higher asset prices and other consequences. As a response, 
the BCBS stated that the spectrum for bank ‘regulatory capital ranges from reducing its cyclical 
risk sensitivity to deliberately introducing elements’ of a CCB that draw upon the reserve 
concept of Bagehot (2005 [1920]) (Borio 2009: 37). Bagehot (2005 [1920]: 41) indicated that 
‘[a] good banker will have accumulated in ordinary times the reserve he is to make use of in 
extraordinary times [(financial distress situation)]’. Likewise, the CCB has the objective to 
protect the banking system against potential future (prudential measure) losses (see BCBS 
2010a, BCBS 2010b, BCBS 2011b, BCBS 2012). Thus, the primary advantage of the CCB is 
that it can be activated to increase the resiliency of the system to an entire range of shocks in 
the banking system. However, the countercyclical capital requirements should be stringent in 
times of credit booms and vice versa. During boom phases, an equity capital buffer should be 
built to cover losses during downturns and to guarantee credit (see Brunnermeier 2009a, BCBS 
2010a, 2010b, IMF 2011). Therefore, the buffer increases or decreases over time within the 
range of zero to 2.5 per cent of risk-weighted assets as a consequence of the credit-to-GDP 
ratio. In 2010, the BCBS published guidance for national authorities to build the CCB. 
Nevertheless, the CCB can be criticised for the follow reasons: it is difficult to calculate credit 
because the data vary across jurisdictions, and the credit-to-GDP gap is drawn from an 
economic forecast. In this context, can supervisory authorities predict business cycles? In 
Switzerland, the SNB activates, adjusts and deactivates the CCB, whereas the FINMA 
supervises and implements the CCB in the banking sector (see SNB 2014). Thus, the CCB is 
primarily a central bank regulation. However, we are very sceptical that the SNB is able to 
predict business cycles. Similarly, Geiger (2010) indicated that if the SNB and other central 
banks have the wisdom to predict the future, it still remains elusive. Therefore, additional 
objective research is needed to design a central bank regulatory measure.  
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5. Transparency measures 
 
Transparency regulation lies at the core of many bank regulatory policies because it protects 
consumers, ensures the integrity of the banking industry and minimises the problem of 
asymmetric information (see Lorez 2013). According to Lorez (2013: 14), transparency 
regulation is composed of three elements: ‘a constant information flow of issues, disclosure of 
material interests in financial assets, and pre- and post-trade publicity of trades’. In 
consideration of these characteristics, we refer to all regulatory measures that disclose 
information as ‘transparency regulation’. Thus, transparency regulation has the advantage that 
(1) it is not a heavy-intervention measure because it does not regulate the banking process 
(going concern), the level of output allowed, prices charged or the allocation of bank services; 
(2) it prohibits the supply of false or misleading information and may require mandatory 
disclosure, perhaps obliging suppliers to provide information to consumers on price, 
composition, quantity, or quality; and (3)  it allows customers ‘of products and services [...] to 
make decisions on the acceptability of the processes employed in producing those products or 
services’ (Baldwin and Cave 1999: 49).  
One example of transparency regulation is the automatic exchange of information 
(AEoI) for the banking sector based on the G20 working group on development (OECD 2012). 
The AEoI is a regular, periodic (for example, annual) transmission of tax information regarding 
non-resident persons sent by the jurisdiction in which income or assets are located to the 
jurisdiction in which the individuals may owe tax. 
Nevertheless, transparency measures can be criticised on several grounds. First, 
reporting practices in banking vary across banks and countries (see Ayadi et al. 2012); therefore, 
harmonised regulation such as the AEoI extends in the right direction. Second, anticipating the 
user of the information disclosed (customers, pension funds and so forth) is complex because, 
for example, customers may fail to use the information properly, fail to understand the 
implications of the data given, neglect to collect the full range of relevant information, or lack 
the resources to research issues fully. Moreover, transparency regulation based on misleading 
information increases the cost for information-based regulatory authorities to evaluate 
information. In this context, the US program in Switzerland creates enormous costs (consulting 
and lawyer costs) for banks and regulatory authorities, whereas the benefit is questionable.   
Nonetheless, a hypothesis can be formulated and an argument made against the 
reasoning of transparency regulation. Based on transparency, the following alternative 
hypothesis can be formulated: improving the transparency of financial services can lead to 
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welfare losses in the capital market, at least to a certain degree. In this regard, we assume that 
improving the availability of information regarding financial services influences the behaviour 
of market participants such that it reduces the volume of investment in the capital markets and 
thus generates a certain degree of welfare loss for the economy. Notably, this hypothesis has 
not yet been proven and verified and thus requires further analysis. 
Conversely, the Anglo-Saxon literature frequently presents the argument of incentive-
compatible bank contracts. It is suggested that depositors can choose between different 
transparent and risk-free investment opportunities, and it is the task of the bank and not of the 
government to reduce information asymmetry between buyers and sellers (see Bryant 1980, 
Diamond 1984, Dewatripont and Tirole 1994, see section 2.1.2). For this reason, incentive-
compatible contracts will better protect depositors from the opportunistic behaviour of better-
informed and more skilled intermediaries, which is why transparency measures are 
unnecessary. 
 
6. Deposit insurance 
 
‘Deposit insurance’ is not discrete in nature; instead, it is the subject of a firm contractual 
agreement and is ‘granted for sure’. Accordingly, ‘small depositors’ in particular are to be 
protected in the event of a bank run and any resulting insolvency-related ‘protective regulation’, 
and the functionality and safety and soundness of the banking system should be secured during 
periods of acute or imminent insolvency and contagion effects (see Diamond and Dybvig 1983, 
Baltensperger and Dermine 1987, Dewatripont and Tirole 1994, Calomiris 1999). The majority 
of OECD countries use an approach that includes deposit insurance. Such an approach may be 
official (for example, the United Kingdom and the United States), may be organised by the 
banking industry itself with encouragement from authorities (for example, Switzerland263 and 
France) or may be jointly administered by authorities and banks (for example, Japan) (see Dale 
1984, Dewatripont and Tirole 1994). We pose the question regarding how to structure deposit 
insurance because doing so presents the government with a unique set of challenges (see also 
Calomiris 1999). Thus, deposit insurance can assume a variety of forms. We have expanded the 
four dimensions presented by Baltensperger and Dermine (1987) by adding three dimensions 
pursuant to Calomiris (1999) and Diamond and Dybvig (1983) (provisions by the government 
or by private organisations, effects on procyclicality and political economy constraints): 
                                                          
263 In Switzerland, deposit insurance is self-regulated (see Art. 37h of the BA 2015 [1934]). The depositor is 
protected to a maximum amount of CHF 100,000 (see Art. 37a para. 1 of the BA 2015 [1934]). 
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(1) Fee structure (flat fee versus risk-related fee),  
(2) Degree of coverage (full264 versus partial coverage),  
(3) Funding provisions (funded versus unfunded systems), 
(4) Provision by the government or by private organisations, 
(5) Compulsory versus voluntary participation, 
(6) Effects on procyclicality or countercyclicality and 
(7) Political economy as a policy constraint.  
 
Various forms of deposit insurance can be created based on the particular selection of 
dimensions, yielding various advantages and disadvantages. From an economic perspective, 
developing a safety and soundness system that is as efficient as possible for depositors and 
banks and that has the ability to obtain an optimal allocation of resources is important. Thus, a 
safety system that protects depositors by preventing bank failures and maintaining inefficient 
banks should be avoided (Meltzer 1967). For example, if the coverage is 100 per cent, then a 
moral hazard emerges. Banks may be induced to take on riskier business because their capital 
is fully covered (see also Llewellyn 1999). For that reason, Calomiris (1999: 1500) suggests 
that deposit insurance ‘must be designed to maximize welfare subject to both economic and 
political constraints’. However, Llewellyn (1999: 29) finds that most types of deposit insurance 
lead to the following four moral hazards:  
 
• Consumers may be less careful in the selection of banks (that is, seek higher-risk banks 
because they receive higher interest rates); 
• ‘The bank takes on more risky business because depositors are protected; 
• Risk is subsidised, because depositors do not demand an appropriate risk premium in their 
deposit interest rates; and 
• The existence of deposit insurance may induce banks to hold lower capital’. 
 
In addition to Llewellyn (1999), Greenbaum and Thakor (2007 [1995]) carefully investigate the 
problem of moral hazard related to deposit insurance (see also Fischel et al. 1987). Greenbaum 
and Thakor (2007 [1995]) conclude that a risk-related fee can reduce moral hazard (see section 
7.2), whereas Greenbaum and Tahkor (2007 [1995]) advocate a combination of prudential 
measures and deposit insurance described as ‘optimal’ regulation in the Anglo-Saxon literature. 
                                                          
264 For example Mexican banks have full deposit insurance and have no forced accounting standards or capital 
requirements (see Calomiris 1999). 
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7. Accounting standards: Swiss GAAP FER versus IFRS 
 
Accounting standards are defined as prudential standards that contain accounting and public 
disclosures and that are based on internal and external accounting principles and rules such that 
‘the information submitted by banks is of a comparable nature and its meaning is clear’ (BCBS 
1997: 36). Therefore, a supervisory agency provides reporting instructions for banks to clearly 
establish accounting standards to ensure that the information submitted by those banks is 
comparable (see Bernet 2003, Meyer 2006). In other words, the aim of accounting standards is 
to analyse and publish company information to ensure transparency in banks' information (fair 
presentation/true and fair value) and to improve both the elements of consumer protection and 
the safety and soundness of banks (see Art. 6a para. 1 of the BA 2015 [1934]; see also Meyer 
2006). Thus, for every business year, banks must prepare a business report that consists of the 
annual financial statement, the management report and the group financial statement (see Art. 
6 para. 1 letters. a-c of the BA 2015 [1934]). In principle, each Swiss bank can determine 
whether to voluntarily use the national accounting standards of the Swiss GAAP 
‘Fachkommision Empfehlung zur Rechnungslegung’ (FER) (accounting recommendation) or 
to use an international standard (most commonly, the International Financial Reporting 
Standards (IFRS) or the United States’ generally accepted accounting principles (US GAAP)). 
However, this judgement and policy discretion is limited to financial reporting once the bank 
chooses to be quoted on the Swiss Infrastructure and Exchange (SIX). The majority of banks 
quoted on the SIX must comply with either the IFRS or the US GAAP. The IFRS (fair 
presentation/true and fair view value) primarily focuses on banks that provide information in 
the foreground (consumer protection). Conversely, banks that are quoted on an American stock 
market and use an audit certificate in the US must comply with US GAAP (fair presentation) 
(see Meyer 2006). In Switzerland, for example, the consolidated UBS financial statement has 
been prepared with respect to the IFRS, Swiss GAAP FER and supplemental disclosures 
required for the US SEC (see UBS 2015).265 Figure A.3 illustrates a simplified UBS balance 
sheet for the year ending on 31 December 2014 in accordance with the Swiss GAAP FER 
standards (left) and the IFRS (right). Table A.1 presents the detailed figures of the Swiss GAAP 
FER and IFRS. According to the available data of the UBS AG Annual Report 2014, the total 
assets under the Swiss GAAP FER are valued at CHF 777,893 million. The total assets are the 
sum of CHF 95,711 million in reserves (12 per cent of the total assets), CHF 451,146 million 
                                                          
265 The UBS Group has prepared a reconciliation of IFRS shareholders’ equity and net profit to the US GAAP. 
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in loans (58 per cent of the total assets) and CHF 231,036 million in other trading portfolios 
and other assets (30 per cent of the total assets).  
 
Figure A.3 UBS balance sheet, 31 December, 2014, in accordance with the IFRS and 
Swiss GAAP FER 
 
Source: Authors’ own elaboration based on UBS (2015). 
 
The liabilities are valued as the sum of CHF 402,488 million in deposits (52 per cent of the total 
liabilities), CHF 333,029 million in other debts (43 per cent of the total liabilities) and CHF 
42,376 million in equity (five per cent equity-to-assets ratio). In accordance with the IFRS, the 
total assets are valued at CHF 1,062,478 million, which is an increase of CHF 284,585 million 
assets compared to the Swiss GAAP FER. Moreover, the total assets are valued as the sum of 
CHF 104,073 million in reserves (cash and balances with central banks; 10 per cent of the total 
assets), CHF 315,757 million in loans (30 per cent of the total assets), and CHF 642,648 million 
in trading portfolios and other assets (60 per cent of the total assets). The liability side contains 
CHF 410,207 million in deposits (39 per cent of the total liabilities), CHF 597,903 million in 
other debts (56 per cent of the total liabilities) and CHF 54,368 million in equity (five per cent 
equity-to-assets ratio equal under the Swiss GAAP FER). 
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Table A.1 UBS Financial Statement with respect to the Swiss GAAP FER and IFRS 
 
Source: Authors’ own elaboration based on UBS (2015). 
 
Both accounting standards have certain similarities regarding the value of the reserve 
and equity positions. Reserves under the Swiss GAAP FER (12 per cent of the total assets) and 
under the IFRS (10 per cent of the total assets) are approximately equal. The same applies for 
total equity (under the Swiss GAAP FER and IFRS, five per cent equity ratio). Therefore, the 
main differences are in the following areas: (1) loans; (2) trading portfolios and other assets; 
(3) deposits; and (4) other debt. The question arises regarding how different standards explain 
such a high discrepancy.  
The difference between the Swiss GAAP FER and the IFRS can be primarily explained 
using the following three arguments:266 (1) under the IFRS, all entities controlled by the UBS 
Group AG (see Figure A.1 in the Appendix 1) are consolidated, whereas under the Swiss 
GAAP, only entities that are active are consolidated; (2) under the IFRS, financial investments 
are valued under fair value (which means that ‘the price that would be received for the sale of 
an asset or paid to transfer a liability in an orderly transaction between market participants in 
the principal market […] as of the measurement date’ (UBS 2015: 469)), whereas under the 
Swiss GAAP FER, the systematisation and measurement is determined by the funding; and (3) 
under the IFRS, the fair value applies only to certain non-trading financial assets and liabilities, 
whereas for the Swiss GAAP FER, the fair value applies only to structured products (see UBS 
2015). 
 
                                                          
266 In addition, there are discrepancies between the Swiss GAAP FER and IFRS in cash flow hedges, goodwill and 
intangible assets, pension and other post-employment benefit plans, netting of replacement values, extraordinary 
income and expense and other presentational differences (see UBS 2015). 
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